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Significance:
Aug 14, 2008
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: FIN Finding
Ineffective Corrective Actions on the Equipment Clearance Order Process
The team identified a finding involving ineffective corrective actions for the equipment clearance order process. Despite the identification of numerous related failures of the equipment clearance order process in various significant conditions adverse to quality condition reports and recent audit reports, the licensee had not performed an effective overall assessment of the equipment clearance order/work process control to determine the extent of the condition and therefore, had not implemented effective corrective actions to address the underlying causes.
The team determined that the ineffective corrective actions associated with the equipment clearance order process, which continues to result in equipment clearance order errors affecting personnel and equipment safety, was a performance deficiency. The team determined that the finding was more than minor because it affected the Initiating Events cornerstone objective to limit those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The team evaluated the finding using the Phase 1 worksheet in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," and determined the finding to have very low safety significance because: it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would be unavailable; it did not contribute to the likelihood of a loss-of-coolant accident; and it did not increase the likelihood of a fire or flooding. This issue has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance, specifically, the work practices aspect, in that, the licensee failed to adequately define and communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance and personnel following procedures. [H.4(b)]
Inspection Report# : 2008009 (pdf)
Significance: Jun 28, 2008
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Failure to evaluate and/or Document Multiple Boric Acid Leaks with Changed Conditions
The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, for failure to follow Procedure 0PGP03-ZE-0133, “Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program,” Revision 0 and Revision 1, which resulted in the licensee not re-evaluating changes to the material condition of plant equipment. On February 26, 2008, in preparation for Unit 1 Refueling Outage 1RE14, the inspectors identified boric acid deposits that appeared brown in color on spent fuel pool Valve 1-FC-0010B. Additional examples were identified by both the licensee and the inspectors where a changed condition was not re-evaluated. These examples point to multiple examples of the licensee failing to follow the established procedure for boric acid corrosion. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 08-8059.
The finding is more than minor because if the failure to ensure that the original assumptions remain valid when the leakage type or color changes continued, then unevaluated degradation of safety-related components could continue and lead to a more significant safety concern. The finding is associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of human performance and it affects the cornerstone objective of limiting those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance based on Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Phase 1 worksheet of the Significance Determination Process because it did not result in exceeding the Technical Specification limit for reactor coolant system leakage or affect other mitigating systems resulting in a loss of safety function. In addition, this finding had human performance crosscutting aspects associated with resources, in that, station personnel had a high number of backlog items related to the boric acid corrosion control program resulting in personnel not following the timelines established by the procedure [H.2(a)].
Inspection Report# : 2008003 (pdf)
Significance: Jan 22, 2008
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Failure to Specify Setpoint Calibration Limits in Relay Setpoint Calculations
The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," having very low safety significance for the failure to specify in a design calculation allowable relay setpoint tolerances. Specifically, the licensee failed to specify and verify in the relay setpoint calculations the relay setpoint tolerances used in the calibration test procedures. The issue was documented in the corrective action program as Condition Record 07-15443.
The finding was determined to be more than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of "Design Control." It impacts the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events and prevent undesirable consequences. The failure to verify the effects of relay setpoint tolerances on relay coordination time intervals could have resulted in a loss-of-relay coordination and could lead to either a loss of power to safety-related components or lead to a potential for compromising other equipment on a single fault that the relay was designed to isolate. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, “Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations,” Phase 1 screening, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because the condition did not represent a loss of safety function of a system or a train.
Inspection Report# : 2007007 (pdf)
Significance: Jan 22, 2008
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Manual Loads not Considered for Fuel Oil Storage Tank Sizing Calculation
The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," having very low safety significance for the failure to include all potential loads in the standby diesel generator fuel oil sizing calculation. Specifically, the licensee did not account for increased standby diesel generator fuel oil usage resulting from the addition of manual electrical loads during the 7-day mission run time. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program as Condition Record 07-15592. The licensee subsequently demonstrated that the spent fuel pool cooling pumps would be the only additional manual loads actually used during the 7 days of operation in the bounding design basis scenario and that there were additional conservative assumptions in the sizing calculation to demonstrate sufficient margin.
The finding was determined to be more than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of "Design Control." It impacts the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events and prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, “Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations,” Phase 1 screening, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality.
Inspection Report# : 2007007 (pdf)
Significance: Jan 22, 2008
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Failure to Use Correct Design Inputs in Determination of the Weak Link for the Auxiliary Feedwater System Outside Containment Isolation Motor Operated Valves
The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria III, "Design Control," of very low safety significance for the failure to translate design basis information into specifications and procedures. Specifically, a non-conservative system pressure was used as an input to an engineering design calculation for the auxiliary feedwater outside containment isolation valves. This finding has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Record 07-15455.
The finding was determined to be more than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of "Design Control." It impacts the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events and prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, “Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations,” Phase 1 screening, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent a loss safety function of a system or a train.
Inspection Report# : 2007007 (pdf)
Significance: Jan 22, 2008
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Surveillance Procedure Lacked Check for Timing of Chiller Loading on the Bus
The team identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.E.11, having very low safety significance for the licensee’s failure to adequately perform the technical specification surveillance requirement. Specifically, the licensee failed to verify the loading times of the essential chillers in order to verify the automatic load sequence timer was operable. This issue was entered into the licensee’s corrective action program as Condition Records 07 14903 and 07-14959.
The finding was determined to be more than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of "Design Control." It impacts the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events and prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, “Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations,” Phase 1 screening, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent a loss of safety function of a system or a train.
Inspection Report# : 2007007 (pdf)
Significance: Jan 22, 2008
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Inadequate Test Program for 125V DC Molded Case Circuit Breakers
The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, "Test Control," having very low safety significance for the licensee’s failure to implement a test program to assure that all installed safety-related molded case circuit breakers will perform satisfactorily in service. Specifically, the licensee had not adequately exercised or subjected to periodic testing all of the 125V dc molded case circuit breakers since initial plant operation. The licensee entered the finding into their corrective action program as Condition Record 07-15817.
The finding was determined to be more than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of "Equipment Performance.” It impacts the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, capability of systems that respond to initiating events and prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, “Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations,” Phase 1 screening, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in a loss of safety function of a system or a train.
Inspection Report# : 2007007 (pdf)
Significance: Jan 22, 2008
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Failure to Incorporate Instrument Uncertainties into Surveillance Requirements for Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.5.2 (Specifically Surveillance Requirement 4.5.2.f)
The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria III, "Design Control," of very low safety significance for the failure to adequately translate design basis information into specifications and procedures. Specifically, measurement instrument uncertainties were not included in the determination of minimum allowed high head safety injection pump and low head safety injection pump developed head values used during periodic technical specification surveillance testing. The licensee entered the finding into their corrective action program as Condition Record 07-15752.
The finding was determined to be more than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of "Design Control." It impacts the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events and prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, “Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations,” Phase 1 screening, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in a loss of safety function of a system or a train.
Inspection Report# : 2007007 (pdf)
Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Last modified : November 26, 2008