PUBLICIZING THE ADA: ADVOCACY AND THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Gallaudet University erupted on March 1, 1988, as an estimated 1,500 alumni, students, faculty, and community supporters rallied to demand the selection of the university's first deaf president. The board of trustees had narrowed its candidate pool to three: Harvey J. Corson and I. King Jordan, both deaf; and Elizabeth A. Zinser, who neither had a hearing impairment nor understood sign language. On the evening of March 6, under the leadership of Chairperson Jane Bassett Spilman, the board selected Zinser as president. Hundreds of students, alumni, and others responded the next morning by shutting down the school: they organized before dawn and blocked every campus entrance. They even searched cars and planned to lie on the ground to prevent a helicopter from landing in the event that Zinser tried to step foot on campus (she never did). They also marched to Capitol Hill and demonstrated at the White House.

Later that day, a ten-person delegation representing students, faculty, and alumni issued four demands to the board: appoint a deaf president; demand Spilman's resignation; protect protestors from punishment; and designate a majority of the board's seats for deaf persons. But the board rejected the demands. At a meeting in the field house that followed, where Spilman appealed to a crowd of protesters to give Zinser a chance, students shouted down Spilman, sounded a fire alarm to obstruct her presentation, and taunted her: "If you could sign, we could hear you." The following day, on March 8, the group hung Zinser and Spilman in effigy; later they cut them down and burned them.

The volatile activity on the campus of the world's only deaf university was front-page news; people from around the world lent their support. Senator Robert Dole (R-KS), Congressmen David E. Bonior (D-MI) and Tony Coelho (D-CA), and Vice President George Bush backed selection of a deaf president. Bonior threatened that the university might lose government funding, which accounted for 75 percent of its budget, unless it met demonstrators" demands.

The Deaf President Now! protest "proved, convincingly, that deaf people could band together effectively for a common cause and succeed."

--Jack Gannon

To students, alumni, and faculty, the selection of a deaf president symbolized deaf persons' attempt to attain full citizenship, equal participation, and self-direction. "The time has come for the plantation mentality, which has for so long controlled this institution and others serving the deaf, to end," psychology professor Allen Sussman said. "We want to be free from hearing oppression," student leader Bridgette Bourne declared. "We don't want to live off the hearing world, we want to live as independent people," she continued. Freshman John Limmidis opined: "We believe that we have to fight to prove to the world that a deaf person is just as good as a hearing person." The presidency of Gallaudet was the highest position in the deaf community; a decision to bypass a deaf person for that office broadcasted the message that hearing persons were better suited for power and leadership. Consequently, it questioned the potential of deaf persons in other employment and social opportunities. Like racial minorities and women, the deaf community wanted the empowerment and legitimacy that comes with leadership from one's own ranks.

On March 10, under relentless pressure, Zinser submitted her resignation. The following day the board acceded to the protestors' demands: it appointed Jordan president, accepted Spilman's resignation, committed to reconstituting the board, and dismissed repercussions for demonstrating. It was a huge victory for the deaf community. As one historian said, the protest "proved, convincingly, that deaf people could band together effectively for a common cause and succeed."

The protest also benefitted and strengthened the disability community as a whole. Students' demands for self-direction, independence, and opportunity echoed the disability rights movement. National coverage of the events confronted many Americans with a foreign image of disability: repudiation of pity and charity, insistence on civil rights. The protest also came at an opportune moment, just over a month before the Americans with Disabilities Act was introduced in Congress. It powerfully symbolized the potential of the disability community, a fitting beginning to a nationwide education about disability and the ADA.

Mobilizing the Disability Community

In 1988, the top priorities for the disability community were the Civil Rights Restoration Act, which became public law on March 22, 1988, and the Fair Housing Amendments Act, enacted on September 13, 1988. The ADA would not get the spotlight until 1989. However, ADA sponsors and the disability community used 1988 as an opportunity to publicize the act, mobilize grass roots support, solicit the endorsement of presidential candidates, enlist congressional cosponsors, and establish the act as a top priority for the next Congress.

The political sophistication attained by the disability community during the 1980s enabled ADA advocates to pursue a multi-pronged strategy to meet its objectives. A Washington-based ADA coalition coordinated these activities in conjunction with the bill's congressional sponsors. Although this coalition did not fully form until 1989, it began to take shape even before the bill's introduction in April, 1988. Describing the emerging leadership is extremely difficult, however, because it was not highly structured. There was no body of voting members that elected officials to formally-defined job positions. There were no department heads. Rather, individuals and a variety of organizations formed a loose (though united) ADA coalition. To facilitate communications, the ADA coalition conducted many of its activities "under the auspices" of the well-established Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities (CCD).

Paul Marchand, Director of the Governmental Affairs Office for the Association for Retarded Citizens (ARC), had founded CCD's predecessor, CCDD, in the early 1970s to unite federal advocacy efforts of the disability community. By 1988, the consortium represented dozens of Washington-based organizations. Additional groups enlisted their support to CCD's campaign to pass the ADA. CCD's operations were carried out through multiple task forces, including the Civil Rights Task Force, which from 1988 to 1990 focused almost exclusively on the ADA. Pat Wright of the Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund (DREDF), Liz Savage of the Epilepsy Foundation of America (EFA), and Curt Decker of the National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems (NAPAS) were the Civil Rights Task Force Co-chairs. The ADA coalition used the task force as its headquarters and CCD stationary for much of its correspondence. Although most of the ADA coalition leaders were from organizations who were members of CCD, it would be misleading to refer to CCD and the ADA coalition interchangeably, since key participants also came from outside CCD. This applied especially to people with disabilities representing the grass roots: ADAPT and NCIL, for example. And Dart, who was a full-fledged supporter and close ally of CCD, nonetheless did not officially represent a CCD member organization: he served the ADA coalition as a voice of the people.

The ADA coalition organized its efforts according to four major functions: overall strategy development; education and lobbying; grass roots mobilization; and legal writing and analysis. And it creatively exploited all available resources to accomplish the job, varying the approach to meet changing circumstances. For the most part, participants tended to focus on one of these four areas, but there was overlap. At the core was a handful of leaders who were most responsible for guiding the overall effort.

The ADA coalition embraced four major functions: strategy development; education and lobbying; grass roots mobilization; and legal analysis.

While many people contributed to developing the overarching strategy for passing the ADA, two persons in particular focused their efforts on this area: Pat Wright and Ralph Neas. Wright's leadership during the ADA's passage eventually earned her the nickname "The General." She had attended medical school in the 1960s, but, after a progressive eye disease left her legally blind, she was forced to leave the profession. Temporarily derailed, she found a new interest in assisting persons with disabilities move from institutions to community- based living and gained an intimate knowledge of how legal technicalities affected the lives of persons with disabilities. Wright made her first major inroads to the disability rights movement at the San Francisco sit-in of April, 1977, where she had served as a personal assistant to Judy Heumann and demonstrated her negotiation skills in working with the guards. In her decade of work with DREDF, Wright had refined her extraordinary and tough negotiating techniques.

"She has [more] hutzpah than anyone I've ever met," said Eastern Paralyzed Veterans of America (EPVA) attorney Jim Weisman, who worked with her closely during the ADA's passage. Wright certainly made her presence known. Her rejection of standard Washington attire stood out among beltway veterans; one journalist said she appeared as if she had arrived directly from the 1960s Berkeley campus. But Wright was so widely respected in Congress and the White House that her apparel and colorful vocabulary were beyond reproach. "She really is brassy," said Weisman, "but she got it done." Indeed, the ADA's success was due in no small part to Wright's efforts, though some perceived Wright as a "loner" because she took advantage of her contacts and her capabilities to negotiate unilaterally in high-pressured situations.

The ADA's success was due in no small part to Pat Wright's efforts. "She has more hutzpah than anyone I've ever met."

--Jim Weisman

Neas, an attorney and Director of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR), brought to the ADA coalition unparalleled experience in civil rights legislation. LCCR carried more than three decades of civil rights advocacy, and was "the broadest, the largest, and oldest coalition in the country," with over 185 organizations and their 60 million dues-paying members. It had either assisted or led the coordination of every civil rights bill since 1957. As Executive Director of the LCCR since 1981, Neas led several civil rights campaigns, including the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act, the Civil Rights Restoration Act, and the Fair Housing Amendments Act. (In 1989, he would begin work on what became the Civil Rights Act of 1991.) In the spring of 1988, Wright approached Neas and the Executive Council to obtain an endorsement of the concept of the ADA. She stressed that the disability community would work with Congress to develop a viable bill after the 1988 election; the important consideration was to lend credibility to the general principles. DREDF's efforts during the 1980s paid off, and LCCR joined the disability community as an indispensable ally. Although Neas did not join the strategy team full-time until he finished with the Civil Rights Restoration Act and Fair Housing Amendments Act, the ADA would become one of his top priorities in January, 1989.

While Wright and Neas were the principal strategists, most strategy development did not take place behind closed doors. For example, Savage and Marchand (who focused on lobbying in Washington), Justin Dart and Marilyn Golden (who focused on the grass roots), and Mayerson and Feldblum (who directed legal strategy) all were regular participants in shaping strategy. Moreover, important strategic contributions came from people such as Mary Lou Breslin of DREDF; National Council on Disability (NCD) Chairperson Sandra Parrino; Lex Frieden of The Institute for Rehabilitation and Research (TIRR) and former NCD Executive Director; Paul Hearne of the Dole Foundation; and Jay Rochlin, Executive Director of the President's Committee on the Employment of People with Disabilities. These individuals provided additional contacts in Congress and the administration and also contributed specific statutory recommendations. Such organizations as NCIL and ADAPT brought the concerns of consumer-directed organizations to the table. Further more, when the CCD Civil Rights Task Force began holding weekly strategy meetings in 1989, out- of-town visitors were active participants.

Crucial for implementation of strategy was the Washington-based education and lobbying effort. In this respect, Wright worked especially closely with Savage--attorney, Assistant Director for Government Affairs of EFA, and Co-chair of the CCD Civil Rights Task Force. Wright and Savage had met in 1985, around the time Savage joined EFA. Together they worked on such landmark civil rights cases as the Handicapped Children's Protection Act, Civil Rights Restoration Act, and Fair Housing Amendments Act. Wright and Savage's strengths complemented one another. Whereas Wright's expertise was in strategy and negotiating, Savage's strength was lobbying. This experience and relationship with Wright naturally evolved into the role of coordinating lobbying activities for the ADA coalition. If Wright was the "General," Savage was one of the principal "Field Commanders."

Marchand also played a key role in the education and lobbying effort. As Director of the Governmental Affairs Office of the ARC, Marchand brought to the ADA coalition the resources of one of the nation's largest disability organizations: 1,200 chapters nationwide, and an Action Alert Network that monitored congressional activities and mustered thousands of letters and phone calls. Advocates for persons with developmental disabilities were a well-established and widely-respected presence in Washington, which effectively positioned Marchand for ADA leadership. Moreover, as Chairman of CCD he had an effective platform for working with members of Congress and the administration.

To aid in the crucial task of educating members of Congress about disability and lobbying them to be ADA cosponsors, which began even before the ADA was first introduced, the ADA coalition relied on a number of lobbying "captains." These included Becky Ogle of the Spina Bifida Association, Bob Williams of the United Cerebral Palsy Associations (UCPA), Denise Rozell of the National Association of Developmental Disabilities Councils (NADDC), Tom Sheridan of the AIDS Action Council, Kathy Megivern of the Association for Education and Rehabilitation of the Blind and Visually Handicapped, Fred Cowell of the Paralyzed Veterans of America (PVA), David Capozzi of the National Easter Seal Society (NESS), Caren Friedman of the Human Rights Campaign Fund, and Curt Decker of the National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems (NAPAS). These lobbyists in turn worked with members of such organizations as CCD, LCCR, NCIL, the National Organization Responding to AIDS (NORA), and ADAPT. Together they organized lobbying teams to visit senators" and congressmen's offices, which supplemented the efforts of congressional sponsors.

Victory would be won through the efforts of thousands of advocates across the nation who could humanize and personalize the issues.

Although lobbying was important, successful passage of the ADA could not be achieved by efforts only within the Washington beltway. Well before the ADA entered Congress, the ADA coalition concluded that success was dependent on convincing members of Congress, the executive branch, and the general public that the difficulties faced by persons with disabilities were a genuine national problem. The ADA could not be viewed as the brain-child of a coterie of think-tank intellects; it had to be correctly understood as an outgrowth of the pervasive experience of discrimination. Victory would be won through the efforts of thousands of advocates across the nation who could humanize and personalize the issues, not by privately wrestling with legal technicalities. NCD had begun this process through "consumer forums," Justin Dart's public forums, Toward Independence, and The ICD Survey. After the ADA was introduced, Marilyn Golden of DREDF and Justin Dart led these efforts. In 1988, the primary goal of the ADA coalition was to get an army ready. In 1989 and 1990, with a communication system in place, Dart and Golden would issue a nationwide call to arms.

There were three main objectives for grass roots mobilization. The first was to educate persons with disabilities about the ADA to prepare them for action. An important part of this process was uniting the fragmented disability community by centering the focus on a common cause. The second was to accumulate evidence of discrimination. This came not only through the standard form of congressional testimony, but also through the novel approach of soliciting "discrimination diaries." In addition to providing evidence for Congress, preparing these documents would prompt people throughout the country to organize diary parties and foster the empowerment that comes from numbers. Over time, many persons with disabilities had internalized oppression, taken complete responsibility for their situations, and thus turned their backs to discrimination. By writing down their experiences, however, people could face discrimination, recognize society's role, get "mad as hell," and lose patience with the circumstances to which they had become acclimated. Third, grass roots mobilization would provide a means to apply pressure on members of Congress and the president. Not only did persons with disabilities write letters, they also joined the lobbying campaign by paying for trips to Washington out of their own pockets.

Golden drew on the extensive contacts she had made through administering DREDF disability rights training projects. In the 1980s, DREDF had brought thousands of persons with disabilities to Berkeley to educate them in their rights and teach them how to mobilize communities for action. These persons in turn shared their knowledge with their local communities. Golden supplemented this network by establishing ties to other organizations, such as NCIL, and the ARC, and their grass roots links. The computer network DIMENET was another avenue for mobilizing people around the country.

As a result of his public forums, Dart had become famous among people with disabilities around the country, indeed he had become somewhat of a cultural icon for much of the disability community. As he toured the country, Dart kept lists of all the people who attended, which produced a massive list of people he could later contact for political action. And by spending years touring the country, people in the grass roots felt as if they were part of the ADA's development rather than objects of it. They were thus more willing and eager to join Dart when the time came for action. Dart simply had "no equal" in getting people mobilized, said Maria Cuprill, a staff member of the House Subcommittee on Select Education.

Members of Congress also recognized the need to demonstrate broad-based support for the ADA. Congressman Major R. Owens (D-NY), in particular, devoted considerable energy to empowering the grass roots. Although Owens was a relative newcomer to disability policy, first encountering it after becoming a member of the House Education and Labor Committee in 1983, he brought additional assets. He had experienced the 1960s civil rights movement first-hand, including service as chairman of the Brooklyn chapter of the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE)--an organization central to the movement's success. He had also developed a passion for fostering citizen participation. In 1987, Owens became Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Select Education, which had jurisdiction over many disability issues. When he first learned about the ADA prior to its introduction, he thought of it primarily as a civil rights issue: carrying forward the banner for civil rights from African Americans to women to people with disabilities. Owens wanted to do whatever he could to help energize people with disabilities.

Accordingly, on May 2, 1988, less than a week after the ADA's introduction, Congressman Owens created the Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities. The group's purpose was twofold: to present to Congress, the executive branch, and the general public evidence of disability discrimination, and to make recommendations. Owens appointed Dart to be the Chairperson. Dart had testified before Owens's subcommittee as Commissioner of the Rehabilitation Services Administration (RSA), which was part of the Department of Education. Owens thereby discovered that Dart shared his philosophy that disability rights were primarily civil rights. But, following his critical testimony regarding the Department of Education and its paternalistic attitudes toward and policies for people with disabilities, Dart resigned as RSA Commissioner. Owens saw his task force as an opportunity for Dart to continue his mission of achieving civil rights for people with disabilities. Owens named Elizabeth Boggs, of the ARC, as Co-chair with Dart. And Lex Frieden assumed the reins as Coordinator. Thirty-five others from the disability community were selected as task force members.

Justin Dart chaired 63 forums in all fifty states, with over 7,000 people in attendance, and collected more than 5,000 documents supporting the ADA.

Dart immediately began organizing another series of public forums. As always, Dart's wife Yoshiko was crucial for the management and execution of Dart's activities, which they paid for primarily with their own funds. Justin met Yoshiko in Japan, where Justin worked as president of Japan Tupperware. Yoshiko was a remarkably successful sales representative for the company. In addition to managing his company, which met with great success, Justin used his position as president to assist people with disabilities in attaining better livelihoods. For example, he sponsored sales campaigns in which the company and employees donated profits to buy wheelchairs for persons with disabilities. Justin also provided employment opportunities to boys who used wheel chairs. And Yoshiko took an active role in training them for work and assisting them in building greater self-confidence as productive citizens. Yoshiko's success, capabilities, and interest in disability attracted Justin's attention, who ultimately hired her as an executive assistant. They married in 1968 and became partners in championing the rights of persons with disabilities.

Between 1988 and 1990 Justin Dart chaired a total of 63 forums in all fifty states, Guam, and Puerto Rico, with over 7,000 people in attendance overall. Attending a public forum was extraordinarily empowering, said Denise Figueroa of New York. When someone has a disability, she said, one tends to "tolerate the discrimination, because it's how you survive." Hearing people talk about their experiences, however, could be a consciousness-raising experience and charge one with a desire to fight for human rights. It was also empowering, said Figueroa, because one realized "you weren't alone."

While traveling throughout the country, Dart collected upwards of 5,000 documents and tape recordings detailing discrimination, offering proposals, and urging passage of the ADA (see Appendix E for a collection of examples). In addition to people with disabilities, comments came from parents, health care providers, and others who worked with people with disabilities. Virtually every type of disability was represented. Thousands of people filled out petitions titled "A VOTE FOR JUSTICE," which declared support of the ADA and concluded with the invitation: "I HAVE PERSONALLY EXPERIENCED AND/OR OBSERVED THE FOLLOWING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES:." For example, when Gary Janski, who had a psychiatric disability, tried to rent a favorite, vacant apartment, the owner said: "we won't rent to your kind." When you're "crippled," observed Sheila Sorenson, "you get treated like you're a two year old and can't do anything." "It makes us feel better to [do] things on our own instead of having everything done for [us]," she said. Ree Steidemann described how deaf persons she worked with repeatedly tried to reach hospitals and other institutions through TTY's, where no one answered or people answered and did not know how to use their TTY devices. "Please, please help us," wrote Frances Murtagh, an exasperated mother of a child with cerebral palsy. "I'm at my wits end trying to fight these people alone." In a profound poem, Carolyn Schwartz pleaded: "So before you condemn what you don't understand. Let me reach out to you and come touch my hand." Debbie Wimmer described how she overheard a security guard announce: "I have a girl in a wheelchair that needs watching." "I was speechless. I was hurt. I was mad," wrote Wimmer. Phyllis Geldzalh captured the blunt sentiments of many people with disabilities: "It would be a serious injustice if ADA was not passed."

In addition to presenting boxes of materials to Congress, the task force issued 11 interim reports to Congress, and prepared 37 statements to leaders in the disability community. Dart also sponsored 14 meetings in Washington and made presentations to various organizations around the country, reaching an estimated 25,000 persons. Moreover, task force members contributed to lobbying efforts by consulting with members of Congress and the executive branch. As a testimony to its dedication to, passion for, and personal investment in disability policy, the task force carried out all its efforts without government funding, through volunteered time and money. And it far exceeded Congressman Owens's expectations.

Although the disability community conducted very little legal work on the ADA in 1988, this was the fourth main objective in addition to strategy development, grass roots mobilization, and lobbying. By mid-1989, a legal team was fairly organized. The lead attorney for the disability community, and the one who most often testified before Congress on behalf of the ADA, was Arlene Mayerson of DREDF. She had worked extensively on the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act, Civil Rights Restoration Act, and Fair Housing Amendments Act, and had submitted countless briefs to various committees and courts. Especially significant was her role in passing the Handicapped Children's Protection Act. Although Mayerson lived in Berkeley, California, during the congressional deliberations on the ADA, Mayerson visited Washington frequently, for weeks at a time, in order to guide legal strategy. Chai Feldblum of the ACLU, who had met Wright while working on the Civil Rights Restoration Act (the first time HIV/AIDS entered a Senate bill for civil rights protections), fulfilled much of the daily responsibilities of legal writing while Mayerson was in California. Although Feldblum specialized in AIDS-related law, and championed the efforts to include persons with HIV and AIDS within the housing provisions, she began developing a firm grasp on general disability law.

Mayerson and Feldblum were hardly alone, however. Robert Burgdorf, the original author of the ADA and now a professor at the District of Columbia School of Law, participated in all modifications to the bill and helped ensure continuity from the original version. Tim Cook of the National Disability Action Center offered general guidance as well as his expertise with respect to public accommodations and transportation. Weisman, of EPVA, served as the resident specialist in Transportation. Bonnie Milstein of the Mental Health Law Project offered her expertise concerning mental impairments. Karen Peltz-Strauss, from the National Center for Law and the Deaf, focused on telecommunication provisions. Depending on the issues pressing at any given moment, these and other attorneys worked closely with Congress, disability strategists, and lobbyists to translate disability objectives into proper legal form. Meanwhile, attorneys Robert Funk and Evan Kemp worked on behalf of the disability community within the Bush administration, respectively as a White House negotiator and Chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).

The massive effort of the disability community was not without its tensions. Many disability organizations had previously been in conflict with one another over limited government resources. As with any coalition, there were tensions between those who held Washington leadership roles and those who worked in the trenches, between inside-the-beltway politicos and persons throughout the rest of the country. Some felt that their views were not being adequately represented in the decision-making process. Others resented claims that persons outside of Washington did not understand the legislative process. There was also tension between persons with disabilities and those without them. It is natural to assume that African-American and women's advocacy groups would be led by African Americans and women. In the disability community, however, one found large numbers of persons without disabilities at the helm. Regardless of the actual impact on policy development and implementation, some persons with disabilities demanded that "their own" be in charge. The important point, however, is not the presence of these tensions, but the way in which the disability community overcame them.

"No subgroup of people with any type of physical or mental disability, or perceived disability, . . . will be sacrificed."

--Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities

There was something in the ADA for every one. Virtually all disability sub-groups wanted to, and subsequently did, champion the goals of the ADA. With few exceptions, they were united in the commitment that there would be "no long term legitimation of unequal status for people with disabilities." Full realization of the goals might take decades, but they wanted to undercut any national policies that would promote discrimination indefinitely. The disability community made a second important commitment. There would be no splintering with respect to the ADA: "No subgroup of people with any type of physical or mental disability, or perceived disability, no matter how politically impotent or how stigmatized, will be sacrificed." And they would fight each other's battles. Advocates for persons with mental retardation pushed for ending discrimination against AIDS; people with epilepsy argued for the need for accessible transportation; and individuals using wheelchairs urged that persons with mental disabilities equally deserved freedom from employment discrimination. Even at the most intense moments in congressional deliberations, the community would stick together.

The Government Response

While persons with disabilities throughout the country were mobilizing to learn about and support the ADA, the general public remained largely unaware of the legislation. Prior to the ADA's introduction, The Washington Post pointed to the ADA as a potential rallying point for the disability community. But there was virtually no mainstream press coverage, either of the bill's introduction, or during the rest of 1988. This was due in part to the lateness of the bill's entree to Congress. Since the ADA's advocates were not pushing for immediate passage, the bill drew neither the press coverage nor the opposition it would when the bill became a serious proposal in 1989. Individuals throughout the country, however, helped raise consciousness about the ADA by talking with their circles of friends and family. And scores of disability and non-disability organizations endorsed the ADA and funneled information to their members.

Disability and congressional advocates focused much more on the executive branch and Congress than on the general public. The ADA was first introduced, as Congressman Coelho said, "to just get reaction, to get people to respond." A prominent executive branch voice was Evan Kemp, who approached the issue both as a Commissioner of EEOC and as a disability rights advocate. He made his first public declaration on the ADA before hundreds of people at the Employers Banquet of the President's Committee on Employment of the Handicapped. The event took place in the International Ballroom of the Washington Hilton Hotel, just a week after the bill's introduction on May 5. Kemp wanted a bill that President Bush could support and therefore alerted people to problematic provisions. Kemp spoke primarily about employment issues, of how it made good business sense to tap the market of disabled persons by promoting accessibility, and good government sense to reduce federal spending through employment. For these reasons he applauded the ADA, but he also questioned its current form. Kemp thought the bill needed to be more detailed to avoid control by bureaucratic regulators. He was especially concerned about the definition of "reasonable accommodation" (see Appendix F), and advocated federal economic assistance to employers to ease the economic burden the ADA might cause. He also thought the proposed limit on reasonable accommodations was "unrealistic" because an employer would have to demonstrate either that the business would be "fundamentally changed" or that it would be forced to file bankruptcy. The definition of "handicap" (see Appendix F) was also problematic for Kemp. He proposed a restricted definition that focused on what he termed the "truly disabled": the "severely handicapped" and persons "excluded because of myths, fears and stereotypes." Kemp's emphasis on the vagueness of language, limits for accommodation, and definition of disability, foreshadowed several issues that would dominate congressional deliberations.

A vigorous response came from Thomas M. Boyd, Acting Assistant Attorney General, who presented the position of the Reagan administration. While the administration "is deeply committed to the goal of bringing individuals with handicaps into the mainstream of American life," wrote Boyd, "we have very serious reservations" about the extent and standards of the ADA. Highlighting the potential costs associated with disability rights, and rejecting the link to provisions for minorities and women, Boyd emphasized the need to keep the pursuit of equal opportunity "within manageable bounds." Especially problematic were the ways in which the ADA departed from Section 504 in two ways: first, by requiring barrier removal uniformly for both existing and new facilities; second, by incorporating the "utterly unrealistic and extreme" provision that a business could defend itself against charges of discrimination only if its basic existence was threatened by the cost of accommodations. The administration objected to the ADA's novel definitions of "handicap" and "reasonable accommodation," and questioned the application of reasonable accommodation beyond employment settings. Boyd also repudiated the proposal for requiring all new transportation vehicles to be accessible, and demurred to ordering implementation of universal design in new housing. Finally, the administration proposed a more limited standard of accessibility to public accommodations, and demanded that the effective date for the bill be delayed at least a year.

The ADA was introduced in 1988 to solicit the endorsement of presidential candidates and induce them to outbid one another.

Although the Reagan administration, as illustrated in Boyd's letter, was at best cautious in its sup port of the ADA, the disability community's sights were set on the next president. In fact, one of the principal reasons for introducing the ADA in 1988 was to use the politics of a presidential election year to solicit candidate endorsement and induce the candidates to outbid one another. People in the disability community correctly believed that presidential support was crucial for the ADA's success. They worked for both campaigns to encourage disabled persons to vote and make disability a campaign issue. They had some leverage. On June 30, 1988, the Louis Harris polling company determined that the disability community comprised 10 percent of the electorate, was "a force to be reckoned with in the politics of the future," and could be the deciding factor in a close election.

Vice President Bush's personal experience with disability shaped his relationship with the disability community. He had a daughter who died from leukemia, a son with a learning disability, an uncle with quadriplegia, and a son whose cancer required a plastic ostomy bag. In conjunction with his leadership of President Reagan's Task Force on Regulatory Relief, his support of the disability community had grown steadily since 1983. This was due in no small part to Kemp, who worked with Bush by writing many of his public statements.

"I am going to do whatever it takes to make sure the disabled are included in the mainstream. For too long, they have been left out, but they are not going to be left out anymore."

--Vice President George Bush

In the September issue of the disability magazine Mainstream, Kemp faced off with Timothy Cook of the Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia (PILCOP) to argue the respective attributes of the two presidential candidates. Kemp noted how, on March 1, 1988, Vice President Bush wrote to the Gallaudet Board of Trustees and urged the Board "to set an example and . . . appoint a president who is not only highly qualified, but who is also deaf." A month before the ADA was introduced, on March 31, Bush also pledged to support legislation providing persons with disabilities "the same protection in private employment that is now enjoyed by women and minorities." Kemp noted how Bush made an even stronger commitment when he participated in the swearing in ceremony of Paul Hearne as Executive Director of the National Council on Disability, on August 12, 1988. Bush's presence alone, before nearly 100 persons with disabilities and the organization that authored the original ADA, symbolized his support of the disability community. But Bush went further and, while he did not endorse the ADA introduced to Congress, said that he would promote a civil rights act for people with disabilities. Kemp's efforts in courting Bush also bore fruit at the Republican convention in August, where Bush incorporated the rights of disabled persons into his acceptance speech. He did not say much, but it was the first time disability was included on such an occasion: "I am going to do whatever it takes to make sure the disabled are included in the mainstream. For too long, they have been left out, but they are not going to be left out anymore."

Cook, a leading disability advocate for Dukakis, focused on Michael Dukakis's strong record on disability as Governor of Massachusetts. Similar to other states, Massachusetts provided full access for persons with disabilities in all state-assisted programs and activities. It was also one of few states to have an executive-level independent agency to enforce disability civil rights. Cook noted that Governor Dukakis strengthened enforcement mechanisms for accessibility standards, including barrier-free sidewalks and roadways. He also made concerted efforts to recruit persons with disabilities for government offices, including high-level leadership positions such as the Massachusetts's Rehabilitation Commission. Moreover, Governor Dukakis had augmented Massachusetts" health insurance, attendant care, and education programs for persons with disabilities.

Yet, while Dukakis promoted accessibility in campaign functions and gave a mild endorsement to the principles of the ADA, he did not court the disability community as vigorously as Vice President Bush. In addition to his personal experiences with disability, Bush's leadership of the Task Force on Regulatory Relief and the disability community's defensive effort helped convinced Bush of the power of the community as a voting block: it commanded respect and could pay high dividends. Bush did not let the opportunity escape him. For example, at the suggestion of Kemp he made a point to incorporate disability issues into his presidential debates.

Dukakis, on the other hand, was facing criticism that he and the Democratic party were too beholden to interest groups, which led him to downplay rather than accentuate direct appeals to specific constituencies such as persons with disabilities. He thereby alienated much of the disability community. Some of Dukakis's tempered support of the disability community may in fact be attributed to the disability community itself. Some disability advocates had advised Dukakis not to come out too strong on behalf of the ADA. Their goal was to have both candidates endorse the principles of the ADA so that whoever was elected would be on their side. They thus wanted to encourage Bush to support the ADA by giving him room to outbid Dukakis, rather than make Bush feel as if he needed to contrast himself with Dukakis by being more reserved in his support of the ADA.

ADA advocates also sought the support of members of Congress. The disability community joined congressional staff and members in a cosponsorship drive that began before the ADA was first introduced and continued throughout the entire session of Congress. Cosponsorship is crucial to the success of any bill. It promises affirmative votes and enables advocates to gauge the level of support. Cosponsorship is also important because, if one can achieve a cross-section of party and ideology, it helps thwart reflexive, negative reaction and partisan labeling. Although ADA advocates anticipated a high level of cosponsorship because they presented the ADA as a civil rights bill, the process proved to be very difficult. Members did not take the issue of costs lightly and were reluctant to attach their name simply because someone else had done so. Nevertheless, by the close of the 100th Congress on October 22, 1988, 26 senators and 117 representatives had endorsed the bill.

Congressional Hearings

The highlights of the 1988 ADA campaign were the congressional hearings held in September and October. On September 27, 1988, the Senate Subcommittee on the Handicapped and the House Subcommittee on Select Education held a joint hearing in the Hart Senate Office Building. On October 24, the House Subcommittee on Select Education held a hearing in the Lafayette Hotel of Boston, Massachusetts. These hearings were not intended to be substantive examinations of the ADA's provisions. "This bill is not going anywhere this year," Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) said flatly at the joint hearing. Senator Lowell P. Weicker, Jr. (R-CT) also conceded that the real battle would not begin until Congress reconvened in 1989. But Weicker emphasized the need to get disability discrimination on the table for immediate discussion: "If there is silence now, there will be silence later. If there is indifference to discrimination now, there will be indifference later." The purpose was therefore to establish a record of discrimination--to humanize the ICD Survey data with the lives of real persons--and make congressional inaction on the ADA intolerable.

The message was clear: persons with disabilities struggled with unequal opportunities; they confronted not only the challenges of their impairments, but also the barriers society erects; federal action was necessary to remedy the situation.

Of the 95 witnesses at the two hearings, there was not a single technical expert speaking to the details of the bill. Only seven federal and state government officials testified. The remaining witnesses were all from the disability community--persons and parents of persons with disabilities, and people who worked with disabled persons in such settings as independent living centers--who spoke of their own experiences. This was, therefore, the first instance in which a congressional hearing regarding disability was dominated by the presence of people with disabilities. Some of the predicaments identified by witnesses were not even issues that the ADA addressed. But the message was clear: persons with disabilities struggled with unequal opportunities; they confronted not only the challenges of their impairments, but also the barriers society erects; federal action was necessary to remedy the situation.

The joint hearing in the Hart Senate Office Building overflowed with eager spectators, many of them disabled, and many having traveled hundreds of miles to participate. Around 200 people with disabilities came to Washington for the event from New Jersey alone. Senator Weicker actually had to stop the proceedings to attend to space needs; he asked those present to rotate so that others watching on television could have a chance to be in the hearing room. The stories of those who testified were gripping and spoke volumes.

Mary Linden, who had been unable to walk since early childhood as a result of physicians' surgical errors, launched the first panel. She described her struggles with a public school that considered her unworthy of education. It was not until after Linden graduated from a disability- segregated high school in 1951 that she learned how to write, and then only because she taught herself. Subsequently she spent over two decades accumulating 61 hours of college credit. To her dismay, she could not enroll in a four-year college because of inaccessible public transportation. She therefore had to do all of her work through correspondence. Linden said she desperately wanted to finish her degree because it was necessary for attaining what she significantly termed "the most precious thing in the world--a paying job!" "I beg you to pass this bill," she pleaded, so that other children will not have to face the same barriers.

Twelve-year-old Jade Calegory followed Linden's testimony and, compared with Linden, presented the stark contrast of what opportunity could do. Jade praised the Federal Government for passing the Education for all Handicapped Children Act because the act enabled him, with his spina bifida and wheelchair, to join the rest of his community's children in the public school. Jade starred in the movie "Mac and Me," which he described as "terrific because it shows a kid with a disability giving help instead of just getting help, and nobody tries to cure me or take away my disability by the end of the movie. That gives people the idea that it is okay to be disabled and just be accepted for who you are." Jade also described his passion for participating in wheelchair races. But he reported that he would get frustrated when he tried to ride a bus home. "Most of the buses do not have lifts on them. Some of the drivers are very rude and get mad if I want to take the bus. Can you believe that? I work and part of my taxes pay for public buses, and then they get mad just because I am using a wheelchair." Accessible buses were important, said Jade, because "it is hard for people to feel good about themselves if they have to crawl up the stairs of a bus, or if the driver passes by without stopping."

Dan Piper and his mother, Sylvia Piper, illustrated the uncertainty they faced because of Dan's developmental disability. Although the Pipers were told that Dan's condition was "hopeless" when he was a young child, and that Dan should be institutionalized, they decided to keep him at home. Ultimately he joined the special education program of an integrated public school, where he took courses with non-disabled peers, helped manage the football team, and became the lead performer in a traveling high school lip-sync group. The Pipers were worried, however, about what would happen to Dan when he finished school and wanted to fulfill his dream of getting a job and living in his own apartment. "Will the landlord decide, because Dan has mental retardation, that he is incapable of independent living? Will he be denied access to transportation? Will restaurants refuse service? Will hotels refuse accommodations?" The Pipers viewed the ADA as a much- needed extension in disability policy: "It is now time to expand handicapped antidiscrimination to the private sector so that Dan's and our visions for his adult life and the lives of many others can finally become a reality."

Judith Heumann's polio resulted in paralysis. Despite her remarkably successful career, she was burdened by the psychological impact of discrimination. She described how she could not enter public school as a child because she was considered "a fire hazard." When she graduated from high school, the principal tried to prevent her from accepting her diploma on stage because of her wheelchair. In college, she was denied her elementary school teaching credentials because of her paralysis: administrators did not think she could teach from a wheelchair. On one occasion, officials at an auction house attempted to remove Heumann and a friend because they were allegedly "disgusting to look at." People do not emerge unscathed from these experiences, concluded Heumann: "this stigma scars for life."

Belinda Mason knew stigma first-hand. At the age of 30, Mason had been diagnosed HIV- positive after a blood transfusion. Moreover, a stroke left her partially paralyzed. "I have learned a terrible truth about America," she said of her subsequent experiences, "that it is not a good place to be different or to be ill, in spite of what we teach in government class." She related that her 75- person town closed the community pool for a week after she entered it, ostensibly because of a cigarette butt. One neighbor carried around a petition demanding that she move out. Mason described another woman who lost her job simply because she decided to have her son, who had AIDS, live at home. She also told of one occasion where police locked a man with AIDS in his car overnight, rather than take him into jail. The next day, people peered through the windows at him as if looking in an aquarium. Mason acknowledged that one cannot simply legislate attitudes and behavior. But she poignantly added: "The truth is that sometimes legislation precedes and enhances humanity." Mason was the first person with HIV ever to testify before Congress. And her moving testimony earned her an appointment to the President's Committee on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic.

Congressman Owens organized the field hearing in Boston at the request of Dart and others from the New England disability community. The purpose was to solicit an even more extensive demonstration of citizen participation. "It was an unforgettable day," said Owens, for the range of disabilities represented, the racial and gender diversity, and the united spirit of those in attendance. Everyone wanted the chance to address Congress. To accommodate as many people as possible, the subcommittee met nonstop from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.: over 80 witnesses testified in rapid-fire succession, each having but a few minutes to relate his or her experiences.

William Cavanaugh, a consumer of the Massachusetts mental health system, spoke about the "abusive treatment practices and human rights violations" of persons in mental institutions. He described one man, Vincent Veletia, who suffocated and died after being restrained with "a full sensory deprivation hood," replete with ear phones emitting constant static, and being forced into a fetal position with his hands cuffed behind his knees. Bonnie O'Day described how a prominent disability advocate from Charlottesville, Franz Stielfried, died because of poor accessibility. Impeded by an intersection without curb cuts, Stielfried tried to cross a dangerous, grassy area next to a 50-foot drop. While trying to lower himself over another curb, however, he lost control of his wheelchair and fell over the cliff to his death. He had been traveling to a meeting to demand for greater accessibility.

"You know, sometimes I almost wish a person would hate me for being disabled. Then at least I would know they knew I was alive."

--Anonymous

Nancy Husted-Jensen described how fully-registered disabled persons were turned away from voting booths because they supposedly did not look sufficiently "competent" to vote. Eileen Healy Horndt similarly recounted how one man with mental retardation was barred from opening a savings account at a local bank because he "did not fit the image the bank wants to project." She spoke of another gentlemen with quadriplegia who joined her in visiting a presidential campaign office to discuss accessibility, but there was no handicap parking space wide enough for the van lift. Horndt also described her own frustration of having to use a calling card at pay telephones because she could not reach the coin slot.

Only after the Disability Law Center of Boston threatened legal action did Barbara Waters avoid leaving college when administrators said her epileptic seizures represented a "liability risk." Eleanor Blake was not so fortunate. After being hospitalized for manic depression, college officials denied her graduation from the human services program because, they said, she was not "psycho logically fit." Later, after switching majors, she graduated summa cum laude.

Patricia Deegan further illustrated the excessive discrimination persons with mental illness face, including "the assumption that what we say about our own experiences is an expression of a disordered mind and can therefore be ignored." Presumed to be crazy, one's basic civil rights were readily violated. Deegan related how one woman reported to mental health workers that she was pregnant, but the professionals dismissed her claim as delusional. Later she visited an emergency room only to be met with the same response. That evening, while roaming the streets in desperation, the woman miscarried and suffered from serious hemorrhaging.

"We are not asking for pity. We are not even asking for your sympathy. All we ask is that you make real the promises and opportunities that America strives to offer everyone."

--Denise Karuth

These examples capture only a small fraction of the testimony presented about lost education and employment opportunities, physical and transportation barriers, social stigma, and violation of basic human rights. But the problem came not only from actions committed, it also came from simple avoidance. Michael Oestreicher related how one frustrated, member of a group discussing beach accessibility poignantly declared: "You know, sometimes I almost wish a person would hate me for being disabled. Then at least I would know they knew I was alive."

In a discrimination diary presented to the committee, Cynthia Miller captured the exasperation evident in these sentiments and those of many other persons with disabilities. "I got home late this evening and did the things most Americans do like cooking, cleaning, feeding the cat," Miller wrote. Then she prepared a list of things she thought needed to be changed to improve the lives of persons with disabilities.

I thought of doing all these things, but the list seems to grow every day. Instead, I got angry and depressed. I got angry and depressed because after I work all day, fight the barriers to get to work, [and] fight the barriers to do the things all Americans do like shop, I have meetings and phone calls and letters and other things I have to do to fight for my equal rights as an American with a disability. I'm tired of being tired, frightened, angry and depressed every day, fighting for my rights. And now, I'm writing a stupid diary until 2:00 in the morning to prove that discrimination exists to my Congress. Why does Congress think so many Americans are fighting this battle if discrimination doesn't exist? Does Congress think we enjoy or prefer to fight for equal rights before we eat or sleep sometimes? . . . I would like to watch The Cosby Show, with slippers on my feet, and time on my hands, like other Americans. I don't want to be Rosa Parks. I just want to be Cyndy Miller.

Denise Karuth, who used a wheelchair because of multiple sclerosis and was legally blind, eloquently stated what people like herself and Cyndy Miller were fighting for. "We are not asking for your money," she explained. "We are not asking for pity. We are not even asking for your sympathy. All we ask is that you make real the promises and opportunities that America strives to offer everyone: the respect and dignity we deserve as free and responsible citizens."

The hearings were captivating and televised on C-Span. Savage used a copy of the proceedings to edit a 30-minute version and make it available all around the country. She became known as the "Girl Scout Cookie-Lady" for her persistence in pushing the video on people. Dart also played a crucial role in spreading the edited hearings by taking copies with him as he traveled around the country for his public forums. People could use the video to explain what disability discrimination was all about and draw on the testimony for examples of how to describe their own experiences.

The ADA on the Eve of the 1988 Election

Although no further action was taken on the ADA in 1988, the ADA did not "die," as some people claimed, when Congress closed its 100th Session on October 22. On the contrary, the ADA of 1988 fulfilled its mission. ADA sponsors never intended it to come to a vote that year. The goal, rather, was to complete the process begun by the National Council on Disability in getting the ADA on the legislative agenda, not only as a token measure, but as a congressional priority. The disability community reached this objective with a pronouncement from Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) at the joint hearing. "I just want to give the assurance," he asserted, "that this will be the first order of business" when Congress convenes for the 101st session in 1989.

The ADA of 1988 fulfilled its mission. The goal was to get the ADA on the legislative agenda as a congressional priority.

The disability community had begun its education process, both internally and with members of Congress and presidential candidates. Members were learning more about what it meant to be disabled. They were being exposed to scores of people with disabilities for the first time. Many declared their support by becoming cosponsors of the bill. The disability community was also becoming much more optimistic at the close of 1988. The 1980s had been a decade of struggle against encroachments. But the Civil Rights Restoration Act symbolized the new alliance formed with the civil rights community. And the Fair Housing Amendments Act broke new ground by extending disability policy to encompass the private sector. The Reagan administration was winding to a close, and the tide was apparently turning. Both presidential candidates had vowed to support legislation akin to the ADA. By the end of 1988, the compelling problem of discrimination had been fused with the solution crafted by the National Council on Disability. The political climate was also changing in a way that would invite, rather than impede, future action.

CREATING A WORKABLE ADA: THE SENATE AND THE WHITE HOUSE

On November 8, 1988, George Bush defeated Michael Dukakis in the election for President of the United States. Bush's strong statements in support of the disability community, and particularly civil rights legislation for people with disabilities, had swayed many disabled voters, including many Democrats. In fact, a poll of voter intentions on the eve of the election, conducted by Louis Harris and Associates, suggested that the wide margin of persons with disabilities supporting Bush was a deciding factor in the election. Although many persons with disabilities had campaigned for Dukakis and were disappointed by the outcome, Bush's election clearly offered an opportunity to the disability community. His attentiveness to disability issues signaled a change in the political climate and made passage of the ADA seem more promising. Moreover, two days before his inauguration, Bush avowed his intent to follow through on his pledges and push the ADA toward passage. "I said during the campaign that disabled people have been excluded for far too long from the mainstream of American life," Bush noted. "One step that I have discussed will be action on the Americans with Disabilities Act in order, in simple fairness, to provide the disabled with the same rights afforded others, afforded other minorities."

In another respect, however, the election of 1988 was damaging to the ADA cause. Senator Lowell P. Weicker, Jr. (R-CT), a long-time supporter of persons with disabilities and the Senate sponsor of the ADA in 1988, lost his bid for reelection to Joseph Lieberman. As one senate staff member said, Weicker was "one of the 5ive-hundred-pound gorillas" in Congress. His leadership in the area of disability was consistent and strong. Now someone else had to fill the void he left. The chief cosponsor of the 1988 ADA was Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA), who had worked closely with Weicker, the National Council on the Handicapped (NCD), and the disability community in the development of the ADA. Weicker and Harkin had even discussed whether Harkin's position as Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Handicapped placed him in the best position to be the original sponsor in 1988. Harkin also had a personal understanding of the need for the ADA because of his brother, who was deaf. It was therefore natural for Harkin to assume Senate leadership. But it was not a foregone conclusion.

"I didn't get elected to get re-elected. My brother is deaf. I understand discrimination. . . . We are doing this legislation."

--Senator Tom Harkin

Sponsorship of the ADA was a risky endeavor for the first-term senator. He was up for reelection in 1990, and no Democratic senator from Iowa had ever won a second term. As a relative newcomer to disability policy, Senator Harkin would have to begin his relationship with the disability community by making compromises with respect to provisions in the ADA--potentially alienating the people he was trying to help. Moreover, failure to pass the bill rapidly might lead some people to compare the leadership skills of Senators Harkin and Weicker. By sponsoring the ADA, Harkin would also become a target for the opposition, which included employers, transit operators, owners of public accommodations, railroads, telecommunications providers, and state and local governments. Finally, the prospects for successfully expanding civil rights protections to incorporate an additional "class" of people, while improved with the change in administration, remained uncertain at best.

Sponsoring the ADA and risking failure could potentially jeopardize Senator Harkin's political career. Although Robert Silverstein, Staff Director and Chief Counsel for the Subcommittee on the Handicapped, cautioned him about the pitfalls, Harkin accepted the challenge. "I didn't get elected to get re-elected," he told Silverstein. "My brother is deaf. I understand discrimination. I understand what it means and what this country can look like in thirty years. We are doing this legislation."

Master Strategy and the Retooling of the ADA

Senator Harkin took the lead in preparing the ADA for reintroduction. Success depended on developing a solid strategy for maneuvering the bill through the treacherous terrain of Congress. It also required attaining the complete backing of the disability community. Harkin's first step was to establish an effective relationship with Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) and Carolyn Osolinik and Michael Iskowitz from Kennedy's committee staff. This was important because a bill successfully voted out of Harkin's Subcommittee on the Handicapped would have to clear Kennedy's Committee on Labor and Human Resources. Coordination of all legislative activities with Kennedy could improve the possibility of a smooth and quick transition to the Senate floor. The disability community was also courting the support of Kennedy. They hoped his stature as a "heavy hitter" senator with seniority could match the standing of Senator Weicker and augment the efforts of Harkin. Kennedy brought the experience of decades of civil rights leadership. Osolinik, whom Pat Wright described as "one of few people who really saw disability as a civil rights issue," directed civil rights issues in Kennedy's office. Moreover, Kennedy had personal experiences with disability through his son who lost a leg to cancer and a sister with a developmental disability. Kennedy's support, however, depended on making significant changes to the ADA.

Senator Kennedy brought the experience of decades of civil rights leadership in addition to his stature as a "heavy hitter" senator with seniority.

Senators Harkin and Kennedy concluded that the bill introduced in 1988 was too ambitious and stood little chance for passage. Therefore, they decided to rewrite the ADA. In accordance with the objectives of the disability community, the senators' primary goal was to achieve the best possible civil rights coverage for persons with disabilities. Toward this end, they and their staffs, in consultation with leaders from the disability community, developed a four-pronged legislative strategy.

First, Senators Kennedy and Harkin made a commitment to achieving bipartisanship. They believed that the ultimate goal of legislation must not simply be to pass a bill, but rather to make an enforceable law. For the bill to be taken seriously, it needed to be widely supported by the business community as well as the disability community, Republicans and Democrats, the Senate and the House, and the Bush administration. Second, Senators Harkin and Kennedy wanted to craft a bill that could withstand the strict scrutiny of Congress. Rather than introduce a bill with aggressive provisions and rely on subsequent negotiations, which ran the risk of permanently labeling the bill "extreme," they hoped to hold extensive discussions and reach important compromises before they even introduced the bill.

While the ADA's complete effect would not be immediately apparent, the American landscape would be transformed for subsequent generations.

The third and fourth strategic commitments followed logically: modesty and parity. The original ADA applied rigorous and rigid standards of accessibility that would be implemented immediately. Senators Kennedy and Harkin instead promoted accessibility at some point in time, and varied provisions according to specific circumstances. While the bill's complete effect would not be apparent immediately following its enactment, the American landscape would be transformed for subsequent generations. Finally, in crafting the actual language of the bill, Silverstein and Osolinik worked with the disability community to build the ADA securely on the foundation of earlier legislation--especially on the Civil Rights Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Fair Housing Amendments Act (See Appendix B). Proponents could therefore argue that the bill was an application of tested principles, not a new creation.

With this strategy in place, Osolinik and Silverstein began 1989 by reviewing the bill line by line. Redrafting the ADA was not, however, a solitary endeavor. After developing their own preliminary ideas about what provisions should constitute a new bill, Silverstein and Osolinik turned to others to identify interests in and reservations about the bill, including the disability community, all "covered entities," the Bush administration, and members of Congress and their staffs. The principal House contacts were Congressman Tony Coelho (D-CA) and Rochelle Dornatt from his staff. Especially helpful from the business community was Nancy Reed Fulco of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Osolinik and Silverstein worked most closely, however, with a group of representatives from the disability community. In addition to the general guidance provided by Pat Wright, Ralph Neas, Liz Savage, and Paul Marchand, Silverstein and Osolinik received technical expertise from attorneys Arlene Mayerson, Chai Feldblum, Robert Burgdorf, Jim Weisman, and others according to specialties. By retooling the bill in close cooperation with this group, Osolinik and Silverstein hoped to earn the backing of the disability community. Then they could present a united front as the bill went through Congress.

From January to March, 1989, Silverstein and Osolinik produced scores of different drafts of the ADA. By March 15 they completed a draft (S. 933), which they circulated privately to representatives of the disability community, the Bush administration, and several members of Congress. The bill duplicated the findings and purpose of the original bill (S. 2345) crafted by NCD (see §2 in Appendix H). It also covered the same main areas, with the exception of housing (which had been addressed by the Fair Housing Amendments Act). S. 933 even incorporated some language of S. 2345 verbatim. But there were marked distinctions.

The new bill, S. 933, demonstrated the commitment to modesty and flexibility in standards by tailoring definitions, provisions, and enforcement to four main titles--Employment, Public Services, Public Accommodations, and Telecommunications. The dedication to legal precedent was also clear. S. 933, for example, incorporated more than five times as many references to earlier statutes. There was also a difference in tone. Whereas the original bill, S. 2345, emphasized discriminatory practices that should not be tolerated--for example, providing unequal services. S. 933 spelled out positive, proactive steps that must be taken to meet nondiscriminatory standards. Several major revisions are worth noting.

One of the most contested aspects of the ADA was the definition of disability (see Appendix F). People asked: Who would be protected by the ADA? It was a difficult question because one cannot readily identify disability with the same precision that one can identify, for example, race and gender. It would also be impractical to name, in a statute, each and every type of disability. This would be cumbersome, if not impossible, and require constant adjustment for future, unknown impairments. The challenge, therefore, was to find a definition that was at once inclusive enough to cover diverse disabilities, but not so universal that anyone could claim protection by the ADA. Under the original bill, S. 2345, a disability was defined as "a physical or mental impairment, perceived impairment, or a record of impairment." This definition was similar to the three-pronged definition implemented under Section 504, except that it did not limit the first prong to impairments that "substantially limit" major life activities. This meant that anyone with "any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss" or "any mental or psychological disorder" was covered. Osolinik and Silverstein instead used the Section 504 standard and restricted the first prong to "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities--such as seeing, walking, self-care, and learning. This meant that a physical impairment such as an infected finger would not constitute a disability.

The most controversial issue in the redrafting stage was the cost and burden imposed upon covered entities. Legislative endeavors of the 1980s successfully established that, in the area of disability civil rights, equal treatment was not enough. The goal had to be equal opportunity. That required modifying policies, providing services, and breaking down barriers: "reasonable accommodations" (see Appendix F). In other words, it was not enough simply to leave the door open, the door also had to be widened. And this meant that civil rights for persons with disabilities could cost money. But at what point does providing "equal opportunity" become an "unreasonable" burden?

Under S. 2345, the only defensible limits to providing accommodations were actions that "would fundamentally alter the essential nature, or threaten the existence of, the program, activity, business, or facility in question." Although Burgdorf wrote the provision to assure that compliance would not mean shutting down a business, it came to be known pejoratively as the "bankruptcy" provision: interpreted to mean that a business would have to go to the brink of bankruptcy before it could defend against charges of discrimination. S. 933, on the other hand, followed Section 504 in using "undue hardship" (see Appendix F) as the standard for determining whether employment accommodations were "reasonable." Undue hardship meant "an action that is unduly costly, extensive, substantial, disruptive, or that will fundamentally alter the nature of the program." It was not a fixed concept, but rather varied on a case-by-case basis, according to such factors as the size of the business, the type of operation, and the nature and cost of the accommodation.

Concern for cost shaped the new approach to barrier removal. S. 2345 required the retrofitting of all public transportation vehicles and facilities to make them accessible. S. 933, on the other hand, varied its demands according to whether vehicles and facilities were newly constructed or already in operation. The general principle was that all new vehicles and transportation facilities would have to be "readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities" (see Appendix F). For used vehicles, transportation operators had to make "good faith efforts" to find accessible vehicles. If a company remanufactured a vehicle to extend its life for at least five years, it had to be made readily accessible to "the maximum extent feasible." With regard to existing facilities, S. 933 required only that certain "key stations" had to be retrofitted for accessibility.

The approach in S. 933 to barrier removal in public accommodations paralleled the transportation provisions. The original bill, S. 2345, required that nearly every place of public accommodation had to remove all barriers within five years. This provision earned S. 2345 the nickname of the "flat earth" bill. Drafters of S. 933, however, dispensed with the idea of wholesale retrofitting. Instead they required that all new construction be accessible. Nevertheless, they did not want to leave existing structures untouched. Consequently, drafters created a new legal term. S. 933 required that businesses make changes to existing structures where accessibility was "readily achievable" (see Appendix F), which was eventually defined to mean "easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense." The goal was to create a mind-set of accessibility, to encourage people to look for creative ways to make the world more accessible. "Readily achievable" modifications might include installing grab bars, ramping a few steps, lowering telephones, adding raised letter and braille markings on elevator controls, and adding flashing alarm lights.

S. 933 also required that where structural changes were not readily achievable, covered entities had to make their services available through alternative methods: for example, coming to the doorway of a Laundromat to pick up laundry when a person could not get inside. Moreover, the bill required the provision of "auxiliary aids and services" (see Appendix F) to persons with disabilities: for example, reading a menu to persons with visual impairments so that they could fully enjoy the benefits of places of public accommodation.

The version of the ADA crafted by Senators Harkin and Kennedy did not only limit initial provisions. In one significant area they significantly expanded the scope of the original bill. Under S. 2345, only those public accommodations (see Appendix F) covered under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had to be accessible. This principally meant places of lodging, eating, and entertainment. Service establishments such as doctors" offices, retail stores, and private clubs, were not included. S. 933, by contrast, defined within its scope virtually every privately-operated establishment that was used by the general public and affected commerce. This included places of lodging, office buildings, parks, recreation facilities, theaters, retail stores, medical facilities, and restaurants. Although this apparently broke the commitment to parity with the Civil Rights Act, advocates argued that it was consistent in spirit: just as the Civil Rights Act addressed the universe where race discrimination was an issue, the ADA covered the broader universe where disability discrimination was relevant.

The new draft of the ADA also took steps to define the original ADA's prohibition of discrimination in "broadcasts, communications, or telecommunications." S. 933 required that communications providers implement telecommunication relay services. A relay service enabled an individual using a Telecommunication Device for the Deaf (TDD)--a machine that transmits typed data over telephone lines--to communicate with someone without such a device, through an operator who would translate text to voice, and voice to text.

Another significant change from S. 2345 concerned legal actions available to remedy discrimination. S. 2345 included both administrative and civil remedies. It granted administrative agencies the authority to order "all appropriate remedial relief" and gave individuals the right to sue in a district court for both injunctive relief and monetary damages, including punitive damages." Drafters of S. 933, however, viewed these remedial provisions as extreme and politically impossible. Therefore they introduced remedies tailored to each title. Only administrative remedies were available for the public accommodations and telecommunications provisions. Private right to action was granted for employment and public services provisions. For employment discrimination, S. 933 also allowed for punitive damages.

Building Support for S. 933

Before publicly circulating the final draft of the bill, Silverstein and Osolinik submitted it to a group of individuals in the disability community for their approval. On one occasion, the two staff members were grilled for hours by persons with disabilities who objected to the apparent weakening of the bill. Osolinik tried to explain that the bill could not be passed without the proposed changes. Silverstein emphasized that the new bill remained true to the original principles. Some in the disability community, however, were outraged. "Lots of people felt let down," said Bonnie O'Day about the reactions at the spring, 1989, conference of the National Council on Independent Living (NCIL). Yet most agreed that it was dangerous to include provisions that might endanger the entire bill. Ultimately, the disability community lent its support, persuaded that it was the best that could be achieved politically. This was crucial, for a competing Republican bill might polarize the debate and kill the ADA; unity behind S. 933 made it difficult for an alternative proposal to gain a foothold.

After the disability community backed S.933, the next task for ADA supporters was to enlist the cosponsorship of members of Congress and the endorsement of President Bush. As in 1988, Liz Savage coordinated a cosponsorship drive in conjunction with House and Senate sponsors. This time the drive was even more aggressive, and it continued throughout the entire ADA deliberations. At the same time, Justin Dart, Marilyn Golden, and others throughout the disability community continued to mobilize the national grass roots network. Persons with disabilities began writing letters urging their representatives to support the ADA.

On the Senate side, ADA advocates were especially interested in enlisting the support of Senators Orrin G. Hatch (R-UT) and Robert Dole (R-KS). Hatch's support was extremely important because he was the ranking Republican on the Labor and Human Resources Committee, and the rest of the committee Republicans generally followed his lead in disability policy. In December, 1988, Senator Harkin began meeting with Hatch personally, in addition to consultations between their staffs. Harkin had hoped that Hatch's long and solid record of supporting persons with disabilities would lead to his endorsement of the bill as chief cosponsor. As with Senators Kennedy and Harkin, Hatch had personal experience with disability through his brother, who lost the use of his legs from polio. Hatch, however, had serious reservations about the bill. For example, he proposed more limited remedies and the exemption of religious groups from the public accommodations provisions. He also wanted to coordinate his position with the White House. As a result, he declined Harkin's invitation to be the lead cosponsor.

Senator Dole's support was crucial because, as Minority Leader, he could wield considerable influence over the progress of the ADA through Senate committees and on the Senate floor.

Instead, Senator Hatch directed his chief counsel, Mark Disler, to draft an alternative bill. Disler had worked for Bradford Reynolds in the attorney general's office during the Reagan administration. During the battles over President Reagan's Task Force on Regulatory Relief, Disler had formed good working relationships with Kemp and Wright and become much more knowledgeable about disability, which helped smooth working with Senator Hatch's staff. The bill Disler crafted was similar to S. 2345 in that it was short and focused on general principles of nondiscrimination. Rather than propose strong, detailed requirements as in S. 933, it gave executive agencies the responsibility and authority to create nondiscrimination standards.

Senator Hatch's actions were, nonetheless, ultimately designed to aid in the ADA's passage. A quick endorsement of the Harkin bill might have alienated other Republicans, whose support was necessary for effective implementation. Senator Dave Durenberger (R-MN), whose advocacy for people with disabilities stretched back to his tenure as chief of staff for the Governor of Minnesota in the 1960s, explained that Hatch "in effect had to stay off of the original bill in order to leverage Republican support for the final product." By drafting his own bill, Hatch paved the way for achieving a broader base of consensus and helped prevent filibustering on the Senate floor.

Senator Dole's support was also crucial because, as Minority Leader, he had the power to wield considerable influence over the progress of the ADA through Senate committees and on the Senate floor. For example, he could discourage his party from requesting that the ADA be referred to multiple committees, which could delay or even kill the bill. He could also help prevent damaging amendments from being introduced on the floor. Similar to Senator Hatch, Dole had a solid record on disability issues. He knew disability first-hand from the paralysis he incurred in World War II. On each anniversary of his injury, April 14, he gave a speech about disability on the Senate floor. In fact, he devoted his first official speech in the Senate, on April 14, 1969, to the needs of the disability community. "It is a minority group whose existence affects every person in our society and the very fiber of our Nation," said Dole. He noted that people with disabilities faced significant problems with employment, income, health care, education, rehabilitation, transportation, and access to public accommodations. Accordingly, he urged Congress to promote collaboration between the public and private sectors to improve opportunities for persons with disabilities. He asserted his commitment to make wise use of financial resources, but he wanted to do what was necessary to achieve for people with disabilities "the independence, security, and dignity" to which they are "entitled." Subsequently, in 1984, Dole established the Dole Foundation, which he dedicated to improving the employment prospects of persons with disabilities.

Nevertheless, Senator Dole had reservations about the ADA. In part, he was ambivalent because he had talked with Senator Charles E. Grassley (R-IA), Senator Harkin's fellow senator from Iowa about introducing his own bill. Dole, however, received a flood of phone calls from the disability community urging him to cosponsor Harkin's bill and abstain from introducing a competing bill. Crucial in shaping Dole's position on the ADA and encouraging him to support it was one of his staff members, Maureen West. Paul Hearne, Executive Director of NCD and a long-time associate of Dole, assisted West in educating the senator about the ADA. Dole refrained from introducing his own bill. But he also continued to withhold his support of S. 933, even though he was one of fourteen original cosponsors of S. 2345.

In addition to Senators Hatch and Dole, ADA supporters were interested in enlisting the support of President Bush and his administration. President Bush had already spoken strongly on behalf of civil rights legislation for people with disabilities on multiple occasions. And Senators Harkin and Kennedy had consulted with the administration throughout the winter and spring of 1989 for input on the development of S. 933. Sometimes these conversations were held person-to- person; at other times they were mediated by members of the disability community, such as Pat Wright and Justin Dart, who had very strong White House connections. The main goal, however, was to encourage the Bush administration take a further step and endorse the version of the ADA developed by Senators Harkin and Kennedy. Faced with the demands of forming an administration and lacking adequate technical disability expertise, however, the White House did not develop a firm position on the bill. Harkin was actually ready to introduce S. 933 in March, but he delayed its introduction at the request of the administration. By April, ADA supporters decided they simply had to move forward with the bill, with or without President Bush. Accordingly, Senator Harkin scheduled the introduction of S. 933 for May 9, 1989, at which time Congressman Coelho would also introduce the companion bill, H.R. 2273. Although ADA supporters were unsuccessful in securing the cosponsorship of Hatch and Dole and the endorsement of Bush, the congressional cosponsorship drive was effective. By May 9, the bill had acquired 33 Senate cosponsors and 84 House cosponsors.

In consultation with Congressman Coelho, Senators Kennedy and Harkin developed a strategy for maneuvering the ADA through Congress. They decided to begin the ADA deliberations in the Senate. The Senate would be more manageable because of its rules for legislative deliberations. Whereas in the House a bill went to all committees with partial jurisdiction, in the Senate a bill went only to one committee, whichever had the preponderance of jurisdiction (subsequent referrals to additional committees could be requested). Moreover, Kennedy and Harkin were chairmen of the committee and subcommittee with jurisdiction. Kennedy's Committee on Labor and Human Resources also had a comfortable Democratic majority. And the ranking Republicans of both the committee and subcommittee--Senators Orrin Hatch and Dave Durenberger--were strong supporters of disability policy. Furthermore, the Senate had a better working relationship with the administration. Given the importance of bringing the administration on board, it was wise to tailor strategy to its interests.

Senators Harkin and Kennedy hoped to push the ADA through the Senate as rapidly as possible with minimal alterations. They feared that lengthy deliberations would increase the chance of losing control of how the ADA was characterized in public debate. Kennedy thus proposed going to mark-up before the Fourth of July recess and to the Senate floor before the August recess. The House would then proceed with the version passed by the Senate, which would help limit the discrepancy between House and Senate versions and smooth conference deliberations.

Senate sponsors scheduled three hearings for May 9, 10, and 16; they devoted April to preparing for them. (See Appendix D for a chronology of legislative action on the ADA.) They hoped to prevent any surprises by getting the facts in order and crafting responses to anticipated opposition. Silverstein turned to those who knew disability the best: members of the disability community. He developed a list of about 100 questions and asked representatives of the disability community to explain, based on their experiences at the local level, how various covered entities would respond to ADA provisions. Osolinik and Silverstein then prepared thick briefing books based on the responses. They also worked with the disability community to select witnesses to testify on each aspect of the bill. Unlike the hearings of 1988, the 1989 Senate hearings would include very detailed, technical analyses of the ADA, with a balance of testimony from those who supported the legislation outright and those who promoted changes. Accordingly, the business community and other covered entities were gearing up for the hearings and working with Senate leaders to identify effective witnesses. On May 5, for example, just before the bill's introduction, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce sponsored the first of several meetings for all business organizations to discuss their strategy for the ADA, which culminated in their testimony before Congress. Subsequently, a group of business organizations formed a coalition called the Disability Rights Working Group.

Senate Hearings and the Quest for Bipartisanship

Senate Hearings on S. 933 began in the Dirksen Senate Office Building on Tuesday morning, May 9, 1989. Ranking minority member Senator Hatch set the stage for the hearings in his opening statement. "I support a comprehensive civil rights bill for persons with disabilities," Hatch declared unambiguously. But he also stated he had "serious concerns." Hatch challenged the extension of public accommodations provisions beyond those establishments covered under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. He promoted an exemption for small businesses. He also opposed provisions for remedies that included monetary and punitive damages. Moreover, Hatch stated that his reservations concerning S.933 might compel him to introduce his own bill, or support a different bill, presumably one introduced by Senator Dole.

"We can be productive, if you will give us that right, give us that opportunity. That is all we ask for, nothing more, but definitely nothing less."

--Congressman Tony Coelho

Traditionally the administration offers the lead testimony on major bills, but by May 9 the Bush administration had still not developed a formal position. In fact, the White House had to cancel a May 1 Rose Garden press conference with Senate leadership, which had been designed to promote the ADA. Consequently, Congressman Coelho was the lead witness. He was selected to open the deliberations not only because he was the sponsor of the identical ADA bill introduced in the House; he also poignantly symbolized the ADA. In his senior year of college, Coelho learned he had epilepsy--reputed by some to be demonic possession. As a result, he was barred from the Catholic priesthood and his familial relationships were severely strained. "I was suicidal and I was down," Coelho said of his experience with discrimination. But Bob Hope took him into his own home and encouraged him to pursue his ministry through public service.

Congressman Coelho met with considerable success after following Hope's advice and beginning a government career. Elected to Congress in 1978, he became Chairman of the Democratic Congressional Campaign committee in 1981. Five years later, he was elected Majority Whip. He also became a national leader in disability issues, which included service as Director of the Epilepsy Foundation of America (EFA). Coelho therefore spoke not only with the authority be stowed upon him from the Democratic leadership, but also as an example of the potential of persons with disabilities. "Tony was sort of the epitome of what a person with a disability can do," said Dornatt of his staff, "and what they can achieve given a fair shake and given a chance." Coelho echoed this theme in his remarks at the Senate hearing: "We can be productive, if you will give us that right, give us that opportunity. That is all we ask for, nothing more, but definitely nothing less."

In addition to speaking about his personal experiences, Congressman Coelho addressed Senator Hatch's remarks and stressed the need for bipartisanship: "We very much want you on board and very much need your support," he entreated. "We would prefer that you not introduce your own bill," he added, urging Hatch to work toward a common bill instead. Hatch replied by pledging his best efforts to develop consensus. "I would love nothing better" than to cosponsor this bill, Hatch said. "But in its present form, I cannot." Only minutes into the first hearing, it was clear that considerable work lay ahead to achieve bipartisanship and shepherd the ADA through Congress. The prospect of a competing bill made cooperation much more critical. The hearings were an opportunity to find a solution.

As in 1988, persons with disabilities presented powerful testimony about the need for the ADA by describing their personal experiences. "There is not one disabled American alive today who has not experienced some form of discrimination," I. King Jordan said. The most vivid imagery came from Justin Dart. In addition to his carefully crafted and eloquent words, Dart brought visual aids. He presented the committee with a box of discrimination diaries and letters that he and others had gathered from around the country (see Appendix E). Yet, Dart acknowledged, no document could truly demonstrate the impact of discrimination. As a supplement, Dart thus brought an extra wheelchair. "I submit to you this brand new empty wheelchair," he said to the committee chairman forcefully. "On January 24, 1988, last year, my younger brother, Peter, was faced with the necessity to use, [and] be identified with, this public invitation to discrimination." But his brother claimed: "I would rather be dead." Four days later, said Dart, he committed suicide.

Others described specific examples of discrimination. Mary DeSapid described being fired by her employer because of her cancer treatment. Amy Dimsdale, a wheelchair-user trained in journalism at the University of Texas at Arlington, described her experiences of being overlooked by potential employers. "I have submitted over 300 resumes and more than 100 applications. I have indicated my willingness to be flexible, work at home, relocate, and use my own special equipment--all to no avail. I need virtually no special accommodations to work, as long as I can get in the building. Lisa Carl, whose cerebral palsy impeded her speech and required use of a wheelchair, spoke about a time when she went to see a movie at a theater around the corner from her house. But Lisa was told she could not enter. Later the theater explained to Lisa's mother: "I basically don't have to let her in here, and I don't want her in here." Betty Corey, who took into her home a girl born with AIDS, described having to contact twenty-six different funeral directors before she could find one who would bury the six-year-old without adding surcharges for handling a person with AIDS. Yet, in none of these situations had a law been broken: there was no protection such as that provided for minorities and women.

Discrimination "destroys healthy self-concepts, and it slowly erodes the human spirit."

--I. King Jordan building."

Disability advocates used numerous arguments to justify the ADA. Many emphasized the loss of human dignity experienced from discrimination. Dimsdale, for example, said she felt "useless, powerless, and demeaned" by her inability to get a job. Discrimination "destroys healthy self-concepts, and it slowly erodes the human spirit," said Jordan. Others argued that discrimination against the disabled violated one of America's central tenets: individualism. Dart explained that he addressed the committee as "a fiscal conservative, an active Republican, and, above all, an advocate for the principles of individual responsibility, individual productivity, and individual rights which have made America great." Social barriers to persons with disabilities, he asserted, under mined an individual's opportunity to participate in American society fully and equally. Others argued that it was more costly to keep persons with disabilities dependent on government assistance than it was to spend the small amount needed to break down barriers and enable people to support themselves. Senator Harkin, for example, hypothesized that the cost to institutionalize one of his constituents with a developmental disability would cost nearly five million dollars over 65 years.

Another argument on behalf of the ADA was simply that it was nothing new, nothing radical. "These standards are not new, they are not confusing, and they are workable," Arlene Mayerson of the Disability rights Education and Defense Fund (DREDF) declared in reference to the ADA's foundation in Section 504. "We tried very hard to avoid any kind of new language," Senator Harkin explained. Although transportation was the most controversial aspect of the ADA, many defended it as the linchpin to the entire bill. "The freedom to go to college does not exist without the means to get to the college," testified Michael McIntyre, Executive Director of Queens Independent Living Center. "The freedom to work does not exist without the ability to get to work. The freedom to organize politically does not exist without people being able to get together in one place. The freedom to date, to go to the movies, to go to the library, to go shopping, to go to a ball game, [to go] anyplace that makes life meaningful, is predicated on the ability to travel." ADA supporters also emphasized the need to develop solid enforcement provisions to make the bill have a practical effect. "The whole trick is to make it more expensive to break the law than it is to keep the law," testified Neil Hartigan, the Attorney General of Illinois. "It won't work without damages."

Although testimony also came from those proposing changes to the bill, virtually every witness pledged support of the overall ADA concept. The Chamber of Commerce, for example, testified that the chamber "shares the goal of the sponsors of this act," and pledged to cooperate "in trying to achieve a workable piece of legislation that we can fully support." Similarly, the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) endorsed "the right of every American to have the opportunity to realize his or her full potential." These sentiments were manifested in the name of the business community's coalition: the Disability Rights Working Group.

The two dominant reservations about the ADA were cost and litigation. Cost was an issue because the ADA, unlike other civil rights legislation, required businesses and employers to spend money on accommodations and modifications. The second main concern was that, as Lawrence Lorber testified, the "litigation potential of this bill is enormous." This fear built on the perception that phrases such as "reasonable accommodation," "undue hardship," "readily achievable," "essential function," and "less effective" were inadequately defined, compelling courts to decide the meaning of the ADA. It also stemmed from the belief that the remedies available under the ADA would invite frivolous law suits. Specific concerns included objections to the public accommodations provisions. William Ball, representing the Association of Christian Schools International, argued that religious organizations and religious schools should be exempt from the public accommodations provisions. The ADA, he argued, would be too costly, might force schools to hire drug/alcohol abusers or homosexuals, and threatened the constitutional separation of church and state. The small business community also argued for an exemption from public accommodations provisions, because of the associated costs and because small business owners were exempt from other civil rights laws.

Careful preparations by Senators Harkin and Kennedy, their staffs, and the disability community paid off in the course of the hearings. Harkin, presiding over the deliberations, was especially deft in handling one of the most controversial issues: mandatory lifts for intercity buses (called "over-the-road" buses because their passengers ride above luggage compartments). In a dialogue with Charles Webb of the American Bus Association (ABA), Harkin creatively used Webb's testimony to defend the ADA. Webb testified that a bus lift cost $35,000, required annual maintenance of $2,000, and resulted in a 38 percent loss in luggage space and a loss of 11 or 12 seats. Harkin, however, asked Webb whether a technologically-advanced lift that cost less than $8,000, required little or no maintenance, and resulted in no loss of package space and only one seat, would be acceptable. "Absolutely," Webb replied. "Well, now, I am glad to hear you say that," said Harkin with pride, "because I have a letter here from the Regional Transportation District of Denver, Colorado," which has secured a contract for a lift with exactly those specifications. To the applause of those assembled, Senator Harkin went on to explain that competition and technology would only drive the price further down when lifts were ordered by the thousands.

In addition to their compelling testimony, the Senate hearings were significant for the dialogue concerning bipartisanship and the Bush administration, which was carried out between Senators Kennedy and Harkin, on the one hand, and Senators Dole and Hatch, on the other. On May 10, under relentless pressure from the disability community, Dole made an appearance before the Senate committee to make a statement. On the previous Friday, May 5, he had met with President Bush's chief counsel C. Boyden Gray, Chief of Staff John Sununu, head of the Domestic Policy Council Roger Porter, and others in the White House, to discuss how they could cooperate in working out a bipartisan bill. Dole had also spoken with President Bush on May 9. Before the committee, Dole now asserted that he and the administration hoped to see, before year's end, "a bipartisan piece of legislation passed by Congress, signed by the president, and embraced by, hopefully, the business community and certainly by the disability community." He was "somewhat cautious," however, because he wanted a bill that all affected parties could defend. He feared the potential for litigation and promoted a gradual phase-in to protect small businesses. Nevertheless, he wanted to be a "positive force" rather than "an obstructionist," and urged that the administration needed more time to formulate its position on the bill.

The disability community, however, was growing impatient. NCIL held its annual conference in Washington, D.C., from May 12 to May 14. At the conference, Bonnie O'Day, Chairperson of the NCIL Civil Rights Subcommittee, met with Pat Wright and Liz Savage, whereupon they talked about organizing NCIL conferees to hold a rally at the White House to demand swift action on the ADA. In short order, O'Day and others from NCIL began planning a march for Sunday, May 14--Mother's Day. Committees formed to make signs and work out such details as getting a police permit. They planned to march from NCIL's reception on Capitol Hill to the White House. Several hundred people, including local ADA supporters, joined the march. They left in the evening amidst pouring rain, carrying candles. People using wheelchairs covered themselves with garbage bags, a symbol of their second-class-citizen status.

"Boyden Gray is the most powerful counsel to a president we've had in a long, long time. . . . On the issues Boyden has chosen, he is awfully damned influential."

--A.B. Culvahouse

At the White House, Marca Bristo, President of NCIL, approached the security desk to place a call to President Bush. Al though she intended only to mobilize and rally the crowd, an operator actually answered the phone and placed a call through to the Domes tic Policy Office. Subsequently, Bristo told a White House representative that she and others were out in the rain, were concerned about the ADA, and wanted to see the president. In reply, the representative offered Bristo a meeting with White House staff the following morning. The next day, Bristo, Dart, and several other representatives from the disability community met with Dr. William L. Roper, of the Domestic Policy Counsel, Chief Counsel Boyden Gray, and EEOC Chairman Evan Kemp to complain about the president's delays. Although the discussion did not result in a specific commitment, the disability representatives came away feeling as if they had gotten their message through to the administration.

Two days later, at the final scheduled hearing on May 16, the NCIL march appeared to have had an effect. Having consulted with the White House, Senator Hatch said that it was "imperative that this committee hear testimony from the administration on this bill." Accordingly, he requested that the committee give the administration one more chance. Hatch proposed that the committee delay mark-up for five weeks, hold one additional hearing during the week of June 19, and invite the administration to come forward. If it did not, Hatch pledged that he would not stand in the way of the bill. Although the administration had already possessed a draft of the bill for nearly two months, Senator Kennedy agreed to grant more time, stipulating that if it did not come forward, the committee would move on without its input.

White House Testimony

During the next five weeks, executive agencies reviewed the bill to make recommendations for an administration position. Unlike Congress, which follows a fairly organized deliberative process to reconcile the views of two parties, policy-making in the White House is an ongoing internal dynamic. It organizes its decision-making according to a series of functions, which are administered by such advisory boards as the National Security Council, the Domestic Policy Council, the Office of Counsel, and the Office of Personnel. These groups, which are composed of cabinet members and staff, theoretically report to the Chief of Staff, who coordinates decisions with the president. Although a presidential administration is generally comprised of officials from one political party, conflicts over specific policies abound.

President Bush wanted the ADA "done in a way that was good for the American people . . . this was not going to be a shell promise."

--Dr. William Roper

Technically, White House policy regarding the ADA fell under the purview of the Domestic Policy Council, which was chaired by Roger Porter and included the attorney general, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Secretary of Transportation. The key to the ADA in the White House, however, was Chief Counsel C. Boyden Gray. There is no formal job description for the White House Chief Counsel. Rather, responsibilities are tailored by each individual president. Gray had served as Bush's counsel for eight years during the Reagan administration. They became close friends and shared similar family backgrounds: their fathers were golf partners. Their relationship gave Gray considerable influence. "Boyden is the most powerful counsel to a president we've had in a long, long time," said Gray's immediate predecessor during the Reagan administration, A.B. Culvahouse. Gray was selective in the issues which he engaged. But "on the issues Boyden has chosen," said Culvahouse, "he is awfully damned influential." And, based on his friendship with Evan Kemp and following his experience with President Reagan's Task Force on Regulatory Relief, Gray took a keen interest in the ADA.

White House action on the ADA was framed by President Bush's declarations in support of disability rights legislation. This was a relatively unique interest for Bush, as he was best known and respected for his expertise on, and passion for, foreign policy. The question, said Dr. William Roper, who worked for Porter on the Domestic Policy Council, was precisely how Bush's commitments would be translated into specific policy. There were discussions about the extent to which the administration would abide by the campaign promise. But Bush was steadfast in his commitment to getting a solid act passed. "He wanted it done in a way that was good for the American people," said Roper: "this was not going to be a shell promise."

Others inside the White House were much less enamored with the ADA, and had substantive reservations. Civil rights was a charged issue in the Bush administration. Kemp explained that the White House would not entertain any concept of "quotas" with regard to the ADA. Officials within the Bush administration emphasized that people with disabilities needed to be qualified for any given job, that the original ADA definition needed to be limited, and that there needed to be a sensible limit to the responsibility of providing reasonable accommodations. If these fundamental issues were settled, said Kemp, the White House could move forward with shaping the details. As White House consultant Robert Funk explained, Funk, Gray, and others reminded skeptics of Bush's promise. In addition to Gray, Attorney General Richard Thornburgh was a crucial advocate of the ADA and Bush's aspirations. So was Kemp, who functioned as a vital link between the disability community and the White House.

Thornburgh's testimony was crucial: it demonstrated that the White House was willing to work toward consensus on a bill that President Bush could endorse.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) organized the various recommendations made by executive agencies, and Attorney General Thornburgh became the point person to represent the administration. Thornburgh, as many others, had personal experience with disability. His son, Peter, had acquired a learning disability from an automobile accident. As parents, Thornburgh and his wife Ginny had moved from caring for the special needs of their own son to working for others with similar conditions. In Pennsylvania, Mrs. Thornburgh had served as county chairperson of the ARC and was a member of President Reagan's Committee on Mental Retardation. Her work influenced her husband, who used his authority as Governor of Pennsylvania to assist persons with disabilities.

At the Senate hearing on June 22, 1989, it was clear that those in support of the ADA within the White House prevailed in shaping the administration's position, which was presented by Attorney General Thornburgh. "We at the Department of Justice," Thornburgh said, "wholeheartedly share [the ADA's] goals and commit ourselves, along with the president and the rest of his administration, to a bipartisan effort to enact comprehensive legislation attacking discrimination in employment, public services, transportation, public accommodations, and telecommunications." He explained that granting civil rights to disabled persons would help the American economy by promoting employment instead of dependence. Moreover, Thornburgh declared the administration's support of every basic principle, as well as to the overall principle of linking the bill to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. He also identified areas of concern: drug-abusers should not be covered by the definition of disability; measures should be taken to ameliorate the burden on small businesses; the extension of public accommodations beyond the Civil Rights Act should be carefully analyzed; attempts should be made to minimize litigation; the Secretary of Transportation should be able to grant exemptions to transit systems; and "the most cost-effective and efficient system" of telecommunications should be pursued. Most significantly, however, Thornburgh pledged to begin working, both at the staff and principal levels, to work toward bipartisan consensus on the ADA.

Although there were pronounced differences between ADA sponsors and the Bush administration, Senator Harkin responded to Attorney General Thornburgh by emphasizing all the areas of agreement. Accordingly, a Washington Post headline declared: "Thornburgh Endorses Civil Rights Protection for the Disabled." This statement masked deep divisions, but it effectively identified the ADA's advances and potential.

Attorney General Thornburgh's testimony was crucial because it demonstrated that the Bush administration was willing to work toward consensus on a bill that President Bush could endorse. Senators Harkin and Kennedy eagerly accepted the invitation to open negotiations with the Bush administration. And, as a result of Thornburgh's testimony, Senators Dole and Hatch laid to rest the possibilities of introducing competing bills. The ADA, sweeping in its provisions, emerged from the hearings with virtually every witness supporting the concept of the bill. Every argument against the ADA met with an effective rebuttal. The ADA was sound and it was on the move.

Negotiations Between the Senate and the White House

Although Senator Harkin was the Senate sponsor, Senator Kennedy--the full committee Chair and a senior Senator--took the lead in negotiating with the White House. Kennedy's plan of attack was to get all parties into the same room and essentially stay there until all issues were resolved. These discussions would include the administration, the Senate, the House, and both the business and disability communities. House Republicans, however, declined to participate, for they did not want to be bound by any agreements. Moreover, the White House insisted that only representatives of Congress and the administration could join the negotiations. Kennedy and Harkin wanted disability representatives to be at the table because they had so much technical expertise, but they and all other outside constituencies were not allowed into the negotiating room. Thus, only representatives from the Senate and the Bush administration came to the table.

The first meeting took place about a week after Attorney General Thornburgh's testimony in the anteroom of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources. Roper was the lead negotiator for the administration. He worked especially closely with Robert Funk, a co-founder of DREDF and a disability advocate from the Domestic Policy Council. Osolinik and Silverstein were the leaders for the Senate. At the outset of the meeting, in light of the absence of House Republicans as participants, Osolinik insisted on two main ground rules. First, she emphasized that they needed to come up with a complete settlement: leaving any issue unresolved might undercut the agreements that were made. Second, she argued that the administration had to stand by the negotiated agreements, even if House Republicans later opposed them and looked for administration support. Roper, however, said he could not commit to these stipulations because he had not cleared them with his superior, Chief of Staff Sununu. Osolinik promptly called off the meeting and said she was ready to continue whenever the administration was willing to agree to the conditions. Such actions led Wright to claim that Osolinik was "one of the toughest negotiators I have ever seen."

Over the Fourth of July weekend, Chief of Staff Sununu telephoned Senator Kennedy to talk about the abruptly-ended meeting. Kennedy repeated the two ground rules submitted by Osolinik, and Sununu agreed to abide by them. Accordingly they made plans to resume negotiations on July 6, 1989, and settled on the times, participants, and location. Over the next two weeks, through July 18, Senate staff and administration staff held ten negotiation sessions. From the Senate, the principal participants were the staffs of Senators Kennedy, Harkin, Hatch, Durenberger, and Dole. Staff from the office of Senator John McCain (R-AZ) joined the discussion regarding telecommunications provisions and were pivotal in shaping that portion of the bill. For the administration, participants came primarily from the White House, including Roper and Funk; the Justice Department, especially the author of the Section 504 regulations, John Wodatch; the Department of Transportation; and OMB.

Although non-governmental constituencies were not allowed in the Senate anteroom, they waited in a nearby conference room where they could be consulted during breaks. Those present in the meetings devoted several hours to each session, went through the bill line by line, and identified scores of disagreements for discussion. The staffs reached agreement on the vast majority of issues, but a few unresolvable disputes were left for the principals. These more difficult issues included the scope of remedies (namely the inclusion of compensatory and punitive damages), the scope of public accommodations (namely whether the ADA applied to more establishments than those covered by the Civil Rights Act), exemption of religious groups from the public accommodations provisions, the definition of disability, and coverage of drug and alcohol users.

On July 28, ten days after the conclusion of negotiation sessions, Senator Dole sponsored a principals meeting in his conference room. They met there because of the ample space and because the office of the Minority Leader was friendlier terrain for the administration. Those present included Senators Kennedy, Harkin, Dole, Hatch, and Durenberger, Chief Counsel Gray, Chief of Staff Sununu, Secretary of Transportation Samuel K. Skinner, Attorney General Thornburgh, head of the Domestic Policy Counsel Roger Porter, and others representing executive agencies covered by the ADA. The purpose of the meeting was to hammer out agreements on remaining issues. But at one point Sununu lost his temper and began yelling at Silverstein. Kennedy slammed his hand on the table, yelled back that he would not stand for shouting at Senate staff, and threatened to walk out. The discussion resumed, but no official agreements were made: the meeting was cut short.

Three days later, on July 31, Senators Kennedy and Harkin and Attorney General Thornburgh resolved the handful of remaining issues and closed the negotiations. The breakthrough compromise, which facilitated agreement on other issues, was essentially a swap concerning public accommodations and remedies. In the area of public accommodations, the administration had used the parity principle against ADA sponsors by arguing that the ADA should cover only those establishments covered under the Civil Rights Act. With respect to remedies, the administration wanted to exclude compensatory and punitive damages. As a compromise, Kennedy and Harkin agreed to restrict remedies to the standards of the Civil Rights Act in exchange for the administration's consent to apply the ADA to the broad spectrum of public accommodations.

The breakthrough compromise, which facilitated agreement on other issues, was essentially a swap concerning public accommodations and remedies.

There were several other major agreements included in what Senator Kennedy termed a "fragile compromise." First, with respect to employment, negotiators incorporated a two-year delay of the effective date for operations with 25 or more employees, and a four-year delay for operations with 15 to 24 employees. Establishments with fewer than 15 employees were already exempted from the employment title. They also introduced stronger language to ensure that current employees who abused drugs and alcohol would not be a protected class. Second, concerning public transportation, the agreement included authority for the Secretary of Transportation to waive the requirement of bus lifts for fixed-route systems when lifts were unavailable. For private intercity bus transportation, the agreement delayed implementation of lift requirements for at least five years and mandated a study to explore how best to make intercity buses accessible. Third, regarding public accommodations, the negotiated agreement delayed implementation for 18 months, exempted religious organizations and private clubs, and specified that elevators were required only in buildings with at least three stories or more than 3,000 square feet per floor.

Senate Approval

After reaching a final agreement with Attorney General Thornburgh on July 31, 1989, Senators Kennedy and Harkin continued to push the ADA forward, scheduling the Labor and Human Resources committee mark-up for August 2. This gave Senate staff only a couple of days to translate every agreement into appropriate legislative language. They did not finish writing the substitute bill until about 3:00 in the morning on the day of the mark-up. The committee mark-up itself was rather uneventfull--lasted less than an hour. This was mainly because the intense and detailed negotiations had settled most issues. Moreover, committee Democrats and Republicans gave deference to Senators Kennedy and Harkin, and Senators Hatch and Durenberger, all of whom supported the rewrite of S. 933. Accordingly, the committee voted unanimously, 16 to 0, to report the ADA to the Senate floor for final consideration. The Senate, the Bush administration, and the disability and business communities had truly come a long way since January to achieve unanimous, bipartisan support. It was "one of the most extraordinary legislative accomplishments I've ever seen," said Neas. For the disability community, it was a remarkable victory. Moreover, the compromise empowered President Bush, who had previously supported the principles of the ADA, to endorse a specific version of the bill.

The Labor and Human Resources Committee voted unanimously, 16 to 0, to report the ADA to the Senate floor for final consideration--a remarkable victory for the disability community.

The Senate closed for recess just two days after the mark-up, on August 4. But while many members and their staffs went on vacation, Senators Harkin and Kennedy continued to drive the ADA forward to keep the momentum alive. They wanted to make the ADA one of the first items of business when the Senate resumed on September 6. This meant that the committee report had to be filed by August 30 in order to give Senators and their staffs ample time to review the issues. For three weeks Democratic and Republican Senate staff worked intensively with the administration, the disability community, and the business community to develop a report that established an accurate historical record reflecting the various negotiated agreements. They completed a draft by August 22, and submitted the report to accompany the substitute version of S. 933 on August 30.

The speed with which the Labor and Human Resources Committee moved the ADA shocked many senators and staff members. When the ADA came up for a vote on September 7, just a day after the Senate reopened for the fall, some senators complained that things had happened too quickly, that they did not have enough time to review the legislation. Others opposed the bill outright. Humphrey (R-NH) called it "one of the most radical pieces of legislation I have encountered." Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) cynically suggested the bill should be called the "Lawyers Relief Act of 1989." For the most part, however, senators applauded the concepts of the ADA. In fact, by September 6 more than 60 senators had signed on as cosponsors.

Debate on the Senate floor lasted late into the night, totaling over fourteen hours. Although the fundamentals of the bill were never threatened, several divisive issues emerged. The first was a proposed amendment by Senator Hatch, which would provide a $5,000 tax credit to businesses for making accommodations and modifications--an alternative to a complete exemption for small businesses from the public accommodations provisions. Hatch warned that the government was a potentially "oppressive" institution and said that it was unfair to burden small businesses with the costs of implementation without placing any of the responsibility on the government. Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D-TX), however, argued that the amendment was a "killer amendment" because all bills affecting revenue are constitutionally required to come from the House. Hatch disagreed with Bentsen, as did a majority of the Senate. But since the Budget Act required a two-thirds majority for such revenue amendments, the tax credit proposal failed.

Near the end of the floor debate, shortly before 10:00 p.m., Senator Grassley introduced an amendment that brought Congress under the purview of the ADA. Senator Hatch had raised the issue during the committee mark-up, but Senator Kennedy had cautioned Hatch that the provision might kill the bill if introduced too early. On the Senate floor, Grassley argued that it was unfair for the Senate to impose a burden on the American people without sharing it. Senator Wendell H. Ford (D-KY), however, argued that such an amendment blurred the constitutional balance of powers by giving the executive branch administrative control over Congress. Ford agreed with Senators Harkin and Kennedy that the ADA should apply to Congress. But he thought the issue should be considered more carefully in conference, not passed hastily because people were tired and wanted to go home. Despite his objections, the Senate approved the amendment (by counting the number of Senators standing in favor of and against it) with the supposition that the amendment only articulated intent: details would be worked out in the House or in conference.

A much more acrimonious debate centered on the definition of disability. Senator William L. Armstrong (R-CO) argued that the definition of disability in the ADA was too broad. He was especially concerned about the inclusion of "mental disorders" and disorders with a "moral con tent." He questioned whether senators thought homosexuality, bisexuality, exhibitionism, pedophilia, voyeurism, and kleptomania should be protected by the ADA. Senator Jesse Helms shared Armstrong's concerns, especially with respect to homosexuality, and feared that employers would no longer be allowed to maintain "moral standards" in their businesses. Senator Kennedy, however, argued that prohibiting discrimination against persons with HIV was crucial if the epidemic was to be controlled, because people would otherwise be less likely to reveal their illness. And Senator Pete V. Domenici (R-NM) cautioned against excluding persons with mental illness, noting the recent recognition that such legendaries as Abraham Lincoln and Winston Churchill struggled with bipolar disorder. Although Senators Kennedy and Harkin opposed unduly restricting the definition, it appeared that the bill would not go forward unless specific conditions or impairments were expressly excluded from the bill. They thus worked with Armstrong and Hatch for hours, in consultation with the disability community, to prepare a list. Senator Hatch typed the amendment himself, and the Senate approved it by a voice vote.

"If it had become a Democratic bill, we would have lost. . . . It had to be bipartisan."

--Congressman Tony Coelho

With these and several other smaller amendments considered and resolved, the Senate finally voted on the ADA. In a remarkable demonstration of bipartisanship, the Senate voted affirmatively by a count of 76 to 8. This bipartisanship was crucial for the ADA's success, because the bill consequently entered the House deliberations as a coalition bill with the indispensable support of President Bush. Without the negotiations that had culminated in the support of Senators Hatch and Dole and President Bush, the ADA might have been labeled as a partisan initiative. "If it had become a Democratic bill," said Congressman Coelho, "we would have lost. . . . It had to be bipartisan." The ADA had indeed achieved a broad base of support from both parties, but a difficult battle in the House of Representatives lay ahead.

FASHIONING A DURABLE ADA: THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

The overwhelming affirmative vote in the Senate contributed to the ADA's remarkable momentum. The intense negotiations with the White House had resulted in a bill that earned President Bush's endorsement, which essentially guaranteed passage of the bill in some form. The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources had been unanimous in its support of the ADA. A grassroots disability community had made its presence known on Capitol Hill by uniting to advocate aggressively for the ADA. Meanwhile, no considerable opposition had organized. By the time the Senate voted on September 7, 1989, nearly half the House had cosponsored the bill--almost enough votes to pass it. These factors led many senators and the Bush administration to anticipate and hope for swift passage in the House before year's end. Other factors, however, pointed to a more challenging process.

Much more work had to be done to achieve the bipartisan support that ADA advocates sought. Hopes for quick passage were dashed; debate in the House took nearly nine more months.

Whereas 185 Democrats signed on as cosponsors (88 percent of all House signatures), only 25 Republicans attached their names to the bill. Moreover, while House Democrats had worked with the Senate in redrafting the ADA and were kept informed about the negotiations with the administration, House Republicans had kept their distance. They did not contribute substantively to the redrafting process; they also declined from participating in the White House negotiations to avoid being bound by them, and because they wanted to convey "that they were trying to look out for [the] needs" of the business community. Consequently, though the Senate crafted a breakthrough compromise bill, House deliberations would have to cover the same issues all over again. Much more work had to be done to achieve the bipartisan support that ADA advocates sought. Hopes for quick passage were dashed; debate in the House took nearly nine more months.

Early Actions in the House

Compared with the Senate, where there were powerful and passionate advocates of disability in leadership positions on both sides of the aisle, Republican and Democratic leadership in the House, with the exception of Majority Whip Tony Coelho (D-CA), were much more cautious. House Speaker James C. Wright, Jr. (D-TX) and Majority Leader Thomas S. Foley (D-WA) were skeptical of the ADA's wide-ranging impact and viewed the bill more as a private agenda of Congressman Coelho than an issue of national policy importance. "I had the leadership unwilling to tell me no because it was me," Coelho said. But they were not openly supportive and would have "killed" the ADA, "if it hadn't been [for] my making it so personal." Although in time the ADA would come to be viewed as a leadership bill, largely because of Coelho's status as Majority Whip, the initially weak support of Democratic leadership placed Republicans in a position to shape the ADA to their interests.

Congressman Coelho was the first member of the House to join the campaign to pass the ADA. He was the bill's sponsor both in 1988 and in 1989. He also collaborated with Senators Tom Harkin (D-IA) and Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) to rewrite the ADA and craft a master strategy for passage. House Republicans did not demonstrate significant interest in the ADA until it entered Congress for the second time in the spring of 1989. The leader among Republicans was Congress man Steve Bartlett (R-TX). He had played an integral role in recasting disability policy in terms of independence and in issuing a mandate to the National Council on the Handicapped (NCD) to review federal programs and make recommendations. Although he generally supported the proposals in Toward Independence, Bartlett was cautious about the lead recommendation pertaining to an equal opportunity law. Throughout 1988 he had watched the ADA from a distance. But after President- elect Bush promised support of an act similar to the ADA at a pre-inaugural event on January 19, making passage seem imminent, Bartlett decided to become involved to ensure that it was a reason able bill.

In April, 1989, Congressman Bartlett joined with Minority Leader Robert H. Michel (R-IL) and Congressman William F. Goodling (R-PA) to propose a partnership with Congressman Coelho. "We would like to work with you to develop a good bipartisan bill," they wrote to Coelho on April 25. "By working together, we hope to develop language that we can agree upon, support, and introduce together." But the revised draft was already completed and Bartlett, Michel, and Goodling did not cosponsor the ADA at the time of its introduction. Michel also wrote a letter to President Bush, on April 26, urging him to join in the efforts of working toward a bipartisan bill. Such an effort, Michel said "is appropriate, definitely warranted, and most importantly, deserved by individuals with disabilities and others who will be affected by it." Bush fulfilled this request by working with the Senate to develop a compromise bill.

Shortly into the House deliberations in the spring of 1989, ADA supporters received a significant blow that paralleled the 1988 defeat of Senator Lowell P. Weicker, Jr. (R-CT). While House Speaker Wright was under scrutiny for alleged ethics violations, some members accused Congressman Coelho of violating House ethical standards by investing in certain bonds. Unlike Wright, however, who dragged out his own investigation before leaving Congress, Coelho promptly submitted his resignation, effective June 15. His commitment to the ADA influenced this decision. Coelho had become a national leader for disability policy. And, though he flatly denied the charges against him, he feared that an investigation might, by association, embarrass the disability community and consequently hurt its prospects for success on the ADA.

Although Congressman Coelho's career as a U.S. Representative drew to a close, his advocacy for the ADA did not. According to Ralph Neas, "he played a key role, if not a crucial role, on many different occasions with Democrats in the House and the Senate, with Republicans in the House and the Senate, and with President Bush, pushing the calendar on a number of occasions, really helping get us through some difficult times." For example, he took the lead in the House cosponsorship drive and capitalized on his personal attachment to the bill and the trust he had cultivated among colleagues. Moreover, though he was a partisan Democrat, Coelho was well known for his desire to bring opponents to his side by working to empower them with shared ownership and finding common ground, rather than pitch battles.

"There was always the possibility that having to go through four committees . . . could endanger some of the best and strongest provisions."

--Ralph Neas

Accordingly, Congressman Coelho joined with Democratic Congressman Major R. Owens (D-NY), and Republican Congressmen Silvio O. Conte (R-MA) and Hamilton Fish, Jr. (R-NY), to facilitate cosponsorship. In a letter to the rest of their colleagues on June 1, they emphasized the Republican origins of the bill through NCD and the problem of paying persons with disabilities not to work. "Persons with disabilities want to be productive, self-supporting, and tax-paying participants in society," they wrote. "This bill will grant them that dignity and that right." Because the ADA was a civil rights bill, ADA supporters anticipated that members would readily support it. Yet, despite the bipartisan effort, the process of enlisting House cosponsors was slow: the issue of costs caused people to hesitate. Whereas members often cosponsor a bill when certain colleagues do, in this case they wanted to scrutinize the bill individually.

The House cosponsorship drive was less successful than that in the Senate--33 percent of all senators and 19 percent of all representatives were cosponsors on May 9. But Congressman Coelho secured a crucial commitment from Congressman Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD). The two members had become close friends since Coelho, as Chairman of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, had assisted Hoyer in his first campaign. At Coelho's request, Hoyer assumed the role of managing the ADA in the House. This meant organizing committee deliberations, serving as the principal negotiator, and leading floor deliberations. Out of respect for Coelho's commitment to the ADA, Hoyer called himself "chief cosponsor," and continued to identify Coelho as the ADA's sponsor. Like so many other members of Congress, the ADA had personal significance for Hoyer: his wife had epilepsy. He became a zealous advocate for the ADA.

A Bird's Eye View of the House Deliberations

By the time the ADA reached the House committees, the basic goals of the bill had been widely affirmed. Many members, however, viewed the legislative process as an incremental one, whereby major policies would be assembled step by step over many years. Passing the ADA was especially challenging because, as Rochelle Dornatt of Coelho's staff observed, "we were creating a whole new set of rights . . . a whole new set of civil rights." The principal focus in the House was not the needs of persons with disabilities, which had already been well-established by the Senate, but, rather, the bill's effect on "covered entities." As Melissa Schulman of Congressman Hoyer's office explained: "What the House was doing . . . was making the bill more acceptable to business." Coelho often noted that "the trick" in the legislative process was "to find that magic number, that 218, to get the bill passed." With the ADA, advocates were trying to get much more than that, but it required extensive work at the committee level to satisfy members concerned with covered entities in their districts.

House consideration of the ADA was different and more complicated than the Senate's for several reasons. First, the committee structure was more complex. In the Senate, the bill went only to one committee and one subcommittee. There it was considered primarily as a civil rights bill and did not undergo the technical scrutiny of the commerce and transportation committees. In the House it went to four committees (Education and Labor, Public Works and Transportation, Energy and Commerce, and Judiciary), and six subcommittees (Select Education; Employment Opportunities; Surface Transportation; Telecommunications and Finance; Transportation, Tourism, and Hazardous Materials; and Civil and Constitutional Rights). In addition, the Committee on Small Business held a non-legislative hearing to generate information that could be used by other committees or during floor deliberations. These multiple committee referrals meant that the ADA would have to withstand the scrutiny of various technical experts, especially with regard to transportation. Moreover, 164 representatives, compared with 16 senators, and many more House staff than Senate staff reviewed the bill in committee. This increased the chance of a committee altering, delaying, or even killing the bill and posed a major challenge to coordinating the deliberative process and keeping the bill intact. All indications suggested that a bill would pass. But, as Neas explained, "there was always the possibility that having to go through four committees . . . could endanger some of the best and strongest provisions." According to Arlene Mayerson, it was "an overwhelming strategic nightmare."

A second factor also complicated the House deliberations. In the Senate, the chief sponsors of the bill, Senators Kennedy and Harkin, were chairmen of the full committee and subcommittee with jurisdiction. In the House, however, Congressman Hoyer was not even a member of any of the committees reviewing the bill. He was "responsible for shepherding . . . the bill through the process," explained Schulman, even though he had to do it without committee authority, relying on forming relationships with chairmen who often guarded their committee jurisdiction jealously. Keeping everything together was a challenging task indeed. But Hoyer rose to the challenge. As Neas said, he "put on one of the best legislative shows of all time." One cannot underestimate Hoyer's importance. "Unless you have somebody who is going to take responsibility for seeing that it all gets done and there is some cohesion in the process," Schulman said, "it never would have happened."

"Unless you have somebody who is going to take responsibility for seeing that it all gets done and there is some cohesion in the process, it never would have happened."

--Melissa Schulman

Congressman Hoyer and staff member Schulman were central players, if not the leaders, in every aspect of the bill's development in the House--cosponsorship, hearings, committee review, negotiations, committee and floor amendments, interactions with the White House, floor deliberations, conference proceedings, and crisis management. They feared that the committees might significantly weaken the bill, and that the disability community might walk out of the process in frustration. Hoyer thus committed to meeting with any member who wanted to discuss the bill. He even walked through a Giant Food store with concerned parties to explore the practical impact of the ADA. Schulman remained confident that the bill would pass. But at times, she said, "it just looked next to impossible."

The legislative process in the House also differed in a third respect: the roles assumed by the business and disability communities and the Bush administration. The ADA went through the Senate like a "blitzkrieg." This had compelled many business lobbyists essentially to throw in the towel with respect to the Senate and strategically focus their efforts on the House. The disability community, on the other hand, had been very much on the offensive throughout the Senate deliberations, seeking to persuade senators and the Bush administration to support its goals for an accessible America. Although many compromises had to be made to achieve presidential and Senate support, the disability community had been generally satisfied with an ADA that emerged from the Senate. And with respect to the Bush administration, it had been an active participant in hammering out a compromise bill that could win the endorsement of President Bush, which Bush granted on August 2, 1989.

Persons with disabilities were now more on the defensive. Their chief goal was to hold as much ground as possible, amidst an onslaught of proposed revisions.

The circumstances were much different in the House. While business groups worked extensively with the Senate and the Bush ad ministration in developing a compromise bill, activity was primarily in Washington: there were only limited efforts to apply pressure on members from their constituents at home. But, during House deliberations, the business community vigorously lobbied the House by mobilizing constituent pressure. By the time the ADA reached the House, Mayerson said, the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) was distributing "millions of flyers to every business across the country." Moreover, because of President Bush's endorsement of the ADA, outright opposition was futile and apathy was dangerous. Barring an unexpected calamity, the bill was going to pass, at least in some form. If businesses wanted their voice to make a difference and meet some of their objectives, they had to support the overall concept of the bill. Persons with disabilities, on the other hand, were now more on the defensive. Their chief goal was to hold as much ground as possible amidst an onslaught of proposed revisions.

The disability community continually reminded opponents that a Republican president backed the ADA. Indeed, President Bush was a strong advocate of the ADA and had been in the forefront of promoting civil rights legislation for people with disabilities. By endorsing the negotiated version of the ADA on August 2, 1989, President Bush set the stage for the House deliberations, where passage consequently seemed imminent. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh most actively articulated the Bush administration's support. For example, on September 19, Thornburgh wrote a powerful letter to the editor of the New York Times on behalf of the ADA. He underscored his and the president's support of the ADA. In particular, he challenged the errors of a Times article--for example, its allegation that there had been "surprisingly narrow public scrutiny" of the ADA. Thornburgh described how the Bush administration, the Senate, and interested parties had entered "painstaking negotiations" that resulted in "a carefully balanced measure."

On October 12, Attorney General Thornburgh testified on behalf of the administration, before the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights and gave a ringing endorsement of the ADA. He noted that many people with disabilities continue to live "in an intolerable state of isolation and dependence" and argued that the ADA could be "the vehicle that brings persons with disabilities into the mainstream of American life." It was a "historic opportunity," he said, to have the chance to help move the ADA through Congress. Thornburgh's testimony was important because it demonstrated the Bush administration's continued support of the ADA and reflected President Bush's desire to see the ADA passed quickly.

For the most part, however, compared with its intense and consistent interaction with the Senate, the Bush administration participated in the House deliberations only intermittently. Proponents of the ADA widely assumed that the administration stayed in the background because the administration was willing to let the House modify the bill and perhaps implement proposals the administration had been unable to negotiate with the Senate. House Republicans, for their part, preferred that the White House let them have the freedom to conduct their own analysis and revisions of the bill. House Democrats wanted the administration to speak out more authoritatively on behalf of the negotiated ADA, but they would settle for not having the administration advocate any weakening amendments. President Bush satisfied all parties by remaining outside the fray.

The House deliberations were also characterized by ideological distinctions. ADA supporters widely hailed the bill as bipartisan legislation. Indeed, in the final analysis the ADA received overwhelming support from both parties--93 percent of the vote in each chamber and at least 86 percent of the vote in each party. There were also key advocates on both sides of the aisle, especially in the Senate, where Senators Harkin, Kennedy, Orrin G. Hatch (R-UT), Dave Durenberger (R-MN), and Robert Dole (R-KS) were deeply committed to the ADA. Moreover, Republicans and Democrats found common ground: they agreed "that it was a bad idea to pay people not to work, to stay home." Nevertheless, an ideological fault line emerged between the interests of the business and disability communities. Republicans tended to vote in favor of easing the demands imposed on business. This became evident during the Senate floor deliberations. For example, Senator Hatch's amendment to include a tax credit for businesses (the only vote to be recorded) split along party lines. Whereas 71 percent of Republicans supported the amendment, 64 percent of Democrats opposed it. In the House, the division was even more clear. For example, whereas 85 percent of Democratic committee members were cosponsors of the ADA, only 10 percent of Republican committee members were. In the committees, members tended to split along party lines regarding amendments that most viewed as helping businesses.

It is important, however, not to lose sight of the enormous area of agreement on the ADA, which was established in the course of negotiations. Although Republicans and Democrats had their differences, it is a testament to their talents and commitment to a laudable objective that they were largely able to put aside partisanship to find common ground.

Lobbying & Grass Roots Activities

For business organizations such as NFIB, the Senate deliberations represented a failure. "The reason we failed in the Senate," said Wendy Lechner, the NFIB point person for the ADA, "was we didn't have time to educate" the members. The ADA was "pushed through as motherhood and apple pie before we had a chance to do anything." In the House, therefore, the objective was to "slow it down long enough for education." NFIB was not alone. Largely under the direction of Nancy Reed Fulco of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, business groups formed the Disability Rights Working Group to help mold the ADA. Different organizations focused on different provisions: NFIB and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce devoted considerable attention to public accommodations; the American Bus Association (ABA), the American Public Transit Authority (APTA), and Greyhound examined transportation issues; the National Restaurant Association (NRA), the Chamber of Commerce, and the National Association of Manufacturers dealt with employment. But they banded together to lobby members of the House about their common concerns. As illustrated in the Senate testimony, business groups were not completely opposed to the bill. "We really weren't trying to deep-six it," said Lechner. "We were really trying to get a better bill, a more livable bill."

"We really weren't trying to deep-six it. We were really trying to get a better bill, a more livable bill."

--Wendy Lechner

To create a more "livable" bill, representatives of covered entities developed a list of about 20 to 30 amendments. Throughout the House deliberations they continually updated this list, removing those changes that were accomplished, and adding others as new issues arose. And they lobbied members of Congress to argue the need for those amendments by issuing various position papers and visiting members' offices. In addition to lobbying inside Washing ton, organizations such as NFIB sent out action alerts to their members urging people to write their representatives, especially those serving on committees. Some opponents of the ADA took their concerns about the ADA to the main stream media.

Business groups had a number of overriding concerns. One was the "vagueness of language" contained in the ADA. Business lobbyists argued that such phrases as "undue hardship," "readily achievable," and "readily accessible," were inadequately defined, and would therefore invite frivolous law suits. Businesses, they argued, would not be able to know whether they were in compliance. A second concern was the potential cost of accommodations. One proposed solution was to have the government share some of the burden through tax credits and other mechanisms. Third, numerous covered entities lobbied to have a more concrete definition of disability, ideally one that listed every covered disability instead of relying on a flexible definition. Fourth, small businesses argued that they should be exempt from the public accommodations requirements, or at least be phased in more gradually, because small businesses were exempt from other civil rights legislation. Fifth, scores of organizations protested the enforcement mechanisms available under the ADA, especially private litigation and the availability of punitive damages. Sixth, many business groups proposed that the ADA should preempt all other disability laws, so that there would be no confusion between different statutes, and no possibility for bringing multiple law suits for one violation.

The business community, however, faced a significant problem in educating and lobbying Congress: it had a much more difficult time than the disability community in keeping its coalition together. By the end of the fall of 1990, the coalition had begun to break down, as organizations focused on those provisions that affected them most. They were, therefore, unable to present a united front to Congress. Nevertheless, during the course of the House deliberations, business groups succeeded in obtaining many of the changes they sought.

In response to a variety of objections posed by business groups, some House members took the initiative in undertaking vigorous publicity campaigns against the ADA. Congressman Dan Burton (R-IN), for example, sent out a flyer in which he enumerated "some of the more onerous provisions" of the ADA. According to Burton, the ADA would "federalize American private enterprise," "wreak havoc in the workplace," "crush small and medium-sized businesses," and "confer federal approval on homosexual/heterosexual "domestic partners." "He also attached an editorial by Gene Antonio that characterized the ADA as "the last ditch attempt of the remorseless sodomy lobby to achieve its national agenda before the impending decimation of AIDS destroys its political clout. This bill simply must be stopped . . . and will become law unless there is a massive public outcry immediately."

"The beauty of the ADA was it was an effort where people in the grass roots were just as important, if not more important, than people in Washington."

--Liz Savage

Similarly, Congressman Ron Marlenee (R-MN) issued a flyer to all the postal patrons in his district. The headline read: "Americans With Disabilities Act: Washington's Latest Way to Crush Businesses, Schools, While Hurting The Disabled." A subheading announced: "ADA Bill To Give Federal Endorsement For Homosexual "Partners" and "AIDS." Congressman Chuck Douglas (R-NH) distributed a letter that pictured a man pointing a gun at the reader. "Berserkers: Time Bombs in the Workplace," the headline declared. Douglas favored the general idea of the ADA, but said the bill "needs dramatic rewriting." He was especially with preventing per sons with mental illness from endangering their coworkers and thus proposed excluding such persons from protection under the ADA.

The disability community was more unified than the business community, but the heightened activity of the business community during House deliberations demanded a strong response from the disability community. "The beauty of the ADA," said Liz Savage, "was it was an effort where people in the grass roots were just as important, if not more important, than people in Washington." To facilitate disability grass roots involvement, leaders such as Marilyn Golden developed regional coordination networks: it was too complicated for one or even a handful of people to manage the calls for an entire nation. While in some cases there was a coordinator for an individual state, most states were organized in groups under a regional coordinator. The regional coordinators were selected because they were well known in their states. They came from a variety of organizations, often from independent living centers.

During the House deliberations, the ADA coalition coordinated its lobbying efforts with each of the scheduled committee mark-ups. As the bill went through each committee, members of the legal team responded to virtually every business position paper by issuing rebuttals. They would proceed point-by-point through amendment lists and either show how claims were in error or why the disability community took a different position. ADA Lobbyists used this information in visiting members of the House, presenting a "Disability Rights 101" education course. Lobbyists were not just Washingtonians. Often at their own expense, persons with disabilities flew and drove in from around to be part of the Washington effort. The National Council on Independent Living (NCIL), for example, ensured that at least one of its representatives resided in Washington throughout the congressional deliberations. On many occasions, Liz Savage offered her apartment as a sort of boarding house for out-of-town visitors. Once they arrived in Washington, grass roots advocates met with leaders in the ADA coalition to get weekly briefings and plot strategy. They also coordinated their lobbying techniques to ensure that they were presenting a unified message to members of Congress.

Grass roots participation in lobbying helped humanize the ADA. Many members were seeing persons with disabilities for the first time and viewing them as assertive citizens. This helped break down the stereotype of persons with disabilities as dependent children. It also illustrated that disabled people could make a difference and offer valuable contributions to society--if only given the chance. Only a minority of people with disabilities, however, could make personal trips to Washington. Others did what they could in their local communities. Kathleen Kleinmann, for example, wanted to do whatever she could do from her home in rural Pennsylvania. She felt she simply had to be a part of the action. "We had that urgency about us," she said. "It was contagious. It spread through the whole country." For Kleinmann and many others, NCIL was the crucial link to activities taking place in Washington. Through it they could learn when and to whom they should write letters. Moreover, people in various local committees applied pressure on the local offices of their representatives. They also contested erroneous public statements about the ADA by calling into local radio shows and making local television appearances.

"The President has endorsed it. The Senate has overwhelmingly passed it. Now it's up to you. Don't weaken a law that will strengthen America."

--New Year's Postcard

The largest single letter-writing campaign took place between the 100th and 101st Congresses, during the winter of 1989-90. The campaign was directed at members of the House of Representatives, who were frustrating many in the disability community by taking so much longer than the Senate and proposing "weakening amendments." Thousands of "New Year's" postcards were mailed throughout the country with a cover letter from James S. Brady, soliciting individuals to mail to them to their congressman. The front of the card printed "ADA" in giant letters for a background. Set over it was the statement: "Our New Year's Wish For Congress: Open the Doors to America. Pass the Americans with Disabilities Act." On the back it said: "The President has endorsed it. The Senate has overwhelmingly passed it." And in larger letters: "Now it's up to you. Don't weaken a law that will strengthen America." Space was provided for people to add their own personal messages. They were encouraged to send cards to their own Congressperson, committee members from their states, Speaker of the House Foley, and Minority Leader Michel.

In addition to lobbying, sending letters, and making phone calls, persons in the disability community, both inside and outside Washington, served the important function of presenting testimony at congressional hearings. As with the hearings of 1988 and the Senate hearings of 1989, the House's ADA hearings included powerful testimony about the need for civil rights protections for persons with disabilities. Persons from the disability community also offered their technical expertise on specific issues and countered the claims of those who proposed weakening amendments.

A final way in which the disability community exerted pressure on Congress and the Bush administration was through demonstrations. One of the most significant protests was organized by ADAPT in September, 1989. In a long ADAPT tradition, the demonstration coincided with the annual meeting of APTA in Atlanta, where Secretary of Transportation Samuel K. Skinner was expected to present an address. On Sunday, September 24, about 100 people throughout the U.S. and Canada, most of whom were in wheelchairs, protested at the entrance of the Hilton Hotel convention site. Stephanie Thomas, a spokesperson for ADAPT, said they were protesting APTA because of its opposition to the ADA.

"We're here until the order gets signed. They'll have to carry everybody out or arrest them."

--Mike Auberger

At about ten o'clock the following morning, on September 25, more than 100 disability activists occupied the main floor of the Richard B. Russell Federal Building and blockaded the main entrances. Some attached chains and bicycle locks to their necks and locked them to door handles so that security could not simply lift them from their wheelchairs. ADAPT demanded that Secretary Skinner sign an executive order requiring the purchase of accessible vehicles for all new transit buses, which would take effect immediate. "We're here until the order gets signed," said Michael W. Auberger, one of the co-founders and leading organizers for ADAPT. "They'll have to carry everybody out or arrest them." Later that day, at around six o'clock, Atlanta police and security officers from the General Services Administration (GSA) did just that. They used bolt cutters to remove demonstrators from the building.

About two hours later, only a few protesters still remained in the building. From inside the building, Marca Bristo contacted Evan Kemp, who told her to call Boyden Gray directly. As she was on the phone with Gray, a police officer insisted that she leave the building. Bristo left, but only after she handed the phone to the officer to prove she was talking to Gray from the White House. Gray subsequently contacted President Bush. Within minutes, police and other security officers began letting the disability activists back into the building. After speaking with Gray, President Bush had personally intervened to inform Gary C. Carson, Regional General Services Administration (GSA) administrator, that the protesters should be allowed to stay. Carson attributed Bush's action to the president's "deep commitment to the handicapped and their right to protest." Apparently, Bush was also concerned about the alternative of having them stay overnight outside the building in a chilling rain. Auberger and others welcomed Bush's intervention, but threatened to stay until Skinner signed the executive order they demanded.

The sit-in ended the following afternoon subsequent to an agreement between the Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) and leaders of ADAPT. UMTA agreed to help facilitate a process of identifying and interfering with transit operators that were rushing to buy inaccessible buses before the ADA was enacted. UMTA also agreed to relay to Secretary Skinner ADAPT's desire to see more effective implementation of the Air Carriers Access Act of 1986, which required accessibility for air travel. The agreement fell short of ADAPT's demands. Yet it appeared to be the best possible action, since UMTA explained that Skinner did not have the authority to issue such an executive order.

ADAPT, however, was not finished with its demonstrations. The next day, Wednesday, September 27, protesters effectively shut-down the Atlanta Greyhound terminal for several hours by encircling the terminal and blocking buses. They chanted: "We Will ride!" "Access is our civil right!" One protester even climbed into the bus, sat in the driver's seat, and chained himself to the steering column. Only four buses carrying about 80 passengers left the terminal during the protest, compared with a typical 20 buses carrying 600 passengers. The purpose of the demonstration was to urge Greyhound and other intercity bus services to begin purchasing lift-equipped buses. The protest ended, however, with the arrest of over 20 activists, who received $75 fines the following day.

Five-and-a-half months later, amidst seemingly stalled House deliberations, ADAPT organized another demonstration--the "Wheels of Justice" campaign. Disability activists from around the country gathered on Sunday night, March 11, to plan the week's events. Wade Blank and Michael Auberger, co-founders of ADAPT, were there. Other leading ADAPT organizers included Bob Kafka, Mark Johnson, Stephanie Thomas, Dianne Coleman, Ben Freeman, and Bernard Baker. At noon the following day, hundreds of activists associated with ADAPT and other disability organizations assembled at the White House. From there they marched and rolled to the Capitol, where they gathered at the west front to listen to speeches from ADA supporters. On the way, they chanted: "What do we want?" "ADA!" "When do we want it?" "Now!"

At the Capitol, Justin Dart, now Chairman of the President's Committee on the Employment of People with Disabilities, addressed the crowd as "pioneer patriarchs of the twentieth century." He likened the ADA to the Declaration of Independence and urged those assembled to "go forward, in the spirit of Ghandi and Martin Luther King, with love, with reasoned truth, with unyielding insistence on respect for the sacred value of each human life." Concluding with a demand for immediate passage of the ADA, Dart declared: "We are American citizens and we will be part of the American dream." Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder and Congressman Major Owens also spoke in support of the ADA, likening the disability rights movement to the civil rights movement of the 1960s. Additional speakers included I. King Jordan, President of Gallaudet University, Evan Kemp, Chairman of the EEOC, and James Brady, former press secretary for President Ronald Reagan.

"We are American citizens and we will be part of the American dream."

--Justin Dart

Auberger was the final speaker. He, too, likened the efforts of those gathered to earlier movements for equality. He described the plight of people with disabilities and urged that disability activists must remain steadfast in demanding civil rights. Then, sitting in his wheelchair at the base of the Capitol steps, Auberger observed that the steps "were a symbol of discrimination against the disabled." Yet, he said, he would not let them continue to be an obstruction. "We will not let any barrier prevent us from the equality that is rightfully ours." As he concluded his speech in front of television cameras, many individuals left their wheelchairs behind to climb the Capitol steps--a symbol of their fortitude in surmounting barriers.

On Tuesday, March 13, ADAPT continued its campaign by meeting with House Speaker Foley (who assumed the House leadership position after Congressman Wright's resignation), Republican Leader Michel, and Congressman Hoyer in the Capitol Rotunda. Leaders of the protest insisted on immediate passage of the ADA. When Foley informed the crowd that two months was a likely time frame, more than 100 demonstrators began chanting: "ADA Now!" Foley and Michel subsequently departed. Hoyer stayed a little longer and departed with a thumbs-up signal. Then, Capitol police told the demonstrators to leave, as demonstrating in the Capitol is against federal law. Most demonstrators refused, however, and formed a tight circle; many chained their wheelchairs together. They chanted: "Access is a civil right!" and "The people united will never be defeated!" But police officers, many protected with riot gear, began using chain-cutters and torches to break through the links demonstrators had fashioned. For about two hours, police reportedly arrested 104 people whom charged them with demonstrating in the Capitol building. The next day, Wednesday, March 14, protesters assembled in Congressmen Shuster and Fish's offices. Others crowded the Energy and Commerce Committee mark-up session. Numbers dwindled over the rest of the week, however, as many were appearing in court.

The "Wheels of Justice" campaign did not bring immediate passage of the ADA. And the ADAPT demonstration in Atlanta did not result in an executive order that required the purchase only of accessible transit buses. Yet the protesters were more concerned with demonstrating the lengths to which persons with disabilities would go to secure their rights. In that sense they succeeded. The events were also an indication that further demonstrations could follow if the ADA got stuck in a quagmire. Combined with the other education and lobbying efforts of the ADA coalition, these activities underscored the nationwide, grass roots demand for passage of the ADA.

Although such demonstrations reflected unity within the disability community, there was not complete unanimity among all people with disabilities. The National Federation of the Blind (NFB), for example, was outspoken in its reservations about the ADA. At its 1989 convention in Denver, Colorado, NFB passed a resolution declaring that if the ADA "could not be amended to cure its weaknesses, it should be opposed." Early in 1990, Kenneth Jernigan of NFB wrote a brief, "Reflections on the Americans with Disabilities Act," to explain NFB's position. The primary concern, he said, was that the ADA might create additional problems for blind people as it attempted to eliminate other problems. In particular, NFB feared that the ADA might force people with disabilities "to accept the special accommodations mandated by the bill and . . . [prevent people] from using the same facilities and services that are available to others." Such accommodations, Jernigan said, may themselves become discriminatory, and make the ADA "a source of unintentional discrimination against some persons with disabilities."

For instance, NFB cautioned that the provision of specially-equipped rooms in hotels might require blind persons to use specific rooms and prevent them from staying near friends. To NFB, the alleged need for this accommodation (or for street corners with audible sounds for crossing and specially-designated seats on buses) was based on "the false assumption that sight is essential for successful performance of most tasks." Blindness, said Jernigan, "is not generally disabling." Consequently, unwanted accommodations falsely portrayed blind people "as limited in ways that they are not" and imposed unfair and unequal restrictions.

As a solution, NFB proposed an amendment stipulating that people with disabilities had the right not to participate in programs or activities specially designed for disabled persons. During the fall of 1989, NFB worked with John Wodatch of the Justice Department to elicit the backing of the administration. Following a meeting with White House staff on January 19, 1990, NFB representatives were confident that they would obtain their proposed amendment. But, Jernigan said, if the amendment is rejected, "we must oppose the bill as vigorously as we can . . . we will do anything we can to slow it down and block [the ADA's] passage." He concluded his "Reflections" with the cautionary statement: "Simply because a thing calls itself civil rights, that does not mean that it is civil rights." NFB eventually attained its goal through an additional clause to the ADA: "an individual with a disability shall not be denied the opportunity to participate in . . . programs or activities that are not separate or different." Subsequently, NFB did not oppose the ADA.

The ADA and the House Committees: Three Phases

Part of the master strategy for passing the ADA involved organizing the committee deliberations in the House. Leading ADA supporters among Democrats, including Congressmen Coelho, Hoyer, and Owens, wanted to start the bill in a committee that was familiar with and favorable to civil rights. In consultation with each of the committee Chairs--Augustus F. Hawkins (D-CA), for Education and Labor; John D. Dingell (D-MI), for Energy and Commerce; Glenn M. Anderson (D-CA), for Public Works and Transportation; and Jack Brooks (D-TX), for Judiciary--they decided to begin with Education and Labor. Several factors made this a logical choice. First, most of its Democratic members supported disability rights. Second, Democratic leadership included Congress man Owens, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Select Education, who had created the Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of People with Disabilities and was a strong advocate of civil rights and grass roots activism. Third, the ranking Republican for the Subcommittee on Select Education was Congressman Bartlett, who had a strong record on disability policy and was instrumental in shaping the mission of NCD. Bartlett, in fact, urged Republicans on other committees to promote letting Education and Labor go first. Fourth, Pat Morrisey, a leading Republican staff member, had also worked extensively with disability policy and, in addition, had a disability. Ideally, the Education and Labor Committee would complete its review of the ADA as a starting point for the rest of the committees.

Although committees operate differently, they tend to follow a similar process of deliberation. The committee chair and committee members give overall guidance to their staff regarding what they would desire to achieve. Then, hearings are scheduled, designed, and held. The purpose of hearings is to solicit justification and document the need for the bill, as well as to hear and discuss reservations about the bill. As much as possible, staff try to settle issues raised by the hearings on their own, which is generally the vast majority of a given bill. For issues that remain unresolved, however, there is a ladder of conflict resolution. Usually, the first step the staff take is to prepare memos for their congressmen about the issues in dispute and then obtain the member's feedback, which can be used in negotiations. If this proves inadequate, members meet directly with one another. Finally, issues that members cannot settle get carried to committee mark-up sessions where they can be introduced as amendments for member voting. Typically, mark-up sessions begin with the consideration of one collective amendment that incorporates all the agreed upon changes. Then, members proceed to discuss and vote upon individual amendments concerning the disputed issues.

Although the activities of all four committees often overlapped (see Appendix C for a chronology), there were three distinguishable phases in the committees' review process. Deliberations by the Education and Labor Committee marked the first phase. A focus on transportation provisions by two committees, the Energy and Commerce Committee and the Public Works and Transportation Committee, constituted the second phase. Activities by the Judiciary committee represented the third and final phase before moving the deliberations to the House floor.

PHASE I: EDUCATION AND LABOR COMMITTEE

The Education and Labor Committee conducted the most thorough evaluation of the bill, at least with respect to the volume of testimony received. Two subcommittees had jurisdiction over the bill: Select Education, chaired by Congressman Owens, and Employment Opportunities, chaired by Matthew G. Martinez (D-CA). In the interest of facilitating rapid consideration of the ADA, Owens negotiated with Martinez to have Employment Opportunities yield to Owens's Select Education Subcommittee. Moreover, Congressman Hawkins, Chairman of the full committee, essentially deferred to Owens for leading the committee's consideration. In addition to the two hearings held in 1988, the Subcommittee on Select Education hosted four hearings between July 18 and October 6, 1989, two of which were joint hearings with the Employment Opportunities Subcommittee.

Congressman Owens welcomed Hoyer as the leader in committee negotiations, because it gave Owens an opportunity to be a "Watch Dog" for the disability community.

Perhaps the most significant of the four hearings was the field hearing of the Subcommittee on Select Education held on August 28, in Houston, Texas. Lex Frieden and Justin Dart had recommended such a hearing to Congressman Owens due to concerns that Congressman Bartlett might not be fully supportive of the ADA be cause of his close associations with such business groups as NFIB. Owens approved of the idea and enjoyed playing the role of bringing the U.S. Congress to local communities. The purpose of the field hearing was to demonstrate to Bartlett that his own constituents strongly supported the ADA. Hundreds of persons with disabilities attended the hearing and an open forum that followed. At the hearing, businessmen, government officials, and transit authorities gave a ringing endorsement to the ADA. And dozens of people with disabilities spoke about their personal experiences at the forum. The proceedings appeared to have a significant impact on Bartlett. Later that evening, he told Frieden and others that he had been "kind of a skeptic" of the ADA. But the day of discussions "made me a believer," and he pledged to do what he could to support the legislation.

Contrary to the typical committee process, where staff settle most disagreements following the hearings, negotiations for the Committee on Education and Labor were led by Congressmen Hoyer and Bartlett in a lengthy series of member-to-member meetings. This was also a unique circumstance because Hoyer was not even on the committee. Although Chairman Hawkins could have exercised his authority over the full committee, he "graciously," as Ralph Neas described it, allowed Hoyer to take the lead. This gave Hoyer, the House manager of the ADA, an opportunity to set the tone for the rest of the House deliberations. Congressman Owens welcomed Hoyer as the leader of committee negotiations, because it gave Owens an opportunity to be a "Watch Dog" for the disability community: he could help ensure that negotiations did not result in a net loss for people with disabilities.

Congressman Hoyer spoke mostly on behalf of Democrats and the disability community, Congressman Bartlett mostly on behalf of Republicans and the business community. But they shared enough in common to produce extraordinarily productive negotiations.

Congressmen Hoyer and Bartlett represented different parties and different clientele--Hoyer spoke mostly on behalf of Democrats and the disability community, Bartlett mostly on behalf of Republicans and the business community. But they shared enough in common to produce extraordinarily productive negotiations. Bartlett wanted to foster business development. His position as Republican point man was to prepare a bill that could gain the support of Republicans and the business community. Hoyer shared similar goals. As Schulman explained: "we weren't interested in creating a new right and doing it in such a way that it would have been impossible for the private sector, for employers and businesses, to meet their responsibilities." Rather, in meeting the needs of persons with disabilities, Hoyer wanted to ensure that businesses knew what was expected of them, that language was clear and fair, and that the bill did not impose an undue burden on business. By working together, the two congressmen were able to help craft legislation that would be acceptable to both sides of the aisle and foster a level of bipartisanship comparable to what had developed in the Senate. The meetings were "the most productive and satisfying legislative negotiations that I had ever been involved with," said Bartlett.

Throughout October, Congressmen Hoyer and Bartlett met extensively and negotiated fourteen amendments that would later be brought up for a vote in committee. Although the committee had jurisdiction mainly over portions of the Employment and Public Accommodations titles, some of their proposed amendments affected the entire bill. The most significant amendment concerned the application of "undue hardship" and "readily achievable." Business lobbyists wanted precise dollar figures to determine exactly how much businesses had to spend on accommodations and modifications. Rather than offer a price cap, the Senate bill specified that three factors should be evaluated in determining whether an accommodation was "reasonable" or a structural modification was "readily achievable"--the size of a business, the type of operation, and the cost of the accommodation. Although this provision fell mainly under the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee, and was ultimately settled there, Hoyer and Bartlett began discussions about "site-specific" factors. They suggested that in determining whether an accommodation was "reasonable" a court should consider the financial resources of the local facility as well as those of the entire covered entity. Thus, a local K-Mart in financial difficulty would not be evaluated only according to the resources of the entire K-Mart corporation. Hoyer and Bartlett also clarified that an employer's obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation was always limited by the standard of "undue hardship" (see Appendix F): there would be no loopholes.

The meetings with Congressman Steny Hoyer were "the most productive and satisfying legislative negotiations that I had ever been involved with."

--Congressman Steve Bartlett

Congressmen Hoyer and Bartlett addressed another persistent concern of employers by adding tougher language for drug and alcohol abuse. They agreed that past drug users who had completed, or were actively engaged in, drug rehabilitation treatment were protected under the ADA. They also decided that covered entities should be free to administer drug tests and exclude individuals who used drugs and had not sought treatment.

Congressmen Hoyer and Bartlett also worked to help minimize the potential for excessive litigation. They added language requiring that all complaints filed under the ADA or Sections 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act must be coordinated so that only one case could be brought against the covered entity; a claimant could not file two claims under two different statutes. They also developed a procedure whereby the attorney general could certify state or local building codes that met ADA accessibility standards, which would be a defense against discrimination charges. In cases where the attorney general exercised authority to pursue monetary damages for aggrieved persons, the two congressmen proposed to exclude punitive damages. They also suggested that when courts considered assessing civil penalties, they must consider the "good faith" efforts of the covered entity. Finally, Congressmen Bartlett and Hoyer incorporated into the bill requirements that executive agencies prepare technical assistance manuals to be disseminated to those with rights and responsibilities under the ADA.

These changes were brought before, and approved by, members of the Committee on Education and Labor at the mark-up sessions on November 9 and 16. Eight additional amendments came up for consideration. Among other things, these amendments would have:

• linked the determination of reasonableness for accommodations and modifications exclusively to the resources of a local facility;
• reduced the penalties the attorney general could assess;
• substituted "significant risk" for "direct threat" as the standard according to which persons with contagious diseases could be discriminated against;
• capped the amount a business had to spend on "readily achievable" modifications to 5 percent of a company's profits;
• delayed implementation until regulations were completed; and,
• limited nondiscrimination protection for association with someone who had AIDS to one's family members.

Except for the package of amendments introduced by Congressmen Hoyer and Bartlett, all amendments introduced at the committee mark-up were voted down, predominantly along party lines. The Democratic position was a "no" vote on all amendments besides the Hoyer-Bartlett package. In the final vote, the committee voted unanimously, 35 to 0, to report H.R. 2273 to the House, as amended by the committee. Despite the contested amendments, this was another strong endorsement of the ADA, and gave the bill a boost similar to that given by the Senate vote. Tough battles lay ahead. But the Hoyer-Bartlett compromises positioned the ADA for future success, and Hoyer and Bartlett would continue to play central roles in the negotiations of other committees.

PHASE II: ENERGY AND COMMERCE & PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEES

Although the Committee on Education and Labor reached a significant compromise that drew the support of many members, it accomplished little with respect to transportation and telecommunications provisions. These responsibilities fell to two committees: Energy and Commerce, and Public Works and Transportation. Their deliberations constituted the second phase of the House process of committee review.

From the beginning of the ADA campaign, advocates worried most about the transportation provisions. Transit authorities had historically posed vigorous challenges to accessibility for persons with disabilities. When the Department of Transportation issued its original Section 504 regulations, APTA responded with a lawsuit--and won. The court ruled that requiring lifts on every bus went beyond the purview of Section 504 and left it up to transit authorities to decide whether to have accessible buses, provide paratransit service, or use a mixture. As a result of this so-called "local option," transportation operators throughout the country provided widely varying levels of accessible transportation. Cities such as New York and Seattle had achieved nearly 100 percent accessible buses, while Chicago had virtually none. Railroad systems had other problems. Accessibility standards for Amtrak, for example, had been in effect for nearly two decades; the regulations simply were not being enforced. By proposing fully accessible public transportation vehicles, the ADA would thus face resistance from such powerful lobbying groups as the ABA, Greyhound, Amtrak, and APTA.

Working the transportation provisions of the ADA through the committee was also challenging because the scope was so broad. The ADA covered all public transportation by both public and private entities, with the exception of air travel, which had been addressed in the Air Carriers Access Act. This included: fixed route systems (including buses, light and rapid rail), paratransit service (which applied only to public entities), demand responsive systems, intercity rail, commuter rail, over-the-road buses (which applied only to private entities), and transportation facilities. To avoid presenting executive agencies with any ambiguity, the transportation committees prepared extraordinarily detailed provisions. Given the memory of the regulatory nightmare of Section 504, where lack of detail in the statute resulted in intense conflict over the regulations, many people in the disability community welcomed the specificity promoted by the transportation committees. Although the two transportation committees upheld the basic principles of the Senate bill, they made the most changes "nearly tripling the amount of space dedicated to transportation provisions.

The two committees operated simultaneously, but the Energy and Commerce Committee was the first to complete its review. It held its hearings on September 27 and 28, 1989 and met for mark- up six months later on March 13, 1990, at which time it reported the ADA, as amended, to the House. The ADA's fate in the transportation committees was largely a function of personalities. Working with the Energy and Commerce Committee was difficult for the disability community. Chairman Dingell was notorious for jealously guarding his committee's jurisdiction, and he was one of Amtrak's greatest advocates. Over the course of the 1980s, funding for Amtrak had plummeted, and Dingell was reluctant to impose any new demands on the struggling public service. This made for a much different dynamic than the other three House committees, where Democrats generally sided with disability advocates to prevent any "weakening" amendments. In this case, Democrats tended to side with the public rail company and were thus more skeptical of the ADA's objectives. The principal staff person for the Energy and Commerce Committee was Alan Roth. By the end of the process he became a hero of sorts for the disability community, but in the beginning Roth posed a great challenge. He thought things had happened too quickly in the Senate, where there was little expert review of transportation provisions, and he wanted to conduct a thorough review of the bill's provisions within his committee's jurisdiction. This had the effect of extending the deliberative process.

Unlike the Education and Labor Committee, and its open negotiations, the Energy and Commerce Committee began its consideration privately, without consulting the disability community. The relationship between disability advocates and the committee was not improved when Pat Wright and Ralph Neas worked with Michigan constituents to apply pressure on the Chairman. It was not until the committee circulated a draft of its own version of the bill, which invited a 30-page rebuttal from the outraged disability community, that Congressman Hoyer could persuade the committee to work with him in developing a bill that the disability community could support.

Although the Energy and Commerce Committee could introduce amendments that affected the entire bill, its jurisdiction over the ADA centered on two main components: telecommunications and railroads. Telecommunications provisions were the least controversial of the ADA's four main titles. Karen Peltz-Strauss and Sy Dubow were the principal attorneys from the deaf community who worked with congressional staff. The National Association of the Deaf (NAD), Telecommunications for the Deaf, Inc., and Self-Help for the Hard of Hearing (SHHH) were active in demonstrating broad support for changes in the nation's telecommunications system. Peltz-Strauss described Congress man Edward J. Markey (D-MA), Chairman of the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, as the deaf community's "chief advocate" in the House. He was "very interested in expanding telecommunications access for people with disabilities." This made for "smooth and harmonious" deliberations, as Congressman Bob Whittaker (R-KS) later described them. "There was striking cooperation among industry, commerce, and Congress," said Peltz-Strauss, which produced provisions "that met the needs of people who were deaf and hard of hearing."

Historically, three of the main telecommunications issues for the deaf and hard of hearing were hearing-aid compatibility, teletype devices, and television decoding. During the 1980s, the deaf community succeeded in passing legislation that required employers to provide hearing-aid compatible telephones, which were equipped to transmit electromagnetic signals to certain hearing aids. In 1988, the Hearing Aid Compatibility (HAC) Act expanded this requirement such that nearly all telephones manufactured or imported into the country had to be compatible. The issue the ADA addressed most directly were teletype (TTY) devices, often called a Telecommunication Device for the Deaf (TDD). Under the original bill introduced to the House and Senate, the ADA required states to establish telecommunications relay services that would allow people to communicate, through an operator, with people who did not have TTY devices. During House deliberations, the basic requirement was affirmed, though the implementation date was extended from two to three years. The most significant change was the removal of the "undue burden" limit on the mandate to provide relay service. The committee also addressed the issue of closed captioning for televisions. Earlier legislation required public television to broadcast with closed captioning. During the House deliberations, Congressman Markey's subcommittee stipulated that all public service announcements partly- or fully-funded by the Federal Government must be produced with closed captioned text.

"The perpetuation of prejudice and discrimination against persons with mental disorders in a vehicle designed to end discrimination is sadly ironic."

--American Psychological Association

The Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance was the first of all House subcommittees to complete its action, on October 12, 1989. Subsequently, the Energy and Commerce Committee devoted several months to deliberating transportation provisions. The committee held the preponderance of jurisdiction over railroads and had absolute jurisdiction over Amtrak. It began its deliberations with the Senate bill, which required that all new rail cars had to be accessible, and mandated that at least one car per train had to be accessible within five years. Since Amtrak was standardized throughout the nation, the committee could be extraordinarily detailed about what accessibility meant for Amtrak. For example, the committee delineated distinctions between single- and bi-level cars. It also designed separate provisions for sleeping, dining, and passenger cars. For Amtrak, the Energy and Commerce Committee even developed a formula to determine precisely how many spaces had to be available for persons using wheelchairs, including space to store wheelchairs. Perhaps the most important decision coming out of this committee, however, was that it sustained the Senate's one-car-per-train rule and the stipulation that all new cars had to be accessible. This was significant because the Public Works and Transportation Committee shared partial jurisdiction over railroads, and wrestled with whether all cars had to be accessible.

"We in the House felt an obligation to . . . fine tune" the ADA "in a way the transit authorities could embrace" the act "and make it work."

--Roger Slagle

Although negotiating over transportation provisions was difficult, the most controversial and intense negotiations in the Energy and Commerce Committee had nothing to do with structural transportation accessibility. Members of the Energy and Commerce Committee were concerned that the ADA's protection of persons who were mentally ill could result in uncontrollable train disturbances, where train operators would be unable to ask meddlesome riders to leave. Consequently, their initial draft of the ADA excluded persons who were mentally ill from the definition of disability. This caused an uproar in the disability community. "Persons with mental disabilities, among all the disabled, have suffered the greatest stigmatization and resulting discrimination," said the American Psychological Association. "The perpetuation of prejudice and discrimination against persons with mental disorders in a vehicle designed to end discrimination is sadly ironic."

The committee ultimately removed the exclusion, but the issue came back up at mark-up. Congressman William E. Dannemeyer (R-CA) proposed an amendment that would have supplemented the established exclusion of compulsive gambling, kleptomania, and pyromania by prohibiting all "behavior disorders." Based upon his belief that the ADA was "a homosexual rights bill in disguise," his amendment also proposed the exclusion of anyone with a contagious or sexually transmitted disease. These proposals posed a major threat to the ADA, for they applied not just to transportation, but to the entire bill. Although the committee rejected the Dannemeyer amendment, these issues were only temporarily put to rest.

The Public Works and Transportation Committee held its hearings on the ADA before Energy and Commerce, on September 20 and 26, 1989. But it held its mark-up several weeks after the Energy and Commerce Committee, on April 3, 1990. For disability advocates, the Public Works and Transportation Committee was much easier to work with than the Energy and Commerce Committee, but it ultimately posed a significant threat to their objectives. Chairman Anderson was a strong supporter of the ADA and charged staff member Roger Slagle, whom he appointed to take the lead on the ADA, with a clear mission: "Get the people on the bus." Slagle was not a detached mediator; he strove for optimal accessibility. From the disability community, he worked especially with attorney Chai Feldblum, whom he described as "one of the brightest people I've ever worked with in my life." But Slagle had one major reservation: unwarranted litigation against transit authorities. Slagle said people on the House side referred to the Senate bill as the "we're-going-to-sue-your-ass" bill. They feared that under the Senate bill a person with a disability might be able to sue a transit authority simply because a lift-equipped bus was late. "We in the House felt an obligation to . . . fine tune" the ADA, said Slagle, "in a way the transit authorities could embrace [the act] and make it work."

The Chairman of the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation was Congressman Norman Y. Mineta (D-CA). Congressman Coelho, who was a close friend of Mineta's, vigorously lobbied Mineta to be more than a passive supporter of the ADA; Coelho wanted him to be an active advocate. The fact that Mineta was indebted to Coelho for crucial help on one of his own legislative endeavors helped persuade him. And Congressman Mineta came through: he was "absolutely wonderful," said Coelho.

Although there were strong advocates for the ADA on the Public Works and Transportation Committee, there was also a powerful counter-voice in Congressman Bud Shuster (R-PA). Shuster repeatedly referred to his mother, who was "a double amputee in a wheelchair," and how he "skinned my knuckles more times than I can count trying to jiggle her wheelchair through a door that should have been wider . . . or trying to lug a wheelchair up a set of stairs where there should have been a ramp." There was no reason, he thought, that she would ever want or need to get on a bus, and he outright opposed equipping all buses with lifts. Many persons in the disability community, however, thought Shuster was out of touch with their sentiments. Persons in wheelchairs did not want to be pushed around and transported; rather, they wanted to control their own mobility and travel as independently as possible--which required accessible vehicles.

The Public Works and Transportation Committee had jurisdiction over transit: that is, transportation used primarily for commuter purposes. One of the biggest issues the committee faced was whether to include a lift on every transit bus. Eastern Paralyzed Veterans of America (EPVA) attorney Jim Weisman, who served as a transportation expert for the disability community, was amazed that some members were opposed to putting lifts on buses. It seemed "ridiculous to me," he said, "because it was academic. . . . Transit authorities had just about given this up. [Everybody] who was anybody knew transit authorities knew that the handwriting was on the wall."

The alternative to equipping buses with lifts was providing paratransit service. Congressman Shuster emphasized that persons with disabilities in his district preferred paratransit over fixed-route buses. So might most people, given a chance to have door-to-door transportation. The problem with paratransit service was that its expenses were unlimited, whereas for fixed route systems the primary cost was a one-time lift installation. Fixed-route buses collected money with every ride; each ride on paratransit cost the operator substantial money. Consequently, paratransit service was unable to meet the demand of its clientele. Transit authorities such as APTA, as Weisman observed, were becoming convinced that it was more cost-effective for them to purchase lift-equipped buses and were thus very moderate in their reservations about the ADA. Members of Congress were the most vigorous opponents. Ultimately, however, the committee sided with its constituents who pushed for lift-equipped, fixed-route bus systems and a supplemental paratransit service for those unable to use standard service.

Debate about what to do with intercity bus services such as Greyhound was much more contentious. Senators had responded by removing the original lift mandate and requiring that a three-year study assess the most effective and cost-efficient accessibility. Greyhound and the ABA argued that people who could not manage the steps into an intercity bus should simply be carried onto the bus. The difference with intercity ("over-the-road") buses was that a lift potentially took away seats and luggage space. Companies such as Greyhound were in many cases the only transportation serving rural areas. They argued that the loss of revenue from lift-installation would necessitate reduced service areas, and that many people would thus be deprived of their only form of transportation. The disability community used the same evidence to make the opposite point: since buses were in some cases the only available form of transportation, it was imperative that persons with disabilities be able to use them. They also argued that it was unfair for Greyhound, which was struggling financially, to point to accessibility as the cause or potential cause of its problems. Ultimately, the committee agreed with the Senate's provision requiring a study and thereby delayed the final decision.

The Public Works and Transportation Committee's primary responsibility with respect to the ADA was bus transit, subways, paratransit, and intercity buses, but it had jurisdiction over rail systems operated by transit authorities. Thus, certain commuter rail routes--for example, from Baltimore to Washington--fell under its jurisdiction. This meant that two different committees had the opportunity to craft rail requirements. The bill the Public Works and Transportation Committee brought before the mark-up, like that of the Energy and Commerce Committee, endorsed the Senate requirements for one car per train, and accessibility for all new vehicles. But an amendment was introduced at the Public Works and Transportation Committee mark-up that removed the accessibility requirement for all new vehicles. Proponents of the amendment contended that trains should be approached like airplanes, where only designated seats, not the entire plane, had to be accessible. The amendment attracted a small number of Democrats whose districts had made little headway in rail accessibility. Combined with the votes of Republicans, who almost unanimously supported the amendment, these Democrats" votes helped give the amendment a majority. It was a significant defeat for the disability community, since the provision violated one of the community's main principles: accessibility for all new vehicles.

The matter was not, however, settled. The amendment created a jurisdictional conflict that had to be settled by House leadership, the House Parliamentarian, and the Rules Committee. Chairman Dingell characteristically and vigorously argued that his committee's jurisdiction should prevail. Democratic leadership on the Public Works and Transportation Committee, on the other hand, especially Congressman Mineta, subtly revealed to Congressman Hoyer and the House leadership that they supported the Energy and Commerce version of the ADA. To the relief of the disability community, the House Parliamentarian and the Rules Committee ruled in favor of Energy and Commerce.

PHASE III: JUDICIARY COMMITTEE

After surviving review by the first three committees--Education and Labor, Energy and Commerce, and Public Works and Transportation--the ADA's final committee hurdle was the Judiciary Committee. This final phase of the House committee process was also a symbolic one: the last chance for opponents of the bill to offer unrestricted amendments. Once the bill went to the House floor, the Rules Committee would allow only certain amendments for consideration. Similar to the Education and Labor Committee, where Subcommittee Chairman Major Owens effectively led the committee's deliberations, Don Edwards (D-CA), Chairman of the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, essentially took the lead in the Judiciary Committee's consideration of the ADA. Moreover, as with the Education and Labor Committee, Congressman Hoyer played a central role in shaping the Judiciary Committee's negotiations and Congressman Bartlett continued to represent the Republican party.

The Judiciary Committee held three hearings, on August 3, October 11, and October 12, 1989. The Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights met for mark-up on April 25, 1990. The full committee held mark-up sessions on May 1 and 2, at which time it reported the ADA favorably to the House, as amended.

One of the hottest issues for the Judiciary Committee, which had jurisdiction over portions of the employment and public accommodations titles, was remedies. Prior to the Judiciary Committee's consideration of the ADA, the Senate and the White House had reached a breakthrough compromise on the issue of remedies: the Senate agreed to restrict available employment and public accommodations remedies to those in the Civil Rights Act, which omitted punitive damages. As a result of this agreement, the Education and Labor Committee never even considered changing the available remedies. A crucial development during the Judiciary Committee's deliberations, however, made them a live issue once again.

On February 7, 1990, Senator Kennedy and Congressman Hawkins introduced the Civil Rights Act of 1990. This bill amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by allowing courts to award compensatory and punitive damages at jury trials, to persons who successfully proved they were victims of discrimination. Because the ADA merely incorporated the remedies of the Civil Rights Act by reference, this proposed change to the Civil Rights Act would also apply to the ADA. Representatives from the disability community contended that this was consistent with earlier agreements with the White House, that the principle all along had been parity with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, regardless of whether those provisions were strengthened or weakened over time.

The Bush administration, however, felt betrayed and argued that their negotiated agreement expressly excluded punitive damages from the bill. On March 12, The Washington Post reported rumors that President Bush might withdraw his endorsement of the bill if the ADA did not expressly limit its remedial provisions to injunctive relief, reinstatement, and back pay. That same night, Attorney General Richard Thornburgh wrote a letter to Congressman Steny Hoyer. He said the administration opposed the link to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and proposed that the conflict be resolved by specifying the current standards of the Act.

The most significant contribution of the Judiciary Committee concerned "site-specific" factors for the determination of "reasonable accommodation" and "readily achievable."

When the committee introduced an am- ended version of the ADA to the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights on April 25, it sided with the disability community and retained the cross-reference to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (R-WI), however, introduced an amendment to eliminate the reference. Some people with disabilities suggested giving up on the remedies issue in order to save the rest of the bill, but the disability community generally lobbied vigorously to oppose this and all other "weakening amendments." To the relief of disability activists, the Sensenbrenner amendment failed. Sensenbrenner tried to pass the amendment a second time when the full committee met on May 1 and 2, but it was voted down again. In its report on the bill, the Judiciary Committee argued that the Sensenbrenner amendment was "antithetical" to the very nature of the ADA. It also referred directly to the Civil rights Act of 1990 and stated that any changes there would be applied to the ADA. Sensenbrenner joined five colleagues in authoring "Additional Views" for the report, where they continued to insist on the need for the Sensenbrenner amendment. They also cryptically threatened that a failure to pass it might jeopardize the entire ADA.

The most significant contribution of the Judiciary Committee concerned "site-specific" factors for the determination of "reasonable accommodation" and "readily achievable" (see Appendix F). Discussions on the topic had begun in earnest between Congressmen Hoyer and Bartlett during the Education and Labor Committee's deliberations and continued throughout the House deliberations. For the most part, the Judiciary Committee introduced the same changes proposed by the Education and Labor Committee. But the Judiciary Committee rearranged the factors for clarity and for different emphasis. It was primarily concerned with avoiding a determination that sided either with the local facility or the covered entity. Rather, the committee stressed that, on a case-by-case and flexible basis, both entities should be evaluated. Moreover, it emphasized that the relationship between the parent company and the local facility should be taken into consideration.

The committee made many other changes, most of which were technicalities compared with earlier, more sweeping compromises. In addition to clarifying the cross-referencing on remedies and site-specific factors, the Judiciary Committee added a new section to the bill that encouraged alternative dispute resolution through reconciliation before moving to litigation. And it made technical changes to the interim standards of accessibility. The final amendment accepted by the Judiciary Committee was a package of six amendments introduced by Congressman Fish, based on negotiations that included the disability community, the White House, and Congressmen Hoyer and Bartlett. Essentially, three of the amendments came from the disability community, and three from the administration. For the administration, the committee added language clarifying: the meaning of "direct threat," the standards by which "anticipatory discrimination" were valid, and that an employer's view of what constituted "essential functions" would be considered by courts. For the disability community, the package included clarification about which entities were covered in the public accommodations title and what was meant by "commercial facilities." It also provided that places where exams were administered had to be accessible.

Additional amendments were introduced, but they failed. Two of these failed amendments--a proposal to cap an employer's obligation to provide accommodations at 10 percent of an employee's salary, and a proposal to enable employers to remove persons with contagious diseases, such as AIDS, from food handling positions--would reemerge on the House floor. On May 2, the Judiciary Committee concluded its deliberations by favorably reporting its version of the ADA to the full House.

Moving to the House Floor

The ADA proceeded rapidly to the House floor after the Judiciary Committee completed its work. On May 14 and 15, 1990, the four committees submitted their reports, which included four different drafts of the ADA. It was then the task of the Rules Committee to produce a bill that synthesized the four versions. A bipartisan staff working group collaborated to sort out the different texts. The only conflict was between the transportation committees over whether new rail vehicles had to be accessible. Otherwise, it was a matter, albeit a challenging one, of piecing everything together. The staff working group crafted a new bill, H.R. 4807, which they substituted for the text of H.R. 2273. On May 16, the Rules Committee submitted its own report that included the new version of H.R. 2273 and a resolution, H. Res. 394. This resolution provided that, at any subsequent time, the Speaker of the House could take up H.R. 2273, the Americans with Disabilities Act, for consideration on the House floor.

Floor deliberations are somewhat of a free-for-all in the Senate: a senator may introduce virtually any amendment, even one that is not germane to the bill, and also filibuster--dominating the floor for unlimited time. The House, by contrast, conducts its floor proceedings according to rules established by the Rules Committee. In the case of the ADA, H. Res. 394 submitted a modified closed rule, meaning that general debate would be restricted and that only specific amendments would be allowed for consideration. The resolution provided that at any time after adoption of the resolution the Speaker of the House could resolve the House into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for consideration of the ADA and the proposed amendments. There would be two hours of general debate: 30 minutes for each committee, split equally between majority and minority members. Eight amendments were approved for consideration.

On May 17, only one day after the Rules Committee presented its resolution, the House met to consider passage of the ADA. The first order of business was to accept the closed rule. Minority congressmen protested. Congressman Robert S. Walker (R-PA) called it a "totalitarian rule" and said the committee used "a process which is both undemocratic and . . . sad." Congressman Bill McCollum (R-FL) said the rule was "an abomination" and "ridiculous" and suggested that the lack of House activity that session provided plenty of time for free debate. Congressman Lynn Martin (R-IL) complained that only 8 of the 45 amendments proposed to the Rules Committee were accepted, and noted that a proposal to have an open rule was defeated on a strict party line vote. Congressman Newt Gingrich (R-GA) said the ADA was an "extraordinarily important bill" and that consideration of every amendment submitted to the Rules Committee was therefore appropriate. Congressmen in the majority, however, generally supported the rule and argued that allowing open debate would undermine all the agreements made in the committees and defeat the basic purpose of committee deliberations. As is customary, the House passed the rule on virtually a straight, party-line vote.

"We have worked closely with" businesses, "and adopted numerous amendments, to ensure that American business can work with the ADA."

--Congressman Steny Hoyer

Immediately following the vote, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole. Congressman Hoyer took the lead for ADA supporters throughout the deliberations and frequently entered debate to clarify various aspects of the ADA. The general debate provided members an opportunity to make basic statements about the virtues and problems of the bill, review the history of committee deliberations, and note key accomplishments. Hoyer drew special attention to how the ADA was "truly the product of thousands and thousands and thousands of people." Similarly, Congressman Owens thanked "all of the members of the community of people with disabilities, who 43 million strong raised their voices across the Nation, and it was their push, their sense of empowerment, that has brought us to where we are." Hoyer also emphasized how much business interests were taken into consideration: "We have worked closely with them, and adopted numerous amendments, to ensure that American business can work with the ADA."

Others, however, thought more work needed to be done. Congressman Bartlett was Congressman Hoyer's counterpart in coordinating the efforts to amend the ADA. Congressman McCollum said the issue was not whether to bestow civil rights, but how to "minimize costs to the employers while still doing that." Back and forth across the aisle, Democrats emphasized the bill's balance and the need to reject "weakening" amendments, and Republicans stressed the potential pitfalls of the bill and the need to fine tune it with further amendments.

The House considered four of the seven amendments on May 17. Two were noncontroversial. Congressman John J. LaFalce (D-NY), based on the Small Business Committee hearing he chaired, proposed postponing the time at which civil actions could be brought against a covered entity. Republicans and Democrats united in unanimous support. The House also approved, by voice vote, Congressman James V. Hansen's (R-UT) amendment to allow wheelchair use in wilderness areas.

Congressman Jim Olin's (D-VA) amendment, to impose a 10 percent salary cap on the amount of accommodations an employer had to provide an employee, was more contentious. The NFIB strongly endorsed the amendment, and Congressman McCollum called it "the small business amendment in this legislation." He suggested that a vote against it would be a vote against small business--a position no member was eager to take. The bill would have put a finite dollar cap on accommodations. But, according to ADA supporters, there were two main problems. First, as Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder (D-CO) said: "It is great for Donald Trump. It is lousy for the person who is cleaning up after Donald Trump." The amendment would mean that persons with similar disabilities would not be given individualized treatment--a central premise of the ADA. Rather, they would be grouped according to income level.

Second, as Congressman Bartlett stated forcefully, the amendment "would in fact be harmful both to those who are disabled and to the employers themselves." By setting a dollar cap, persons with disabilities might insist on 10 percent of their income as a mandatory level of accommodation, when much less might be needed. "The Olin amendment attempts to set a ceiling," said Bartlett, "but in fact it sets a floor." Members on both sides argued that they had the White House's support. Congressman Fish, on one hand, said the Bush administration had tried to negotiate a similar amendment at the committee level but concluded that the principle was unacceptable. Congressman Olin, on the other hand, said he had called the White House during the course of deliberations and was told the administration "very much favors" the amendment. Bartlett put an end to the discussion by declaring that the White House had no position. The final vote was close. The 32 members who did not vote could have passed the amendment, which failed 187 to 213. As with each of the contested amendments, votes split along party lines. Whereas 71 percent of Democrats voted no, 74 percent of Republicans voted yes.

The most controversial amendment to reach the floor was the Chapman amendment, which would enable employers to remove persons with contagious diseases, such as AIDS, from food handling positions. The issue of AIDS was not new. It had always been covered by the ADA. From the beginning, many organizations supported the bill precisely because it offered protection to persons with HIV and AIDS. Moreover, the provisions in the ADA that protected persons with AIDS essentially replicated what had already been settled in the Fair Housing Amendments Act. Nevertheless, the Chapman amendment posed a significant challenge to members, most of whom would have preferred the issue did not exist. By this time, in May, 1990, it appeared the ADA would pass; few wanted to stand in its way. But members also feared that being forced to vote on an "AIDS" amendment during an election year could be damaging: a perfect ten-second sound bite. Moreover, the Chapman amendment was precisely the kind of issue that could kill the ADA. It seemed to represent more than just concerns about contagious diseases: it looked like a way to stop the ADA in its tracks.

Congressman Jim Chapman (D-TX) led the debate in favor of his amendment. By having a Democrat such as Chapman lead the charge, supporters of the amendment might counter the perception that it was a Republican amendment and enlist the support of more Democrats. For similar reasons, the lead floor opponent of the amendment was Republican Congressman Fish. Arguments in support of the amendment rested on the claim that customers who knew that food handlers at a given establishment had AIDS would discontinue taking their business there. "The reality is that many Americans would refuse to patronize any food establishment if an employee were known to have a communicable disease," said Chapman. He also argued that the "hospitality" industry was the best employer of persons with disabilities and that it would be foolish to harm that source of employment. Congressman Douglas, who introduced the same amendment in the Judiciary Committee, supported it "because perception is reality." Significantly, Chapman, Douglas and others admitted that there was no known evidence that AIDS could be transmitted through food handling. The amendment was needed not to stop the spread of AIDS, they said, but to protect businesses from fears and prejudice.

"We should not make exceptions to the principle in ADA that employment decisions should not be based on myth or stereotype. Mr Chairman, the Congress must not enshrine ignorance and prejudice in the law."

--Congressman Hamilton Fish

For ADA supporters, as Congressman Ted Weiss (D-NY) said, "The Chapman amendment flies in the face of the very purpose of the ADA" by institutionalizing irrational discrimination. Congressman Jim McDermott (D-WA), who was also a physician, said he would support the amendment if it protected public health. "But the amendment is not about the reality of contagious disease," he explained. "It is about the fear of contagious disease." The amendment established public policy in contradistinction to known facts "in deliberate deference to the fears and prejudice of others." This, he said, was "bad medicine, bad science, bad public policy." Congressmen Don Edwards (D-CA) and Steny Hoyer likened the amendment to arguments used against the Civil Rights Act: that "white customers would not eat in restaurants where black Americans were served," as Edwards put it. Hoyer simply called it "the Jim Crow amendment of 1990."

Largely due to the efforts of Congressman Hoyer, the Bush administration entered the Chapman debate by issuing formal statements on the medical facts of AIDS and food handling. Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), and Dr. William L. Roper, Director of the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), wrote letters on the issue. They flatly repudiated the notion that persons diagnosed with HIV or AIDS posed a health risk in the context of food handling.

Congressman Fish brought the floor debate to a close by pleading: "We should not make exceptions to the principle in ADA that employment decisions should not be based on myth or stereotype. Mr. Chairman, the Congress must not enshrine ignorance and prejudice in the law." Congressman Chapman, however, prevailed. In a strikingly close vote--199 to 187--the House supported the exclusion of persons with contagious and communicable diseases from food handling. The 46 members who abstained from voting easily could have swayed the tally. Although it was not as pronounced as in some of the other amendments, this issue also tended to split on party lines. Whereas 80 percent of Republicans supported the measure, 67 percent Democrats opposed it.

The Chapman amendment was the last of the day. The disability community, which made a commitment to staying united no matter what the cost, had encountered a significant defeat. Persons with HIV and AIDS, they believed, were equally entitled to civil rights protections. They also feared that allowing one group to fall prey to prejudice might establish a trend. Would persons with mental illness, for whom exclusions had also been proposed, be next? Where would it stop? More than anything else, it seemed inconceivable to embrace a nondiscrimination law that patently enshrined discrimination based on irrational fear.

Although the Chapman amendment was the first major defeat for the disability community in congressional floor deliberations, three more threatening amendments were left for consideration on May 22, 1990. Two concerned transportation. The Lipinski amendment was a repeat of the amendment passed by the Public Works and Transportation Committee and overruled by the Rules Committee: it rejected the requirement that all new rail vehicles had to be accessible. William O. Lipinski (D-IL) argued that his amendment provided better accessibility and did not weaken the ADA: it would guarantee space according to demand. But most members and spectators viewed it as undermining one of the basic premises of the ADA: that all new buildings and vehicles will be accessible, that society will not consciously build obstacles to persons with disabilities. Moreover, they pointed out that the Lipinski amendment would mean that spaces accessible for wheelchairs would be confined to one car, providing a sort of "cattle car" effect. The White House chose not to take a stand on the issue. The amendment failed decisively, with 75 percent of members voting against it.

The second transportation amendment came from Congressman Shuster. With the Rules Committee having supported the principle of all new transit buses being lift-equipped, Shuster proposed an alternative. He suggested that the Secretary of Transportation should be allowed to waive the requirements of accessible vehicles for urban areas of less than 200,000, or in non-urban areas, provided that the community designed an alternative based on input from persons with disabilities. Shuster was concerned that the lift mandate would be implemented at the expense of paratransit. But Congressman Mineta's argument, that "local option simply does not work as a national policy," prevailed. Democrats tended to side with Mineta, and Republicans with Shuster. But, overall, the disability community won with a favorable margin: 64 percent of the House opposed the amendment.

The final amendment taken up by the House was a revisit of the Sensenbrenner amendment: restricting remedies to those currently stated in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The basic argument on behalf of the amendment was that the potential to add punitive damages through the Civil Rights Act of 1990 represented a violation of the negotiated agreement with the White House. Congressman Bartlett, speaking in favor of the amendment, said it "simply codifies" what the Education and Labor Committee reported in principle. Although representatives of the disability community felt all along that the principle was parity, representatives of the administration and many Republicans felt that the compromise was a fixed reference to the Civil Rights Act, and that they therefore had been double-crossed. Congressman Sensenbrenner also expressed the widespread fear that the ADA would lead to excessive litigation and that the availability of punitive damages would do nothing but encourage adversarial law suits. The Bush administration expressly supported this amendment.

"You have lesser rights if you have lesser remedies."

--Congresswoman Pat Schroeder

Opponents, however, thought that this amendment, like the Chapman amendment, struck at the very essence of the ADA. The philosophical basis of the ADA was the Civil Rights Act of 1964--that persons with disabilities should share the same civil rights protections as those possessed by other disadvantaged groups. To provide persons with disabilities with a different standard of remedies was discriminatory, they said. Congressman Dan Glickman (D-KS) conceded that there might be legitimate reasons for excluding punitive damages from civil rights laws, but said it was "unfair to lock the disabled into a lesser set of remedies." As Congresswoman Schroeder said: "you have lesser rights if you have lesser remedies." Congressman Bruce A. Morrison (D-CT) argued that it was an "abomination" to "plant the seeds of . . . discriminatory treatment before the courts, discriminatory treatment before the law," in a bill expressly designed to prohibit discrimination.

The voting results for this amendment were the most strictly partisan of all the amendments. Overall, the House rejected the amendment by a narrow margin of 54 percent. Democrats, however, opposed the amendment with an 81 percent majority, while Republicans supported the amendment with an 86 percent majority. After the vote on the Sensenbrenner amendment, the House Committee on the Whole reported the bill back to the full House for a final vote. Although no member requested a second vote on any of the amendments, Congressman Tom DeLay (R-TX) exercised his right to offer a motion to recommit the bill back to the Rules Committee for consideration. He proposed the committee consider two further amendments: one giving employers more latitude in evaluating drug and alcohol history in employment decisions, and another applying the entirety of the ADA to the executive and judicial branches. But the House rejected the motion with a 66 percent majority. As with the other votes, this decision split largely on party lines: 96 percent of Democrats opposed the amendment; 78 percent of Republicans supported it. After the DeLay motion was defeated, the House turned immediately to a recorded vote on the ADA. Both parties passed the bill overwhelmingly. Of the 423 members voting, 403 (95 percent) supported the ADA. The ADA was now destined for passage, but still more challenges lay ahead.