District of Columbia Department of Human Services, DAB No. 1426 (1993)

  Department of Health and Human Services

        DEPARTMENTAL APPEALS BOARD

     Appellate Division


SUBJECT:        District of Columbia         DATE:  July 21, 1993
     Department of Human Services Docket No.
   A-93-88 Decision No. 1426

   DECISION

The District of Columbia Department of Human Services (DC) appealed a
penalty imposed by the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) on
November 30, 1992, pursuant to title IV-D of the Social Security Act
(Act).  An audit by OCSE of DC's operation of its child support
enforcement and paternity establishment program for the period January 1
through December 31, 1990, resulted in a finding that DC had failed to
achieve substantial compliance with the requirements of title IV-D,
specifically, that DC had failed to take action on at least 75% of cases
requiring establishment of paternity.  Since this was the third
consecutive finding of failure to meet this requirement, the penalty
imposed was a three percent reduction, $1,875,547, of the amount
otherwise payable to DC under title IV-A of the Act.  See section
403(h)(1)(c) of the Act.

Based on the reasoning below, we sustain OCSE's imposition of the
penalty.

Background

Every state that participates in the cooperative federal-state program
for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) pursuant to title
IV-A of the Act is required to have a child support enforcement and
paternity establishment program pursuant to title IV-D of the Act.
Section 402(a)(27).  The IV-D program was created to provide child
support and paternity establishment services for both AFDC and non-AFDC
families.  Regulations implementing title IV-D require states to submit
and follow a plan for locating absent parents, establishing paternity
where necessary, obtaining child and spousal support, and enforcing
child support obligations of absent parents.  45 C.F.R. Part 302.  DC is
a "state" for purposes of Title IV of the Act.  Section 1101(a)(1) of
the Act.  The Act requires OCSE to audit participating states at various
intervals to determine whether each state is "complying substantially"
with program requirements.  For performance criteria such as the
establishment of paternity criterion of 45 C.F.R. . 305.24(c), the
regulations define substantial compliance as taking appropriate action
in 75% of cases requiring such action.  45 C.F.R. . 305.20(d) and
(a)(2).

OCSE issued an action transmittal on May 5, 1988 (OCSE-AT-88-7) which
provided details regarding the standard its auditors would use in
evaluating cases for the establishment of paternity criterion beginning
with audits conducted for FY 1988.  In relevant part, the action
transmittal provided that --

 . . . the substantial compliance standard to be applied to State
 and local efforts to establish paternity will be based on the
 actual establishment of paternity and/or a support order or
 initiation of legal action to establish paternity and obtain a
 support order during the audit period in at least 75 percent of
 the cases reviewed requiring those services when, at the
 beginning of the audit period:  (1) The absent parent has been
 located; and (2) Both the establishment of paternity and a
 support order are necessary.  The standard does not apply in
 cases needing a support order if paternity has been established.

AT-88-7 (DC exhibit (ex.) B) at 1-2.

OCSE conducted an annual audit of DC's IV-D program which led to the
penalty at issue here.  See "Annual Comprehensive Audit District of
Columbia," dated August 21, 1992 (att. to DC ex. C).  The auditors
selected a statistical sample of 402 cases from DC's listing of IV-D
cases, and ultimately reviewed 262 of these to determine whether
appropriate actions were taken to provide required services.  Id. at
8-9. 1/  The auditors determined that 46 of these cases required
paternity services, but only 18 of those received such services.  Thus,
the efficiency rate for this criterion (i.e., the extent to which
appropriate action was initiated on cases in accordance with federal
requirements) was only 39%; the auditors estimated with 99.99%
confidence that DC did not meet the 75% case processing standard for
this criterion.  Id. at 10-11. 2/  Following DC's appeal of the penalty,
the auditors again reviewed the 46 cases and determined that one case
was erroneously included because establishment of paternity services was
not required.  The auditors' recalculations after excluding this one
case resulted in an efficiency rate of 40% with a confidence level of
99.99%.

DC did not challenge the auditors' statistical sampling methodology or
their calculations.  Instead, DC argued that 11 of the 46 reviewed cases
did not meet the guidelines in AT-88-7 as cases requiring paternity
services because the files for those cases did not contain a confirmed
address for the absent parent.  DC maintained that all 11 cases should
have been reviewed instead as cases requiring location services.  OCSE
responded that 10 of the 11 cases were correctly included. 3/  OCSE also
asserted that, in any event, elimination from the sample of all cases DC
challenged would result in a efficiency rate of 51.43% with a 99.5%
level of confidence that DC did not meet the 75% substantial compliance
standard.  OCSE response br. at addendum 1, . 28.  DC replied that "a
high level of confidence based upon an inappropriately selected sample
is a contradiction in terms that cannot be fair or accurate,
irrespective of whether the District in this case achieves substantial
compliance with the establishment of paternity phase for appropriate
cases."  DC reply at 4.

Analysis

Even if DC has a legitimate complaint, at least in some cases, about the
OCSE auditors' position that any address is sufficient to trigger the
need for establishment of paternity services, 4/ the fact remains that,
even if all challenged cases are excluded, DC's performance for this
criterion still falls far short of the 75% required by the regulations.
DC specifically stated in its reply brief that "[t]hese calculations
[showing an efficiency rate of 40%] have been reviewed by the District's
statistician and are not now challenged."  DC reply at 4.  Consequently,
DC's disagreement with OCSE's conclusion that DC failed to meet the 75%
standard appears to be based, as much as we can understand it, on an
assertion that the audit was fatally flawed by the auditors' incorrect
(according to DC) inclusion of 11 cases in the sample as cases requiring
establishment of paternity services.

Statistical sampling, if done in accordance with the general rules and
conventions statisticians have developed, can provide sound evidence of
whether a state is in compliance with the title IV-D standards.  Ohio
Dept. of Human Services, DAB No. 1202 (1990), reconsideration denied
(February 25, 1991), aff'd sub nom. Ohio v. Sullivan, 789 F. Supp. 1395
(S.D. Ohio 1992).  DC did not provide any support whatsoever for its
contention that the OCSE audit was rendered so unreliable by inclusion
of the challenged cases that their exclusion would not cure the
allegedly defective results.  DC has not alleged, for example, that the
sample of 35 cases (the number of cases left after exclusion of all
challenged cases) is not a random sample which is representative of the
universe of cases in the State's program for this criterion and thus may
not provide a valid basis for statistical projections.  Compare Oklahoma
Dept. of Human Services, DAB No. 1223 (1991).  Neither has DC argued
that OCSE's statistical calculations are incorrect, as it did in a
previous appeal before us.  See District of Columbia Dept. of Human
Services, DAB No. 1228 (1991).  Although DC is apparently asserting that
the inclusion of cases that allegedly should have not been included
somehow renders the entire audit process suspect, DC's own statistician
reviewed all of OCSE's calculations without finding anything to
challenge about them or the sample on which they were based.
Consequently, since DC does not offer any support for its contention
that the OCSE audit is unreliable, we cannot credit it.

Accordingly, we find that DC's disagreement with OCSE about whether the
challenged cases should be included or excluded does not undermine the
validity of OCSE's conclusion that, even excluding questioned cases from
the sample, a statistically valid analysis demonstrates with 99.95%
confidence that DC failed to provide services in 75% of the cases
requiring establishment of paternity services.  We therefore conclude
that OCSE has provided ample evidence to support imposition of the
penalty in this case.  See Mississippi Dept. of Public Welfare, DAB No.
1267 (1991); New Mexico Human Services Dept., DAB No. 1224 (1991); Ohio.

Conclusion

We uphold OCSE's November 30, 1992 imposition of a three percent penalty
disallowance.

 


      ___________________________
       Judith A.
       Ballard

 

      ___________________________
       Donald F.
       Garrett

 

      ___________________________
       M. Terry Johnson
       Presiding Board
       Member

 


1.     The auditors excluded from review 82 cases because services were
not required or could not be provided; 31 cases because case records
were not provided for review; 7 cases because they were closed prior to
the audit period; 19 cases where legal action had been initiated prior
to the audit period but paternity was not established during the audit
period (since an action had already been initiated); and 1 case where an
address was not available at the beginning of the audit period and
paternity was not established nor were legal actions initiated.  Id.

2.     DC also failed to meet the 75% standard for the location of
absent parents criterion, but since it had passed the previous year, it
was permitted to propose a corrective action plan.  OCSE accepted DC's
corrective action plan and will audit for compliance at the close of the
corrective action plan period.  If DC continues to be out of compliance,
an additional one percent penalty will be imposed.  See DC ex. A.

3.     Upon review, OCSE determined that one file contained evidence
that a valid marriage existed at the time the subject children were
born, so that establishment of paternity services were not needed.

4.     Some of the files provided by DC as exhibits showed addresses for
absent parents that were obtained several years before the audit period.
See, e.g., OCSE Declaration ex. VII (address provided was address where
absent parent lived with client before he moved out in 1982).  While DC
claimed that it should not be obliged to bring a paternity action in a
case where it considered the absent parent's address to be suspect, DC
did not produce any official policy or state plan provision that
required a reliably verified address.  Moreover, several of the cases
had fairly recent addresses.  See OCSE Declaration ex. IV (address
supplied in March 1989).

5.     The auditors excluded from review 82 cases because services were
not required or could not be provided; 31 cases because case records
were not provided for review; 7 cases because they were closed prior to
the audit period; 19 cases where legal action had been initiated prior
to the audit period but paternity was not established during the audit
period (since an action had already been initiated); and 1 case where an
address was not available at the beginning of the audit period and
paternity was not established nor were legal actions initiated.  Id.

6.     DC also failed to meet the 75% standard for the location of
absent parents criterion, but since it had passed the previous year, it
was permitted to propose a corrective action plan.  OCSE accepted DC's
corrective action plan and will audit for compliance at the close of the
corrective action plan period.  If DC continues to be out of compliance,
an additional one percent penalty will be imposed.  See DC ex. A.

7.     Upon review, OCSE determined that one file contained evidence
that a valid marriage existed at the time the subject children were
born, so that establishment of paternity services were not needed.

8.     Some of the files provided by DC as exhibits showed addresses for
absent parents that were obtained several years before the audit period.
See, e.g., OCSE Declaration ex. VII (address provided was address where
absent parent lived with client before he moved out in 1982).  While DC
claimed that it should not be obliged to bring a paternity action in a
case where it considered the absent parent's address to be suspect, DC
did not produce any official policy or state plan provision that
required a reliably verified address.  Moreover, several of the cases
had fairly recent addresses.  See OCSE Declaration ex. IV (address
supplied in March