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# The BACK BENCHER



Central District of Illinois Federal Defenders

Vol. No. 28

Reversible Error 2002

## DEFENDER'S MESSAGE

I am pleased to present you with another "Reversible Error" Special Edition of *The Back Bencher*. Alex Bunin, the Federal Defender for the Northern District of New York and Vermont, has compiled cases from every federal circuit finding reversible error since 1995, and he has generously shared his work with us, which we now pass on to you. His compilation will undoubtedly be of use to you when defending your clients both in the district court and on appeal.

Also useful to you in your practice will be our upcoming panel attorney seminar open to all panel attorneys. With the cooperation of Judge McCuskey, the seminar will be held in the Urbana Division at the federal courthouse on May 9, 2002, at 3:00 pm. The program will last approximately two and one-half hours, with a social gathering afterward at a place to be determined.

Dean Strang, the Federal Defender for the Eastern District of Wisconsin in Milwaukee, will address the critical topic of Motions Practice in Federal Court; George Taseff, Senior Litigator, will address the topic of New Tools of the Trade for Effective Federal Advocacy; and Jonathan Hawley, Appellate Division Chief, will give an Update on Recent Seventh Circuit and Supreme Court Opinions. Additionally, a great deal of written materials in both hard copy and CD will also be available at no cost to you.

As you know, federal criminal defense practice is a challenging and complex area of the law. Periodic training and communication with fellow practitioners is essential to providing quality

representation to our clients. It is hoped that

attorneys from all divisions will attend, but especially those in the Urbana Division. Please make every effort to attend the seminar and take advantage of the opportunity to not only benefit from the topics addressed, but also enjoy meeting and conversing with other CJA panel attorneys in your division.

Please notify the Peoria office if you plan to attend by May 2, 2002. You may do so by mail or phone. The Peoria office is located at 401 Main Street, Suite 1500, Peoria, IL 61602, and the telephone number is (309) 671-7891.

We hope to see you there.

Yours very truly,

Richard H. Parsons  
Federal Public Defender  
Central District of Illinois

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## CHURCHILLIANA

In 1944, Churchill made a Christmas visit to Athens. In Athens, the Prime Minister met General Alexander. He asked Alexander what kind of a man was Damaskenos, the Orthodox Archbishop of Greece.

“Is he one of those priestly ascetics concerned only with spiritual grace or one of those crafty prelates concerned rather with temporal gain?”

“Regrettably,” replied Macmillan, “the archbishop seems to be one of the latter.”

“Good,” replied Churchill, rubbing his hands. “Then he is just our man.”

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# Dictum Du Jour

As warm bread is sliced by  
 a gleaming knife  
 May sunlight cut through  
 the harsh winter cold  
 May God's love shine  
 brightly in your common life  
 And may your own romance  
 be never old  
 May hope increase with  
 each lengthening day  
 And rout the ache of hurt  
 and conflict's gloom  
 May loyal friends never be  
 far away  
 With the promise that spring  
 will surely bloom  
 May our good God of songs  
 round the fireplace  
 Of love and laughter, of  
 good wine and fun  
 Lurk always in your home's  
 hidden space  
 And bind you in love when  
 each day is done  
 And may God bless you and  
 keep you close  
 Father, Son, and Holy Spirit

~ Old Irish Proverb

\*\*\*\*\*

In large measure, the Framers were influenced by Charles de Secondat, baron de Montesquieu, an astute student of history and politics in his own right, who, in his seminal work *The Spirit of the Laws*, said:

“Democratic and aristocratic states are not in their own nature free. Political liberty is to be found only in moderate governments; and even in these it is not always found. It is there only when there is no abuse of power: but constant experience shows us that every man invested with power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his authority as far as it will go. Is it not strange, though true, to say that virtue itself has need of limits?”

To prevent this abuse, it is necessary from the very nature of things, power should be a check to power.”

This case provides us with a textbook example of the abuse of executive power contemplated by Montesquieu, Lord Acton, and the Framers of our Constitution. Rather than adhere to the clear letter of the law, which itself is the ultimate check against arrogation of power, the prosecutor apparently deliberately withheld from the trial court and from the jury admissible evidence that would cause any fair-minded person to have grave reservations about the credibility of a key government witness.

- Benn v. Lambert,  
2\_\_ F.3d \_\_\_, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 2899, \*58-\*59 (9th Cir. Feb. 26, 2002) (Trott, J., concurring).

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“As the district court aptly observed, “While it may have been incredibly stupid and short-sighted for [McCoy] to have offered his opinions and experiences to a group of teen-aged gangster wanna-be’s, the Constitution protects even stupid speech.”

- McCoy v. Stewart,  
2\_\_ F.3d \_\_\_, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 2900, \*13 (9th Cir. Feb. 26, 2002).

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“More generally, based on several principles that are fundamental to the right to the assistance of counsel, we cannot conclude that just because defendant has not advanced a theory of innocence he ipso facto was afforded effective assistance of counsel. First, constitutional due process requires that a criminal defendant’s guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ‘It is the duty of the Government to establish . . . guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. This notion is basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society - is a requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of ‘due process’”. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970) (quoting dissent in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-03 (1952)). Second, the right to counsel does not require a showing of actual innocence. Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 380. Third, the Sixth Amendment commands that even where there is no defense theory available, counsel still has a duty to hold the state to it’s “heavy burden” to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 657 n. 19.

These principles together require that we not limit ineffective assistance to only those claims where defendant can demonstrate his innocence. Because the right to counsel safeguards the right to a fair trial, and because a fair trial requires that a defendant’s guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to effective assistance of counsel extends to those cases in which we lack confidence that the jury would have been convinced of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt had he been afforded adequate counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. This court’s task is not to determine a defendant’s guilt or innocence but to determine, with all due deference to the jury and the trial process itself, whether defendant was deprived of a fair trial.”

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Although prepared for martyrdom, I preferred that it be postponed.

- Winston Churchill

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It is fun being in the same decade with you.

- Franklin Delano Roosevelt (in a letter to Churchill, 1942)

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I had the story, bit by bit, from various people, and, as generally happens in such cases, each time it was a different story.

- Edith Wharton, Ethan Frome (opening line)(1911)

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Get your facts first, then you can distort them as you please.

- Mark Twain

\*\*\*\*\*

My divorce came as a complete surprise to me. That will happen when you haven't been home in eighteen years.

- Lee Trevino

\*\*\*\*\*

Glory is fleeting, but obscurity is forever.

- Napoleon Bonaparte

\*\*\*\*\*

This court's Settlement Conference Office invited the parties to try to resolve their differences, and at a meeting hosted by one of our settlement attorneys the parties reached an oral agreement. Unfortunately, they do not agree on the contents of this agreement ....

- Herrnreiter v. Chicago Housing Authority, slip op. (7<sup>th</sup> Cir 2/13/2002).

\*\*\*\*\*

The Microsoft/Netscape ... brouhaha is the sort of battle one thinks about when considering lawsuits under federal antitrust laws. One does not ordinarily conjure up the same sort of images when thinking about two little retail stores in suburban Chicago duking it out over blue jeans and T-shirts.

- 42<sup>nd</sup> Parallel North v. E. Street Denim Co., slip op. (7<sup>th</sup> Cir 2/13/2002).

The following are contributed by our good friend Dale Cobb, the noted criminal defense lawyer, bon vivant, raconteur, boulevardier and lawyer extraordinaire.

### Top 8 Idiots of 2001 From Kristol

#### Idiot #1

I am a medical student currently doing a rotation in toxicology at the poison control center. Today, this woman called in very upset because she caught her little daughter eating ants. I quickly reassured her that the ants are not harmful and there would be no need to bring her daughter into the hospital. She calmed down, and at the end of the conversation happened to mention that she gave her daughter some ant poison to eat in order to kill the ants. I told her that she better bring her daughter into the emergency room right away.

Here's your sign lady. Wear it with pride.

#### Idiot #2

Seems that a year ago, some Boeing employees on the airfield decided to steal a life raft from one of the 747s. They were successful in getting it out of the plane and home. When they took it for a float on the river, a Coast Guard helicopter coming towards them surprised them. It

turned out that the chopper was homing in on the emergency locator beacon that activated when the raft was inflated. They are no longer employed at Boeing.

Here's your sign guys. Don't get it wet, the paint might run.

#### Idiot #3

A true story out of San Francisco:

A man, wanting to rob a downtown Bank of America walked into the branch and wrote "this is a stikkup. Put all your munny in this bag." While standing in line, waiting to give his note to the teller, he began to worry that someone had seen him write the note and might call the police before he reached the teller's window. So he left the Bank of America and crossed the street to Wells Fargo. After waiting a few minutes in line, he handed his note to the Wells Fargo teller. She read it and, surmising from his spelling errors that he wasn't the brightest light in the harbor, told him that she could not accept his stickup note because it was written on a Bank of America deposit slip and that he would either have to fill out a Wells Fargo deposit slip or go back to Bank of America. Looking somewhat defeated, the man said, "OK" and left. He was arrested a few minutes later, as he was waiting in line back at Bank of America.

Don't bother with the guy's sign. He probably couldn't read it anyway.

#### Idiot #4

A motorist was unknowingly caught in an automated speed trap that measured his speed using radar and photographed his car. He later received in the mail a ticket for \$40 and a photo of his car. Instead of payment, he sent the police department a photograph of \$40. Several days later, he received a

letter from the police that contained another picture, this time of handcuffs. He immediately mailed in his \$40.

Another sign (though this guy might be onto something worth thinking about!)

**Idiot #5**

Guy walked into a little corner store with a shotgun and demanded all the cash from the cash drawer. After the cashier put the cash in a bag, the robber saw a bottle of scotch that he wanted behind the counter on the shelf. He told the cashier to put it in the bag as well, but the cashier refused and said, "Because I don't believe you are over 21." The robber said he was, but the clerk still refused to give it to him because he didn't believe him. At this point the robber took his driver's licence out of his wallet and the man was in fact over 21 and he put the scotch in the bag. The robber then ran from the store with his loot. The cashier promptly called the police and gave the name and address of the robber that he got off the license. They arrested the robber two hours later.

Remind me to have more signs printed up. Give this guy his!

**Idiot #6**

A pair of Michigan robbers entered a record shop nervously waving revolvers. The first one shouted, "Nobody move!" When his partner moved, the startled first bandit shot him.

This guy doesn't need a sign. He probably figured it out himself.

**Idiot #7**

Arkansas: Seems this guy wanted some beer pretty badly. He decided that he'd just throw a cinder block through a liquor store window, grab

some booze, and run. So he lifted the cinder block and heaved it over his head at the window. The cinder block bounced back and hit the would-be thief on the head, knocking him unconscious. Seems the liquor store window was made of Plexiglass. The whole event was caught on video tape.

Oh, that smarts. Give him his sign!

**Idiot #8**

Ann Arbor: The Ann Arbor News crime column reported that a man walked into a Burger King in Ypsilanti, Michigan at 12:50 a.m., flashed a gun and demanded cash. The clerk turned him down because he said he couldn't open the cash register without a food order. When the man ordered onion rings, the clerk said they weren't available for breakfast. The man, frustrated, walked away.

Please note that these people are allowed to vote AND BREED!

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These are actual test answers from various schools:

Q: Name the four seasons.  
A: Salt, pepper, mustard, and vinegar.

Q: Explain one of the processes by which water can be made safe to drink.  
A: Flirtation makes water safe to drink because it removes large pollutants like grit, sand, dead sheep and canoeists.

Q: How is dew formed?  
A: The sun shines down on the

leaves and makes them perspire.

Q: What is a planet?  
A: A body of earth surrounded by sky.

Q: What guarantees may a mortgage company insist on?  
A: If you are buying a house, they will insist you are well endowed.

Q: What are steroids?  
A: Things for keeping carpets still on the stairs.

Q: What happens to your body as you age?  
A: When you get old, so do your bowels and you get intercontinental.

Q: What happens to a boy when he reaches puberty?  
A: He says good-bye to his boyhood and looks forward to his adultery.

Q: Name a major disease associated with cigarettes.  
A: Premature death.

Q: How can you delay milk turning sour?  
A: Keep it in the cow.

Q: How are the main parts of the body categorized? (e.g., abdomen).  
A: The body is consisted into three parts -- the brainium, the borax and the abdominal cavity. The brainium contains the brain, the borax contains the heart and lungs, and the abdominal cavity contains the five bowels, A, E, I, O, and U.

Q: What is the Fibula?  
A: A small lie.

Q: What does "varicose" mean?  
A: Nearby.

Q: Give the meaning of the term "Caesarian Section."  
A: The caesarian section is a district in Rome.

Q: What is a seizure?

A: A Roman emperor.

Q: What is a terminal illness?

A: When you are sick at the airport.

Q: Give an example of a fungus. What is a characteristic feature?

A: Mushrooms. They always grow in damp places and so they look like umbrellas.

Q: Use the word "judicious" in a sentence to show you understand its meaning.

A: Hands that judicious can be soft as your face.

Q: What does the word "benign" mean?

A: Benign is what you will be after you be eight.

Q: What is a turbine?

A: Something an Arab wears on his head.

Q: What is a Hindu?

A: It lays eggs.

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## WELCOME ABOARD

We would like to extend a warm welcome to our newest team member, Assistant Federal Public Defender Robert A. Alvarado. Rob comes to our office with over 18 years of experience as a criminal trial attorney. After graduating from the University of Illinois Law School, Rob worked for five years as a Cook County Assistant State's Attorney, where he worked in both the appeals and the felony trial division. During this time, he authored training materials for trial attorneys which are still in use by that office today. He then worked for eight years as the First Assistant State's Attorney for LaSalle County.

For the past five years, he has been in private practice defending the citizen accused in state and federal cases of all types, and he was a member of our CJA panel in the Central District of Illinois until accepting a position with our office.

Included among the hundreds of cases with which Rob has been involved over the last 18 years are a dozen first degree murder jury trials, including two capital cases. He has also made numerous arguments before the intermediate appellate courts in Illinois and has argued before the Illinois Supreme Court on two occasions. While a prosecutor, he was involved with the Illinois State Police Drug Interdiction Program in the early 1990s, litigating cases involving some of the largest cocaine and marijuana seizures in Illinois history.

Rob's broad experience as both a prosecutor and a defender will undoubtedly be of great value to our office and the clients we represent. We are glad that Rob has agreed to put his talents and experience to work for the indigent citizen-accused, and we look forward to working with him.

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## Reversible Errors: 2001 Edition

The following is a project of the Office of the Federal Public Defender for the Districts of Northern New York & Vermont. The cases listed are those in which a criminal defendant received relief from an United States Court of Appeals or the United States Supreme Court. The precedents were reviewed shortly before this publication was released to assure they had not be overruled.

The purpose of this project is to try to give CJA Panel Attorneys a shortcut to case law that favor their

clients. The editor does not promise that cases are precedent in all jurisdictions. If a case is preceded by an asterisk (\*), that means the case may have been distinguished by another panel of that circuit or by another circuit. It should be researched to see if it is authority in your jurisdiction.

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## Release

\*United States v. Goosens, 84 F.3d 697 (4th Cir. 1996) (Prohibiting a defendant from active cooperation with the police was an abuse of discretion).

United States v. Porotsky, 105 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 1997) (Court denied travel request based on conclusions made by probation).

United States v. Swanquist, 125 F.3d 573 (7th Cir. 1997) (Court failed to give reasons for denying release on appeal).

United States v. Fisher, 137 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 1998) (Defendant did not fail to appear for trial that had been continued).

United States v. Baker, 155 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 1998) (Cannot put conditions of release on person acquitted by reason of insanity who is not a danger).

## Counsel

United States v. Cash, 47 F.3d 1083 (11th Cir. 1995) (Defendant could not waive counsel without proper findings by court).

United States v. McKinley, 58 F.3d 1475 (10th Cir. 1995) (Court improperly denied self-representation).

United States v. McDermott, 64 F.3d 1448 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,

516 U.S. 1121 (1996) (Barring defendant from sidebars with stand-by counsel denied self-representation).

**\*United States v. Goldberg**, 67 F.3d 1092 (3rd Cir. 1995) (Defendant did not forfeit counsel by threatening his appointed attorney).

**United States v. Duarte-Higareda**, 68 F.3d 369 (9th Cir. 1995) (Court failed to appoint counsel for evidentiary hearing).

**Delguidice v. Singletary**, 84 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 1996) (Psychological testing of a defendant without notice to counsel violated the Sixth Amendment).

**Williams v. Turpin**, 87 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 1996) (State that created a statutory right to a motion for new trial must afford counsel and an evidentiary hearing).

**United States v. Ming He**, 94 F.3d 782 (2d Cir. 1996) (Cooperating defendant had the right to have counsel present when attending a presentence debriefing).

**Weeks v. Jones**, 100 F.3d 124 (11th Cir. 1996) (Right to counsel in a habeas claim did not turn on the merits of the petition).

**United States v. Keen**, 104 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 1996) (Court did not sufficiently explain to a defendant the dangers of pro se representation).

**\*Carlo v. Chino**, 105 F.3d 493 (9th Cir. 1997) (State statutory right to post-booking phone calls was protected by federal due process).

**United States v. Amlani**, 111 F.3d 705 (9th Cir. 1997) (Prosecutor's repeated disparagement of an attorney in front of his client, denied the defendant his right to chosen counsel).

**United States v. Taylor**, 113 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 1997) (Court did not assure a proper waiver of counsel).

**Blankenship v. Johnson**, 118 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 1997) (When the prosecution sought discretionary review, the defendant had a right to counsel).

**\*United States v. Mills**, 138 F.3d 928 (11th Cir.), modified, 152 F.3d 937, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1003 (1998) (Defendant could not be made to share codefendant counsel's cross-examination of government witness).

**United States v. Pollani**, 146 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998) (*Pro se* defendant's late request for counsel should have been honored).

**Henderson v. Frank**, 155 F.3d 159 (3rd Cir. 1998) (Defendant was denied counsel at suppression hearing).

**United States v. Klat**, 156 F.3d 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Counsel was required at competency hearing).

**\*United States v. Iasiello**, 166 F.3d 212 (3rd Cir. 1999) (Indigent defendant had right to appointed counsel at hearing).

**United States v. Proctor**, 166 F.3d 396 (1st Cir. 1999) (Ambiguous request for counsel tainted previous waiver).

**United States v. Leon-Delfis**, 203 F.3d 103 (1st Cir. 2000) (Questioning after polygraph violated defendant's right to counsel).

**\*United States v. Hernandez**, 203 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 2000) (Defendant was denied self-representation at plea).

**Roney v. United States**, 205 F.3d 1061 (8th Cir. 2000) (Petitioner was entitled to counsel on a motion to vacate sentence).

**\*United States v. Russell**, 205 F.3d 768 (5th Cir. 2000) (Absence of lawyer due to illness did not waive right to counsel).

**United States v. Hayes**, 231 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2000) (Defendant did not voluntarily waive representation).

**Buhl v. Cooksey**, 233 F.3d 783 (3rd Cir. 2000) (Defendant did not voluntarily waive counsel at trial).

**United States v. Boone**, 245 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2001) (Two attorneys must be appointed for defendant facing death-eligible crime).

**Fisher v. Roe**, 263 F.3d 906 (9th Cir. 2001) (Defendant had right to counsel during reading of testimony).

**United States v. Davis**, 269 F.3d 514 (5th Cir. 2001) (Judge must warn defendant of effects of hybrid counsel).

## Discovery

**United States v. Alzate**, 47 F.3d 1103 (11th Cir. 1995) (A prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence).

**United States v. Barnes**, 49 F.3d 1144 (6th Cir. 1995) (Request for discovery of extraneous evidence created a continuing duty to disclose).

**\*United States v. Boyd**, 55 F.3d 239 (7th Cir. 1995) (Government failed to disclose drug use and drug dealing by prisoner-witnesses).

**\*United States v. Hanna**, 55 F.3d 1456 (9th Cir. 1995) (Prosecutor should have learned of *Brady* material even if it was not in her possession).

**Kyles v. Whitley**, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (Prosecution failed to turn over material and favorable evidence, sufficient to change result).

of case).

**United States v. Wood**, 57 F.3d 733 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Government failed to disclose favorable FDA materials).

**United States v. Camargo-Vergara**, 57 F.3d 993 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Government failed to disclose defendant's post-arrest statement).

**In Re Grand Jury Investigation**, 59 F.3d 17 (2<sup>d</sup> Cir. 1995) (Court properly required disclosure of documents subpoenaed by the grand jury).

**United States v. O'Conner**, 64 F.3d 355 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1174 (1996) (Evidence of government witness threats and collaboration were not disclosed).

**In Re Grand Jury**, 111 F.3d 1083 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 1997) (Government could not seek disclosure of phone conversations that were illegally recorded by a third party).

**United States v. Arnold**, 117 F.3d 1308 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Prosecutor withheld exculpatory tapes of government witnesses).

**\*United States v. Vozzella**, 124 F.3d 389 (2<sup>d</sup> Cir. 1997) (Evidence of perjured testimony should have been disclosed).

**United States v. Fernandez**, 136 F.3d 1434 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Court must hold hearing when defendant makes showing of a *Brady* violation).

**United States v. Mejia-Mesa**, 153 F.3d 925 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (*Brady* claim required hearing).

**United States v. Scheer**, 168 F.3d 445 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Government failed to disclose it had intimidated key prosecution witness).

**United States v. Ramos**, 179 F.3d

1333 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Defendant was denied opportunity to depose witness who was outside country).

**\*United States v. Riley**, 189 F.3d 802 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Intentional destruction of notes of interview with informant violated Jencks Act).

**Nuckols v. Gibson**, 233 F.3d 1261 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Government failed to disclose criminal allegations against key prosecution witness).

**United States v. Abbott**, 241 F.3d 29 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2001) (Government was obligated to disclose linkage between plea agreements of defendant and his mother).

**Mitchell v. Gibson**, 262 F.3d 1036 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Withholding exculpatory evidence that could have affected sentence).

**Boss v. Pierce**, 263 F.3d 734 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Witness's statement may not be available to defendant through due diligence).

**McCambridge v. Hall**, 266 F.3d 12 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2001) (Objection not required to preserve *Brady* violation).

**United States v. Bass**, 266 F.3d 532 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Government's study on racial disparities in prosecution warranted discovery of decision to seek death penalty).

## Arrests

**\*United States v. Lambert**, 46 F.3d 1064 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Defendant was seized while agents held his driver's license for over 20 minutes).

**United States v. Little**, 60 F.3d 708 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Requiring a passenger to go to the baggage area restrained her liberty).

**\*United States v. Mesa**, 62 F.3d 159 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Nervousness

and inconsistencies did not validate continued traffic stop).

**\*United States v. Buchanon**, 72 F.3d 1217 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Defendants were seized when the troopers separated them from their vehicle).

**United States v. Roberson**, 90 F.3d 75 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 1996) (Anonymous call did not give officers reasonable suspicion to stop a defendant on the street merely because his clothes matched the caller's description).

**\*United States v. Davis**, 94 F.3d 1465 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (No reasonable suspicion for stop of a defendant known generally as a gang member and drug dealer).

**Washington v. Lambert**, 98 F.3d 1181 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (General description of two African-American males did not justify stop).

**\*United States v. Jerez**, 108 F.3d 684 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Nighttime confrontation by police at the defendant's door was a seizure).

**United States v. Miller**, 146 F.3d 274 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Leaving turn signal on violated no law and did not justify stop).

**\*United States v. Jones**, 149 F.3d 364 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Agent lacked reasonable suspicion for investigatory immigration stop).

**\*United States v. Acosta-Colon**, 157 F.3d 9 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1999) (Defendant's 30 minute handcuffed detention, preventing him from boarding flight, was not lawful stop).

**United States v. Salvano**, 158 F.3d 1107 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Cross country trip, nervousness, nor scent of evergreen, justified warrantless detention).



**United States v. Dortch**, 199 F.3d 193 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir.), *amended*, 203 F.3d 883 (2000) (Continued detention after traffic stop was unreasonable).

**United States v. Freeman**, 209 F.3d 464 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Crossing lane-divider did not create probable cause for traffic stop).

**United States v. Thomas**, 211 F.3d 1186 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Tip did not provide reasonable suspicion for stop).

**United States v. Guevara-Martinez**, 262 F.3d 751 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Illegal arrest tainted later fingerprint evidence).

**Northrop v. Trippett**, 265 F.3d 372 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Anonymous tip of two black males wearing brand clothing and selling drugs did not justify detention).

**Sparing v. Village of Olympia Fields**, 266 F.3d 68 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Entering screen door without consent was an arrest).

## Search of Persons

**\*United States v. Caicedo**, 85 F.3d 1184 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Record lacked evidence to support a finding of the defendant's consent to search).

**\*United States v. Eustaquio**, 198 F.3d 1068 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (No reasonable suspicion to search bulge on defendant's midriff).

**United States v. Gray**, 213 F.3d 998 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (No reasonable suspicion to stop defendant for protective frisk).

**United States v. Burton**, 228 F.3d 524 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Officer's safety alone did not justify search of pocket).

**United States v. Miles**, 247 F.3d

1009 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Manipulating small box in clothing exceeded pat-down search).

**Fontana v. Haskin**, 262 F.3d 871 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Claim of sexual harassment by officer was allegation of illegal search).

## Search of Private Vehicles

**United States v. Adams**, 46 F.3d 1080 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Suppression of evidence seized from motor home was upheld).

**United States v. Chavis**, 48 F.3d 871 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Court improperly placed the burden on the defendant to show a warrantless search occurred).

**United States v. Angulo-Fernandez**, 53 F.3d 1177 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Confusion about who owned a stalled vehicle did not create probable cause for its search).

**Ornelas v. United States**, 517 U.S. 690 (1996) (Defendant's motion to suppress should be given *de novo* review by the court of appeals).

**United States v. Duguay**, 93 F.3d 346 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1029 (1999) (Car could not be impounded for a later search unless the arrestee could not provide for its removal).

**\*United States v. Elliott**, 107 F.3d 810 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Consent to look in trunk was not consent to open containers within).

**United States v. Chan-Jimenez**, 125 F.3d 1324 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Defendant did not consent to search of truck).

**United States v. Cooper**, 133 F.3d 1394 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy in rental car four days after contract expired).

**\*United States v. Beck**, 140 F.3d 1129 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Continued detention of vehicle was not justified by articulable facts).

**\*United States v. Rodriguez-Rivas**, 151 F.3d 377 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Vehicle stop lacked reasonable suspicion).

**United States v. Huguenin**, 154 F.3d 547 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Checkpoint stop to merely look for drugs was unreasonable).

**United States v. Rivas**, 157 F.3d 364 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (1. Drilling into trailer was not routine border search; 2. No evidence that drug dog's reaction was an alert).

**United States v. Iron Cloud**, 171 F.3d 587 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Portable breath test results were inadmissible as evidence of intoxication).

**Knowles v. Iowa**, 525 U.S. 113 (1999) (Speeding ticket does not justify full search of vehicle).

**\*United States v. Payne**, 181 F.3d 781 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Parole officer did not have reasonable suspicion to search defendant's trailer and truck).

**\*United States v. Lopez-Soto**, 205 F.3d 1101 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (No good faith mistake to warrantless car search).

**United States v. Wald**, 216 F.3d 1222 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Odor of burnt methamphetamine in passenger compartment did not provide probable cause to search trunk).

**United States v. Baker**, 221 F.3d 438 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2000) (No reasonable

suspicion to justify search of trunk).

**United States v. Holt**, 229 F.3d 931 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Questioning about weapons exceeded stop).

**United States v. Jones**, 234 F.3d 234 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Continued detention tainted search despite initial consent).

**United States v. Jones**, 242 F.3d 215 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Anonymous tip did not justify investigatory stop of vehicle).

**United States v. Reinholz**, 245 F.3d 765 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Warrantless arrest lacked probable cause).

**United States v. Sigmond-Ballesteros**, 247 F.3d 943 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Lacked reasonable suspicion to search car for undocumented aliens).

**United States v. Caro**, 260 F.3d 1209 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Officer needed probable cause to look for VIN number inside door).

**United States v. Nee**, 261 F.3d 79 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2001) (Suppression upheld when officer's were found not to be credible about stop).

**United States v. Gomez**, 276 F.3d 694 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Homeowner had expectation of privacy to vehicle of third party parked in driveway).

## Search of Commercial Vehicles

**\*United States v. Garzon**, 119 F.3d 1446 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (1. Passenger did not abandon bag by leaving it on bus; 2. General warrantless search of all bus passengers by dog was illegal).

**\*United States v. Guapi**, 144 F.3d

1393 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Bus passenger did not voluntarily consent to search).

**\*United States v. Washington**, 151 F.3d 1354 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Bus passenger was searched without voluntary consent).

**Bond v. United States**, 529 U.S. 334 (2000) (Manipulation of bag found on bus was illegal search).

**United States v. Stephens**, 206 F.3d 914 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Defendant was illegally seized and searched on bus).

**United States v. Drayton**, 231 F.3d 787 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 803 (2002) (Search at depot was not voluntary).

## Search of Packages

**United States v. Doe**, 61 F.3d 107 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1995) (Warrantless testing of packages at an airport checkpoint lacked justification).

**\*United States v. Ali**, 68 F.3d 1468, modified, 130 F.3d 33 (2<sup>d</sup> Cir. 1995) (Checking whether the defendant had a valid export license was not a proper ground for seizure).

**United States v. Odum**, 72 F.3d 1279 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Court was limited to facts at the time the stop occurred to evaluate reasonableness of the seizure).

**United States v. Nicholson**, 144 F.3d 632 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (1. Feeling through sides of bag was a search; 2. Abandonment of bag was involuntary).

**\*United States v. Fultz**, 146 F.3d 1102 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Guest had expectation of privacy in boxes he stored at another's home).

**\*United States v. Rouse**, 148 F.3d 1040 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Search of bags lacked probable cause).

**\*United States v. Allen**, 159 F.3d 832 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply to cocaine found in duffle bag later detected by dog and warrant).

**United States v. Johnson**, 171 F.3d 601 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (No reasonable suspicion to intercept delivery of package).

**United States v. Osage**, 235 F.3d 518 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Consent to search suitcase did not extend to sealed can inside).

**United Staes v. Runyan**, 275 F.3d 449 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Police could not open closed container discovered by previous private search).

## Search of Private Property

**United States v. Hill**, 55 F.3d 479 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Remand was required to see if there was a truly viable independent source for the search).

**\*United States v. Ford**, 56 F.3d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Search under a mattress and behind a window shade exceeded a protective sweep).

**United States v. Tovar-Rico**, 61 F.3d 1529 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Possibility that surveillance officer was observed, did not create exigency for warrantless search of apartment).

**\*United States v. Cabassa**, 62 F.3d 470 (2<sup>d</sup> Cir. 1995) (Exigent circumstances were not relevant to the inevitable discovery doctrine).

**\*United States v. Mejia**, 69 F.3d 309 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply

where the police simply failed to get a warrant).

**J.B. Manning Corp. v. United States**, 86 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 1996) (Good faith exception to the warrant requirement does not affect motions to return property).

**United States v. Leake**, 95 F.3d 409 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Neither the independent source rule, nor the inevitable discovery rule, saved otherwise inadmissible evidence).

**United States v. Madrid**, 152 F.3d 1034 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Inevitable discovery doctrine did not save illegal search of house).

**United States v. Ivy**, 165 F.3d 397 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Consent to enter home was not shown to be voluntary).

**\*United States v. Johnson**, 170 F.3d 708 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Officers lacked reasonable suspicion to prevent occupant from leaving home).

**United States v. Kiyuyung**, 171 F.3d 78 (2<sup>d</sup> Cir. 1999) (Firearms found during warrantless search were not in plain view).

**Flippo v. West Virginia**, 528 U.S. 11 (1999) (No crime scene exception to warrant requirement).

**United States v. Sandoval**, 200 F.3d 659 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy in tent on public land).

**United States v. Vega**, 221 F.3d 789 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. den. 531 1155 (2000) (The police cannot create exigency for search of leased home).

**United States v. Reid**, 226 F.3d 1020 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Non-resident did not have apparent authority to allow search of apartment).

**United States v. Oaxaca**, 233 F.3d 1154 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Agents could

not enter open door of garage).

**United States v. Lewis**, 231 F.3d 238 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Absent probable cause, exigent circumstances did not permit entry to home).

**United States v. Santa**, 236 F.3d 325 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Search of apartment lacked exigent circumstances).

**\*United States v. Gamez-Orduno**, 235 F.3d 453 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Overnight guests had standing to challenge search).

**United States v. Heath**, 259 F.3d 522 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Allowing officer to examine keys was not consent to open and enter apartment).

## Warrants

**\*United States v. Van Damme** 48 F.3d 461 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (No list of items to be seized under the warrant).

**United States v. Mondragon**, 52 F.3d 291 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Supplemental wiretap application failed to show necessity).

**\*United States v. Kow**, 58 F.3d 423 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Warrant failed to identify business records with particularity, and good faith did not apply).

**\*United States v. Weaver**, 99 F.3d 1372 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Bare bones, boilerplate affidavit was insufficient to justify warrant).

**Marks v. Clarke**, 102 F.3d 1012 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 907 (1997) (Warrant to search two residences did not authorize the officers to search all persons present).

**United States v. Foster**, 104 F.3d 1228 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Flagrant disregard for the specificity of a warrant required suppression of all found).

**United States v. Castillo-Garcia**, 117 F.3d 1179 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 962 (1997) (Government failed to show the necessity for wiretaps).

**United States v. McGrew**, 122 F.3d 847 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Search warrant affidavit lacked particularity).

**United States v. Alvarez**, 127 F.3d 372 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Warrant affidavit contained a false statement made in reckless disregard for the truth).

**\*United States v. Schroeder**, 129 F.3d 439 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Warrant did not authorize a search of adjoining property).

**In Re Grand Jury Investigation**, 130 F.3d 853 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Search warrant was overbroad).

**\*United States v. Hotal**, 143 F.3d 1223 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Anticipatory search warrant failed to identify triggering event for execution).

**United States v. Albrektsten**, 151 F.3d 951 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Arrest warrant did not permit search of defendant's motel room).

**United States v. Ford**, 184 F.3d 566 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1161 (2000) (Search warrant authorized broader search than reasonable).

**United States v. Herron**, 215 F.3d 812 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (No reasonable officer would have relied on such a deficient warrant).

**United States v. Tuter**, 240 F.3d

1292 (10th Cir. 2001) (Anonymous tip lacked reliability to support warrant).

**United States v. King**, 244 F.3d 736 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Officer's mistaken belief that ordinance was violated did not provide reasonable suspicion to stop).

**Leveto v. Lapina**, 258 F.3d 156 (3rd Cir. 2001) (Search warrant for home did not justify pat-down of owner).

**United States v. Blackmon**, 273 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2001) (Police may not borrow information from previous wiretap warrant in another case).

## Knock and Announce

**Wilson v. Arkansas**, 514 U.S. 927 (1995) ("Knock and announce" rule implicated the Fourth Amendment).

**United States v. Zermeno**, 66 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 1995) (Officers failed to knock and announce during a drug search).

**\*United States v. Bates**, 84 F.3d 790 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Officers did not have the right to break down an apartment door without first knocking and announcing their presence).

**Richards v. Wisconsin**, 520 U.S. 385 (1997) (No blanket drug exception to the knock and announce requirement).

**United States v. Cantu**, 230 F.3d 148 (5th Cir. 2000) ("Knock and announce" applies to all attempts at forcible entry).

## Statements

**\*United States v. Dudden**, 65 F.3d

1461 (9th Cir. 1995) (Immunity agreement required a hearing on whether the defendant's statements were used to aid the government's case).

**United States v. Tenorio**, 69 F.3d 1103 (11th Cir. 1995) (Post-*Miranda* statements were improperly admitted).

**United States v. Ali**, 86 F.3d 275 (2<sup>nd</sup> Cir. 1996) (Custodial interrogation required *Miranda* warnings).

**\*In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated April 9, 1996**, 87 F.3d 1198 (11th Cir. 1996) (Custodian of records could not be compelled to testify as to the location of documents not in her possession when those documents incriminated her).

**United States v. Trzaska**, 111 F.3d 1019 (2d Cir. 1997) (Defendant's statement to probation officer was inadmissible).

**\*United States v. D.F.**, 115 F.3d 413 (7th Cir. 1997) (Statements taken from a juvenile in a mental health facility were involuntary).

**United States v. Abdi**, 142 F.3d 566 (2d Cir. 1998) (Defendant's uncounseled statement was erroneously admitted).

**\*United States v. Garibay**, 143 F.3d 534 (9th Cir. 1998) (Defendant with limited English and low mental capacity did not voluntarily waive *Miranda*).

**United States v. Chamberlain**, 163 F.3d 499 (8th Cir. 1999) (Inmate under investigation was entitled to *Miranda* warnings).

**United States v. Tyler**, 164 F.3d 150 (3rd Cir. 1999) (Police did not honor defendant's invocation of silence).

**Pickens v. Gibson**, 206 F.3d 988

(10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Admission of confession was not harmless).

**United States v. Martinez-Gaytan**, 213 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 2000) (Agent who did not speak Spanish could not introduce defendant's Spanish confession).

**Dickerson v. United States**, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (*Miranda* warnings are required by Fifth Amendment).

**United States v. Orso**, 234 F.3d 436 (9th Cir. 2000) (Officer lied to get admissions).

**Gardner v. Johnson**, 247 F.3d 551 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Psychiatrist's warnings about self-incrimination were insufficient).

## Recusal

**\*Bracy v. Gramley**, 520 U.S. 899 (1997) (Petitioner could get discovery of trial judge's bias against him).

**\*United States v. Jordan**, 49 F.3d 152 (5th Cir. 1995) (Judge should have been recused because the defendant made claims against family friend of the judge).

**\*United States v. Avilez-Reyes**, 160 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 1999) (Judge should have recused himself in case where attorney testified against judge in disciplinary hearing).

**United States v. Scarfo**, 263 F.3d 80 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2001) (Judge should have recused himself if he felt prejudiced by news article).

## Indictments

**United States v. Holmes**, 44 F.3d 1150 (2d Cir. 1995) (Money laundering and structuring counts based on the same transaction were multiplicitous).

**United States v. Hairston**, 46 F.3d 361 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Multiple payments were part of the same offense).

**United States v. Graham**, 60 F.3d 463 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Multiplicious to charge the same false statement made on different occasions).

**\*United States v. Kimbrough**, 69 F.3d 723 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1157 (1996) (Multiple possessions of child pornography should have been charged in a single count).

**\*United States v. Cancelliere**, 69 F.3d 1116 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Court amended charging language of indictment during trial).

**\*United States v. Johnson**, 130 F.3d 1420 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Gun possession convictions for the same firearm were multiplicious).

**United States v. Morales**, 185 F.3d 74 (2<sup>nd</sup> Cir. 1999) (Racketeering enterprise did not last for duration alleged in indictment).

**\*United States v. Dubo**, 186 F.3d 1177 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Indictment did not allege mens rea).

**United States v. Nunez**, 180 F.3d 227 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Indictment failed to charge an offense).

**United States v. Dipentino**, 242 F.3d 1090 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Trial court constructively amended indictment).

**United States v. Olson**, 262 F.3d 795 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Bank robbery indictment failed to allege a taking by force or intimidation).

## Limitation of Actions

**United States v. Li**, 55 F.3d 325

(7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Statute of limitations ran from the day of deposit, not the day the deposit was processed).

**United States v. Spector**, 55 F.3d 22 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1995) (Agreement to waive the statute of limitations was invalid because it was not signed by the government).

**United States v. Podde**, 105 F.3d 813 (2<sup>d</sup> Cir. 1997) (Statute of limitations barred the reinstatement of charges that were dismissed in a plea agreement).

**United States v. Manges**, 110 F.3d 1162 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1106 (1998) (Conspiracy charge was barred by statute of limitations).

**United States v. Grimmett**, 236 F.3d 452 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Statute of limitations had run since defendant's withdrawal from the conspiracy).

## Venue

**\*United States v. Miller**, 111 F.3d 747 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Court refused a jury instruction on venue in a multi-district conspiracy case).

**United States v. Carter**, 130 F.3d 1432, cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1041 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Requested instruction on venue should have been given).

**United States v. Cabrales**, 524 U.S. 1 (1998) (Venue for money laundering was proper only where offenses were begun, conducted and completed).

**\*United States v. Brennan**, 183 F.3d 139 (2<sup>d</sup> Cir. 1999) (Venue for mail fraud permissible only in districts where proscribed acts occurred).

**\*United States v. Hernandez**, 189

F.3d 785 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1028 (1999) (Venue was improper for undocumented alien discovered in one district and tried in another).

**United States v. Williams**, 274 F.3d 1079 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Sale to government informant did not bring the conspiracy within district's venue).

## Pretrial Procedure

**United States v. Ramos**, 45 F.3d 1519 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Trial judge wrongly refused deposition without inquiring about testimony or its relevance).

**United States v. Smith**, 55 F.3d 157 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Government's motion for dismissal should have been granted).

**United States v. Gonzalez**, 58 F.3d 459 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Government's motion for dismissal should have been granted).

**\*United States v. Young**, 86 F.3d 944 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Court improperly denied a hearing on a motion to compel the government to immunize a witness).

**United States v. Mathurin**, 148 F.3d 68 (2<sup>d</sup> Cir. 1998) (Court improperly denied hearing on motion to suppress).

## Severance

**\*United States v. Breinig**, 70 F.3d 850 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Severance should have been granted where the codefendant's defense included prejudicial character evidence regarding the defendant).

**\*United States v. Baker**, 98 F.3d 330 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1179 (1997) (Evidence admissible against only one codefendant).

required severance).

**United States v. Jordan**, 112 F.3d 14 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1041 (1998) (Charges should have been severed when a defendant wanted to testify regarding one count, but not others).

**United States v. Cobb**, 185 F.3d 1193 (11th Cir. 1999) (Court erroneously denied severance under *Bruton*).

## Conflicts

**United States v. Shorter**, 54 F.3d 1248 (7th Cir.), cert. denied. 516 U.S. 896 (1995) (Actual conflict when the defendant accused counsel of improper behavior).

**\*Ciak v. United States**, 59 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 1995) (Actual conflict for attorney who had previously represented a witness against the defendant).

**United States v. Malpiedi**, 62 F.3d 465 (2d Cir. 1995) (Conflict for counsel representing witness who gave damaging evidence against his defendant).

**\*United States v. Jiang**, 140 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 1998) (Attorney's potential conflict required remand for hearing).

**United States v. Kliti**, 156 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 1998) (Court should have held hearing on defense counsel's potential conflict).

**Perrillo v. Johnson**, 205 F.3d 775 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Actual conflict existed in successive prosecutions of codefendants).

**Lockhart v. Terhune**, 250 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 2001) (Counsel had actual conflict of interest).

## Competency / Sanity

**\*United States v. Mason**, 52 F.3d 1286 (4th Cir. 1995) (Court failed to apply a reasonable cause standard to competency hearing).

**Cooper v. Oklahoma**, 517 U.S. 348 (1996) (Court could not require a defendant to prove his incompetence by a higher standard than preponderance of evidence).

**United States v. Davis**, 93 F.3d 1286 (6th Cir. 1996) (Court did not have the statutory authority to order a mental examination of a defendant who wished to raise the defense of diminished capacity).

**United States v. Williams**, 113 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 1997) (Defendant's actions during trial warranted a competency hearing).

**United States v. Nevarez-Castro**, 120 F.3d 190 (9th Cir. 1997) (Court refused to hold a competency hearing).

**United States v. Haywood**, 155 F.3d 674 (3rd Cir. 1999) (Defendant allegedly restored to competency required second hearing).

## Privilege

**Ralls v. United States**, 52 F.3d 223 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Fee information was inextricably intertwined with privileged communications).

**\*United States v. Sindel**, 53 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 1995) (Fee information could not be released without disclosing other privileged information).

**\*United States v. Gertner**, 65 F.3d 963 (1st Cir. 1995) (IRS summons of attorney was just a pretext to investigate her client).

**In Re Richard Roe Inc.**, 68 F.3d 38

(2d Cir. 1995) (Court misapplied the crime-fraud exception).

**United States v. Rowe**, 96 F.3d 1294 (9th Cir. 1996) (In-house investigation by attorneys associated with the defendant/lawyer was covered by the attorney-client privilege).

**Mockaitis v. Harclerod**, 104 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1997) (Clergy-communicant privilege was upheld).

**United States v. Bauer**, 132 F.3d 504 (9th Cir. 1997) (Questioning of defendant's bankruptcy attorney violated attorney-client privilege).

**\*United States v. Glass**, 133 F.3d 1356 (10th Cir. 1998) (Defendant's psychotherapist-patient privilege was violated).

**Swinder & Berlin v. United States**, 524 U.S. 399 (1998) (Attorney-client privilege survives client's death).

**United States v. Millard**, 139 F.3d 1200 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 949 (1998) (Statements during plea discussions were erroneously admitted).

**In re Sealed Case**, 146 F.3d 881 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Documents prepared in anticipation of litigation were work product).

**Mitchell v. United States**, 526 U.S. 314 (1999) (Guilty plea does not waive privilege against self incrimination at sentencing).

## Jeopardy / Estoppel

**United States v. Abcasis**, 45 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1995) (Government was estopped from convicting a person when its agents caused that person in good faith to believe they were acting under government authority).

**United States v. Weems**, 49 F.3d 528 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Government was estopped from proving element previously decided in forfeiture case).

**United States v. Sammaripa**, 55 F.3d 433 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Mistrial was not justified by manifest necessity).

**United States v. McLaurin**, 57 F.3d 823 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Defendant could not be retried for bank robbery after conviction on the lesser included offense of larceny).

**Rutledge v. United States**, 517 U.S. 292 (1996) (Defendant could not be punished for both a conspiracy and a continuing criminal enterprise based upon a single course of conduct).

**Venson v. State of Georgia**, 74 F.3d 1140 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Prosecutor's motion for mistrial was not supported by manifest necessity).

**United States v. Holloway**, 74 F.3d 249 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Prosecutor's promise not to prosecute, made at a civil deposition, was the equivalent of use immunity for a related criminal proceeding).

**United States v. Hall**, 77 F.3d 398 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied. 519 U.S. 849 (1996) (Possession of a firearm and its ammunition could only yield a single sentence).

**United States v. Garcia**, 78 F.3d 1517 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Acquittal for knowingly conspiring barred a second prosecution for the substantive crime).

**Terry v. Potter**, 111 F.3d 454 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (When a defendant was charged in two alternate manners, and the jury reached a verdict as to only one, there was an implied

acquittal on the other offense to which jeopardy barred retrial).

**United States v. Stoddard**, 111 F.3d 1450 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (1. Second drug conspiracy prosecution was barred by double jeopardy; 2. Collateral estoppel barred false statement conviction, based upon drug ownership for which defendant had been previously acquitted).

**United States v. Romeo**, 114 F.3d 141 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (After an acquittal for possession, an importation charge was barred by collateral estoppel).

**United States v. Turner**, 130 F.3d 815 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Prosecution of count, identical to one previously dismissed, was barred).

**United States v. Downer**, 143 F.3d 819 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Court's substitution of conviction for lesser offense, after reversal, violated Ex Post Facto Clause and Grand Jury Clause).

**United States v. Dunford**, 148 F.3d 385 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Convictions for 6 firearms and ammunition was multiplicitous).

**United States v. Beckett**, 208 F.3d 140 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2000) (Sentences for robbery and armed robbery violated double jeopardy).

**United States v. Kithcart**, 218 F.3d 213 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2000) (Government could not relitigate suppression motion).

**United States v. Kramer**, 225 F.3d 847 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Defendant was entitled to attack underlying state child support obligation).

**Morris v. Reynolds**, 264 F.3d 38 (2<sup>d</sup> Cir. 2001) (Jeopardy attaches at unconditional acceptance of guilty plea).

## Plea Agreements

**United States v. Clark**, 55 F.3d 9 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1995) (Government breached the agreement by arguing against acceptance of responsibility).

**\*United States v. Laday**, 56 F.3d 24 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Government breached the agreement by failing to give the defendant an opportunity to cooperate).

**\*United States v. Washman**, 66 F.3d 210 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Defendant could have withdrawn his plea up until the time the court accepted the plea agreement).

**United States v. Levay**, 76 F.3d 671 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Defendant could not be enhanced with a prior drug conviction when the government withdrew notice as part of a plea agreement).

**United States v. Taylor**, 77 F.3d 368 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Defendant could withdraw his guilty plea when the government failed to unequivocally recommend a sentence named in the agreement).

**\*United States v. Velez Carrero**, 77 F.3d 11 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1996) (Agreement to recommend no enhancement was breached by the government's neutral position at sentencing).

**United States v. Dean**, 87 F.3d 1212 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Judge could modify the forfeiture provisions of a plea agreement, when the forfeiture was unfairly punitive).

**\*United States v. Kummer**, 89 F.3d 1536 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Defendants who pleaded guilty to accepting a gratuity under plea agreements could have withdrawn their pleas when they were sentenced under bribery guidelines).

**United States v. Ritsema**, 89 F.3d 392 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (A court could not ignore a previously adopted plea agreement at resentencing).

**United States v. Belt**, 89 F.3d 710 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Failure to object to the government's breach of the plea agreement was not a waiver).

**United States v. Beltran-Ortiz**, 91 F.3d 665 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Failure to debrief the defendant, thus preventing him from benefiting from the safety valve, violated the plea agreement).

**United States v. Hawley**, 93 F.3d 682 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Government violated its plea agreement not to oppose credit for acceptance of responsibility).

**United States v. Van Thournout**, 100 F.3d 590 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Government breached an agreement from another district to recommend concurrent time).

**\*United States v. Sandoval-Lopez**, 122 F.3d 797 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Defendant could attack illegal conviction without fear that dismissed charges in plea agreement would be revived).

**United States v. Wolff**, 127 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 2325 (1998) (Government's failure to argue for acceptance of responsibility breached agreement and required entire sentence to be reconsidered).

**United States v. Gilchrist**, 130 F.3d 1131 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 1997) (Plea agreement was breached by imposing a higher term of supervised release).

**United States v. Johnson**, 132 F.3d 628 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Prosecutor violated plea agreement by urging higher drug quantity).

**\*United States v. Mitchell**, 136 F.3d 1192 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Failure

to adhere to unconditional promise to move for downward departure violated plea agreement).

**\*United States v. Isaac**, 141 F.3d 477 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 1998) (Plea agreements referring to substantial assistance departures were subject to contract law).

**United States v. Brye**, 146 F.3d 1207 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Government's opposition to downward departure breached plea agreement).

**United States v. Castaneda**, 162 F.3d 832 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Government failed to prove defendant violated transactional immunity agreement).

**\*United States v. Lawlor**, 168 F.3d 633 (2<sup>d</sup> Cir. 1999) (Government breached plea agreement that stipulated to a specific offense level).

**United States v. Nathan**, 188 F.3d 190 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 1999) (Statement made after plea agreement was not stipulation).

**United States v. Frazier**, 213 F.3d 409 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Government cannot unilaterally retreat from plea agreement without hearing).

**United States v. Baird**, 218 F.3d 221 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2000) (Plea agreement prevented use of information at any proceeding).

**United States v. Mondragon**, 228 F.3d 978 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Prosecutor breached plea agreement by recommending sentence).

**United States v. Randolph**, 230 F.3d 243 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Prosecution in second jurisdiction violated plea agreement).

**United States v. Johnson**, 214 F.3d 1049 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Government breached plea agreement by failing to file departure motion before

sentencing).

**Dunn v. Collernan**, 247 F.3d 450 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2001) (Prosecutor's recommendation of "lengthy sentence" violated plea agreement).

**Gunn v. Ignacio**, 263 F.3d 965 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Prosecutor breached agreement by opposing concurrent sentence).

## Guilty Pleas

**United States v. Maddox**, 48 F.3d 555 (D.C. 1995) (A summary rejection of a guilty plea was improper).

**\*United States v. Ribas-Dominicce**, 50 F.3d 76 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1995) (Court misstated the mental state required for the offense).

**\*United States v. Goins**, 51 F.3d 400 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Court failed to admonish the defendant about the mandatory minimum punishment).

**\*United States v. Casallas**, 59 F.3d 1173 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Trial judge improperly became involved in plea bargaining during colloquy).

**\*United States v. Smith**, 60 F.3d 595 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Court failed to explain the nature of the charges to the defendant).

**\*United States v. Gray**, 63 F.3d 57 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1995) (Defendant who did not understand the applicability of the mandatory minimum could withdraw his plea).

**United States v. Daigle**, 63 F.3d 346 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Court improperly engaged in plea bargaining).

**United States v. Martinez-Molina**, 64 F.3d 719 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1995) (Court failed to inquire whether the plea was voluntary or whether the defendant had been threatened or coerced).



**\*United States v. Showerman**, 68 F.3d 1524 (2d Cir. 1995) (Court failed to advise the defendant that he might be ordered to pay restitution).

**United States v. Tunning**, 69 F.3d 107 (6th Cir. 1995) (Government failed to recite evidence to prove allegations in an *Alford* plea).

**United States v. Guerra**, 94 F.3d 989 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Plea was vacated when the court gave the defendant erroneous advice about enhancements).

**\*United States v. Quinones**, 97 F.3d 473 (11th Cir. 1996) (Court failed to ensure that the defendant understood the nature of the charges).

**\*United States v. Cruz-Rojas**, 101 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1996) (Guilty pleas were vacated to determine whether factual basis existed for carrying a firearm).

**\*United States v. Siegel**, 102 F.3d 477 (11th Cir. 1996) (Failure to advise the defendant of the maximum and minimum mandatory sentences required that the defendant be allowed to withdraw his plea).

**United States v. Shepherd**, 102 F.3d 558 (DC Cir. 1996) (Court abused its discretion in rejecting the defendant's mid-trial guilty plea).

**United States v. Still**, 102 F.3d 118 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 806 (1997) (Court failed to admonish the defendant on the mandatory minimum).

**United States v. Amaya**, 111 F.3d 386 (5th Cir. 1997) (Defendant's plea was involuntary when the court promised to ensure a downward departure for cooperation).

**\*United States v. Gonzalez**, 113 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 1997) (Court should have held a hearing when the defendant claimed his plea was

coerced).

**\*United States v. Brown**, 117 F.3d 471 (11th Cir. 1997) (Misinformation given to the defendant made his plea involuntary).

**United States v. Pierre**, 120 F.3d 1153 (11th Cir. 1997) (Plea was involuntary when defendant mistakenly believed he had preserved an appellate issue).

**\*United States v. Cazares**, 121 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 1997) (Plea to drug conspiracy was not an admission of an alleged overt act).

**United States v. Toothman**, 137 F.3d 1393 (9th Cir. 1998) (Plea could be withdrawn based upon misinformation about guideline range).

**United States v. Gobert**, 139 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 1998) (Insufficient factual basis existed for defendant's guilty plea).

**United States v. Gigot**, 147 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 1998) (Failure to admonish defendant of elements of offense and possible penalties rendered plea involuntary).

**United States v. Thorne**, 153 F.3d 130 (4th Cir. 1998) (Court failed to advise defendant of the nature of supervised release).

**\*United States v. Odedo**, 154 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 1998) (Defendant not admonished about nature of charges).

**United States v. Suarez**, 155 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 1998) (Defendant was not admonished as to nature of charges).

**\*United States v. Andrades**, 169 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1999) (Court failed to determine whether defendant understood basis for plea, and failed to receive sufficient factual basis).

**United States v. Blackwell**, 172 F.3d 129 (2d Cir.), *superceded*, 199 F.3d 623 (1999) (Omissions during colloquy voided plea).

**United States v. Gomez-Orozco**, 188 F.3d 422 (7th Cir. 1999) (Proof of citizenship required withdrawal of guilty plea to illegal re-entry charge).

**United States v. Guess**, 203 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000) (Record did not support guilty plea to firearm charge).

**United States v. James**, 210 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 2000) (Plea colloquy did not cover elements of offense).

**United States v. Barrios-Gutierrez**, 255 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 567 (2001) (Defendant was not informed of statutory maximum).

**United States v. Santo**, 225 F.3d 92 (1st Cir. 2000) (Court understated mandatory minimum at plea).

**United States v. Ruiz**, 229 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 2000) (Withdrawal of guilty plea for newly discovered evidence should be allowed for "fair and just reason").

**United States v. Castro-Gomez**, 233 F.3d 684 (1st Cir. 2000) (Court did not inform defendant he was subject to mandatory life sentence).

**United States v. Markin**, 263 F.3d 491 (6th Cir. 2001) (Judge cannot participate in negotiations once guilty plea is entered).

**United States v. Lujano-Perez**, 274 F.3d 219 (5th Cir. 2001) (Court must explain nature of the charges).

## Timely Prosecution

**United States v. Verderame**, 51

F.3d 249 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 954 (1995) (Trial court denied repeated, unopposed motions for continuance in drug conspiracy case, with only 34 days to prepare).

**United States v. Jones**, 56 F.3d 581 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Open-ended continuance violated the Speedy Trial Act).

**United States v. Mejia**, 69 F.3d 309 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Court denied a one-day continuance of trial, preventing live evidence on suppression issue).

**United States v. Foxman**, 87 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 1996) (Trial court was required to decide whether the government had delayed indictment to gain a tactical advantage).

**United States v. Johnson**, 120 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 1997) (Continuance because of court conflict violated Speedy Trial Act).

**United States v. Lloyd**, 125 F.3d 1263 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (112-day continuance was not justified).

**United States v. Hay**, 122 F.3d 1233 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (48-day recess for jurors' vacations was abuse of discretion).

**United States v. Graham**, 128 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 1997) (Eight-year delay between indictment and trial violated the Sixth Amendment).

**United States v. Gonzales**, 137 F.3d 1431 (10th Cir. 1998) ("Ends of justice" continuance could not be retroactive).

**\*United States v. Barnes**, 159 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 1999) (Open-ended continuance violated speedy trial).

**United States v. Hall**, 181 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 1999) (Continuances for codefendants violated Speedy Trial Act).

**United States v. Moss**, 217 F.3d

426 (6th Cir. 2000) (Unnecessary delay while motion was pending required dismissal with prejudice).

**\*United States v. Ramirez-Cortez**, 213 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2000) (Failure to make "ends of justice" findings for speedy trial exclusion).

**United States v. Hardemann**, 249 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 2001) (Delay to arraign co-defendant violated speedy trial).

**United States v. Nguyen**, 262 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2001) (Court did not explain denial of continuance when defendant asked for new counsel).

## Jury Selection

**Cochran v. Herring**, 43 F. 1404 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1073 (1996) (*Batson* claim should have been granted).

**\*United States v. Jackman**, 46 F.3d 1240 (2d Cir. 1995) (Selection procedure resulted in an under-representation of minorities in jury pool).

**United States v. Beckner**, 69 F.3d 1290 (5th Cir. 1995) (Defendant established prejudicial pretrial publicity that could not be cured by voir dire).

**\*United States v. Annigoni**, 96 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1996) (Court's erroneous denial of a defendant's proper peremptory challenge required automatic reversal).

**Turner v. Marshall**, 121 F.3d 1248 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1153 (1998) (Prosecutor's stated reason for striking a black juror was pretextual).

**\*Tankleff v. Senkowski**, 135 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 1998) (Race-based peremptory challenges were not subject to harmless error review).

**\*United States v. Ovalle**, 136 F.3d

1092 (6th Cir. 1998) (Plan which resulted in removal of 1 in 5 blacks from panel, violated Jury Selection and Service Act).

**United States v. Tucker**, 137 F.3d 1016 (8th Cir. 1998) (Evidence of juror bias and misconduct required evidentiary hearing).

**Campbell v. Louisiana**, 523 U.S. 392 (1998) (White defendant could challenge discrimination against black grand jurors).

**United States v. Blotcher**, 142 F.3d 728 (4th Cir. 1998) (Court improperly denied defendant's race neutral peremptory challenge).

**Dyer v. Calderon**, 151 F.3d 970 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1033 (1998) (Juror's lies raised presumption of bias).

**\*United States v. Herndon**, 156 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 1998) (Denial of hearing on potentially biased juror).

**United States v. McFerron**, 163 F.3d 952 (6th Cir. 1999) (Defendant did not have burden of persuasion on neutral explanation for peremptory strike).

**United States v. Serino**, 163 F.3d 91 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1999) (Defendant gave valid neutral reason for striking juror).

**Jordan v. Lefevre**, 206 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2000) (Merely finding strike of juror was rational does not determine whether there was purposeful discrimination).

**United States v. Gonzalez**, 214 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2000) (Juror who equivocated about fairness to sit in drug case should have been excused).

**McClain v. Prunty**, 217 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2000) (Judge must investigate whether purposeful jury

selection discrimination occurred).

## Closure

**United States v. Doe**, 63 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 1995) (Court summarily denied a defendant's request to close the trial for his safety).

**\*Okonkwo v. Lacy**, 104 F.3d 21 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 958 (1998) (Record did not support closure of proceedings during testimony of undercover officer).

**\*Pearson v. James**, 105 F.3d 828 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 958 (1998) (Closure of courtroom denied the right to a public trial).

**Judd v. Haley**, 250 F.3d 1308 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Total closure of courtroom violated right to public trial).

## Jury Trial

**\*United States v. Robertson**, 45 F.3d 1423 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 844 (1995) (No evidence that the defendant intelligently and voluntarily waived a jury trial).

**\*United States v. Ajmal**, 67 F.3d 12 (2d Cir. 1995) (Jurors should not question witnesses as a matter of course).

**United States v. Duarte-Higareda**, 113 F.3d 1000 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Court failed to question a non-English speaking defendant over a jury waiver).

**United States v. Iribe-Perez**, 129 F.3d 1167 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Jury was erroneously told that the defendant would plead guilty before start of trial).

**\*United States v. Saenz**, 134 F.3d 697 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Court's questioning of a witness gave

appearance of partiality).

**United States v. Tilghman**, 134 F.3d 414 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Court's questioning of defendant denied him a fair trial).

**United States v. Mortimer**, 161 F.3d 240 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 1999) (Trial judge was absent during defense closing).

**United States v. Weston**, 206 F.3d 9 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Use of anti-psychotic medication was not supported by evidence of danger to defendant or others).

**United States v. Gomez-Lepe**, 207 F.3d 623 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Magistrate Judge could not preside over polling jury in felony case).

## Confrontation

**United States v. Hamilton**, 46 F.3d 271 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 1995) (Prosecution witnesses were not unavailable when they could have testified under government immunity).

**United States v. Lachman**, 48 F.3d 586 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1995) (Government exhibits were properly excluded on grounds of confusion and waste).

**United States v. Strother**, 49 F.3d 869 (2d Cir. 1995) (A statement, inconsistent with the testimony of a government witness, should have been admitted).

**United States v. Forrester**, 60 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 1995) (Agent improperly commented on the credibility of another witness).

**\*United States v. Paguio**, 114 F.3d 928 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Missing witness's self-incriminating statement should have been admitted).

**United States v. Lis**, 120 F.3d 28 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Ledger connecting another to the crime was not

hearsay).

**United States v. Beydler**, 120 F.3d 985 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Unavailable witness's statement, incriminating the defendant, was inadmissible hearsay).

**\*United States v. Foster**, 128 F.3d 949 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Exculpatory grand jury testimony should have been admitted at trial).

**United States v. Williams**, 133 F.3d 1048 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Statements by informant to agent were hearsay).

**United States v. Lowery**, 135 F.3d 957 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Court erroneously excluded defendant's evidence that he encouraged witnesses to tell the truth).

**United States v. Moses**, 137 F.3d 894 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Allowing child-witness to testify by video violated right to confrontation).

**United States v. Marsh**, 144 F.3d 1229 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Admission of complaints by defendant's customers denied confrontation).

**United States v. Mitchell**, 145 F.3d 572 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 1998) (Anonymous note incriminating defendant was inadmissible hearsay).

**United States v. Cunningham**, 145 F.3d 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Unredacted tapes violated confrontation).

**United States v. Sanchez-Lima**, 161 F.3d 545 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Exclusion of deposition denied right to put on defense).

**United States v. Saenz**, 179 F.3d 686 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Defendant was entitled to show his knowledge of victim's prior acts of violence to support self-defense).

**United States v. Torres-Ortega**, 184 F.3d 1128 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999)

(Admission of grand jury testimony violated confrontation).

**United States v. Samaniego**, 187 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 1999) (There was no foundation for admission of business records).

**United States v. Sumner**, 204 F.3d 1182 (8th Cir. 2000) (Child's statement to psychologist was hearsay).

**United States v. Byrd**, 208 F.3d 592 (7th Cir. 2000) (Defendant was prevented from introducing shackles and restraints in which he was held during alleged assault on officers).

**\*Lajoie v. Thompson**, 217 F.3d 663 (9th Cir. 2000) (Notice requirement of rape shield law violated right of confrontation).

**United States v. Rhynes**, 218 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2000) (Sequestered defense witness should not have been excluded for violating rule).

**Schaal v. Gammon**, 233 F.3d 1103 (8th Cir. 2000) (Admission of videotape of victim's statements violated confrontation).

**Agnew v. Leibach**, 250 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2001) (Bailiff was improperly called to testify about defendant's confession).

**United States v. Wells**, 262 F.3d 455 (5th Cir. 2001) (Witness could not testify to contents of destroyed business records).

## Impeachment

**\*United States v. Cooks**, 52 F.3d 101 (5th Cir. 1995) (Court refused to allow government witness to be questioned about jeopardy from same charges).

**United States v. Acker**, 52 F.3d 509 (4th Cir. 1995) (Prior consistent statements were not admissible because they were made prior to the

witness having a motive to fabricate).

**United States v. Tory**, 52 F.3d 207 (9th Cir. 1995) (Witness' statement that the robber wore sweat pants was inconsistent with prior statement that he wore white pants).

**United States v. Rivera**, 61 F.3d 131 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1132 (1997) (Court should not have admitted an attached factual stipulation when allowing defendant to impeach a witness with a plea agreement).

**United States v. Blum**, 62 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 1995) (Court excluded evidence relevant to the witness' motive to testify).

**United States v. Platero**, 72 F.3d 806 (10th Cir. 1995) (Court excluded cross examination of a sexual assault victim's relationship with a third party).

**United States v. Landerman**, 109 F.3d 1053 (5th Cir.), *modified*, 116 F.3d 119 (1997) (The defendant should have been allowed to question a witness about a pending state charge).

**\*United States v. Mulinelli-Nava**, 111 F.3d 983 (1st Cir. 1997) (Court limited cross examination regarding theory of defense).

**United States v. James**, 169 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1999) (Records of victim's violence were relevant to self-defense).

**Schledwitz v. United States**, 169 F.3d 1003 (6th Cir. 1999) (Defendant could expose bias of witness involved in investigation).

**United States v. Manske**, 186 F.3d 770 (7th Cir. 1999) (Defendant could cross-examine witness about his threats to other witnesses about their testimony).

**United States v. Beckman**, 222 F.3d 512 (8th Cir. 2000) (Limiting defense cross violated confrontation).

**United States v. Doherty**, 233 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2000) (Court should have admitted evidence of agent's threat against defense witness).

**Wilkerson v. Cain**, 233 F.3d 886 (5th Cir. 2000) (Limit on questioning eye witness violated confrontation).

**Redmond v. Kingston**, 240 F.3d 590 (7th Cir. 2001) (Defendant was prohibited from cross examining rape victim about prior false claim).

**Thomas v. Hubbard**, 273 F.3d 116 (9th Cir. 2001) (Defendant should have been able to question officers about missing witness who was suspect).

## Co-Defendant's Statements

**United States v. Montilla-Rivera**, 115 F.3d 1060 (1st Cir. 1997) (Exculpatory affidavits of co-defendants, who claimed Fifth Amendment privilege, were newly discovered evidence regarding a motion for new trial).

**\*United States v. Glass**, 128 F.3d 1398 (10th Cir. 1997) (Introduction of a co-defendant's incriminating statement violated *Bruton*).

**\*United States v. Peterson**, 140 F.3d 819 (9th Cir. 1998) (*Bruton* violation occurred).

**Gray v. Maryland**, 523 U.S. 185 (1998) (*Bruton* prohibited redacted confession, which obviously referred to defendant).

**Lilly v. Virginia**, 527 U.S. 116 (1999) (Admission of accomplice confession denied confrontation).

**United States v. McCleskey**, 228 F.3d 640 (6th Cir. 2000) (Admission of non-testifying co-defendant's statement denied confrontation).

**United States v. Reynolds**, 268 F.3d 572 (8th Cir. 2001) (Evidence against co-defendant was inadmissible when he admitted underlying crime).

## Misconduct

**United States v. Flores-Chapa**, 48 F.3d 156 (5th Cir. 1995) (Prosecutor referred to excluded evidence).

**\*United States v. Kallin**, 50 F.3d 689 (9th Cir. 1995) (Prosecutor commented upon the defendant's failure to come forward with an explanation).

**United States v. Gaston-Brito**, 64 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 1995) (Hearing was necessary to determine if an agent improperly gestured toward defense table in front of the jury).

**United States v. Tenorio**, 69 F.3d 1103 (11th Cir. 1995) (Prosecutor commented upon the defendant's silence).

**\*United States v. Cannon**, 88 F.3d 1495 (8th Cir. 1996) (Prosecutor's reference to black defendants, who were not from North Dakota, as "bad people," was not harmless).

**\*United States v. Roberts**, 119 F.3d 1006 (1st Cir. 1997) (Prosecutor commented on defendant's failure to testify and misstated burden of proof).

**United States v. Rudberg**, 122 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 1997) (Prosecutor vouched for a witness' credibility in closing argument).

**United States v. Johnston**, 127 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 1997) (Prosecutor commented on the defendant's failure to testify and asked questions highlighting defendant's silence).

**United States v. Wilson**, 135 F.3d 291 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1143 (1998) (Prosecutor's argument that defendant was a murderer prejudiced drug case).

**\*United States v. Vavages**, 151 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 1998) (Prosecutor coerced defense witness into refusing to testify).

**United States v. Maddox**, 156 F.3d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Prosecutor's argument referred to matters not in evidence).

**Agardu v. Portuondo**, 159 F.3d 98 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1016 (1999) (Prosecutor claimed that defendant was less credible without arguing any facts in support).

**United States v. Rodrigues**, 159 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Improper closing by prosecutor).

**United States v. Richardson**, 161 F.3d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Improper remarks by prosecutor).

**United States v. Golding**, 168 F.3d 700 (4th Cir. 1999) (Prosecutor threatened defense witness with prosecution if she testified).

**United States v. Francis**, 170 F.3d 546 (6th Cir. 1999) (Cumulative acts of prosecutorial misconduct).

**\*Smith v. Groose**, 205 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 985 (2000) (Prosecution argued contradictory facts in two different but related trials).

**United States v. Cabrera**, 222 F.3d 590 (9th Cir. 2000) (Repeated references to "Cuban drug dealers").

**United States v. Beeks**, 224 F.3d 741 (8th Cir. 2000) (Prosecutor's questioning violated prior in limine ruling).

**United States v. LaPage**, 231 F.3d

488 (9th Cir. 2000) (Prosecutor used perjured testimony).

**Sandoval v. Calderon**, 241 F.3d 765 (9th Cir. 2001) (Prosecution referred to religious authority for sentence).

**United States v. Sigma Intern. Inc.**, 244 F.3d 841 (11th Cir. 2001) (Prosecutorial misconduct before grand jury invalidated indictment).

**United States v. Adkinson**, 247 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2001) (Bad faith inclusion of bank fraud charge warranted reimbursement of attorney's fees).

**United States v. Rodriguez**, 260 F.3d 416 (5th Cir. 2001) (Prosecutor argued jury could infer guilt from post-arrest silence).

## Extraneous Evidence

**United States v. Rodriguez**, 45 F.3d 302 (9th Cir. 1995) (Evidence of flight a month after crime was inadmissible to prove an intent to possess).

**\*United States v. Blackstone**, 56 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 1995) (Drug use was improperly admitted in felon in possession case).

**United States v. Moorehead**, 57 F.3d 875 (9th Cir. 1995) (Evidence that the defendant was a drug dealer should not have been admitted in firearms case).

**United States v. Aguilar-Aranceta**, 58 F.3d 796 (1st Cir. 1995) (Prior misdemeanor drug conviction was more prejudicial than probative in a distribution case).

**United States v. McDermott**, 64 F.3d 1448 (10th Cir. 1995) (Evidence that the defendant threatened a witness should not have

been admitted because it was not clear the defendant knew the person was a witness).

**\*United States v. Vizcarra-Martinez**, 66 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1995) (Evidence of personal use of methamphetamine at the time of the defendant's arrest was inadmissible).

**\*United States v. Elkins**, 70 F.3d 81 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Evidence of the defendant's gang membership was improperly elicited).

**United States v. Irvin**, 87 F.3d 860 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 903 (1997) (Court should have excluded testimony that the defendant was in a motorcycle gang).

**\*United States v. Utter**, 97 F.3d 509 (11th Cir. 1996) (In arson case, it was error to admit evidence that the defendant threatened to burn his tenant's house or that the defendant's previous residence had burned).

**\*United States v. Lecompte**, 99 F.3d 274 (8th Cir. 1996) (Evidence of prior contact with alleged victims did not show plan or preparation).

**\*United States v. Jobson**, 102 F.3d 214 (6th Cir. 1996) (Court failed to adequately limit evidence of the defendant's gang affiliation).

**United States v. Murray**, 103 F.3d 310 (3rd Cir. 1997) (Evidence that an alleged murderer had killed before was improperly admitted in a CCE case).

**\*United States v. Fulmer**, 108 F.3d 1486 (1st Cir. 1997) (Allowing testimony about bombing of federal building was prejudicial).

**United States v. Paguio**, 114 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 1997) (Evidence that the defendant previously applied for a loan was prejudicial).

**Old Chief v. United States**, 519

U.S. 172 (1997) (Court abused its discretion by refusing to accept the defendant's offer to stipulate that he was a felon, in a trial for being a felon in possession of a firearm).

**\*United States v. Sumner**, 119 F.3d 658 (8th Cir. 1997) (When defendant denied the crime occurred, prior acts to prove intent were not admissible).

**United States v. Millard**, 139 F.3d 1200 (8th Cir. 1998) (Prior drug convictions erroneously admitted).

**United States v. Mulder**, 147 F.3d 703 (8th Cir. 1998) (Bank's routine practice was irrelevant to fraud prosecution).

**\*United States v. Ellis**, 147 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 1998) (Testimony about destructive power of explosives was prejudicial).

**\*United States v. Merino-Balderrama**, 146 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1998) (Pornographic films should not have been displayed in light of defendant's offer to stipulate).

**United States v. Spinner**, 152 F.3d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Letter containing evidence of prior bad acts should not have been admitted).

**United States v. Polasek**, 162 F.3d 878 (5th Cir. 1999) (Convictions of defendant's associates should not have been admitted).

**\*United States v. Jean-Baptiste**, 166 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 1999) (Admission of prior bad act was plain error absent evidence it actually occurred).

**United States v. Lawrence**, 189 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 1999) (Testimony regarding defendant's marriage was more prejudicial than probative).

**United States v. Heath**, 188 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1999) (Previous arrest was not admissible prior bad act).

**United States v. Anderson**, 188 F.3d 886 (7th Cir. 1999) (Prior bad act was more than 10 years old).

**United States v. Walton**, 217 F.3d 443 (7th Cir. 2000) (Evidence of prior unsolved theft was irrelevant).

**United States v. Jimenez**, 214 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2000) (Description of defendant's prior conviction involving firearm was not harmless).

**United States v. Varoudakis**, 233 F.3d 113 (1st Cir. 2000) (Evidence of previous fire was more prejudicial than probative).

**United States v. Grimes**, 244 F.3d 375 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Narratives found on defendant's computer should not have been introduced in child porn case).

## Identification

**United States v. Emanuele**, 51 F.3d 1123 (3rd Cir. 1995) (Identification, made after seeing the defendant in court, and after a failure to identify him before, should have been suppressed).

**\*United States v. Hairston**, 64 F.3d 491 (9th Cir. 1995) (Alibi instruction was required when evidence of alibi was introduced in the government's case).

**\*Lyons v. Johnson**, 99 F.3d 499 (2d Cir. 1996) (Court denied the defendant the right to display a witness in support of a misidentification defense).

**United States v. Montgomery**, 100 F.3d 1404 (8th Cir. 1996) (Co-defendants should have been required to try on clothing, after defendant had to, when the government put ownership at issue).

## Expert Testimony

**\*United States v. Boyd**, 55 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Officer relied upon improper hypothetical in drug case).

**United States v. Shay**, 57 F.3d 126 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1995) (Defense expert should have been allowed to explain that the defendant had a disorder that caused him to lie).

**United States v. Posado**, 57 F.3d 428 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Per se rule prohibiting polygraph evidence was abolished by *Daubert*).

**United States v. Childress**, 58 F.3d 693 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1098 (1996) (Defense expert should have been allowed to testify on the defendant's inability to form intent).

**United States v. Velasquez**, 64 F.3d 844 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 1995) (Defense expert should have been allowed to testify on the limitations of handwriting analysis).

**Rupe v. Wood**, 93 F.3d 1434 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1142 (1997) (Exclusion of a witness' failed polygraph results denied due process).

**United States v. Hall**, 93 F.3d 1337 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Expert testimony that the defendant had a disorder that may have caused him to make a false confession should have been admitted).

**Calderon v. U.S. District Court**, 107 F.3d 756 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 907 (1997) (CJA funds for expert could be used to exhaust a state claim).

**\*United States v. Morales**, 108 F.3d 1031 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (The court should not have excluded a defense expert on bookkeeping).

**\*Lindh v. Murphy**, 124 F.3d 899

(7<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1069 (1998) (Defendant was not allowed to examine the state's psychiatrist about allegations of sexual improprieties with patients).

**\*United States v. Word**, 129 F.3d 1209 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Lay testimony of abuse to defendant was admissible).

**United States v. Dixon**, 185 F.3d 393 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Court improperly refused instruction on insanity based upon expert testimony).

**United States v. Barnette**, 211 F.3d 803 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Defendant was prevented from presenting expert to answer government's rebuttal expert testimony).

**\*United States v. Smithers**, 212 F.3d 306 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Court excluded expert on identification without a hearing).

**\*United States v. Velarde**, 214 F.3d 1204 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Court failed to make reliability determination about government's expert testimony).

**United States v. Henke**, 222 F.3d 633 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Lay witness could not testify to what defendant knew about regulatory scheme).

**\*United States v. Vallejo**, 237 F.3d 1008 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Exclusion of defense experts regarding defendant's ability to communicate in English).

**United States v. Watson**, 260 F.3d 301 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2001) (Drug agents could not give opinion about defendant's intent).

**United States v. McGowan**, 274 F.3d 1251 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Testimony about nature of drug trafficking organizations was inadmissible).

## Entrapment

**United States v. Reese**, 60 F.3d 660 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Entrapment instruction failed to tell the jury that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed).

**United States v. Bradfield**, 113 F.3d 515 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Evidence supported an instruction on entrapment).

**\*United States v. Duran**, 133 F.3d 1324 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Entrapment instruction failed to place burden on government).

**United States v. Thomas**, 134 F.3d 975 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Defendant may present good prior conduct to support entrapment defense).

**United States v. Sligh**, 142 F.3d 761 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Court failed to give instruction on entrapment).

**\*United States v. Burt**, 143 F.3d 1215 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Entrapment instruction failed to place proper burden on government).

**United States v. Gamache**, 156 F.3d 1 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1998) (Jury should have been instructed on entrapment).

**United States v. Poehlman**, 217 F.3d 692 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Defendant was entrapped as matter of law).

**\*United States v. Brooks**, 215 F.3d 842 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Drug defendant was entrapped as matter of law).

## Defenses

**United States v. Tory**, 52 F.3d 207 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Defense was prevented from arguing that an absence of evidence implied that evidence did not exist).

**United States v. Ruiz**, 59 F.3d 1151 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1133 (1996) (Defendant has the right to have the jury instructed on his theory of defense).

**United States v. Hall**, 77 F.3d 398 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Defendant's counsel was improperly prohibited from addressing general principles of reasonable doubt in closing).

**\*United States v. Talbott**, 78 F.3d 1183 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Jury instruction could not shift the burden to the defendant on the issue of self-defense).

**\*United States v. Otis**, 127 F.3d 829 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Duress instruction was omitted).

**\*United States v. Benally**, 146 F.3d 1232 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Defendant was entitled to instructions on self-defense and lesser included offense).

**United States v. Sanchez-Lima**, 161 F.3d 545 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Self-defense instruction should have been given).

**United States v. Smith**, 217 F.3d 746 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Court failed to instruct upon defendant's theory of the case).

**United States v. Crowley**, 236 F.3d 104 (2<sup>d</sup> Cir. 2000) (Jury should have been charged on voluntary intoxication).

## Jury Instructions

**Smith v. Singletary**, 61 F.3d 815 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1140 (1996) (Court failed to give mitigating instruction in a capital case).

**\*United States v. Birbal**, 62 F.3d

456 (2<sup>d</sup> Cir. 1995) (Jurors were instructed they "may" acquit, rather than they "must" acquit, if the government did not meet its burden).

**\*United States v. Ahmad**, 101 F.3d 386 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Jury instructions in a pollution case implied strict liability rather than the requirement of knowledge).

**United States v. Rodgers**, 109 F.3d 1138 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (If a court allows a jury to review trial testimony, there must be a cautionary instruction not to place upon it undue emphasis).

**\*United States v. Bancalari**, 110 F.3d 1425 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Instruction omitted the element of intent).

**United States v. Doyle**, 130 F.3d 523 (2<sup>d</sup> Cir. 1997) (Erroneous instructions stated that presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt were to protect only the innocent).

**United States v. Wilson**, 133 F.3d 251 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Jury instructions did not adequately impose burden of proving knowledge).

**\*United States v. Romero**, 136 F.3d 1268 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) ("Law of the case" required element named in jury instruction to be proven).

**\*United States v. Rossomando**, 144 F.3d 197 (2<sup>d</sup> Cir. 1998) (Ambiguous jury instruction misled jurors).

**United States v. Lampkin**, 159 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Jury improperly instructed that government could not prosecute juvenile witnesses).

**United States v. Prawl**, 168 F.3d 622 (2<sup>d</sup> Cir. 1999) (Court refused to instruct jury not to consider co-defendants guilty plea).

**Jenkins v. Huchinson**, 221 F.3d 679 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Reasonable doubt instruction improperly indicated it was only advisory).

**United States v. Chanthadara**, 230 F.3d 1237 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Judge said that defense was a "smoke screen").

**\*United States v. Gardner**, 244 F.3d 784 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Failure to instruct on uncorroborated accomplice testimony).

## Deliberations

**United States v. Berroa**, 46 F.3d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (*Allen* charge varied from ABA standard).

**United States v. Harber**, 53 F.3d 236 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Case agent's report was taken into the jury room).

**United States v. Burgos**, 55 F.3d 933 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (*Allen* charge asked jurors to think about giving up firmly held beliefs).

**\*United States v. Araujo**, 62 F.3d 930 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Verdict was taken from eleven jurors when the twelfth was delayed by car trouble).

**\*United States v. Ottersburg**, 76 F.3d 137 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir.), *clarified*, 81 F.3d 657 (1996) (Plain error to allow alternate jurors to deliberate with the jury).

**\*United States v. Manning**, 79 F.3d 212 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 853 (1996) (Court should have given a "yes or no" answer to a deadlocked jury's question, rather than refer them to the testimony).

**United States v. Berry**, 92 F.3d 597 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Jury improperly considered a transcript, rather than the actual tape).



**United States v. Benedict**, 95 F.3d 17 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Trial court should not have accepted partial verdicts).

**United States v. Thomas**, 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 1997) (Juror should not have been dismissed when he did not admit to refusing to follow the law during deliberations).

**United States v. Hall**, 116 F.3d 1253 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Exposure of jury to unrelated, but prejudicial matters, required new trial).

**United States v. Keating**, 147 F.3d 895 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Reasonable probability of juror prejudice required new trial).

**United States v. Lampkin**, 159 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Jury was allowed to consider tapes not in evidence).

**United States v. Beard**, 161 F.3d 1190 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Error to substitute alternates for jurors after deliberations began).

**United States v. Spence**, 163 F.3d 1280 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Juror dismissed during deliberations without just cause).

**United States v. Eastern Medical Billing, Inc.**, 230 F.3d 600 (3rd Cir. 2000) (*Allen* charge was coercive).

**United States v. Lloyd**, 269 F.3d 228 (3rd Cir. 2001) (Court overstepped authority to inquire into juror's decision).

## Variance

**United States v. Gilbert**, 47 F.3d 1116 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 851 (1995) (Proof of failure to comply with a directive of a federal officer was in variance with the original charge).

**United States v. Johansen**, 56 F.3d 347 (2d Cir. 1995) (Variance when none of the conspiracies alleged

were proven).

**\*United States v. Tsinhahijinnie**, 112 F.3d 988 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Fatal variance between pleading and proof of date of offense).

**\*United States v. Mohrbacher**, 182 F.3d 1041 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Variance between charge of transporting child pornography and proof of mere receipt).

**United States v. Ramirez**, 182 F.3d 544 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Variance between charge and proof in firearm case).

**United States v. Shipsey**, 190 F.3d 1081 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Court's instruction to jury constructively amended indictment).

**United States v. Pige**, 197 F.3d 879 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Jury instruction constructively amended indictment).

**United States v. McDermott**, 245 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2001) (Variance between conspiracy charged and proof at trial).

## Speech / Assembly

**United States v. Popa**, 187 F.3d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Conviction for harassing AUSA with racial epithets violated first amendment).

**United States v. Baugh**, 187 F.3d 1037 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Assembly at national park could not be conditioned on promise not to trespass).

**United States v. Frandsen**, 212 F.3d 1231 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Requiring permit to make public expression of views was illegal prior restraint).

**United States v. Poocha**, 259 F.3d 1077 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Use of profanity to a park ranger was not

disturbing the peace).

## Interstate Commerce

**United States v. Box**, 50 F.3d 345 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 714 (1996) (Extortion of interstate travelers did not involve interstate commerce).

**\*United States v. Cruz**, 50 F.3d 714 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Shipment of firearm in interstate commerce must occur after the firearm is stolen).

**\*United States v. Quigley**, 53 F.3d 909 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Liquor store robbery did not affect interstate commerce).

**United States v. Grey**, 56 F.3d 1219 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Use of currency did not involve interstate commerce).

**United States v. Lopez**, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) ("Gun-free school zone" law found unconstitutional).

**\*United States v. Barone**, 71 F.3d 1442 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (False checks did not involve interstate commerce).

**United States v. Denalli**, 90 F.3d 444 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Arson of neighbor's home did not involve interstate commerce).

**\*United States v. Gaydos**, 108 F.3d 505 (3rd Cir. 1997) (Insufficient evidence that arson involved interstate commerce).

**United States v. Izydore**, 167 F.3d 213 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (No evidence that phone calls crossed state lines for wire fraud interstate nexus).

**United States v. Wilson**, 182 F.3d 737 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Insufficient evidence of child pornography shipped in interstate commerce).

**\*United States v. Spinner**, 180 F.3d 514 (3rd Cir. 1999) (Indictment failed to allege element of interstate commerce).

**United States v. Causey**, 185 F.3d 407 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1277 (2000) (No federal nexus shown regarding communication).

**Jones v. United States**, 539 U.S. 848 (2000) (Residence that was not used for commercial purpose did not involve interstate commerce in arson case).

**\*United States v. Wang**, 222 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2000) (Robbery of cash did not have sufficient impact on interstate commerce).

**United States v. King**, 227 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2000) (Arson did not affect interstate commerce).

**United States v. Corp**, 236 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2001) (Photos of child taken by defendant did not have sufficient connection to interstate commerce).

**United States v. Johnson**, 246 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2001) (Plea lacked factual basis for connection to interstate commerce).

**United States v. Turner**, 272 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 2001) (Robbery of individual who ran illegal lottery did not affect interstate commerce).

## Conspiracy

**United States v. Newton**, 44 F.3d 913 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 857 (1995) (Leasing residence for a drug dealer did not prove the defendant's participation in a conspiracy).

**United States v. Lluesma**, 45 F.3d 408 (11th Cir. 1995) (Proof of conspiracy to export stolen vehicles was insufficient against defendant who did odd jobs for mid-level conspirator).

**United States v. Flores-Chapa**, 48 F.3d 156 (5th Cir. 1995) (Defendant's beeper and personal use of drugs was not proof of conspiracy).

**United States v. Lewis**, 53 F.3d 29 (4th Cir. 1995) (Court failed to instruct the jury that conspiring with a government agent alone required an acquittal).

**United States v. Ross**, 58 F.3d 154 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 954 (1995) (Defendant was not a conspirator merely because he sold drugs at same location as conspirators).

**United States v. Kim**, 65 F.3d 123 (9th Cir. 1995) (To be guilty of conspiracy, the defendant must have known of the illegal structuring).

**United States v. Lopez-Ramirez**, 68 F.3d 438 (11th Cir. 1995) (Insufficient evidence of conspiracy as to defendant who was present in home where 65 kilos of cocaine was delivered and then seized).

**United States v. Palazzolo**, 71 F.3d 1233 (6th Cir. 1995) (Verdict form failed to distinguish the object of the conspiracy).

**United States v. Martinez**, 83 F.3d 371 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 998 (1997) (Defendant's conviction for conspiracy to possess cocaine was reversed because there was no evidence beyond defendant's intent to help coconspirators steal money).

**\*United States v. Thomas**, 114 F.3d 403 (3rd Cir. 1997) (Insufficient evidence of a conspiracy, when it was not shown that defendant knew cocaine was in bag he was to retrieve).

**United States v. Cruz**, 127 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 1997) (A defendant could not join a conspiracy that was already completed).

**United States v. Jensen**, 141 F.3d 830 (8th Cir. 1998) (Insufficient evidence of drug conspiracy).

**United States v. Paul**, 142 F.3d 836 (5th Cir. 1998) (Insufficient evidence of conspiracy to import).

**United States v. Toler**, 144 F.3d 1423 (11th Cir. 1998) (Insufficient evidence that defendant participated in conspiracy).

**United States v. Thomas**, 150 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 1998) (Defendant was entitled to instruction that buyer/seller relationship is not itself a conspiracy).

**United States v. Garcia**, 151 F.3d 1243 (9th Cir. 1998) (Gang relationship alone did not support conspiracy).

**United States v. Gore**, 154 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 1998) (Buyer/seller relationship did not establish conspiracy).

**\*United States v. Idowu**, 157 F.3d 265 (3rd Cir. 1999) (Insufficient evidence that defendant knew purpose of drug conspiracy).

**United States v. Meyer**, 157 F.3d 1067 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1070 (1999) (Court should have instructed that mere buyer/seller relationship did not establish conspiracy).

**United States v. Morillo**, 158 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 1999) (Insufficient evidence of drug conspiracy).

**United States v. Dekle**, 165 F.3d 826 (11th Cir. 1999) (Insufficient evidence that doctor conspired to illegally distribute drugs).

**United States v. Mercer**, 165 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 1999) (Insufficient evidence of a drug conspiracy).

**\*United States v. Vaghela**, 169 F.3d 729 (11th Cir. 1999) (Insufficient evidence of conspiracy).

to obstruct justice).

**United States v. Torres-Ramirez**, 213 F.3d 978 (7th Cir. 2000) (Purchase of drugs and knowledge of conspiracy did not make defendant a co-conspirator).

**\*United States v. Estrada-Macias**, 218 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2000) (Mere presence and knowledge of a conspiracy were insufficient to convict).

**\*United States v. Fuchs**, 218 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2000) (No instruction that conspiracy must have occurred during statute of limitations).

**United States v. Rivera**, 273 F.3d 751 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Mere buyer/seller relationship was not conspiracy).

## Firearms

**Staples v. United States**, 511 U.S. (1994) (When defendant was prohibited from possessing a particular kind of firearm, it must be proven he knew that he possessed that type of firearm).

**United States v. Herron**, 45 F.3d 340 (9th Cir. 1995) (Defendant whose civil rights were restored was not prohibited from possessing a firearm).

**United States v. Caldwell**, 49 F.3d 251 (6th Cir. 1995) (Licensed dealer who sold firearm away from business was not guilty of unlicensed sale).

**United States v. Anderson**, 59 F.3d 1323 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 999 (1995) (Multiple §924 (c) convictions must be based on separate predicate offenses).

**Bailey v. United States**, 516 U.S. 137 (1995) (Passive possession of firearm was insufficient to prove "use" of firearm during drug trafficking crime).

**United States v. Kelly**, 62 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 1995) (Defendant whose civil rights were restored was not prohibited from possessing a firearm).

**\*United States v. Hayden**, 64 F.3d 126 (3rd Cir. 1995) (Defendant should have been allowed to introduce evidence of his low intelligence and illiteracy to rebut allegations that he knew he was under indictment when buying a firearm).

**United States v. Edwards**, 90 F.3d 199 (7th Cir. 1996) (Defendant must be shown to know his shotgun is shorter than 18 inches in length in order to be liable for failure to register the weapon).

**\*United States v. Rogers**, 94 F.3d 1519 (11th Cir.), cert.denied, 522 U.S. 252 (1998) (Government failed to prove a defendant knew that he possessed a fully automatic weapon).

**\*United States v. Atcheson**, 94 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1140 (1997) (Each §924 (c) conviction must be tied to a separate predicate crime).

**United States v. Indelicato**, 97 F.3d 627 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 835 (1997) (Defendant who did not lose his civil rights could not be felon in possession).

**\*United States v. Casterline**, 103 F.3d 76 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 835 (1997) (Felon in possession charge may not proven solely by ownership).

**United States v. Paul**, 110 F.3d 869 (2d Cir. 1997) (Court failed to give duress instruction in a felon in possession case).

**United States v. Taylor**, 113 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 1997) (Firearm found in shared home was not shown to be possessed by the defendant).

**United States v. Stephens**, 118 F.3d 479 (6th Cir. 1997) (Separate caches of cocaine possessed on the same day, did not support two separate gun enhancements).

**\*United States v. Westmoreland**, 122 F.3d 431 (7th Cir. 1997) (Agent's presentation of inoperable firearm to defendant, immediately before arrest, did not support possession of a firearm in relation to drug crime).

**United States v. Gonzalez**, 122 F.3d 1383 (11th Cir. 1997) (Evidence did not support possession of a firearm while a fugitive from justice).

**United States v. Norman**, 129 F.3d 1393 (10th Cir. 1997) (Felon whose civil rights had been restored was not illegally in possession of firearm).

**United States v. Perez**, 129 F.3d 1340 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Jury should have been required to decide the type of firearm).

**United States v. Graves**, 143 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 1998) (Accessory to felon in possession had to know co-defendant was a felon and possessed firearm).

**United States v. Spinner**, 152 F.3d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Failure to show firearm was semiautomatic assault weapon).

**United States v. Benboe**, 157 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 1999) (Firearm conviction not supported by evidence).

**United States v. Sanders**, 157 F.3d 302 (5th Cir. 1999) (Insufficient evidence that defendant carried firearm).

**United States v. Mount**, 161 F.3d 675 (11th Cir. 1999) (Weapon found in stairwell was not carried).

**United States v. Gilliam**, 167 F.3d

628 (D.C.), cert. denied, 526 U.S. (1999) (Failed to prove prior conviction in felon in possession).

**\*United States v. Aldrich**, 169 F.3d 526 (8th Cir. 1999) (Vacating related gun count required entire new trial on others).

**\*United States v. Meza-Corrales**, 183 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1999) (Felon had civil rights restored and could possess firearms).

**United States v. Martin**, 180 F.3d 965 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Insufficient evidence of constructive possession of a firearm).

**United States v. Fowler**, 198 F.3d 808 (11th Cir. 1999) (Restoration of rights by state allowed firearms possession).

**United States v. Howard**, 214 F.3d 361 (2d Cir. 2000) ( Jury could not infer defendant knew firearm was stolen merely because he was felon, or that firearm was found next to one with obliterated serial number).

**\*United States v. Adams**, 214 F.3d 724 (6th Cir. 2000) (Simultaneous possession of firearm and ammunition may result in only one conviction).

**United States v. Coleman**, 208 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2000) (Insufficient evidence that defendant knew co-defendant had a firearm for armed bank robbery conviction).

**United States v. Mason**, 233 F.3d 619 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Felon could get instruction that firearm was briefly possessed for legal purpose).

**\*United States v. Hishaw**, 235 F.3d 565 (10th Cir. 2000) (Insufficient evidence that defendant possessed firearm found under his car seat).

**United States v. Sanders**, 240 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2001) (Evidence did

not prove defendant knew that weapon had silencer).

**United States v. Finley**, 245 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2001) (Single gun could not be used for two possessions during a drug trafficking crime).

**United States v. Atkins**, 276 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2001) (Evidence was insufficient that defendant had validly waived counsel to domestic violence charge that was basis for federal firearms offense).

**United States v. Laskie**, 258 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Honorable discharge” of drug offense in Nevada counts as a set aside of the prior conviction).

**United States v. Osborne**, 262 F.3d 486 (5th Cir. 2001) (Civil rights were restored even though state law was later changed).

**United States v. Fix**, 264 F.3d 532 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Granting new trial for state conviction removed disability to possess firearm).

## Extortion

**\*United States v. Tomblin**, 46 F.3d 1369 (5th Cir. 1995) (Private citizen did not act under color of official right).

**\*United States v. Scotti**, 47 F.3d 1237 (2d Cir. 1995) (Facilitating payment of a debt was not extortion).

**\*United States v. Delano**, 55 F.3d 720 (2d Cir. 1995) (Services or labor were not property within the meaning of a statute used as a predicate for RICO).

**\*United States v. Wallace**, 59 F.3d 333 (2d Cir. 1995) (Demanding payment from fraudulent check scheme was not extortion).

**United States v. Allen**, 127 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 1997) (Insufficient evidence of extortionate credit when terms of loan were consensual).

**United States v. Houston**, 217 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2000) (No specific finding of express threat of death).

## Drugs

**United States v. Jones**, 44 F.3d 860 (10th Cir. 1995) (Car passenger was not shown to have knowledge of the drugs).

**\*United States v. Johnson**, 46 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Government failed to prove distribution within 1000 feet of a school).

**United States v. Medjuck**, 48 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1995) (Government failed to show a nexus to U.S. territory).

**United States v. Valerio**, 48 F.3d 58 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1995) (Insufficient evidence that the drugs were intended for distribution).

**\*United States v. Andujar**, 49 F.3d 16 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1995) (There was no more evidence than mere presence).

**United States v. Jones**, 49 F.3d 628 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Inferences derived from standing near open trunk did not prove knowledge).

**\*United States v. Polk**, 56 F.3d 613 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Use of the defendant’s car and home were insufficient to show participation).

**United States v. Horsley**, 56 F.3d 50 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Distribution of cocaine is lesser included offense of distribution of cocaine within a 1,000 feet of a school, and the jury should be charged accordingly).

**\*United States v. Kitchen**, 57 F.3d

516 (7th Cir. 1995) (Momentarily picking up a kilo for inspection was not possession).

**United States v. Kearns**, 61 F.3d 1422 (9th Cir. 1995) (Brief sampling of marijuana was not possession).

**\*United States v. Lucien**, 61 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 1995) (Instruction on simple possession should have been given in a drug distribution case).

**\*United States v. Applewhite**, 72 F.3d 140 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1227 (1996) (Government failed to prove distribution within a 1000 feet of a school).

**United States v. Derose**, 74 F.3d 1177 (11th Cir. 1996) (Insufficient evidence that the defendant took possession of marijuana when he did not have key to car where drugs were stored).

**United States v. Baron**, 94 F.3d 1312 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1047 (1996) (Court committed plain error by giving a deliberate ignorance instruction when there was no evidence that the defendant knew, or avoided learning, of secreted drugs).

**United States v. Wozniak**, 126 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 1997) (Charge on marijuana impermissibly amended indictment alleging cocaine and methamphetamine).

**\*United States v. Hunt**, 129 F.3d 739 (5th Cir. 1997) (There was insufficient evidence of an intent to distribute).

**United States v. Soto-Silva**, 129 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 1997) (Deliberate ignorance instruction was not warranted for charge of maintaining premises for drug distribution).

**United States v. Brito**, 136 F.3d 397 (5th Cir. 1998) (Evidence that defendant was asked to find drivers did not prove constructive possession of hidden marijuana).

**United States v. Lombardi**, 138 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 1998) (Evidence did not support conviction for using juvenile to commit drug offense).

**United States v. Leonard**, 138 F.3d 906 (11th Cir. 1998) (Insufficient evidence that passenger of vehicle possessed drugs or gun hidden in car).

**United States v. Sampson**, 140 F.3d 585 (4th Cir. 1998) (Insufficient evidence that drug offense occurred within 1000 feet of a playground or public housing).

**United States v. Delagarza-Villarreal**, 141 F.3d 133 (5th Cir. 1997) (Insufficient evidence of possession of marijuana where defendant never took control).

**\*United States v. Ortega-Reyna**, 148 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1998) (Insufficient evidence that drugs hidden in borrowed truck were defendant's).

**\*United States v. Quintanar**, 150 F.3d 902 (8th Cir. 1998) (No evidence that defendant exercised control over contraband).

**United States v. Valadez-Gallegos**, 162 F.3d 1256 (10th Cir. 1999) (Passenger was not linked to contraband in vehicle).

**United States v. Edwards**, 166 F.3d 1362 (11th Cir. 1999) (Insufficient evidence of drug possession where defendant merely picked up package).

**United States v. Orduno-Aguilera**, 183 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 1999) (Insufficient evidence that substance was illegal steroid).

**United States v. Monger**, 185 F.3d 574 (9th Cir. 1999) (Court should have instructed on lesser offense of simple possession).

**United States v. Garcia-Sanchez**, 189 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 1999) (Drug

quantities not supported by evidence where defendant did not agree to sell from specific location).

**United States v. Owusu**, 199 F.3d 329 (6th Cir. 2000) (Insufficient evidence where defendant did not arrange for distribution).

**United States v. Bryce**, 208 F.3d 346 (2d Cir. 2000) (Uncorroborated admissions were insufficient to establish possession or distribution).

**United States v. Corral-Gastelum**, 240 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2001) (Mere proximity to drugs did not prove possession).

## CCE / RICO

**\*United States v. Barona**, 56 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1092 (1996) (Insufficient to find a CCE when there were persons who could not be legally counted as supervisees).

**United States v. Witek**, 61 F.3d 819 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1060 (1996) (Mere buyer-seller relationship did not satisfy management requirement for conviction of engaging in continuing criminal enterprise).

**United States v. Russell**, 134 F.3d 171 (3rd Cir. 1998) (CCE instruction omitted unanimity requirement).

**United States v. To**, 144 F.3d 737 (11th Cir. 1998) (Insufficient evidence of RICO and Hobbs Act violations).

**United States v. Polanco**, 145 F.3d 536 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1071 (1999) (Insufficient evidence that defendant murdered victim to maintain position in CCE).

**Richardson v. United States**, 526 U.S. 813 (1999) (Jury must agree on specific violations).

**United States v. Frega**, 179 F.3d 793 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1191 (2000) (Court's instruction failed to identify potential predicate acts in RICO case).

**United States v. Glover**, 179 F.3d 1300 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Role as organizer or leader must be based on managing persons, not merely assets).

**United States v. McSwain**, 197 F.3d 472 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Conspiracy to manufacture and distribute are lesser offenses of CCE).

**United States v. Brown**, 202 F.3d 691 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Omission of instruction requiring unanimity on specific violations reversed CCE conviction).

**United States v. Desena**, 260 F.3d 150 (2<sup>d</sup> Cir. 2001) (Talk of "war" and "grabbing shirts" did not support CCE).

## Fraud / Theft

**United States v. Cannon**, 41 F.3d 1462 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 823 (1995) (Proof of false documents to elicit payment on government contracts was insufficient when documents did not contain false information).

**\*United States v. Manarite**, 44 F.3d 1407 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 851 (1995) (Mailings were not related to scheme to defraud).

**\*United States v. Altman**, 48 F.3d 96 (2<sup>d</sup> Cir. 1995) (Mailings were too remote to be related to the fraud).

**United States v. Hammoude**, 51 F.3d 288 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1128 (1995) (Composite stamp did not make a visa a counterfeit document).

**United States v. Wilbur**, 58 F.3d

1291 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Physician who stole drugs did not obtain them by deception).

**\*United States v. Klingler**, 61 F.3d 1234 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Customs broker's misappropriation of funds did not involve money of the United States).

**\*United States v. Valentine**, 63 F.3d 459 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Government agent must convert more than \$5000 in a single year to violate 18 U.S.C. §666).

**\*United States v. Campbell**, 64 F.3d 967 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Bank officers did not cause a loss to the bank).

**United States v. Lewis**, 67 F.3d 225 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (State chartered foreign bank was not covered by the bank fraud statute).

**United States v. Johnson**, 71 F.3d 139 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Court improperly instructed the jury that a credit union was federally insured).

**United States v. Mueller**, 74 F.3d 1152 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Filing a misleading affidavit to delay a civil proceeding involving a bank was not bank fraud).

**United States v. Morris**, 81 F.3d 131 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Sale of a phone that disguised its identity was not fraud in connection with an access device).

**\*United States v. Allen**, 88 F.3d 765 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1202 (1997) (Government failed to prove that a credit union was federally insured).

**United States v. Wester**, 90 F.3d 592 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1996) (Loan's face value was not the proper amount of loss when collateral was pledged).

**United States v. McMinn**, 103 F.3d

216 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1997) (Defendant was not in the business of selling stolen goods unless he sold goods stolen by others).

**\*United States v. Czubinski**, 106 F.3d 1069 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1997) (Merely browsing confidential computer files was not wire fraud or computer fraud).

**United States v. Tencer**, 107 F.3d 1120 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 960 (1997) (Insurance checks that were not tied to fraudulent claims were insufficient proof of mail fraud).

**\*United States v. Todd**, 108 F.3d 1329 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Defendant was improperly prohibited from introducing evidence that employees implicitly agreed that pension funds could be used to save the company).

**\*United States v. Cochran**, 109 F.3d 660 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (There was insufficient proof of mail fraud without evidence of misrepresentation).

**United States v. Parsons**, 109 F.3d 1002 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Money that defendant legitimately spent as postal employee could not be counted toward fraud).

**\*United States v. Grossman**, 117 F.3d 255 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Personal use of funds from business loan was not bank fraud).

**\*United States v. Cross**, 128 F.3d 145 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1076 (1998) (Fixing cases was not mail fraud just because court mailed disposition notices).

**United States v. LaBarbara**, 129 F.3d 81 (2<sup>nd</sup> Cir. 1997) (Government failed to show use of mails in a fraud case).

**United States v. Defries**, 129 F.3d 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (The court should have given an advice of counsel instruction on an

embezzlement count).

**United States v. Baird**, 134 F.3d 1276 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Instruction failed to charge jury that contractor was only liable for falsity of costs it claimed to have incurred).

**\*United States v. Adkinson**, 135 F.3d 1363 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Dismissal of underlying bank fraud undermined convictions for conspiracy, mail and wire fraud schemes, and money laundering).

**\*United States v. Rodriguez**, 140 F.3d 163 (2<sup>nd</sup> Cir. 1998) (Insufficient evidence of bank fraud).

**\*United States v. Ely**, 142 F.3d 1113 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Government failed to prove defendant was a bank director as charged in the indictment).

**\*United States v. D'Agostino**, 145 F.3d 69 (2<sup>nd</sup> Cir. 1998) (Diverted funds were not taxable income for purposes of tax evasion).

**\*United States v. Schnitzer**, 145 F.3d 721 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Impermissible theory of fraud justified new trial).

**\*United States v. Shotts**, 145 F.3d 1289 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1177 (1999) (Bail bond license was not property within meaning of mail fraud statute).

**United States v. Hughey**, 147 F.3d 423 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Passing bad checks was not unauthorized use of an access device).

**\*United States v. Evans**, 148 F.3d 477 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1112 (1999) (No evidence that mailings advanced fraudulent scheme).

**United States v. Blasini-Lluberas**, 169 F.3d 57 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1999) (There was no misapplication of bank funds on a debt not yet due).

**United States v. Silkman**, 156 F.3d 833 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Administrative tax assessment was not conclusive proof of tax deficiency).

**United States v. Adkinson**, 158 F.3d 1147 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Insufficient evidence of fraud).

**United States v. Rodrigues**, 159 F.3d 439 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Insufficient evidence of fraud and theft).

**United States v. Hanson**, 161 F.3d 896 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Factual questions about bank fraud should have been decided by jury).

**United States v. Laljie**, 184 F.3d 180 (2<sup>d</sup> Cir. 1999) (No evidence that checks were altered, that signatures were not genuine, or that they were intended to victimize bank).

**United States v. Lindsay**, 184 F.3d 1138 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Insufficient evidence that bank was FDIC insured).

**United States v. Harstel**, 199 F.3d 812 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Receipt of mailed bank statements was not a fraudulent use of mails).

**United States v. Principe**, 203 F.3d 849 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Possession of counterfeit document should not have been sentenced under trafficking guidelines).

**United States v. Tucker**, 217 F.3d 960 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Loss to IRS occurred when taxes were due, not when conspiracy began).

**Cleveland v. United States**, 531 U.S. 12 (2000) (Victim must actually receive the item for there to be mail fraud).

**United States v. Gee**, 226 F.3d 885 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Insufficient evidence of mail and wire fraud where defendant did not conceal material facts).

**\*United States v. Rahseparian**, 231 F.3d 1257 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Jury could not reasonably infer that father knew of son's fraudulent business scheme).

**United States v. Odiodio**, 244 F.3d 398 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (No bank fraud when bank not subject to civil liability).

**United States v. Howerter**, 248 F.3d 198 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2001) (Person authorized to write checks did not commit bank larceny by cashing checks payable to himself).

**United States v. Ali**, 266 F.3d 1242 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (FDIC insurance at time of trail did not prove bank was insured at time of fraud).

## Money Laundering

**United States v. Newton**, 44 F.3d 913 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Proof of aiding and abetting money laundering conspiracy was insufficient against defendant who leased house on behalf of conspirator).

**\*United States v. Rockelman**, 49 F.3d 418 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Evidence failed to show the transaction was intended to conceal illegal proceeds).

**\*United States v. Hove**, 52 F.3d 233 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Failure to instruct the jury that the defendant must know his structuring was illegal, was plain error).

**United States v. Torres**, 53 F.3d 1129 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 883 (1995) (Buying a car with drug proceeds was not money laundering).

**United States v. Willey**, 57 F.3d 1374 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1029 (1995) (Transferring money between accounts was

insufficient evidence of an intent to conceal).

**\*United States v. Wynn**, 61 F.3d 921 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1015 (1995) (Insufficient evidence that the defendant knew his structuring was unlawful).

**\*United States v. Dobbs**, 63 F.3d 391 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Undisguised money used for family needs was not money laundering).

**United States v. Nelson**, 66 F.3d 1036 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Defendant's eagerness to complete the transaction was not sufficient to prove an attempt).

**\*United States v. Kramer**, 73 F.3d 1067 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1011 (1996) (Transaction that occurred outside of the United States was not money laundering).

**United States v. Phipps**, 81 F.3d 1056 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Not money laundering to deposit a series of checks that are less than \$10K each).

**United States v. Pipkin**, 114 F.3d 528 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 821 (1996) (Defendant did not knowingly structure a currency transaction).

**\*United States v. High**, 117 F.3d 464 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Money laundering instruction omitted the element of willfulness).

**United States v. Garza**, 118 F.3d 278 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Money laundering proof was insufficient where defendants neither handled nor disposed of drug proceeds).

**\*United States v. Christo**, 129 F.3d 578 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Check kiting scheme was not money laundering).

**\*United States v. Shoff**, 151 F.3d 889 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Purchase with proceeds of fraud was not money

laundering).

**United States v. Calderon**, 169 F.3d 718 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Insufficient evidence of money laundering).

**United States v. Zvi**, 168 F.3d 49 (2<sup>d</sup> Cir. 1999) (Charging domestic and international money laundering based on the same transactions was multiplicitous).

**\*United States v. Brown**, 186 F.3d 661 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Insufficient evidence of money laundering when no proof checks were connected to fraud).

**United States v. Anderson**, 189 F.3d 1201 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Titling vehicle in mother's name did not prove money laundering).

**\*United States v. Messner**, 197 F.3d 330 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Coded language did not support money laundering conviction).

**United States v. Miranda**, 197 F.3d 1357 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Ex post facto application of money laundering conspiracy statute)

**United States v. Olaniyi-Oke**, 199 F.3d 767 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Purchase of computers for personal use was not money laundering).

**United States v. Loe**, 248 F.3d 449 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (When legitimate and illegal funds were commingled, government had to prove illegal funds were laundered).

**United States v. Marshall**, 248 F.3d 525 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Purchase of personal property was not money laundering).

## Aiding and Abetting

**United States v. de la Cruz-Paulino**, 61 F.3d 986 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1995)

(Moving packages of contraband and statements about police was not aiding and abetting).

**United States v. Luciano-Mosquero**, 63 F.3d 1142 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1234 (1996) (No evidence that the defendant took steps to assist in the use of a firearm).

**\*United States v. Fulbright**, 105 F.3d 443 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1236 (1997) (Government failed to prove anyone committed the principle crime with requisite intent).

**United States v. Beckner**, 134 F.3d 714 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Lawyer was not shown to have knowledge of client's fraud for aiding and abetting).

**\*United States v. Nelson**, 137 F.3d 1094 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 231 (1999) (Evidence did not support aiding and abetting use and carrying of a firearm during crime of violence).

**United States v. Stewart**, 145 F.3d 273 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Insufficient evidence that passenger aided and abetted drug possession without intent to distribute).

**United States v. Garcia-Guizar**, 160 F.3d 511 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Insufficient evidence of aiding and abetting when no money found on defendant and was not present at sale).

**United States v. Wilson**, 160 F.3d 732 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 828 (1999) (Insufficient evidence of aiding and abetting murder or retaliation where defendant only told shooter of victim's location).

**United States v. Barnett**, 197 F.3d 138 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Insufficient evidence of conspiring or aiding and abetting murder for hire when defendant did not share intent with principal).



## Perjury

**United States v. Hairston**, 46 F.3d 361 (4th Cir. 1995) (Ambiguity in the question to the defendant was insufficient for perjury conviction).

**United States v. Dean**, 55 F.3d 640 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1184 (1996) (Statement that was literally true did not support a perjury conviction).

**United States v. Jaramillo**, 69 F.3d 388 (9th Cir. 1995) (Defendant charged with perjury by inconsistent statements must have made both under oath).

**United States v. Shotts**, 145 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 1998) (Evasive, but true, answer was not perjury).

## False Statements

**United States v. Gaudin**, 515 U.S. 506 (1995) (Materiality is an element of a false statement case)

**United States v. Bush**, 58 F.3d 482 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (No material false statements or omissions were made to receive union funds).

**United States v. Rothhammer**, 64 F.3d 554 (10th Cir. 1995) (Contractual promise to pay was not a factual assertion).

**United States v. Campbell**, 64 F.3d 967 (5th Cir. 1995) (Defendant's misrepresentations to a bank were not material).

**\*United States v. McCormick**, 72 F.3d 1404 (9th Cir. 1995) (Defendant who did not read documents before signing them was not guilty of making a false statement).

**United States v. Barrett**, 111 F.3d 947 (D.C.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 867 (1997) (Defendant's

misrepresentation to court was not a material false statement).

**United States v. Farmer**, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) (Answer to ambiguous question did not support conviction for false declaration).

**United States v. Hodge**, 150 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 1998) (Insufficient evidence of false statements when no certification made on documents).

**United States v. Sorenson**, 179 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 1999) (Defendant's false statements were contained in an unsigned loan application).

**United States v. Walker**, 191 F.3d 326 (2d Cir. 1999) (Insufficient proof that defendant was responsible for more than 100 false immigration documents).

## Contempt

**United States v. Mathews**, 49 F.3d 676 (11th Cir. 1995) (Certification of contempt must be filed by the judge who witnessed the alleged contempt).

**United States v. Forman**, 71 F.3d 1214 (6th Cir. 1995) (Attorney was not in contempt for releasing grand jury materials in partner's case).

**United States v. Brown**, 72 F.3d 25 (5th Cir. 1995) (Lawyer's comments on a judge's trial performance were not reckless).

**United States v. Mottweiler**, 82 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 1996) (Defendant must have acted willfully to be guilty of criminal contempt).

**United States v. Grable**, 98 F.3d 251 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1059 (1997) (Contempt order could not stand in light of incorrect advice about Fifth Amendment privilege).

**Bingman v. Ward**, 100 F.3d 653

(9<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1188 (1997) (Magistrate judge did not have the authority to hold a litigant in criminal contempt).

**United States v. Neal**, 101 F.3d 993 (4th Cir. 1996) (Plain error for a judge to prosecute and preside over a contempt action).

**United States v. Vezina**, 165 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 1999) (Insufficient evidence of criminal contempt of a TRO dealing with a third party).

## Immigration

**\*United States v. Bahena-Cardenas**, 70 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1995) (Alien who was not served with warrant of deportation, was not guilty of illegal reentry).

**United States v. Dieguimde**, 119 F.3d 933 (11th Cir. 1997) (Order of deportation did not consider defendant's request for political asylum).

**United States v. Gallardo-Mendez**, 150 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 1998) (Prior guilty plea did not prevent defendant from contesting non-citizen status).

**\*United States v. Pacheco-Medina**, 212 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2000) (Defendant who was captured a few yards from border did not enter United States).

**United States v. Rodriguez-Fernandez**, 234 F.3d 498 (8th Cir. 2000) (Without detention order in place, defendant did not escape from INS).

**\*United States v. Ruiz-Lopez**, 234 F.3d 445 (9th Cir. 2000) (Presence at border is not the same as being found in the United States).

**Steele v. Blackman**, 236 F.3d 130 (3rd Cir. 2001) (Alien's misdemeanor conviction for distributing less than 30 grams of

marijuana was not aggravated felony).

**United States v. Matsumaru**, 244 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2001) (Insufficient evidence that attorney set up practice to evade immigration laws).

**United States v. Herrera-Ochoa**, 245 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 2001) (Defendant's presence at trial could not be evidence that he had previously entered United States).

**United States v. Portillo-Mendoza**, 273 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2001) (Prior California DUI was not aggravated felony).

## Pornography

**\*United States v. Hilton**, 167 F.3d 61 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 844 (1999) (Whether defendant believed pornographic actors were over 18 years old was a jury question).

**United States v. McKelvey**, 203 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2000) (Single film strip with three images was not "3 or more matters" under child porn statute).

**United States v. Henriques**, 234 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2000) (At least three images must travel in interstate commerce for child pornography conviction).

## Violent Crimes

**United States v. Main**, 113 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 1997) (In an involuntary manslaughter case, the harm must have been foreseeable within the risk created by the defendant).

**\*United States v. Wicklund**, 114 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1997) (Murder for hire required a receipt or promise of pecuniary value).

**United States v. Yoakum**, 116 F.3d 1346 (10th Cir. 1997) (Defendant's interest in a business, and his presence near time of fire, did not support arson conviction).

**United States v. Spruill**, 118 F.3d 221 (4th Cir. 1997) (Insufficient evidence that a threat would be carried out by fire or explosive).

**\*Smith v. Horn**, 120 F.3d 400 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 1997) (First degree murder instruction failed to require specific intent).

**United States v. Bordeaux**, 121 F.3d 1187 (8th Cir. 1997) (Jury instruction in an abusive sexual contact case failed to require force).

**United States v. Estrada-Fernandez**, 150 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 1998) (Simple assault is lesser included offense of assault with deadly weapon).

**United States v. Guerrero**, 169 F.3d 933 (5th Cir. 1999) (Inconclusive identification did not support bank robbery conviction).

**Jones v. United States**, 526 U.S. 227 (1999) (Jury must decide whether carjacking resulted in serious bodily injury or death).

**United States v. Wood**, 207 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2000) (Doctor's injection of drug to treat patient did not prove premeditated murder).

**United States v. Hood**, 210 F.3d 660 (6th Cir. 2000) (Assault without verbal threat was minor rather than aggravated).

**United States v. Baker**, 262 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2001) (Instruction allowed conviction without proving all elements of murder with intent to obstruct justice).

## Assimilative Crimes

**United States v. Devenport**, 131 F.3d 604 (7th Cir. 1997) (Violation of a state civil provision was not covered by Assimilative Crimes Act).

**United States v. Sylve**, 135 F.3d 680 (9th Cir. 1998) (Deferred prosecution was available for charge under Assimilative Crimes Act).

**United States v. Waites**, 198 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2000) (Conduct that was regulated federally should not have been prosecuted under Assimilative Crimes Act).

**United States v. Provost**, 237 F.3d 934 (8th Cir. 2001) (Federal government cannot prosecute state crime occurring on lands that are no longer in Indian hands).

**United States v. Prentice**, 273 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2001) (Parties cannot stipulate victim was Indian when they were not).

## Miscellaneous Crimes

**United States v. Rodriguez**, 45 F.3d 302 (9th Cir. 1995) (Possessing an object designed to be used as a weapon, while in prison, was a specific intent crime).

**United States v. Alkhabaz**, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997) (Transmission of e-mail messages of torture, rape and murder did not fall within federal statute without public availability).

**United States v. Grigsby**, 111 F.3d 806 (11th Cir. 1997) (Importation of prohibited wildlife products fell under exceptions to statute).

**United States v. Nyemaster**, 116 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 1997)

(Insufficient evidence of being under the influence of alcohol in a federal park).

**United States v. Cooper**, 121 F.3d 130 (3rd Cir. 1997) (Evidence did not support conviction for tampering with a witness).

**\*United States v. King**, 122 F.3d 808 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Crime of mailing threatening communication required a specific intent to threaten).

**\*United States v. Valenzano**, 123 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 1997) (Obtaining a credit report without permission was not a crime).

**\*United States v. Farrell**, 126 F.3d 484 (3rd Cir. 1997) (Urging a witness to “take the Fifth” was not witness tampering).

**United States v. Rapone**, 131 F.3d 188 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Evidence was insufficient to show retaliation).

**United States v. Romano**, 137 F.3d 677 (1st Cir. 1998) (Law prohibiting sale of illegally taken wildlife did not cover the act of securing guide services for hunting trip).

**\*United States v. Cottman**, 142 F.3d 160 (3rd Cir. 1998) (Government is not a victim under Victim Witness Protection Act).

**\*United States v. Copeland**, 143 F.3d 1439 (11th Cir. 1998) (Government contractor was not bribed under federal statute).

**United States v. Walker**, 149 F.3d 238 (3rd Cir. 1998) (Prison worker was not a corrections officer).

**United States v. Truesdale**, 152 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1998) (Insufficient evidence of illegal gambling).

**United States v. Davis**, 183 F.3d 231 (3rd Cir. 1999) *amended* 197 F.3d 662 (same). (Insufficient

evidence of obstruction of justice and conspiracy without proof of knowledge of pending proceeding).

**United States v. Bad Wound**, 203 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2000) (Defendant not liable for acts of coconspirators prior to entering conspiracy).

**United States v. Naiman**, 211 F.3d 40 (2d Cir. 2000) (Receipt of the funds is a jurisdictional element of commercial bribery).

**United States v. Giles**, 213 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2000) (Counterfeit labels were not goods within meaning of statute).

**United States v. Neuhausser**, 241 F.3d 460 (6th Cir. 2001) (Insufficient evidence to support Travel Act conviction).

**United States v. Ortlieb**, 274 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. 2001) (Obstruction of justice requires wrongful intent).

## Juveniles

**United States v. Juvenile Male #1**, 47 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1995) (Court properly refused transfer of a juvenile for adult proceedings).

**United States v. Doe**, 53 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 1995) (Unadjudicated juvenile could not be sentenced to supervised release).

**United States v. Juvenile Male PWM**, 121 F.3d 382 (8th Cir. 1997) (Court imposed sentence beyond comparable guideline for adults).

**Impounded Juvenile I.H., Jr.**, 120 F.3d 457 (3rd Cir. 1997) (Failure to provide juvenile records barred transfer to adult status).

**\*United States v. Male Juvenile**, 148 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 1998)

(Certification for juvenile by AUSA was invalid).

**United States v. Juvenile LWO**, 160 F.3d 1179 (8th Cir. 1999) (Judge may not consider unadjudicated incidents at juvenile transfer hearing in assessing nature of charges or prior record).

**United States v. Juvenile (RRA-A)**, 229 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2000) (Agents failed to notify juvenile’s parents or Mexican consulate).

## Sentencing - General

**United States v. Rivera**, 58 F.3d 600 (11th Cir. 1995) (Defendant was sentenced on the wrong count).

**\*United States v. Knowles**, 66 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1149 (No proof the conspiracy extended to the date when guidelines became effective).

**\*Page v. United States**, 69 F.3d 482 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Court failed to require the parties to state objections at the sentencing hearing).

**\*United States v. Petty**, 80 F.3d 1384 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Record should have shown that the defendant read the presentence report and supplements).

**United States v. Torres**, 81 F.3d 900 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Disparity in coconspirators’ sentences was not justified, due to inconsistent factual findings).

**United States v. Burke**, 80 F.3d 314 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Presentence report could not be used as evidence when the defendant disputed the facts therein).

**\*United States v. Ivy**, 83 F.3d 1266 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 901 (1996) (Government’s failure to object to a presentence report

waived its complaint).

**\*United States v. Graham**, 83 F.3d 1466 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1132 (1997) (Adoption of the presentence report is not the same as express findings).

**United States v. Versaglio**, 85 F.3d 943 (2d Cir.), *modified*, 96 F.3d 637 (1996) (Criminal contempt offense cannot be punished by both fine and incarceration).

**United States v. Moskovits**, 86 F.3d 1303 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1120 (1997) (Court improperly considered a defendant's decision to go to trial rather than accept a plea offer).

**\*United States v. Tabares**, 86 F.3d 326 (3rd Cir. 1996) (Erroneous information did not justify a sentence at the top of the range).

**United States v. Farnsworth**, 92 F.3d 1001 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1034 (1996) (Adoption of the presentence report did not resolve disputed matters).

**\*United States v. Romero**, 122 F.3d 1334 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1025 (1998) (Court may not resolve factual disputes by merely adopting the presentence report).

**United States v. Ross**, 131 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 1997) (When defendant is convicted of a conspiracy count with multiple objects, the court must find beyond a reasonable doubt that a particular object was proven before applying that guideline section).

**United States v. Renteria**, 138 F.3d 1328 (10th Cir. 1998) (Lying at suppression hearing invoked accessory after fact guideline, not perjury).

**United States v. Washington**, 146 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 1998) (Court should not have relied upon

statements made pursuant to plea agreement).

**\*United States v. Myers**, 150 F.3d 459 (5th Cir. 1998) (Defendant was denied right of allocution).

**\*United States v. Davenport**, 151 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998) (Defendant did not waive right to review presentence report by absconding).

**United States v. Glover**, 154 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 1998) (Time credited toward a sentence did not lengthen total sentence).

**United States v. Casey**, 158 F.3d 993 (8th Cir. 1999) (Court must use guideline of charged offense).

**United States v. Partlow**, 159 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 1999) (Specific offense characteristics must be applied in the order listed).

**United States v. Weaver**, 161 F.3d 528 (8th Cir. 1999) (Typo on PSR recommending wrong base level was plain error).

**\*United States v. Allard**, 164 F.3d 1146 (8th Cir. 1999) (Offense characteristic for one offense could not be used for another).

**United States v. Robinson**, 164 F.3d 1068 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 848 (1999) (Hearsay statements used at sentencing were unreliable).

**United States v. Mueller**, 168 F.3d 86 (5th Cir. 1999) (Failure to disclose addendum to presentence report).

**United States v. Jones**, 168 F.3d 217 (10th Cir. 1999) (If the court allows an oral objection at sentencing then a finding on that objection must be made).

**United States v. Navarro**, 169 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 1999) (Cannot have sentencing via video conference

over defendant's objection).

**United States v. Mitchell**, 187 F.3d 331 (3rd Cir. 1999) (Court may not draw adverse inference from silence at sentencing).

**United States v. Swiney**, 203 F.3d 397 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1238 (2000) (Application of mandatory minimum is controlled by guidelines definition of relevant conduct, not *Pinkerton* doctrine).

**\*United States v. Kent**, 209 F.3d 1073 (8th Cir. 2000) (Sentence with mental health counseling was improper when there was no history of mental condition).

**United States v. Sadler**, 234 F.3d 368 (8th Cir. 2000) (Once district court lost jurisdiction over case it could not raise sentence).

**Shafer v. South Carolina**, 532 U.S. 36 (2001) (Whenever future dangerousness is at issue in a capital case, the jury must be informed about life sentence without possibility of parole).

**United States v. Fields**, 242 F.3d 393 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Kidnapping could not be enhanced by murder, when murder was not pled).

**United States v. Corporan-Cuevas**, 244 F.3d 199 (1st Cir. 2001) (Could not sentence beyond statutory maximum even when concurrent to legal sentence).

**United States v. Velasquez**, 246 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2001) (Sentence exceeded statutory maximum without proof of death or serious bodily injury).

**United States v. Thomas**, 246 F.3d 438 (8th Cir. 2001) (Sentence exceeded statutory maximum without proof of drug quantities).

**United States v. Bradford**, 246 F.3d 1107 (8th Cir. 2001) (Sentence violating statutory maximum cannot

be upheld because trial court might have stacked sentences to reach same result).

**United States v. Knight**, 266 F.3d 203 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2001) (It is plain error to apply wrong guideline section).

**United States v. Sumner**, 265 F.3d 532 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Court must make specific findings to include uncharged conduct).

**United States v. Martinez**, 274 F.3d 897 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Federal sentence under Assimilative Crimes Act was three times state sentence for same conduct).

**United States v. Taylor**, 277 F.3d 721 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Court must be assured information in report was not from defendant's immunized statements).

**United States v. Burgos**, 276 F.3d 1284 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Court could not penalize defendant for failure to cooperate in unrelated investigation).

## Grouping

**United States v. DiDomenico**, 78 F.3d 294 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1006 (1996) (Unadjudicated crimes could not be used to determine a combined offense level).

**\*United States v. Wilson**, 98 F.3d 281 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Money laundering and mail fraud should have been grouped together).

**\*United States v. Haltom**, 113 F.3d 43 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Mail fraud and tax fraud counts should have been grouped).

**\*United States v. Emerson**, 128 F.3d 557 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Money laundering and mail fraud should have been grouped).

**United States v. Kennedy**, 133

F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 911 (1998) (Court cannot refuse to group counts in order to give defendant a higher sentence).

**United States v. Marmolejos**, 140 F.3d 488 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 1998) (Clarifying amendment to grouping section justified post-sentence relief).

**\*United States v. Thomas**, 155 F.3d 833 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1048 (1998) (Court failed to group counts when threats were made to same victim).

**\*United States v. Martinez-Martinez**, 156 F.3d 936 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Reduction for non-drug conspiracy was mandated when object crime was not substantially complete).

**United States v. Levario-Quiroz**, 161 F.3d 903 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Offenses outside United States were not relevant conduct).

**United States v. Bartley**, 230 F.3d 667 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Drug and money laundering conspiracies should have been grouped).

**United States v. Nedd**, 262 F.3d 85 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2001) (Grouping determined by sets of victims, not individuals).

## Consecutive/ Concurrent

**United States v. Greer**, 91 F.3d 996 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Sentences at two proceedings on the same day were presumed concurrent).

**\*United States v. Fuentes**, 107 F.3d 1515 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Federal sentence which calculated a state sentence into the base offense level must be concurrent to the state sentence).

**\*United States v. Corona**, 108 F.3d 565 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997)

(Duplicitous sentences were not purely concurrent where each received a separate special assessment).

**United States v. Kikuyama**, 109 F.3d 536 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Court cannot rely on need for mental health treatment in fashioning a consecutive sentence).

**\*United States v. Nash**, 115 F.3d 1431 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1117 (1998) (Multiplicious counts must be sentenced concurrently and may not receive separate special assessments).

**\*United States v. Mendez**, 117 F.3d 480 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Simultaneous acts of possessing stolen mail and assaulting a mail carrier with intent to steal mail, could not receive cumulative punishments).

**\*McCarthy v. Doe**, 146 F.3d 118 (2<sup>d</sup> Cir. 1998) (BOP could designate state institution in order to implement presumptively concurrent sentence).

**\*United States v. Quintero**, 157 F.3d 1038 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Federal sentence could not be imposed consecutively to not yet imposed state sentence).

**United States v. Dorsey**, 166 F.3d 558 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 1999) (Court had authority to reduce a sentence in order to make it effectively concurrent to a previously imposed state sentence).

**United States v. Chea**, 231 F.3d 531 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Court was required to consider undischarged prior when fashioning sentence).

## Retroactivity

**\*United States v. Vazquez**, 53 F.3d 1216 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Case remanded to determine retroactive effect of favorable guideline, that

became effective after sentencing).

**\*United States v. Felix**, 87 F.3d 1057 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Amendment to the guidelines, which required a sentence based on a lower, negotiated quantity of drugs, was retroactive).

**United States v. Etherton**, 101 F.3d 80 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Retroactive amendment could be used to reduce supervised release).

**\*United States v. Ortland**, 109 F.3d 539 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 851 (1997) (Since mail fraud is not a continuing offense, an act committed after the date of an increase to guidelines did not require all counts to receive increased guidelines).

**United States v. Zagari**, 111 F.3d 307 (2<sup>d</sup> Cir. 1997) (Use of guidelines effective after conduct violated Ex Post Facto Clause).

**United States v. Armistead**, 114 F.3d 504 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 922 (1997) (Ex post facto application of a guideline provision).

**\*United States v. Aguilar-Ayala**, 120 F.3d 176 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Defendant was entitled to sentence reduction to mandatory minimum because of retroactive guideline amendment, regardless of whether safety valve applied).

**United States v. Bowen**, 127 F.3d 9 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1997) (Amendment defining hashish oil was applied ex post facto).

**\*United States v. Mussari**, 152 F.3d 1156 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Ex post facto application of criminal penalties to failure to pay child support).

**United States v. Comstock**, 154 F.3d 845 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Using guideline effective after commission of offense violated ex post facto

where amendment increased punishment).

**United States v. Schulte**, 264 F.3d 656 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Act was committed prior to effective date of statute).

## Sentencing - Marijuana

**\*United States v. Foree**, 43 F.3d 1572 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Seedlings and cuttings did not count as marijuana plants).

**\*United States v. Smith**, 51 F.3d 980 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Weight of wet marijuana was improperly counted).

**United States v. Caldwell**, 88 F.3d 522 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1048 (1996) (Extrapolation of drug quantities was error).

**\*United States v. Antonietti**, 86 F.3d 206 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Counting seedlings as marijuana plants to calculate the base offense level was plain error).

**United States v. Agis-Meza**, 99 F.3d 1052 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Court had an insufficient basis to calculate a quantity of marijuana based upon cash and money wrappers seized).

**\*United States v. Carter**, 110 F.3d 759 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Court abused its discretion in denying a motion for a reduction of a sentence over weight of wet marijuana).

**\*United States v. Mankiewicz**, 122 F.3d 399 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Marijuana that was rejected by defendants should not have been counted).

**United States v. Perulena**, 146 F.3d 1332 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Defendant was not responsible for marijuana imported before he joined conspiracy).

**\*United States v. Wyss**, 147 F.3d

631 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Drugs for personal use could not be counted toward distribution quantity).

**United States v. Butler**, 238 F.3d 1001 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Failure to allege marijuana quantity required resentencing to below enhanced statutory maximum).

**United States v. Garcia**, 242 F.3d 593 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Drug quantity was not proven).

## Sentencing - Meth

**\*United States v. Ramsdale**, 61 F.3d 825 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Improperly sentenced for D-methamphetamine rather than "L").

**United States v. Hamilton**, 81 F.3d 52 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (To be culpable or manufacturing a quantity of drugs, the defendant must have been personally able to make that quantity).

**United States v. McMullen**, 86 F.3d 135 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Judge could not determine the type of methamphetamine based upon the judge's experience, the price, or where the drugs came from).

**United States v. Gutierrez-Hernandez**, 94 F.3d 582 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (There was no presumption that three drug manufacturers were equally culpable).

**United States v. Cole**, 125 F.3d 654 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Defendant's testimony about his ability to manufacture was relevant).

**United States v. O'Bryant**, 136 F.3d 980 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Government has burden of proving more serious form of methamphetamine).

**\*United States v. Whitecotton**, 142 F.3d 1194 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Later

drug sales were not foreseeable to defendant).

**United States v. Asch**, 207 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2000) (Drugs for personal use could not be used to calculate range for distribution).

**United States v. Kroeger**, 229 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2000) (Environmental harm enhancement did not apply to meth case).

**\*United States v. Eschman**, 227 F.3d 886 (7th Cir. 2000) (Meth quantities should have been based upon defendant's own ability to produce).

**United States v. Munoz**, 233 F.3d (6th Cir. 2000) (Court could not count meth that defendant was incapable of delivering).

**United States v. Fraser**, 243 F.3d 473 (8th Cir. 2001) (Drug quantities for personal use must be excluded from distribution amounts).

**United States v. Hollingsworth**, 257 F.3d 871 (8th Cir. 2001) (Quantity of precursor chemical must be pled and proven beyond reasonable doubt to raise maximum punishment).

## Sentencing - Heroin

**\*United States v. Jinadu**, 98 F.3d 239 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1179 (1997) (Court could not rely on drug quantities alleged in indictment to determine a mandatory minimum).

**\*United States v. Shonubi**, 103 F.3d 1085 (2d Cir. 1997) (Multiplying quantity of seized drugs by number of previous trips was an inadequate measure).

**United States v. Rodriguez**, 112 F.3d 374 (8th Cir. 1997) (Insufficient evidence of drug

quantities).

**United States v. Gore**, 154 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 1998) (Possession and distribution of the same drugs may only be punished once).

**United States v. Marrero-Ortiz**, 160 F.3d 768 (1st Cir. 1999) (Insufficient evidence of drug quantity).

**United States v. Guevara**, 277 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2001) (When quantity of heroin was not pled or proven to jury, defendant is subject to range for heroin proven, not higher statutory maximum).

## Sentencing - Cocaine

**United States v. Reese**, 67 F.3d 902 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1228 (1996) (Drugs were not reasonably foreseeable to the defendant, nor within scope of agreed joint criminal activity).

**\*United States v. Howard**, 80 F.3d 1194 (7th Cir. 1996) (District court could not rely upon the probation officer's estimates of drug quantities without corroborating evidence).

**United States v. Acosta**, 85 F.3d 275 (7th Cir. 1996) (Drug quantity finding was insufficient).

**United States v. Nesbitt**, 90 F.3d 164 (6th Cir. 1996) (Court failed to resolve whether amounts of drugs were attributable during the time of the conspiracy).

**United States v. Hernandez-Santiago**, 92 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 1996) (Court failed to make a finding as to the scope of the defendant's agreement).

**\*United States v. Chalarca**, 95 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 1996) (When negotiated drug amount was not foreseeable, the court should use the

lowest possible quantity).

**In Re Sealed Case**, 108 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Court failed to make findings attributing all drugs to the defendant).

**\*United States v. Milledge**, 109 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 1997) (Evidence did not justify drug quantity finding).

**United States v. Jackson**, 115 F.3d 843 (11th Cir. 1997) (Package containing 1% cocaine and 99% sugar was not a mixture under the guidelines).

**\*United States v. Granados**, 117 F.3d 1089 (8th Cir. 1997) (The court failed to make specific drug quantity findings).

**\*United States v. Patel**, 131 F.3d 1195 (7th Cir. 1997) (Evidence was insufficient that seized money could support cocaine quantities).

**United States v. Bacallao**, 149 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1998) (No showing prior cocaine transactions were relevant conduct).

**United States v. Flowal**, 163 F.3d 956 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1509 (1999) (Drug quantity was arbitrarily chosen).

**\*United States v. Noble**, 246 F.3d 946 (7th Cir. 2001) (Failure to charge drug quantity was plain error).

## Sentencing - Crack

**United States v. Lawrence**, 47 F.3d 1559 (11th Cir. 1995) (Could not simply multiply sales outside of crackhouse times days defendant was in conspiracy).

**\*United States v. Hansley**, 54 F.3d

709 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 998 (1995) (Individual findings were needed to hold defendant responsible for all drugs in conspiracy).

**\*United States v. Lee**, 68 F.3d 1267 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (There were inadequate findings to support drug quantities. Crack abusers' credibility was questioned).

**United States v. Chisholm**, 73 F.3d 304 (11th Cir. 1996) (No factual basis that the defendant knew powder would be converted to crack).

**\*United States v. James**, 78 F.3d 851 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 844 (1996) (No proof that the cocaine base was crack for enhanced penalties to apply).

**United States v. Hill**, 79 F.3d 1477 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 858 (1996) (Different transactions almost two years apart, with the sole similarity being the type of drug, were not relevant conduct).

**United States v. Graham**, 83 F.3d 1466 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1132 (1997) (Court failed to make individualized findings of drug quantities).

**United States v. Frazier**, 89 F.3d 1501 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1222 (1997) (Sentencing findings did not support drug quantities attributed to the defendant).

**United States v. Byrne**, 83 F.3d 984 (8th Cir. 1996) (Drugs seized after the defendant was in custody could not be counted toward sentence).

**\*United States v. Tucker**, 90 F.3d 1135 (6th Cir. 1996) (Court did not make individualized findings as to each defendant in a drug conspiracy).

**United States v. Randolph**, 101

F.3d 607 (8th Cir. 1996) (Trial court inadequately explained its drug quantity findings).

**United States v. Brown**, 156 F.3d 813 (8th Cir. 1999) (Court should have only based sentence on drug quantity proven by government).

**United States v. Garrett**, 161 F.3d 1131 (8th Cir. 1999) (Insufficient evidence of drug quantity).

**United States v. Gomez**, 164 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1999) (Unrelated drug sales were not relevant conduct to conspiracy).

**United States v. Moore**, 212 F.3d 441 (8th Cir. 2000) (Defendant's responsibility for drugs limited to jointly undertaken activity).

**United States v. Jackson**, 240 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 112 (2001) (Failure to plead drug quantities required reversal).

**United States v. Williams**, 247 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 2001) (Drugs meant for personal use were not to be counted toward distribution conspiracy).

**United States v. Palmer**, 248 F.3d 569 (7th Cir. 2001) (Unreliable hearsay did not support drug quantity).

**United States v. Cotton**, 261 F.3d 397 (4th Cir. 2001) (Failure to charge drug quantity to increase maximum punishment is plain error).

**United States v. Baptiste**, 264 F.3d 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (Failure to allege drug quantity is plain error when defendant sentenced above lowest statutory maximum).

**United States v. Thomas**, 274 F.3d 655 (2d Cir. 2001) (Failure to plead and prove amount of crack limits punishment to lowest statutory maximum).

## Sentencing - Firearms

**United States v. Bernardine**, 73 F.3d 1078 (11th Cir. 1996) (Government failed to prove the defendant was a marijuana user, and thus he was not a prohibited person).

**United States v. Mendoza-Alvarez**, 79 F.3d 96 (8th Cir. 1996) (Simply carrying a firearm in one's car was not otherwise unlawful use).

**\*United States v. Barton**, 100 F.3d 43 (6th Cir. 1996) (Enhancement relating to prior convictions covered only those before the instant offense).

**United States v. Moit**, 100 F.3d 605 (8th Cir. 1996) (Possession of shotguns and hunting rifles qualified for "sporting or collection" reduction).

**\*United States v. Willis**, 106 F.3d 966 (11th Cir. 1997) (Defendant who previously pleaded nolo contendere in a Florida state court was not convicted for purposes of being a felon in possession of a firearm).

**\*United States v. Cooper**, 111 F.3d 845 (11th Cir. 1997) (Firearm that was not possessed at the site of drug offense did not justify enhancement).

**United States v. Zelaya**, 114 F.3d 869 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Express threat of death was not foreseeable to the accomplice-defendant).

**\*United States v. Knobloch**, 131 F.3d 366 (3rd Cir. 1997) (Court could not impose an increase for a firearm when there was a consecutive gun count).

**\*United States v. McDonald**, 165 F.3d 1032 (6th Cir. 1999) (Felon who stole firearm was not using it in



connection with another felony).

**United States v. Ahmad**, 202 F.3d 588 (2d Cir. 2000) (Firearms that were not prohibited cannot be counted toward specific offense characteristic).

**United States v. Hill**, 210 F.3d 881 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Defendant who had already pled guilty was not “under indictment” when he received firearm).

**United States v. Pena-Lora**, 225 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2000) (Identity of hostage taken was not proven to award enhancement).

**United States v. Moerman**, 233 F.3d 379 (6th Cir. 2000) (Defendant merely brandished firearm, not otherwise used).

**United States v. Seesing**, 234 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2000) (Enhancement for obliterated serial number only applied to firearm counts).

**United States v. Diaz**, 248 F.3d 525 (11th Cir. 2001) (Co-defendant’s brandishing firearm did not support enhancement for defendant).

**United States v. O’Malley**, 265 F.3d 353 (6th Cir. 2001) (During conspiracy to steal firearms, it was not foreseeable that one of the firearms would be illegal).

## Sentencing - Money Laundering

**United States v. Jenkins**, 58 F.3d 611 (11th Cir. 1995) (“Rule of lenity” precluded counting money laundering transactions under \$10,000).

**\*United States v. Allen**, 76 F.3d 1348 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 841 (1996) (Money laundering guidelines should have been based

on the amount of money laundered, not the loss in a related fraud).

**United States v. Gabel**, 85 F.3d 1217 (7th Cir. 1996) (Robberies and burglaries were not relevant conduct in a money laundering case).

**United States v. Morales**, 108 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 1997) (Drug mandatory minimum did not apply to money laundering offense).

**United States v. Hunt**, 272 F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 2001) (Court cannot substitute drug quantities for money laundered).

## Sentencing - Pornography

**United States v. Cole**, 61 F.3d 24 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1163 (1996) (Insufficient evidence of child pornography depicting minors under twelve).

**\*United States v. Ketcham**, 80 F.3d 789 (3rd Cir. 1996) (Enhancement for exploitation of a minor was reversed in a child pornography case for insufficient evidence).

**\*United States v. Surratt**, 87 F.3d 814 (6th Cir. 1996) (Defendant’s sexual abuse, unrelated to receiving child pornography did not prove a pattern of activity to increase the offense level).

**\*United States v. Kemmish**, 120 F.3d 937 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1132 (1998) (The defendant did not engage in a pattern of exploitation).

**United States v. Fowler**, 216 F.3d 459 (5th Cir. 2000) (Child porn was not “distributed” for guideline enhancement).

**United States v. Galo**, 239 F.3d 572 (3rd Cir. 2001) (Prior state sexual abuse conviction was not

proper enhancement).

## Sentencing - Fraud / Theft

**\*United States v. Maurello**, 76 F.3d 1304 (3rd Cir. 1996) (Loss to a fraud victim was mitigated by the value received by the defendant’s actions).

**\*United States v. Millar**, 79 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 1996) (Adjustment for affecting a financial institution was limited to money received by the defendant).

**United States v. Eyoum**, 84 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 941 (1996) (Fair market value, rather than the smuggler’s price, should have been used to calculate the value of illegally smuggled wildlife).

**United States v. Strevel**, 85 F.3d 501 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (In determining the amount of loss, the court could not rely solely on stipulated amounts).

**United States v. King**, 87 F.3d 1255 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Without proof the defendant committed the burglary, other stolen items, not found in his possession, could not be calculated toward loss).

**United States v. Sung**, 87 F.3d 194 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Findings did not establish reasonable certainty that the defendant intended to sell the base level quantity of counterfeit goods).

**United States v. Allen**, 88 F.3d 765 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1202 (1997) (Collateral recovered to secure a loan, and the interest paid, was not subtracted from loss in a fraud case).

**United States v. Cowart**, 90 F.3d

154 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Common modus operandi alone, did not make robberies part of a common scheme).

**United States v. Krenning**, 93 F.3d 1257 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Value of rented assets bore no reasonable relationship to the victim's loss).

**United States v. Comer**, 93 F.3d 1271 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Acquitted theft was not sufficiently proven to include in loss calculations).

**United States v. Coffman**, 94 F.3d 330 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1165 (1997) (Previous fraud using the same worthless stock was not relevant conduct).

**United States v. Olbres**, 99 F.3d 28 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1996) (Adoption of PSI was not a finding of tax loss).

**\*United States v. Peterson**, 101 F.3d 375 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1161 (Violation of fiduciary duty alone was not relevant conduct).

**\*United States v. Kohli**, 110 F.3d 1475 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (There was insufficient evidence of the quantity of fraud attributed).

**\*United States v. Sepulveda**, 115 F.3d 882 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Evidence did not support the alleged volume of unauthorized calls).

**\*United States v. Rutgard**, 116 F.3d 1270 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (That defendant's business was "permeated with fraud" was too indefinite a finding).

**United States v. Arnous**, 122 F.3d 321 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Food stamp fraud should have been valued by lost profits, not the face value of the stamps).

**United States v. Sublett**, 124 F.3d 693 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Loss during contract fraud did not include legitimate services actually

provided).

**\*United States v. McIntosh**, 124 F.3d 1330 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Failure to disclose his interest in a residence that the defendant did not own was not bankruptcy fraud).

**United States v. Barnes**, 125 F.3d 1287 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Services that were satisfactorily performed should have been subtracted from loss).

**United States v. Monus** 128 F.3d 376 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Court did not adequately explain loss findings).

**United States v. Cain**, 128 F.3d 1249 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Sales made before defendant was hired were not relevant conduct toward fraud).

**\*United States v. Word**, 129 F.3d 1209 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Fraud, before defendant joined conspiracy, was not relevant conduct).

**United States v. Melton**, 131 F.3d 1400 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Unforeseeable acts of fraud could not be attributed to defendant).

**United States v. Desantis**, 134 F.3d 760 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Neither defendant's business failure, nor state administrative findings, were relevant to fraud case).

**\*United States v. Cihak**, 137 F.3d 252 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 847 (1998) (Fraud of co-conspirators must be foreseeable to defendant to be relevant conduct).

**United States v. Tatum**, 138 F.3d 1344 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Application note governing fraudulent contract procurement should have been applied rather than theft guideline).

**\*United States v. Phath**, 144 F.3d 146 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1998) (Depositing counterfeit checks and withdrawing money did not require more than minimal planning).

**United States v. Sapoznik**, 161

F.3d 1117 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Calculation of benefits from bribes did not support findings).

**\*United States v. Ponec**, 163 F.3d 486 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (No showing that money withdrawn from defendant's account came from employer).

**United States v. Austin**, 239 F.3d 1 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2001) (Value of get-away-car was not part of loss from bank robbery).

**United States v. Titchell**, 261 F.3d 348 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2001) (Court must make detailed analysis of potential loss and intended loss).

## Enhancements- General

**United States v. Tapia**, 59 F.3d 1137 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 953 (1995) (Using phone to call co-defendant was not more than minimal planning).

**\*United States v. Miller**, 77 F.3d 71 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Enhancement for manufacturing counterfeit notes did not apply to those so obviously counterfeit that they are unlikely to be accepted).

**United States v. Torres**, 81 F.3d 900 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Government must prove sentencing enhancements by a preponderance of evidence).

**United States v. Kraig**, 99 F.3d 1361 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Insufficient evidence that the defendant employed sophisticated means).

**United States v. Brazel**, 102 F.3d 1120 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 822 (1997) (Sentence could not be enhanced with convictions that were not final).

**United States v. Eshkol**, 108 F.3d 1025 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 522

U.S. 841 (1997) (Only existing counterfeit bills could be counted toward upward adjustment).

**\*United States v. DeMartino**, 112 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 1997) (Court was without authority to increase a sentence that was not mere clerical error).

**\*United States v. Shadduck**, 112 F.3d 523 (1st Cir. 1997) (No proof that a defendant violated a judicial order during a course of fraud).

**\*United States v. Calozza**, 125 F.3d 687 (9th Cir. 1997) (Identical enhancements for separately grouped counts was double-counting).

**\*United States v. Barakat**, 130 F.3d 1448 (11th Cir. 1997) (Enhancement for sophisticated means could not be based on acquitted conduct).

## Enhancements- Drug Crimes

**United States v. Ruiz-Castro**, 92 F.3d 1519 (10th Cir. 1996) (Court failed to inquire whether the defendant had notice of the government's intent to seek an enhanced sentence with a prior drug conviction).

**\*United States v. Ekinici**, 101 F.3d 838 (2d Cir. 1996) (Unlawful dispensing of drugs by a doctor was not subject to an enhancement for proximity to a school).

**United States v. Mikell**, 102 F.3d 470 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1181 (1997) (Defendant who was subject to an enhanced sentence under 21 U.S.C. §841, could collaterally attack a prior conviction).

**United States v. Chandler**, 125

F.3d 892 (5th Cir. 1997) (Enhancement for drug sale near school only applied when it was charged by indictment).

**United States v. Hudson**, 129 F.3d 1994 (8th Cir. 1997) (Firearm enhancement was not proven).

**United States v. Sanchez**, 138 F.3d 1410 (11th Cir. 1998) (Court must hold a hearing if defendant challenges validity of a prior drug conviction used for statutory enhancement).

**United States v. Saavedra**, 148 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 1998) (Defendant could not receive increase for selling drugs near school unless so charged).

**United States v. Hass**, 150 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1998) (Non-final state conviction could not be basis for statutory enhancement of drug sentence).

**United States v. Schmalzried**, 152 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1998) (Government failed to connect firearm to drug offense).

**United States v. Rettelle**, 165 F.3d 489 (6th Cir. 1999) (Mandatory minimum controlled by drugs associated with conviction only).

**United States v. Hands**, 184 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 1999) (Domestic abuse was irrelevant to drug conspiracy).

**United States v. Crawford**, 185 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 1999) (Proximity to school must be charged in order for enhancement to apply).

**United States v. Garrett**, 189 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1999) (Guilty plea colloquy was not admission to crack, as opposed to powder, for sentencing purposes).

**\*United States v. Chastain**, 198 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 1999)

(Improper enhancement for use of private plane in drug case).

**United States v. Takahashi**, 205 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2000) (Enhancement for drug crime in protected area must be pleaded and proven before a finding of guilt).

**United States v. Smith**, 210 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2000) (Tossing drugs out window during chase was not reckless endangerment).

**United States v. Szakacs**, 212 F.3d 344 (7th Cir. 2000) (Possession of firearm had no connection to drugs).

**Watterson v. United States**, 219 F.3d 232 (3rd Cir. 2000) (No enhancement for drugs in proximity to school unless charged under that statute).

**United States v. Cooper**, 274 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 2001) (Firearm neither found near drugs nor used in connection to drug activities).

## Enhancements- Violence

**United States v. Murray**, 82 F.3d 361 (10th Cir. 1996) (In assault case, an enhancement for discharging a firearm did not apply to shots fired after the assault).

**United States v. Rivera**, 83 F.3d 542 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1996) (Insufficient evidence that a rape involved serious bodily injury).

**\*United States v. Alexander**, 88 F.3d 427 (6th Cir. 1996) (Note indicating the presence of a bomb, and a request to cooperate to prevent harm, during a bank robbery, was not an express threat of death).

**United States v. Shenberg**, 89 F.3d 1461 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1117 (1997) (More than minimal planning increase did not apply to plan to assault a fictitious

informant).

**United States v. Tavares**, 93 F.3d 10 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 955 (1996) (Finding that an aggravated assault occurred was inconsistent with a finding of no serious bodily injury).

\***United States v. Triplett**, 104 F.3d 1074 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1236 (1997) (Threat of death adjustment was double counting in case for using firearm during crime of violence).

\***United States v. Reyes-Oseguera**, 106 F.3d 1481 (9th Cir. 1997) (Flight on foot was insufficient for reckless endangerment enhancement).

**United States v. Dodson**, 109 F.3d 486 (8th Cir. 1997) (Lacked proof of bodily injury for enhancement).

**United States v. Sawyer**, 115 F.3d 857 (11th Cir. 1997) (Enhancement for bodily injury was not supported by alleged psychological injury).

**United States v. Drapeau**, 121 F.3d 344 (8th Cir. 1997) (Enhancement for assaulting a government official applicable only when official is victim of the offense).

**United States v. Sovie**, 122 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 1997) (Evidence to support enhancement for intending to carry out threat was insufficient).

**United States v. Bourne**, 130 F.3d 1444 (11th Cir. 1997) (Applying both brandishing weapon and threat of death enhancements was double counting).

\***United States v. Hayes**, 135 F.3d 435 (6th Cir. 1998) (Enhancements for reckless endangerment, and assault, during flight, were double counting).

**United States v. Tolen**, 143 F.3d 1121 (8th Cir. 1998) (Putting hand

in pocket and warning to cooperate or “no one will get hurt” was not express threat of death).

**United States v. Kushmaul**, 147 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 1998) (Holding baseball bat was not “otherwise used”).

\***United States v. Thomas**, 155 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 1999) (Intent to carry out threat could not be proven by criminal history).

**United States v. Smith**, 156 F.3d 1046 (10th Cir. 1999) (Insufficient evidence of actual or threatened force or violence).

**United States v. Richardson**, 161 F.3d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Burglary was not shown to be crime of violence).

\***United States v. Anglin**, 169 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 1999) (Bank tellers were not physically restrained).

**United States v. Leahy**, 169 F.3d 433 (7th Cir. 1999) (Departure of 10 levels for analogous terrorism enhancement was unreasonable).

**United States v. Zendeli**, 180 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 1999) (Enhancement for injury did not apply to co-defendant’s injury).

**United States v. Charles**, 209 F.3d 1088 (8th Cir. 2000) (Two convictions, sentenced simultaneously, should have only counted as one prior crime of violence).

**United States v. Brock**, 211 F.3d 88 (4th Cir. 2000) (Enhancement for multiple threats was incompatible with base level for no threats).

**Castillo v. United States**, 530 U.S. 120 (2000) (In order to get aggravated sentence for carrying a firearm during crime of violence, use of a machine gun must be

proven as element of offense).

\***United States v. Rebmann**, 226 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2000) (Elements of death or serious bodily injury must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in drug case).

**United States v. Franks**, 230 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2000) (Cannot receive enhancement for “express threat of death” as well as conviction for use of a firearm during a crime of violence).

**United States v. Wright**, 248 F.3d 765 (8th Cir. 2001) (No evidence of serious bodily injury).

**United States v. Campbell**, 259 F.3d 293 (4th Cir. 2001) (Enhanced statutory maximum for use of deadly or dangerous weapon required pleading and proof beyond reasonable doubt).

**United States v. Atwater**, 272 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2001) (Five-level enhancement cannot be based on assumption that all bank robbers use firearms).

## Enhancements- Immigration

\***United States v. Fuentes-Barahona**, 111 F.3d 651 (9th Cir. 1997) (Conviction occurring before effective date of guideline amendment could not be considered as aggravated felony).

**United States v. Herrera-Solorzano**, 114 F.3d 48 (5th Cir. 1997) (Prior probated felony was not an aggravated felony in an illegal reentry case).

**United States v. Reyna-Espinosa**, 117 F.3d 826 (5th Cir. 1997) (Prior conviction for being an alien in unlawful possession of a firearm was not an aggravated felony).

\***United States v. Viramontes-**

Alvarado, 149 F.3d 912 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 976 (1998) (Non-citizen's priors were not aggravated felonies).

United States v. Avilia-Ramirez, 170 F.3d 277 (2d Cir. 1999) (Defendant's prior aggravated felony was not a listed offense at the time of his reentry).

United States v. Guzman-Bera, 216 F.3d 1019 (11th Cir. 2000) (Theft was not aggravated felony at time of deportation and reentry).

## Career Enhancements

\*United States v. Talbott, 78 F.3d 1183 (7th Cir. 1996) (Under the Armed Career Criminal Act guidelines, "felon in possession" was not a crime of violence).

\*United States v. Sparks, 87 F.3d 276 (9th Cir. 1996) (Attempted home invasion was not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act).

\*United States v. Murphy, 107 F.3d 1199 (6th Cir. 1997) (Two prior robberies were a single episode under Armed Career Criminal Act).

United States v. Bennett, 108 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 1997) (There was no proof that a prior burglary involved a dwelling or physical force under career offender provisions).

United States v. Hicks, 122 F.3d 12 (7th Cir. 1997) (Burglary of a building was not a crime of violence for career offender enhancement).

United States v. Rogers, 126 F.3d 655 (5th Cir. 1997) (Attempted drug crime did not support career offender enhancement).

\*United States v. Covington, 133 F.3d 639 (8th Cir. 1998) (Evidence did not show imprisonment within last 15 years on predicate offense used for career offender enhancement).

United States v. Gottlieb, 140 F.3d 865 (10th Cir. 1998) (Defendant established that no firearm or dangerous weapon was used in prior conviction defeating Three Strikes enhancement).

United States v. Dahler, 143 F.3d 1084 (7th Cir. 1998) (Defendant whose rights were restored was not armed career criminal).

\*United States v. McElyea, 158 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 1999) (Crimes of a single transaction may not be counted separately under Armed Career Criminal Act).

\*United States v. Thomas, 159 F.3d 296 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1023 (1999) (Statutory rape without violence was not predicate crime under Armed Career Criminal Act).

United States v. Richardson, 166 F.3d 1360 (11th Cir. 1999) (Prior conviction under Armed Career Criminal Act must occur before felon in possession violation).

United States v. Wilson, 168 F.3d 916 (6th Cir. 1999) (Burglary of a building is not a career offender predicate unless it involves physical force, or its threat or attempt).

\*United States v. Sacko, 178 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999) (Court could not look at facts of prior conviction to determine whether it was a violent felony).

\*United States v. Casarez-Bravo, 181 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 1999) (Prior conviction not counted under criminal history cannot be used as career offender predicate).

United States v. Martin, 215 F.3d 470 (4th Cir. 2000) (Bank larceny is not a crime of violence).

\*United States v. Peterson, 233 F.3d 101 (1st Cir. 2000) (Defendant's prior for breaking and entering did not meet definition of violent felony under ACCA).

United States v. Concha, 233 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2000) (Foreign convictions are not predicates under ACCA).

United States v. Matthews, 240 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2001) (Court lacked documentary evidence to find prior conviction proven under ACCA).

United States v. Brandon, 247 F.3d 186 (4th Cir. 2001) (Absent an element of intent to distribute or manufacture, prior was not a serious drug felony).

Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2001) (Not all felony DUIs in New York are crimes of violence).

United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2001) (California DUI was not crime of violence).

United States v. Sparks, 265 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 2001) (Burglary of a storage locker was not violent felony).

United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001) (Prior juvenile adjudications that do not provide for jury trial must be pled and proven beyond a reasonable doubt).

## Cross References

United States v. Lagasse, 87 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 1996) (There was no link between a knife-point robbery of a conspirator, and the charged drug

conspiracy, to justify an increase in sentence).

**\*United States v. Aderholt**, 87 F.3d 740 (5th Cir. 1996) (Murder guidelines were improperly applied in a mail fraud conspiracy because murder was not an object of the conspiracy).

**United States v. Meacham**, 115 F.3d 1488 (10th Cir. 1997) (Transportation of a child, not involving prostitution or production of a visual depiction, required cross reference to lower base level for sexual contact).

**\*United States v. Jackson**, 117 F.3d 533 (11th Cir. 1997) (Police officer convicted of theft should not have been sentenced under civil rights guidelines).

**United States v. Cross**, 121 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 1997) (Torture was not relevant conduct in a drug case).

**\*United States v. Sanders**, 162 F.3d 396 (6th Cir. 1999) (Possibility that defendant could have been charged with state burglary did not mean firearm was used in connection with another offense).

**\*United States v. Mezas De Jesus**, 217 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kidnaping, used to enhance sentence, needed to be proven by clear and convincing evidence).

**United States v. Shabazz**, 263 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 2001) (Use base level, not total offense level, when calculating accessory after the fact).

**United States v. Taylor**, 272 F.3d 980 (7th Cir. 2001) (Shooting must be directly related to escape to enhance sentence).

## Abuse of Trust

**\*United States v. Jolly**, 102 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 1996) (Corporate principal could not get abuse of trust

enhancement for defrauding investors).

**United States v. Long**, 122 F.3d 1360 (11th Cir. 1997) (Abuse of trust enhancement did not apply to prison employee who brought in contraband).

**\*United States v. Garrison**, 133 F.3d 831 (11th Cir. 1998) (Owner of a health care provider did not occupy position of trust with Medicare).

**United States v. Burt**, 134 F.3d 997 (10th Cir. 1998) (Deputy sheriff's drug dealing did not merit abuse of trust or special skills enhancements).

**United States v. Reccko**, 151 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 1998) (Police switchboard operator did not occupy position of trust).

**\*United States v. Wadena**, 152 F.3d 831 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1050 (1999) (Money laundering, unrelated to defendant's position, did not warrant abuse of trust).

**United States v. Holt**, 170 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 1999) (Part-time police officer did not justify abuse of trust enhancement).

**United States v. Guidry**, 199 F.3d 1150 (10th Cir. 1999) (Defendant must have relationship of trust with victim for abuse of trust to apply).

**United States v. Tribble**, 206 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2000) (Postal window clerk did not hold position of trust).

**United States v. Ward**, 222 F.3d 909 (11th Cir. 2000) (Bank guard did not occupy position of trust).

**United States v. Willard**, 230 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2000) (Motherhood alone is not a position of trust under the guidelines).

**United States v. Trice**, 245 F.3d 1041 (8th Cir. 2001) (Abuse of trust adjustment did not apply to arms length business relationship).

## Obstruction of Justice

**United States v. Williams**, 79 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 1996) (In order to justify an obstruction of justice enhancement, the court had to find the defendant knowingly made a false statement under oath).

**\*United States v. Strang**, 80 F.3d 1214 (7th Cir. 1996) (Perjury in another case did not warrant an obstruction of justice enhancement in the instant case).

**United States v. Medina-Estrada**, 81 F.3d 981 (10th Cir. 1996) (Court must have found all elements of perjury were proven to give enhancement for obstruction of justice).

**United States v. Hernandez**, 83 F.3d 582 (2d Cir. 1996) (Staring at a witness and calling them "the devil," did not justify enhancement for intimidation).

**United States v. Sisti**, 91 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 1996) (Obstruction of justice was only proper for conduct related to the conviction).

**\*United States v. Ruggiero**, 100 F.3d 284 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1138 (1998) (Judge properly refused to apply an obstruction of justice enhancement).

**\*United States v. Draves**, 103 F.3d 1328 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1127 (1997) (Fleeing from a police car was not obstruction of justice).

**United States v. Harris**, 104 F.3d 1465 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 833 (1997) (Actions of

accessory after the fact did not justify obstruction enhancement when those same acts supported the substantive offense).

**United States v. Zagari**, 111 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 1997) (No finding to support obstruction enhancement).

**\*United States v. Tackett**, 113 F.3d 603 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1089 (1998) (Court failed to find that government resources were wasted for obstruction enhancement).

**United States v. Sawyer**, 115 F.3d 857 (11th Cir. 1997) (Sentencing increase for reckless endangerment only applied to defendant fleeing law enforcement officer, not civilians).

**\*United States v. Sassanelli**, 118 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 1997) (Obstruction findings did not specify which statements were materially untruthful).

**\*United States v. Solono-Godines**, 120 F.3d 957 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1061 (1998) (Misrepresentation by the defendant did not obstruct justice).

**United States v. Webster**, 125 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 1997) (Finding that the defendant testified falsely lacked specificity).

**United States v. Senn**, 129 F.3d 886 (7th Cir. 1997) (Lying about minor details to grand jury was not obstruction).

**United States v. Norman**, 129 F.3d 1393 (10th Cir. 1997) (Concealing drugs at scene of crime was not obstruction).

**United States v. McRae**, 156 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1999) (Insufficient findings of obstruction of justice).

**United States v. Jones**, 159 F.3d 969 (6th Cir. 1999) (Irrelevant false testimony did not support

obstruction of justice).

**United States v. Koeberlein**, 161 F.3d 946 (6th Cir. 1999) (Failure to appear on unrelated offense was not obstruction).

**United States v. Monzon-Valenzuela**, 186 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 1999) (Absent perjury finding, adjustment for obstruction did not apply).

**United States v. Gage**, 183 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 1999) (Defendant's denial that his robbery note mentioned a firearm did not justify obstruction adjustment).

**United States v. Amsden**, 213 F.3d 1014 (8th Cir. 2000) (Defendant convicted of threatening communications did not obstruct justice by sending additional threatening letter).

**\*United States v. Woodard**, 239 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2001) (Unless defendant left district intending to miss court, it was not obstruction).

**United States v. McGiffin**, 267 F.3d 581 (7th Cir. 2001) (Conclusions about defendant's testimony were not specific findings).

**United States v. Jenkins**, 275 F.3d 283 (3rd Cir. 2001) (Failing to appear at related state proceeding was not obstruction).

## Vulnerable Victim

**\*United States v. Castellanos**, 81 F.3d 108 (9th Cir. 1996) (Merely because a fraud scheme used Spanish language media, did not justify an enhancement for victims particularly susceptible to fraud).

**\*United States v. Stover**, 93 F.3d

1379 (8th Cir. 1996) (Persons' desire to adopt children did not make them vulnerable victims of an adoption agency).

**\*United States v. Shumway**, 112 F.3d 1413 (10th Cir. 1997) (Prehistoric skeletal remains were not vulnerable victims).

**\*United States v. Robinson**, 119 F.3d 1205 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1139 (1998) (Asian-American merchants were not vulnerable victims).

**United States v. Hogan**, 121 F.3d 370 (8th Cir. 1997) (Victims must have been targeted in order to be considered vulnerable).

**United States v. Monostra**, 125 F.3d 183 (3rd Cir. 1997) (Victim's vulnerability must facilitate the crime in some manner).

**United States v. McCall**, 174 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1999) (Vulnerable victim enhancement is not a relative standard).

**United States v. Pospisil**, 186 F.3d 1023 (8th Cir. 1999) (No evidence that defendant knew victims were vulnerable).

**United States v. Castaneda**, 239 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2001) (Club workers who were encouraged to provide sexual services for fees were not vulnerable victims).

## Aggravating Role

**United States v. Ivy**, 83 F.3d 1266 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 901 (1996) (Insufficient findings for a managerial role).

**United States v. Lozano-Hernandez**, 89 F.3d 785 (11th Cir. 1996) (Leadership role in drug conspiracy was not proven).

**United States v. Patasnik**, 89 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 1996) (Management role had to be based on managing people, not assets).

**United States v. Wester**, 90 F.3d 592 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1996) (Court failed to make findings there were five or more participants).

**United States v. Miller**, 91 F.3d 1160 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Lack of evidence that the defendant controlled others precluded a leadership role).

**\*United States v. Albers**, 93 F.3d 1469 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Leadership role could not be based solely on defendant's importance to the success of the conspiracy).

**\*United States v. Delpit**, 94 F.3d 1134 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Murder-for-ire scheme had less than five participants).

**United States v. Avila**, 95 F.3d 887 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Defendant who was the sole contact between a buyer and a seller was not an organizer).

**United States v. Jobe**, 101 F.3d 1046 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 823 (1997) (Defendant's position as bank director did not justify managerial role when he did not manage or supervise others).

**United States v. DeGovanni**, 104 F.3d 43 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 1997) (Corrupt police sergeant was not a supervisor merely because of his rank).

**United States v. Eidson**, 108 F.3d 1336 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 248 (1997) (Clean Water Act violation lacked five participants for role adjustment).

**United States v. Gort-Didonato**, 109 F.3d 318 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (To impose an upward role adjustment, the defendant must have supervised at least one person).

**United States v. Bryson**, 110 F.3d 575 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Facts did not support upward adjustment for role).

**United States v. Logan**, 121 F.3d 1172 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Record did not support upward role adjustment).

**United States v. Makiewicz**, 122 F.3d 399 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Defendant was not a leader for asking his father to accompany informant to motel).

**United States v. Del Toro-Aguilar**, 138 F.3d 340 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Occasionally fronting drugs to coconspirators did not justify upward role adjustment).

**\*United States v. Alred**, 144 F.3d 1405 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Defendant was not an organizer).

**United States v. Lopez-Sandoval**, 146 F.3d 712 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Defendant was not an organizer).

**\*United States v. Ginton**, 154 F.3d 1245 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1281 (No managerial role for defendant who did not supervise or control others).

**United States v. Walker**, 160 F.3d 1078 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1056 (1999) (Insufficient evidence of organizer role).

**United States v. Graham**, 162 F.3d 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Conclusionary statement that defendant was lieutenant did not justify role adjustment).

**United States v. Tank**, 200 F.3d 627 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Insufficient evidence of defendant's leadership role).

## Mitigating Role

**United States v. Moeller**, 80 F.3d 1053 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (No leadership role for a government official who

inherited an historically corrupt system, but the defendant's lack of understanding of the entire scheme justified a minimal role adjustment).

**\*United States v. Miranda-Santiago**, 96 F.3d 517 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1996) (There was an insufficient basis to deny a minor role reduction).

**\*United States v. Haut**, 107 F.3d 213 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1127 (1997) (Arson defendants who worked at direction of others were minimal participants).

**\*United States v. Snoddy**, 139 F.3d 1224 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Sole charged defendant may receive minor role when justified by relevant conduct).

**United States v. Neils**, 156 F.3d 382 (2<sup>d</sup> Cir. 1999) (Defendant who merely steered buyers was minor participant).

## Acceptance of Responsibility

**United States v. Fells**, 78 F.3d 168 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 847 (1996) (Defendant making a statutory challenge, could still qualify for acceptance of responsibility).

**United States v. Patino-Cardenas**, 85 F.3d 1133 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (No basis to deny credit when the defendant did not falsely deny relevant conduct).

**United States v. Garrett**, 90 F.3d 210 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Defendant could not be denied acceptance when he filed an uncounseled, pro se motion to withdraw plea after his attorney died).

**United States v. Flores**, 93 F.3d 587 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Defendant should have received credit for his written statement).



**\*United States v. Atlas**, 94 F.3d 447 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1130 (1997) (Defendant who timely accepted responsibility must be given the additional one-level downward adjustment).

**United States v. Ruggiero**, 100 F.3d 284 (2d Cir. 1996) (Single false denial did not bar credit for acceptance of responsibility).

**United States v. McPhee**, 108 F.3d 287 (11th Cir. 1997) (Defendant who qualified should not have been given less than the full three-point reduction for timely accepting responsibility).

**\*United States v. Guerrero-Cortez**, 110 F.3d 647 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1017 (1998) (Defendant's pretrial statements of acceptance justified reduction though case was tried).

**United States v. Marroquin**, 136 F.3d 220 (1st Cir. 1998) (Creation of a lab report was not the type of trial preparation to deny extra point off for accepting responsibility).

**United States v. Fisher**, 137 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 1998) (Despite not guilty plea, admission in open court could be acceptance).

**\*United States v. McKittrick**, 142 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1072 (1998) (Defendant who did not contest facts at trial may be eligible for acceptance).

**United States v. Ellis**, 168 F.3d 558 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1999) (Defendant who went to trial was still potentially eligible for timely acceptance of responsibility).

**United States v. Rice**, 184 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 1999) (Defendant was entitled to full three-level reduction for acceptance).

**United States v. Corona-Garcia**, 210 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2000) (Even

after trial, defendant could receive full credit for acceptance when he confessed fully and immediately upon arrest).

**United States v. Ochoa-Gaytan**, 265 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 2001) (Defendant could get acceptance even after trial).

## Safety Valve

**\*United States v. Shrestha**, 86 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 1996) (Eligibility for the safety valve did not depend on acceptance of responsibility).

**United States v. Flanagan**, 87 F.3d 121 (5th Cir. 1996) (On remand, the sentencing court could withdraw a leadership role so the defendant could qualify for safety valve).

**\*United States v. Real-Hernandez**, 90 F.3d 356 (9th Cir. 1996) (To be eligible for safety valve, a defendant did not need to give information to a specific agent).

**United States v. Beltran-Ortiz**, 91 F.3d 665 (4th Cir. 1996) (Failure to debrief the defendant, thus preventing him from benefitting from the safety valve, violated the plea agreement).

**United States v. Miranda-Santiago**, 96 F.3d 517 (1st Cir. 1996) (Government had to rebut the defendant's version in order to deny safety valve).

**United States v. Sherpa**, 97 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir.), *amended*, 110 F.3d 656 (1997) (Even a defendant who claimed innocence was eligible if he met requirements).

**United States v. Wilson**, 105 F.3d 219 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 847 (1997) (Co-conspirator's use of a firearm did not bar application of the safety valve).

**United States v. Osei**, 107 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1997) (Two-level safety

valve adjustment applied regardless of mandatory minimum).

**\*United States v. Clark**, 110 F.3d 15 (6th Cir. 1997) (Safety valve applied to cases that were on appeal at effective date).

**United States v. Mertilus**, 111 F.3d 870 (11th Cir. 1997) (Safety valve applied to a telephone count).

**\*United States v. Mihm**, 134 F.3d 1353 (8th Cir. 1998) (Court failed to consider safety valve at resentencing).

**United States v. Carpenter**, 142 F.3d 333 (6th Cir. 1998) (Refusal to testify did not bar safety valve).

**United States v. Gama-Bastidas**, 142 F.3d 1233 (10th Cir. 1998) (Court failed to make findings regarding applicability of safety valve).

**\*United States v. Kang**, 143 F.3d 379 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Defendant could not be denied safety valve because government claimed he was untruthful absent supporting evidence).

**United States v. Clavijo**, 165 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 1999) (Unforeseen possession of firearm by coconspirator does not bar safety valve relief).

**United States v. Ortiz-Santiago**, 211 F.3d 146 (1st Cir. 2000) (Plea agreement prohibiting further adjustments did not preclude safety valve).

**United States v. Lopez**, 264 F.3d 527 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (It does not matter in which order the court applies the guidelines).

## Criminal History

**\*United States v. Spell**, 44 F.3d 936 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Judgement was the only conclusive proof of prior

convictions).

**United States v. Douglas**, 81 F.3d 324 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1251 (1996) (Juvenile sentence, more than five years old, was incorrectly applied).

**United States v. Cox**, 83 F.3d 336 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Proper to attack a guidelines sentence when prior convictions were later successfully attacked).

**\*United States v. Parks**, 89 F.3d 570 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (No criminal history points could be attributed to a defendant when indigence prevented payment of fines).

**United States v. Flores**, 93 F.3d 587 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Court erroneously twice counted a single probation revocation to increase two prior convictions).

**United States v. Ortega**, 94 F.3d 764 (2d Cir. 1996) (Uncounseled misdemeanor was improperly counted).

**United States v. Easterly**, 95 F.3d 535 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Fish and game violation should not have been counted).

**\*United States v. Gilcrist**, 106 F.3d 297 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Sentence, upon which parole began over 15 years ago, could not be counted toward criminal history).

**United States v. Huskey**, 137 F.3d 283 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Prior convictions in same information were related cases for counting criminal history).

**United States v. Walker**, 142 F.3d 103 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 896 (1998) (Prior convictions for offenses that were calculated into offense level should not have received criminal history points).

**United States v. Hernandez**, 145 F.3d 1433 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Arrest

warrant did not determine nature of prior conviction).

**United States v. Torres**, 182 F.2d 1156 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Prior convictions that are relevant conduct may not be counted toward criminal history).

**United States v. Thomas**, 211 F.3d 316 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Two prior rapes were a single transaction).

**United States v. Arnold**, 213 F.3d 894 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Sentence of less than a year and a day must be imposed within ten years of offense to count toward criminal history).

**United States v. Stuckey**, 220 F.3d 976 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Military prior was not serious drug offense).

**United States v. Morales**, 239 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2001) (No criminal history point for 2nd degree harassment).

## Upward Departures

**United States v. Thomas**, 62 F.3d 1332 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1166 (1996) (Consequential damages did not justify an upward departure unless it was substantially in excess of typical fraud case).

**\*United States v. Henderson**, 75 F.3d 614 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Upward departure for multiple weapons in a drug case was improper).

**United States v. Blackwell**, 81 F.3d 945 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Court did not have jurisdiction to increase a sentence after judgement was final).

**United States v. Harrington**, 82 F.3d 83 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Court should not have upwardly departed for a defendant's status as an attorney without first considering application of abuse of trust).

**\*United States v. Sherwood**, 98 F.3d 402 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Just because victims were almost vulnerable, did not justify an upward departure).

**United States v. LeCompte**, 99 F.3d 274 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Justification was based on guideline amendment after offense occurred).

**\*United States v. Valentine**, 100 F.3d 1209 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (The difference between seven and five offenses did not justify departure for multiple counts).

**United States v. Mangone**, 105 F.3d 29 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1258 (1997) (Failure to give notice of upward departure was plain error).

**\*United States v. Otis**, 107 F.3d 487 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Failure to give notice of an upward departure was plain error).

**United States v. Arce**, 118 F.3d 335 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Manufacturing firearms was not a basis for upward departure).

**United States v. White**, 118 F.3d 739 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Lenient guideline range was not a ground for upward departure).

**\*United States v. DePace**, 120 F.3d 233 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1153 (1998) (Upward departure was without notice).

**United States v. Johnson**, 121 F.3d 1141 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Defendant did not get notice of upward departure).

**United States v. Stein**, 127 F.3d 777 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Upward departure based on more than minimal planning and multiple victims was unwarranted).

**United States v. Corrigan**, 128 F.3d 330 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Neither, number of victims, number of

schemes, nor amount of loss, supported upward departure).

**United States v. Candelario-Cajero**, 134 F.3d 1246 (5th Cir. 1998) (Absent an upward departure, grouped counts cannot receive consecutive sentences).

**United States v. Terry**, 142 F.3d 702 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Extent of upward departure was not supported by findings).

**\*United States v. Hinojosa-Gonzales**, 142 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1033 (1999) (Defendant did not get adequate notice of upward departure).

**\*United States v. G.L.**, 143 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1998) (Lenient theft guidelines did not justify upward departure).

**\*United States v. Almaguer**, 146 F.3d 474 (7th Cir. 1998) (Use of firearm was included in guideline and did not justify upward departure).

**United States v. Nagra**, 147 F.3d 875 (9th Cir. 1998) (Upward departure based upon factor considered by guidelines was double counting).

**\*United States v. Van Metre**, 150 F.3d 339 (4th Cir. 1998) (Commentary Note on grouping did not provide basis for upward departure).

**United States v. Johnson**, 152 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 1998) (Arson was within heartland of cases and did not justify upward departure).

**United States v. Lawrence**, 161 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 1999) (Must specify findings to depart up for under-representation of criminal history).

**United States v. Whiteskunk**, 162 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 1999) (Upward departure must include some

method of analogy, extrapolation, or reference to the guidelines).

**\*United States v. Jacobs**, 167 F.3d 792 (3rd Cir. 1999) (Court did not adequately explain upward departure for psychological injury).

## Downward Departures

**United States v. Rodriguez**, 64 F.3d 638 (11th Cir. 1995) (Downward departure was allowed to give credit for acceptance of responsibility on consecutive sentences).

**Koon v. United States**, 518 U.S. 81 (1996) (A district court could depart from the guidelines if (1) the reason was not specifically prohibited by the guidelines; (2) the reason was discouraged by the guidelines but exceptional circumstances apply; or (3) the reason was neither prohibited nor discouraged, and the reason was not previously addressed by the applicable guideline provisions in that case).

**United States v. Conway**, 81 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 1996) (Court could not refuse a downward departure based upon information received as part of a cooperation agreement).

**United States v. Graham**, 83 F.3d 1466 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1132 (1997) (Extreme vulnerability to abuse in prison could justify a downward departure).

**\*United States v. Walters**, 87 F.3d 663 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1000 (1996) (Downward departure was approved for a defendant who did not personally benefit from money laundering).

**\*United States v. Cubillos**, 91 F.3d 1342 (9th Cir. 1996) (Basis for downward departure could no longer be categorically rejected after

*Koon*).

**\*United States v. Jaroszenko**, 92 F.3d 486 (7th Cir. 1996) (Remorse could be considered as a ground for downward departure).

**United States v. Sanders**, 97 F.3d 856 (6th Cir. 1996) (Downward departure was available for an Armed Career Criminal).

**United States v. Olbres**, 99 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 1996) (Court could grant departure for effect on innocent employees of the defendant).

**United States v. Ethernon**, 101 F.3d 80 (9th Cir. 1996) (Court had authority to reduce the sentence after a revocation of supervised release when the guidelines were later amended to provide for a lower range).

**\*United States v. Williams**, 103 F.3d 57 (8th Cir. 1996) (Court could reduce a sentence for a retroactive amendment even after a reduction for substantial assistance).

**United States v. Lopez**, 106 F.3d 309 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Prosecutors' violation of ethical rule in meeting with an indicted defendant justified a downward departure).

**\*United States v. Brock**, 108 F.3d 31 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Rehabilitation was a proper basis for downward departure).

**United States v. Paton**, 110 F.3d 562 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Government's breach of plea agreement was a proper ground for downward departure).

**United States v. Wallace**, 114 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 1997) (Court should not have limited a downward departure just because the defendant already received credit for accepting responsibility).

**\*United States v. McBroom**, 124 F.3d 533 (3rd Cir. 1997) (Reduced

mental capacity was a basis for downward departure in a child porn case).

**\*United States v. Rounsavall**, 128 F.3d 665 (8th Cir. 1997) (Defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine if the government's failure to move for a reduced sentence was irrational, in bad faith, or unconstitutionally motivated).

**United States v. Clark**, 128 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 1997) (Downward departure for a lesser harm was available in a felon in possession case).

**United States v. O'Hagan**, 139 F.3d 641 (8th Cir. 1998) (Court could depart downward to credit time served on an expired state sentence for the same conduct).

**United States v. Kaye**, 140 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 1998) (Court can depart downward based on assistance to state law enforcement without motion by government).

**United States v. Campo**, 140 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 1998) (Judge could not refuse to depart solely because he did not like USA's policy about not recommending a specific sentence).

**United States v. Whitecotton**, 142 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (Court could depart based on entrapment and diminished capacity).

**United States v. Faulks**, 143 F.3d 133 (3rd Cir. 1998) (Agreement not to contest forfeitures may be basis for downward departure).

**United States v. Crouse**, 145 F.3d 786 (6th Cir. 1998) (Civic involvement justified downward departure).

**\*United States v. Whitaker**, 152 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1998) (Post-offense drug rehabilitation can

justify downward departure).

**United States v. Stockheimer**, 157 F.3d 1082 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1184 (1999) (Refusing to consider downward departure based on economic reality of intended loss was plain error).

**United States v. Fagan**, 162 F.3d 1280 (10th Cir. 1999) (Court could depart downward for exceptional remorse).

**\*United States v. Jones**, 160 F.3d 473 (8th Cir. 1999) (Government actions prejudicing defendant can justify downward departure).

**\*United States v. Martinez-Ramos**, 184 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 1999) (Court had authority to depart downward to remedy sentencing disparity).

**\*United States v. Coleman**, 188 F.3d 354 (6th Cir. 1999) (Court must look at case as a whole to see if factors take case out of "heartland" for downward departure).

**United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez**, 198 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 1999) (Government need not consent to departure for stipulated deportation).

**United States v. Wells**, 211 F.3d 988 (6th Cir. 2000) (Plea agreement required only full cooperation, not substantial assistance).

**United States v. Ventrilla**, 233 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2000) (Judge was mistaken about authority to depart for diminished mental capacity).

**United States v. Causor-Serrato**, 234 F.3d 384 (8th Cir. 2000) (Court could depart for defendant's agreement to be deported).

**United States v. Walter**, 256 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2001) (Defendant was eligible for departure for childhood abuse).

**United States v. Busekros**, 264 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2001) (Departure for substantial assistance allowed defendant to retain federal benefits).

**United States v. Rodriguez-Montelongo**, 263 F.3d 429 (5th Cir. 2001) (Cultural assimilation is basis for departure).

## Fines / Restitution

**\*United States v. Remillong**, 55 F.3d 572 (11th Cir. 1995) (Restitution order reversed for a defendant with no ability to pay and no future prospects).

**United States v. Ledesma**, 60 F.3d 750 (11th Cir. 1995) (Restitution order could only be applied to charges of conviction).

**\*United States v. Mullens**, 65 F.3d 1560 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1112 (1996) (Record lacked findings to support restitution when amount was specific offense characteristic).

**United States v. Maurello**, 76 F.3d 1304 (3rd Cir. 1996) (The court had to make findings to determine actual loss to victim).

**\*United States v. Reed**, 80 F.3d 1419 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 882 (1996) (Restitution order had to be limited to conduct of conviction).

**United States v. Blake**, 81 F.3d 498 (4th Cir. 1996) (Restitution could only be based on the loss directly related to the offense, and the court had to make findings that the defendant can pay that amount without undue hardship).

**\*United States v. Giwah**, 84 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1996) (Restitution

order failed to indicate that all statutory factors were considered).

**United States v. Sharma**, 85 F.3d 363 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (No reason was given for an upward departure on a fine).

**United States v. Hines**, 88 F.3d 661 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (In assessing fine and restitution, the court should have considered the defendant's familial obligations of his recent marriage).

**\*United States v. Upton**, 91 F.3d 677 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1228 (1997) (No restitution was available to victims not named in the indictment).

**\*United States v. Sablan**, 92 F.3d 865 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Consequential expenses could not be included in a restitution order).

**United States v. Jaroszenko**, 92 F.3d 486 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (The court failed to fully consider the defendant's ability to pay restitution).

**United States v. Santos**, 93 F.3d 761 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1170 (1997) (Defendant could not be ordered to pay restitution for money taken in a robbery for which he was not convicted).

**\*United States v. Monem**, 104 F.3d 905 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Court did not make sufficient factual findings to justify the fine of a defendant who claimed inability to pay).

**\*United States v. McMillan**, 106 F.3d 322 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Court could reduce a fine for substantial assistance).

**United States v. Messner**, 107 F.3d 1448 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Restitution had to be based on actual loss).

**United States v. McArthur**, 108 F.3d 1350 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (A defendant could not be ordered to pay restitution for acquitted

conduct).

**United States v. Eidson**, 108 F.3d 1336 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 899 (1997) (Facts did not support restitution order).

**United States v. Hodges**, 110 F.3d 250 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Fine was not justified for a defendant with a negative net worth).

**United States v. Khawaja**, 118 F.3d 1454 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Government was not a victim for purposes of awarding restitution).

**\*United States v. Gottesman**, 122 F.3d 150 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Defendant's promise to pay back-axes did not authorize court-ordered restitution).

**\*United States v. Baggett**, 125 F.3d 1319 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Restitution must be based upon a specific statute).

**United States v. Mayer**, 130 F.3d 338 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Restitution should not have been higher than the loss).

**United States v. Drinkwine**, 133 F.3d 203 (2<sup>d</sup> Cir. 1998) (Insufficient evidence that defendant could pay a fine).

**United States v. Menza**, 137 F.3d 533 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Defendant did not have to pay restitution for amount greater than losses).

**United States v. Riley**, 143 F.3d 1289 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Defendant could not be ordered to pay restitution on loan unrelated to fraud).

**United States v. Stoddard**, 150 F.3d 1140 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Restitution could not exceed actual loss).

**\*United States v. Siegel**, 153 F.3d

1256 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Court must consider defendant's ability to pay restitution).

**\*United States v. Dunigan**, 163 F.3d 979 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Court did not adequately consider defendant's ability to pay restitution).

**United States v. Brierton**, 165 F.3d 1133 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Restitution can only be based on loss from charged offense).

**United States v. Merric**, 166 F.3d 406 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1999) (Court could not delegate scheduling of installment payments to probation officer's discretion).

**United States v. Johnston**, 199 F.3d 1015 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Forfeited money should have been subtracted from restitution).

**United States v. Prather**, 205 F.3d 1265 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Amount of special assessment governed by date of offense).

**United States v. Beckett**, 208 F.3d 140 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2000) (Restitution should not have been ordered without determining ability to pay).

**United States v. Norris**, 217 F.3d 262 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Restitution was not for actual loss).

**United States v. Griffin**, 215 F.3d 866 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Loss from food stamp fraud was limited to actual benefits diverted).

**United States v. Andra**, 218 F.3d 1106 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Tax loss should not have included penalties and interest).

**United States v. Rodrigues**, 229 F.3d 842 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (No restitution for speculative loss).

**United States v. Young**, 272 F.3d 1052 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Report's failure to document loss excused defendant's failure to object to

restitution amount).

## Appeals

**United States v. Byerley**, 46 F.3d 694 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Government waived argument by inconsistent position at sentencing).

**United States v. Caraballo-Cruz**, 52 F.3d 390 (1st Cir. 1995) (Government defaulted on double jeopardy claim).

**\*United States v. Carillo-Bernal**, 58 F.3d 1490 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (The government failed to timely file certification for appeal).

**United States v. Petty**, 80 F.3d 1384 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Waiver of appeal of an unanticipated error was not enforceable).

**\*United States v. Ready**, 82 F.3d 551 (2d Cir. 1996) (Waiver of appeal did not cover issue of restitution and was not waived).

**\*United States v. Thompson**, 82 F.3d 700 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Technicalities that did not prejudice the government were not cause to deny a motion to extend time to file an appeal).

**\*United States v. Agee**, 83 F.3d 882 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Waiver of appeal, not discussed at the plea colloquy, was invalid).

**\*United States v. Webster**, 84 F.3d 1056 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (When a law was clarified between trial and appeal, a point of appeal was preserved as plain error).

**\*United States v. Allison**, 86 F.3d 940 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Remand was proper even though the district court could still impose the same sentence).

**\*United States v. Perkins**, 89 F.3d 303 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Orally raising an issue of double-counting at

sentencing preserved it for appeal).

**United States v. Stover**, 93 F.3d 1379 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Appellate court refused to use a substantive change to the guidelines to uphold a sentence that was improper at the time imposed).

**United States v. Alexander**, 106 F.3d 874 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Rule of the case barred reconsideration of a suppression order after remand).

**United States v. Zink**, 107 F.3d 716 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Waiver of appeal of sentence did not cover a restitution order).

**United States v. Saldana**, 109 F.3d 100 (1st Cir. 1997) (Defendant had a jurisdictional basis to appeal a denial of a downward departure).

**\*Sanders v. United States**, 113 F.3d 184 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Pro se petitioner's out-of-time appeal was treated as a motion for extension of time).

**United States v. Arteaga**, 117 F.3d 388 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 988 (1997) (Evidence that was precluded at trial could not support convictions on appeal).

**\*In Re Grand Jury Subpoena**, 123 F.3d 695 (1st Cir. 1997) (Third party may appeal the denial of a motion to quash without risking a contempt citation).

**\*United States v. Martinez-Rios**, 143 F.3d 662 (2d Cir. 1998) (Vague appeal waiver was void).

**United States v. Montez-Gavira**, 163 F.3d 697 (2d Cir. 1999) (Deportation did not moot appeal).

**United States v. Gonzalez**, 259 F.3d 355 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (*Apprendi* error was preserved even when defendant waived appeal).

**United States v. Smith**, 263 F.3d 571 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Government

appeal, of suppression, was dismissed when there was no certification that appeal was not filed in bad faith).

## Resentencing

**\*United States v. Moore**, 131 F.3d 595 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Limited remand did not allow a new enhancement at resentencing).

**\*United States v. Wilson**, 131 F.3d 1250 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Government waived the issue of urging additional relevant conduct at resentencing).

**United States v. Rapal**, 146 F.3d 661 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Higher `resentence presumed vindictiveness`).

**\*United States v. Ticchiarelli**, 171 F.3d 24 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 850 (1999) (Sentence imposed, between original sentence and remand, could not be counted at resentencing).

**United States v. Jackson**, 181 F.3d 740 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Resentencing did not overcome presumption of vindictiveness).

**\*United States v. Faulks**, 201 F.3d 208 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2000) (Defendant could not be resentenced in absentia).

## Supervised Release / Probation

**United States v. Doe**, 79 F.3d 1309 (2d Cir. 1996) (Occupational restriction was not supported by the court's findings).

**United States v. Edgin**, 92 F.3d

1044 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1069 (1997) (Court failed to provide adequate reasons to bar a defendant from seeing his son while on supervised release).

**United States v. Wright**, 92 F.3d 502 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Simple possession of drugs was a Grade C, not a Grade A violation, of supervised release).

**United States v. Leaphart**, 98 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1996) (Misdemeanor did not justify a two year term of supervised release).

**United States v. Myers**, 104 F.3d 76 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1218 (1997) (Court could not impose consecutive sentences of supervised release).

**United States v. Ooley**, 116 F.3d 370 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 963 (1998) (Probationer was entitled to a hearing over a warrantless search).

**\*United States v. Collins**, 118 F.3d 1394 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Illegal ex post facto application of rule allowing additional term of release after revocation).

**United States v. Romeo**, 122 F.3d 941 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Court could not order deportation as a condition of supervised release).

**United States v. Aimufa**, 122 F.3d 1376 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Court lacked authority to modify conditions of release after revocation).

**\*United States v. Patterson**, 128 F.3d 1259 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Failure to provide allocution at supervised release revocation was plain error).

**United States v. Pierce**, 132 F.3d 1207 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (Probation revocation for a drug user did not require a prison sentence; treatment is an option).

**United States v. Biro**, 143 F.3d 1421 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Deportation could not be condition of supervised release).

**United States v. Bonanno**, 146 F.3d 502 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Court improperly delegated discretion over drug testing to probation officer).

**United States v. Balogun**, 146 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 1998) (Court could not order supervised release tolled while defendant out of country).

**United States v. Giraldo-Prado**, 150 F.3d 1328 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Deportation cannot be condition of supervised release).

**\*United States v. Evans**, 155 F.3d 245 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 1998) (Cannot make reimbursement for court-appointed counsel a condition of supervised release).

**United States v. Havier**, 155 F.3d 1090 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (Motion to revoke must specifically identify charges).

**\*United States v. Kingdom**, 157 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 1998) (Revocation sentence should have been concurrent sentences based on most serious violation).

**United States v. Waters**, 158 F.3d 1933 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Defendant had right to allocution at revocation hearing).

**United States v. Strager**, 162 F.3d 921 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Disrespectful call to probation officer did not justify revocation).

**United States v. McClellan**, 164 F.3d 308 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Court must explain why it is departing above revocation guidelines).

**\*United States v. Cooper**, 171 F.3d 582 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (Court could not order that defendant not leave city

for more than 24 hours as condition of supervised release).

## Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

**\*Esslinger v. Davis**, 44 F.3d 1515 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Counsel failed to determine that the defendant was a habitual offender before plea).

**United States v. Cook**, 45 F.3d 388 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Court infringed on counsel's professional judgement).

**\*Finch v. Vaughn**, 67 F.3d 909 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Counsel failed to correct misstatements that state sentence could run concurrent with potential federal sentence).

**Montemoino v. United States**, 68 F.3d 416 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Failure to file notice of appeal after request by defendant).

**\*United States v. Hansel**, 70 F.3d 6 (2d Cir. 1995) (Counsel failed to raise statute of limitations).

**Upshaw v. Singletary**, 70 F.3d 576 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (Claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at plea was not waived even though not raised on direct appeal).

**United States v. Streater**, 70 F.3d 1314 (D.C. 1995) (Counsel gave bad legal advice about pleading guilty).

**Martin v. United States**, 81 F.3d 1083 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Counsel failed to file a notice of appeal when requested to do so by the defendant).

**Sager v. Maass**, 84 F.3d 1212 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Counsel was found ineffective for not objecting to inadmissible evidence).

**Glock v. Singletary**, 84 F.3d 385

(11<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1044 (1996) (Counsel's failure to discover and present mitigating evidence at the sentencing proceeding required an evidentiary hearing).

**United States v. McMullen**, 86 F.3d 135 (8th Cir. 1996) (Counsel's bad sentencing advice required remand).

**\*United States v. Del Muro**, 87 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 1996) (Prejudice was presumed when trial counsel was forced to prove his own ineffectiveness at a hearing).

**Baylor v. Estelle**, 94 F.3d 1321 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1151 (1997) (Counsel was ineffective for failing to follow up on lab reports suggesting that the defendant was not the rapist).

**Huynh v. King**, 95 F.3d 1052 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Lawyer's failure to raise a suppression issue was grounds for remand).

**United States v. Baramdyka**, 95 F.3d 840 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1132 (1997) (Appeal waiver did not bar a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel).

**\*United States v. Glover**, 97 F.3d 1345 (10th Cir. 1996) (Ineffective for counsel to fail to object to the higher methamphetamine range).

**Martin v. Maxey**, 98 F.3d 844 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Failure to file a motion to suppress could be grounds for ineffectiveness claim).

**Fern v. Gramley**, 99 F.3d 255 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (Prejudice could be presumed from an attorney's failure to file an appeal upon the defendant's request).

**Griffin v. United States**, 109 F.3d 1217 (7th Cir. 1997) (Counsel's advice to dismiss appeal to file motion to reduce a sentence was prima facie evidence of ineffective

assistance of counsel).

**\*United States v. Kauffman**, 109 F.3d 186 (3rd Cir. 1997) (Failure to investigate insanity defense was ineffective assistance of counsel).

**Williamson v. Ward**, 110 F.3d 1508 (10th Cir. 1997) (Failure to investigate the defendant's mental illness was ineffective assistance of counsel).

**Williamson v. Ward**, 110 F.3d 1508 (10th Cir. 1997) (Failure to investigate the defendant's mental illness was ineffective assistance of counsel).

**United States v. Gaviria**, 116 F.3d 1498 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1082 (1997) (Counsel was ineffective for giving incorrect sentencing information in contemplation of plea).

**United States v. Soto**, 132 F.3d 56 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Counsel was ineffective for failing to urge downward role adjustment).

**United States v. Taylor**, 139 F.3d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Counsel was ineffective for failing to inform client of advice of counsel defense).

**\*Smith v. Stewart**, 140 F.3d 1263 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 929 (1998) (Failure to investigate mitigating evidence was ineffective).

**Tejeda v. Dubois**, 142 F.3d 18 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1998) (Counsel's fear of trial judge hindered defense).

**United States v. Kliti**, 156 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 1998) (Defense counsel who witnessed exculpatory statement had conflict).

**United States v. Moore**, 159 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 1999) (Irreconcilable conflict between defendant and lawyer).

**United States v. Alvarez-**

**Tautimez**, 160 F.3d 573 (9th Cir. 1999) (Counsel ineffective for failing to withdraw plea after co-defendant's suppression motion granted).

**United States v. Granados**, 168 F.3d 343 (8th Cir. 1999) (Counsel was ineffective for unfamiliarity with guidelines and failure to challenge breach of plea agreement).

**United States v. Harfst**, 168 F.3d 398 (10th Cir. 1999) (Failure to argue for downward role adjustment can be ineffective assistance of counsel).

**Prou v. United States**, 199 F.3d 37 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1999) (Counsel failed to attack timeliness of statutory drug enhancement).

**United States v. Hall**, 200 F.3d 962 (6th Cir. 2000) (Despite waiver, dual representation denied effective assistance of counsel).

**Combs v. Coyle**, 205 F.3d 269 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1035 (2000) (Counsel failed to object to post arrest statement, or to investigate defense expert witness).

**United States v. Patterson**, 215 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 2000) (Absences of counsel during trial denied effective assistance).

**\*Carter v. Bell**, 218 F.3d 581 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Failure to investigate mitigating evidence was ineffective assistance).

**United States v. Mannino**, 212 F.3d 835 (3rd Cir. 2000) (Failing to raise sentencing issue denied effective assistance).

**United States v. McCoy**, 215 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (But for counsel's deficient performance, defendant would not have pled guilty).

**Washington v. Hofbauer**, 228 F.3d 689 (6th Cir. 2000) (Counsel's



failure to object to prosecutor's misconduct was ineffective assistance).

**Cossel v. Miller**, 229 F.3d 649 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Counsel was ineffective for failing to object to suggestive in-court identification).

**Lockett v. Anderson**, 230 F.3d 695 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (Inadequate mitigation investigation by defense).

**Glover v. United States**, 531 U.S. 198 (2000) (Counsel's failure to object to application of guidelines that increased sentence was ineffective assistance).

**United States v. Davis**, 239 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 2001) (Counsel was ineffective by threatening to withhold services to encourage plea).

**Betts v. Litscher**, 241 F.3d 594 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Counsel failed to perfect appeal).

**Wanatee v. Ault**, 259 F.3d 700 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Counsel failed to advise client of affect of felony-murder rule).

**Glover v. Miro**, 262 F.3d 268 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Overworked attorney did not spend enough time with client).

**Burdine v. Johnson**, 262 F.3d 336 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Attorney slept through portions of trial).

**Burns v. Gammon**, 260 F.3d 892 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Failure to raise objection to prosecutor's misconduct during closing argument).

**Hunt v. Mitchell**, 261 F.3d 575 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Defendant denied right to confer with new counsel ten minutes before trial).

**Magana v. Hofbauer**, 263 F.3d 542 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Counsel misinformed defendant about effect

of plea agreement).

**Greer v. Mitchell**, 264 F.3d 663 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Failure to allege ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal can be ineffective assistance of counsel).

**Dixon v. Snyder**, 266 F.3d 693 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (Counsel misunderstood admissibility of witness statements).

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