Signed at Washington, DC, this 10th day of March, 2006.

Elliott S. Kushner,

Certifying Officer, Division of Trade Adjustment Assistance. [FR Doc. E6–4294 Filed 3–23–06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4510-30–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[IA-05-052; ASLBP No. 06-845-01-EA]

In the Matter of David Geisen; Establishment of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

Pursuant to delegation by the Commission dated December 29, 1972, published in the **Federal Register**, 37 FR 28,710 (1972), and the Commission's regulations, *see* 10 CFR 2.104, 2.202, 2.300, 2.303, 2.309, 2.311, 2.318, and 2.321, notice is hereby given that an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board is being established to preside over the following proceeding:

David Geisen (Enforcement Action)

This proceeding concerns a request for a hearing submitted on February 23, 2006, by David Geisen in response to a January 4, 2006 NRC staff "Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-License Activities," 71 FR 2571 (January 17, 2006). Under the terms of that immediately effective staff order, the staff concluded that because Mr. Geisen (1) had knowledge of the degraded condition of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station and the limitations experienced during RPV head inspections; and (2) had deliberately provided materially incomplete and inaccurate information in connection with the continued operation of the Davis-Besse facility for a period prior to a February 2002 refueling outage that resulted in a significant adverse condition going uncorrected, Mr. Geisen was, among other things, prohibited for five years from engaging in NRClicensed activities.

The Board is comprised of the following administrative judges:

- Michael C. Farrar, Chair, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001.
- E. Roy Hawkens, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001.
- Nicholas G. Trikouros, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001.

All correspondence, documents, and other materials shall be filed with the

administrative judges in accordance with 10 CFR 2.202.

Issued at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day of March 2006.

G. Paul Bollwerk, III,

Chief Administrative Judge, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel. [FR Doc. E6–4269 Filed 3–23–06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[IA-05-053; ASLBP No. 06-846-02-EA]

In the Matter of Dale L. Miller; Establishment of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

Pursuant to delegation by the Commission dated December 29, 1972, published in the **Federal Register**, 37 FR 28,710 (1972), and the Commission's regulations, *see* 10 CFR 2.104, 2.202, 2.300, 2.303, 2.309, 2.311, 2.318, and 2.321, notice is hereby given that an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board is being established to preside over the following proceeding:

Dale L. Miller (Enforcement Action)

This proceeding concerns a request for a hearing submitted on February 23, 2006, by Dale L. Miller in response to a January 4, 2006 NRC staff "Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-License Activities," 71 FR 2579 (January 17, 2006). Under the terms of that immediately effective staff order, the staff concluded that because Mr. Miller (1) had knowledge of the degraded condition of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station and the limitations experienced during RPV head inspections; and (2) had deliberately provided materially incomplete and inaccurate information in connection with the continued operation of the Davis-Besse facility for a period prior to a February 2002 refueling outage that resulted in a significant adverse condition going uncorrected, Mr. Miller was, among other things, prohibited for five years from engaging in NRClicensed activities.

The Board is comprised of the following administrative judges:

- Michael C. Farrar, Chair, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001.
- E. Roy Hawkens, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001.
- Nicholas G. Trikouros, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001.

All correspondence, documents, and other materials shall be filed with the administrative judges in accordance with 10 CFR 2.202.

Issued at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day of March 2006.

G. Paul Bollwerk, III,

Chief Administrative Judge, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel. [FR Doc. E6–4272 Filed 3–23–06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[IA-05-054; ASLBP No. 06-847-03-EA]

In the Matter of Steven P. Moffitt; Establishment of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

Pursuant to delegation by the Commission dated December 29, 1972, published in the **Federal Register**, 37 FR 28,710 (1972), and the Commission's regulations, *see* 10 CFR 2.104, 2.202, 2.300, 2.303, 2.309, 2.311, 2.318, and 2.321, notice is hereby given that an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board is being established to preside over the following proceeding:

Steven P. Moffitt (Enforcement Action)

This proceeding concerns a request for a hearing submitted on February 23, 2006, by Steven P. Moffitt in response to a January 4, 2006 NRC staff "Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-License Activities," 71 FR 2581 (January 17, 2006). Under the terms of that immediately effective staff order, the staff concluded that because Mr. Moffitt (1) had knowledge of the degraded condition of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station and the limitations experienced during RPV head inspections; and (2) had deliberately provided materially incomplete and inaccurate information in connection with the continued operation of the Davis-Besse facility for a period prior to a February 2002 refueling outage that resulted in a significant adverse condition going uncorrected, Mr. Moffitt was, among other things, prohibited for five years from engaging in NRClicensed activities.

The Board is comprised of the following administrative judges:

- Michael C. Farrar, Chair, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001.
- E. Roy Hawkens, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001.

Nicholas G. Trikouros, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001.

All correspondence, documents, and other materials shall be filed with the administrative judges in accordance with 10 CFR 2.202.

Issued at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day of March 2006.

G. Paul Bollwerk, III,

Chief Administrative Judge, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel.

[FR Doc. E6-4276 Filed 3-23-06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Advisory Committee on the Medical Uses of Isotopes; Renewal Notice

AGENCY: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: This notice is to announce the renewal of the Advisory Committee on the Medical Uses of Isotopes (ACMUI) for a period of two years.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has determined that the renewal of the charter for the Advisory Committee on the Medical Uses of Isotopes for the two year period commencing on March 17, 2006 is in the public interest, in connection with duties imposed on the Commission by law. This action is being taken in accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act, after consultation with the Committee Management Secretariat, General Services Administration.

The purpose of the ACMUI is to provide advice to NRC on policy and technical issues that arise in regulating the medical use of byproduct material for diagnosis and therapy. Responsibilities include providing guidance and comments on current and proposed NRC regulations and regulatory guidance concerning medical use; evaluating certain non-routine uses of byproduct material for medical use; and evaluating training and experience of proposed authorized users. The members are involved in preliminary discussions of major issues in determining the need for changes in NRC policy and regulation to ensure the continued safe use of byproduct material. Each member provides technical assistance in his/her specific area(s) of expertise, particularly with respect to emerging technologies. Members also provide guidance as to NRC's role in relation to the responsibilities of other Federal

agencies as well as of various professional organizations and boards.

Members of this Committee have demonstrated professional qualifications and expertise in both scientific and non-scientific disciplines including nuclear medicine; nuclear cardiology; radiation therapy; medical physics; nuclear pharmacy; State medical regulation; patient's rights and care; health care administration; and Food and Drug Administration regulation.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION PLEASE

CONTACT: Mohammad S. Saba, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555; Telephone (301) 415–7608; e-mail *mss@nrc.gov.*

Dated: March 17, 2006.

Andrew L. Bates,

Federal Advisory Committee, Management Officer.

[FR Doc. E6–4286 Filed 3–23–06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[EA-05-006]

In the Matter of Certain Licensees Authorized To Possess and Transfer Items Containing Radioactive Material Quantities of Concern; Order Imposing Additional Security Measures (Effective Immediately)

The Licensees identified in Attachment A¹ to this Order hold licenses issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) or an Agreement State, in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and 10 CFR parts 30, 32, 50, 70 and 71, or equivalent Agreement State regulations. The licenses authorize them to possess and transfer items containing radioactive material quantities of concern. This Order is being issued to all such Licensees who may transport radioactive material quantities of concern under the NRC's authority to protect the common defense and security, which has not been relinquished to the Agreement States. The Orders require compliance with specific additional security measures to enhance the security for transport of certain radioactive material quantities of concern.

On September 11, 2001, terrorists simultaneously attacked targets in New York, NY, and Washington, DC,

utilizing large commercial aircraft as weapons. In response to the attacks and intelligence information subsequently obtained, the Commission issued a number of Safeguards and Threat Advisories to Licensees in order to strengthen Licensees' capabilities and readiness to respond to a potential attack on this regulated activity. The Commission has also communicated with other Federal, State and local government agencies and industry representatives to discuss and evaluate the current threat environment in order to assess the adequacy of the current security measures. In addition, the Commission commenced a comprehensive review of its safeguards and security programs and requirements.

As a result of its initial consideration of current safeguards and security requirements, as well as a review of information provided by the intelligence community, the Commission has determined that certain security measures are required to be implemented by Licensees as prudent, interim measures to address the current threat environment in a consistent manner. Therefore, the Commission is imposing requirements, as set forth in Attachment B² of this Order, on all Licensees identified in Attachment A of this Order. These additional security measures, which supplement existing regulatory requirements, will provide the Commission with reasonable assurance that the common defense and security continue to be adequately protected in the current threat environment. These additional security measures will remain in effect until the Commission determines otherwise.

The Commission recognizes that Licensees may have already initiated many of the measures set forth in Attachment B to this Order in response to previously issued Safeguards and Threat Advisories or on their own. It is also recognized that some measures may not be possible or necessary for all shipments of radioactive material quantities of concern, or may need to be tailored to accommodate the Licensees' specific circumstances to achieve the intended objectives and avoid any unforeseen effect on the safe transport of radioactive material quantities of concern.

Although the security measures implemented by Licensees in response to the Safeguards and Threat Advisories have been adequate to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of common defense and

¹Attachment A contains sensitive unclassified information and will not be released to the public.

² Attachment B contains Safeguards Information and will not be released to the public.