TRANSCRIPT OF FBI PRESS CONFERENCE
ON DOJ INSPECTOR
GENERAL'S REPORT ON THE USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS
03/09/07
Speaker:
FBI Director Robert S. Mueller
MUELLER:
Good morning, everyone. And I want to welcome you and thank
you for being here, particularly on such short notice.
As
you know, the inspector general has released a report this
morning regarding the FBI's use of national security letters.
And I want to say at the outset: That is an excellent report.
It is one I take exceptionally seriously, and I appreciate
the work of the inspector general in conducting this review.
Let
me also say that weand I speak for the FBI as an institutionaccept
the report's findings and its recommendations and have already
taken steps to address many of these recommendations.
Some
of these steps and many of these steps are outlined on the
chart to my right.
By
way of background, the inspector general was directed by Congress
in the Patriot reauthorization act to examine the FBI's use
of national security letters, to look at their effectiveness,
and to report on any improper or illegal uses.
As
a reminder, national security letters enable us, the FBI,
to obtain certain types of transactional informationnot
content of conversations, but items such as telephone toll
records, subscriber information and the like.
I'll
say that these pieces of information are absolutely essential
and they're critical building blocks in our counterterrrorism
and counterintelligence investigations.
I'll
tell you, I'm particularly concerned about the findings in
the report that indicate that we did not have appropriate
policies in place and, in other areas where we did have appropriate
policies, we did not adhere to them in using this important
tool.
I'll
note that the inspector general indicated that his review
did not reveal intentional violations of national security
letter authorities, A.G. guidelines, or internal FBI policy.
Rather,
as he put it, he found confusion about the authorities available
under the various NSL statutes. As well, the I.G. found that,
in almost every instancein most instanceswe sought
and obtained information to which we were entitled.
Nevertheless,
the report identifies serious deficiencies in our tracking
and internal controls with regard to the use of this tool.
And
before I address these deficiencies, I wanted to look at another
subject addressed by the inspector general in his report.
The
report rightfully discusses the effectiveness as NSL as a
proven and a useful tool in protecting the American public
from acts of terrorism.
The
report concurs with our determination that national security
letters have contributed significantly to our counterterrorism
and intelligence missions.
As
the report says, FBI agents believe that national security
letters are a critical tool and are the bread and butter of
our investigations. And the report cites several examples
where national security letters have advanced particular investigations,
and I recommend that you look at that portion of his report.
I
also deeply appreciate the inspector general's putting in
context his findings with regard to the use of this tool by
describing the demanding environment in which the FBI, particularly
the Counterterrorism Division, was operating over the last
five years.
Now,
with that said, let me turn to the deficiencies that were
pointed out by the inspector general.
First
of all, inaccurate reporting. As you undoubtedly know, we
are required to report to Congress twice a year on the numbers
of NSLs issued. And the numbers that we have provided in recent
years have been inaccurate. The I.G. attributes this to several
factors: first, deficiencies in the database we use for internal
tracking of NSLs; secondly, the failure to retain signed copies
of national security letters where they can be easily counted
for purposes of the report to Congress.
We've
already taken steps to correct these deficiencies. Early last
year, we began to develop a Web-based system that will ensure
that when an NSL is issued, it will be accurately recorded.
And we are now requiring all offices to maintain signed copies
of NSLs.
We
also are doing a retrospective to determine what NSLs had
been or did not make it into the system so we can correct
those figures.
The
second area of deficienciessubstantial area of deficiencies
with regard to what is called IOBs, intelligence oversight
board violations.
By
executive order, the president's intelligence oversight board
is to be notified if there are activities that may be contrary
to national security authorities. These are known as potential
IOB violations.
An
example would be where an agent is seeking information on
a particular telephone number, transposes the numbers in that
telephone number in a request to a communications provider,
and obtains the wrong records.
Our
policy is when that happens, we sequester those records and
destroy them. We also identify that as a possible violation
and investigate why that occurred.
The
inspector general in his review of four offices found that
we had identifiedwe, the FBI had identified26
such violations, and in all but one case, agreed with how
we had handled them.
But
he also found another 22 violationspotential violationsthat
we had not found. And while he said that none of these involved
intentional or deliberate misuse of authorities, I will tell
you that my concern is that we did not pick up those mistakes
ourselves.
So
we've taken a number of steps to address this. We've improved
our internal guidance, focusing on reporting unauthorized
collections. We have and are continuing to develop trainings
that will be mandatory for all of our special agents in charge,
our attorneys in the field and our national security agents.
And,
going forward, we will be conducting reviews with the Department
of Justice of our offices of these potential IOB violations.
The
third area addressed by the inspector general relates to what
is called exigent letters.
By
statute, communications carriers can provide us information
in emergency situations. And they're entitled to trust our
representation that it is indeed an emergency situation.
After
September the 11th, the practice grew up whereby we would
provide to these carriers a letter, saying that indeed we
needed particular information because of the exigent nature
of the investigation, and that a grand jury subpoena would
follow. In a substantial number of these cases, the inspector
general found that there were not necessarily exigent circumstances
and that grand jury subpoenas had not followed.
And
while we were entitled to that information, we were using
the wrong vehicle to obtain that information.
I
should make it clear that communications carriers were absolutely
entitled to rely on our representation in providing those
materials.
Here
are the steps we're taken to rectify that situation.
As
of May of last year, we stopped the use of these letters.
We will seek emergency disclosure of records in the future
only when the circumstances comport with the statute. I also
awarded a special inspection to determine how this occurred,
and the attorney general is looking at that, as well as at
how we provide legal advice in situations such as this.
Those
are the three most substantial areas of concern pointed out
by the inspector general.
But
the question should and must be asked, how could this happen?
Who is accountable?
And the answer to that is, I am to be held accountable.
To
be more specific, when we received the additional capabilities
in the Patriot Act, in addition to establishing procedures
for reporting the number of NSLs to Congress, I should have
set up an audit system to assure the accuracy of those figures,
and did not.
Secondly,
as the inspector general points out, there was confusion and
uncertainty in the field as to the use of these authorities.
I should have provided the appropriate training, education
and internal oversight so that all out there, all in the field
understood the use of these authorities, and I did not.
And
lastly, I should have introduced internal controls and additional
levels of review to assure that incidents such as the use
of the exigent letters immediately came to light and were
remedied, and I did not.
As
I previously noted, each of these deficiencies is being addressed.
But let me finish with two thoughts.
First,
national security letters are absolutely essentialabsolutely
essential for us to do our job in protecting the American
public against terrorist attacks.
But
it is equally important that as we exercise these authorities
we do it consistent with the privacy protections and civil
liberties that we in the FBI are sworn to uphold.
I
am the person responsible, I am the person accountable, and
I am committed to ensuring that we correct these deficiencies
and live up to these responsibilities.
And
one last thought: I would say that this is an example of appropriate
and effective congressional oversight. Congress required that
this report be done, and the I.G. has completed a thorough
and a fair review and identified issues of serious concern
that have to be rectified. And the inspector general will
come back and review our progress periodically.
So
this process, as it should be, is a way to assure appropriate
oversight in how we use this critical tool for protecting
the American public.
Thank
you. And I'd be happy to answer what questions you do have.
QUESTION:
Director Mueller, you've talked, I know, to some members of
Congress initially about this. How concerned are you that
Congress might act to restrict the FBI's ability to use these
letters, and what will happen if it did?
MUELLER:
Well, I expect that Congress will review the report thoroughly,
look at the deficiencies that were pointed out, evaluate what
steps we are taking to address them, and look to future inspector
general reports on how we are measuring up.
As
I've stated, national security letters are absolutely essential
in terms of providing us with the information, the building
blocks we need to conduct our investigations.
And
there has to be a balance between the authorities that are
given us in order to protect the American public and the protection
of privacy and our civil liberties. I think the balance is
appropriate.
And
I would also work with Congress to assure that concerns that
Congress has as to the use of this particular tool are laid
to rest.
QUESTION:
Can I just follow that up?
You
could argue, I suppose, that setting the clerical errors aside,
the number of abusespotential abusesis quite small
out of something like 150,000 of these over the last few years.
Viewed in that light, it's just a small problem.
MUELLER:
Well, again, comparatively I would say that the sampling that
was done by the inspector general was relatively small. The
number of abuses is exceptionally small, given the numbers
out there.
But
nonetheless, it is a serious problem because we should have
in place the procedures to assure that where there are mistakes
made, where a person's telephone toll records are obtained
by us without appropriate process or where mistakes have been
made, it is absolutely essential that we identify that and
that we sequester those records and destroy them.
We
have that responsibility as well as the responsibility to
conduct our investigations. So it is serious.
QUESTION:
Director Mueller, you said the proper oversights were not
put in place, and you took responsibility for that. Why weren't
they in place?
MUELLER:
Because I did not early on recognize that beyond just putting
into place a database to record, for instance, the number
of NSLs, I could not rely solely on persons following the
procedures which we have in the bureau which requires a notification
of any NSL to go to the Office of General Counsel so it can
be recorded in that database and reflected to Congress.
It's
very important to have an audit procedure to make sure that
that is happening; not just put the procedure in place, but
have some sort of mechanism to assure that the procedures
are being followed. I did not put that into place at the outset.
QUESTION:
Director Mueller, you know that the report claims that there
were no intentional discrepancies made and no criminal actions
taken. In your viewit does note a couple of times that
FBI agents inaccurately misrepresented that subpoenas had
been issued (inaudible).
In
your view, will any of your agents or personnel face subpoenas
or (inaudible) criminal sanctions or (inaudible)?
MUELLER:
Well, the inspector general found no criminal violations.
But, as I indicated, we areinspections is doing a review
to determine whether or not there should be any administration
actions taken.
QUESTION:
(OFF-MIKE)
MUELLER:
Yes, I do not believe so, at this point.
And
the inspector general did not point any instances where theand
let me just refer you to page 124 of the report where, at
the end of the paragraph there, the inspector general says,
We also did not find any indication that the FBI's misuse
of NSL authorities constituted criminal misconduct.
QUESTION:
No, but it said that some of the discrepancies were illegal.
So if the law's been broken, I wonder if anybody could be
indicted or face...
MUELLER:
Well, I would refer you to the language of the inspector general
in that regard.
QUESTION:
I'm sorry. Director Mueller, I didn't hear you. You said that
the inspection review was going to be done and was going to
look at what, sir?
MUELLER:
It's going to bethe inspection is reviewing our practice
of issuing those exigent letters.
QUESTION:
And so would that then result in disciplinary action?
MUELLER:
It might, depending on the findings.
QUESTION:
Clearly some mistakes were made. Is there any evidence that
individuals or businesses were damaged as a result of these
mistakes?
MUELLER:
No, asalso, as pointed out in the inspector general's
report, in almost all the cases, the information that we were
seeking, we were appropriately seeking.
We
had used the wrong vehicle, or as the I.G. has put it, In
most cases, the FBI was seeking to obtain information that
it could have obtained properly if it had followed applicable
statutes, guidelines and internal policies.
QUESTION:
So you can reassure Americans that no one was damaged by this?
MUELLER:
I can reassure Americans that is absolutely the case.
QUESTION:
I have a follow-up question...
MUELLER:
I will tell you, thoughlet me just be absolutely clear.
There are two instances in which I believe the I.G. points
out that we received credit reports and counterterrorismcounterintelligence
investigations where under the appropriate guidelines for
counterintelligence investigations we were not entitled to
receive those reports.
So
that is one incident in whichone area in which we had
obtained information that we should not have.
QUESTION:
There's really quite a phenomenal jump in the issuance of
these national security letters. I'm wondering whether that's
really a reflection of an astronomical jump in the number
of investigations or as, I guess, critics would see, that
there are more fishing expeditions (inaudible).
MUELLER:
I would dispute the critics who would say there are fishing
expeditions.
Ninety
percent of the national security letters that we've issued
have been for telephone subscriber records, for instance,
and toll records.
If
you go back to what happened before September 11th, say, as
happened to be the case, there's a number in Yemen that is
associated with terrorists. It's very important to know if
that number has been in contact with any numbers in the United
States.
You
may find out that that number's been in contact with numbers
in the United States. It's absolutely essential to know what
those numbers were, who were the people assigned to or utilizing
those numbers, so that you can determine what, if any, association
there is in the United States with that particular number,
say, in Yemen.
If
you take Al-Midhar and Al-Hamzi, two individuals who were
in San Diego before September 11th, had we been alerted to
them beforehand and identified their telephone numbers, we
would want to know who they had contacted.
That
could be 10, 15, 20 numbers that they had contact, once you
get their tolls. Absolutely essential that we follow up on
every one of those numbers.
Had
we done that, had we been able to, maybe we would have identified
the other hijackers.
And
so, when you're looking for cells, when you're looking for
persons who are associated with terrorists or those who would
support terrorists, it's absolutely essential to have the
use of these national security letters to obtain the toll
information so we can paint the picture of these cells.
And
so, why you see an increase in the use of these numbers is
our belief that we have to undertake this kind of investigative
activity to secure the safety of the American public.
QUESTION:
Director Mueller, have the NSLs or exigent letters assisted
in disrupting...
MUELLER:
Yes. Absolutely.
QUESTION:
(OFF-MIKE) how many, for the record, how many?
MUELLER:
I can'tthere's not a daythere rarely is a day
go by when we make an arrest in a terrorist case where the
national security letter tool has not been used.
Recently, there have been arrestsarrests a couple days
ago in Phoenix, if I'm not mistake, of a United States sailor.
Well, that's a type of investigation that would have utilized
NSLs.
In
any of the Lackawanna, Seattle, Portlanda number of
these casesthe national security letter mechanism has
been absolutely essential to defining the persons who were
involved in those conspiracies.
QUESTION:
Director, besides the large increase in the aggregate in the
number of NSLs, there's a growing number of them that relate
to U.S. persons as opposed to non-U.S. persons...
(CROSSTALK)
QUESTION:
... increase the I.G. cited was something like 39 percent
to 53 percent.
MUELLER:
Yes.
QUESTION:
Can you help us understand why the increased focus on U.S...
MUELLER:
Sure. We are looking at ties to terrorism overseas. The attacks
on September 11ththe attack was formulated, the preparations
were made, the funding was done overseas and the attack was
in the United States. In order to prevent attacks in the future,
we absolutely have to track terrorists overseas to see what
ties they have in the United States.
An
example might be in the arrests that were made in the summer
of last year; the individuals in London who planned to take
explosives on planes and blow them up.
Say,
for exampleand I'm not talking specificallybut
we came across a telephone book of one of those individuals
and there are United States numbers in there, we would immediately
get national security letters to follow up on those numbers
that were in one of those terrorists' books.
If
we find in a cave in Afghanistan or someplace else information
relating to telephone numbers, e-mail addresses and the like
that come back to the United States, we'll immediately follow
up and determine what, if any, association that number in
the United States has with that terrorist activity overseas.
And our growthour growth in terms of our ability toin
advanceidentify person who are associated with terrorists
is benefited substantially by our ability, through national
security letters, to get this information.
I
will, again, remind you that the information is not content,
it is not the content of the calls themselves, but identifying
the persons who are in contact with these terrorists, often
overseas.
QUESTION:
Just a quick follow-up. (inaudible) estimate in terms of what
percent of the investigations involve U.S. citizens (inaudible)
persons?
MUELLER:
No, I couldn't give you an estimate on that.
QUESTION:
Earlier today, Senators Specter and Leahy held a conference
and they said that yesterday, when they were talking to you,
that they had sensed that you were surprised by the findings
and that you were very angry.
This
has been a concern that has long been out there. I know that
Leahy has voiced this for years. I'm wondering why didn't
you act then, why didn't you do the audits then, why did it
take this long to find out about these problems.
MUELLER:
Well, the inspector general went in and did the audit that
I should have put in place many years ago. As I said before,
I should have put that same sort of audit procedure in place
previously.
And,
yes, I was somewhat surprised by the findings of the inspector
general. As I've said in many of these areas, as soon as we
have identified those areas, we've moved to fix them. May
of last yearwe did not wait for this report; in May
of last year we discontinued the use of the exigent letters.
So
as we've identified these problems, we have addressed them.
But
we are conducting a review with the Department of Justice
of our use of NSLs as a follow-up to what the inspector general
has brought to our attention. And my expectation as a result
of that review we'll put into place probably additional safeguards
to assure that we're not surprised again.
QUESTION:
Well, I guess my question is, why didn't you do that when
you should have done that?
MUELLER:
Did not understand the necessity of putting them in place
at that time.
We
had policies, directions that you will, for instance, send
communications back to the Office of General Counsel whenever
you do an NSL. We had assumedI had assumed that that
was being done. I did not recognize in a number of instances
that this was not being done. That's an example.
And
I should have anticipated that not only do you give directions
for persons to do it, but you put into place a mechanism to
assure that it is being done.
QUESTION:
You've talked a lot about taking responsibility here. Did
it cross your mind to resign? Or did you offer to resign?
MUELLER:
No discussion of that, no.
QUESTION:
Director Mueller, what do you think happened in the field?
Do you thinksome of these Patriot Act powers have been
hard-won from a reluctant Congress. Do you think the field
didn't understandthere was sort of a nonchalant attitude
about using these authorities, or is it more just the pressure
that they're under in the haste of investigating?
MUELLER:
Well, I can assure you it's not an nonchalant attitude at
all with regard to these authorities. Everybody in the bureau
takes them exceptionally seriously. We understand the impact
that the use of these vehicles have on a person's privacy
rights, civil liberties and the like.
There
are a number of explanations. Often in the field we do not
have the support personnel to accomplish this. There are persons
that were not sufficiently educated as the necessity of doing
this or the mechanism for doing it. And we are in the process
of rectifying that.
The
database that we currently have is somewhat limited. One of
the issues pointed out by the inspector general is that in
that database we had default entries, which when you put in
particular information, the default was not to record NSLs,
which was the wrong thing to do. And so a number of national
security letters were automatically eliminated by the way
the software was set up.
So
there are a number of contributing factors to why we underreported
these NSLs to Congress. And, as I said, beginning in May of
last year we set to develop a different computer program for
that, and it is going to be piloted this summer in Washington
field office -- a program whereby you will not get a national
security letter authorized unless it goes into the databank
and we have all the information that is to accurately report
what needs to be reported to Congress.
Yes?
QUESTION:
Is it the case that the statutes regarding those national
security letters in the Patriot Act are not as clear as they
could be?
There
will be much talk about a legislative fix being needed here.
Is there any kind of legislative fix at all that you believe
could be helpful? Or does the training that you refer to to
that be sufficient?
MUELLER:
Well, you'll see thatyes. Short answer, yes. Administrative
subpoenas would be helpfuladministrative subpoenas that
we have the authority to use in narcotics cases, child pornography
cases, a number of cases would benefit because it is one process,
one procedure.
As
you will see, in reading the inspector general's report, the
authority for issuance of national security letters appears
in no less than four and probably more statutes. And so in
order to obtain a national security letter for telephone tolls,
you have to go to one statute; in order to find authority
for credit reports, you go to another statute. It would be
beneficial to have it in one statute. And so it would simplify
it not just for Congress, but also for us.
QUESTION:
Director, you talked about how critically important these
letters are to the mission of the FBI. And we also know that
the FBI's allowed to do this without seeking a court order
for the information. Is part of your frustration that this
is about trust; that Congress gives you this authority to
go out and do this, (inaudible) in dealing with these issues?
MUELLER:
Well, I think Congress and the American people should have
a lot of trust in the FBI. Occasionally, there are areas where
we need to admit mistakes that we've made -- this is one of
them; areas where we should've done a better jobthis
is one of them. And I think Congress and ourselves should
both trust but also verify.
And
I will tell you, in this case, it's why I make the point,
this is an appropriate oversight.
The
inspector general has come in and pointed out things that
perhaps we should have picked up before. But that's the purpose
of the inspector general and that's the purpose of congressional
oversight.
STAFF:
Thank you very much.
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