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Significance:
Mar 31, 2008
Identified By: Self-Revealing
Item Type: FIN Finding
Inadequate Installation of SSF DG Field Flash Relay Cover (Section 1R19)
A self-revealing finding (FIN) was identified for failure to implement self-checking during Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) diesel generator (DG) field flash relay cover reinstallation, resulting in a failure of the relay during post maintenance testing and subsequent loss of the electronic governor.
The inspectors determined that the licensee’s failure to correctly install the SSF DG field flash relay cover was a performance deficiency. The finding was considered to be more than minor because it affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green), based on the Phase 1 screening criteria found in MC 0609, Appendix A, Attachment 1, in that the additional 15.6 hours of SSF unavailability resulting from the deficiency was less than the TS allowed outage time. Additionally, the Oconee Phase 2 pre-solved table for exposure times of less than three days yields a Green result for the SSF DG. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of human error prevention techniques [H.4.a], as described in the work practices component of the human performance cross-cutting area. (Section1R19)
Inspection Report# : 2008002 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 14, 2008
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Inadequate Design Control in the Translation of Design Basis Information into Procedure for Draining and Nitrogen Purging the RCS (Section 1R21.2.2)
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a
non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control.
Specifically, the licensee failed to verify the applicability of design basis information,
related to critical vortex height to assure adequate low pressure injection (LPI) pump
suction conditions, before translating that information into the shutdown operations
procedure for draining the reactor coolant system.
This finding is greater than minor because if left uncorrected, the finding would
become a more significant safety concern. In particular, the station routinely uses
older calculations, test information, and analyses to establish operator action or
alarm set points, support operability determinations, or change the design of the
plant. If the applicability of that information is not verified for the system
configuration and conditions under review, the quality of that engineering product
could be compromised, resulting in a significant safety concern. The finding was
determined to be of very low significance, via Manual Chapter (MC) 0609, Appendix
G, Attachment 1, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process (SDP),
Phase 1 because it did not significantly degrade the station capability to recover
decay heat removal. The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting area of
problem identification and resolution, specifically with respect to corrective action,
because the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate the previous similar finding in the
2006 Oconee Component Design Bases Inspection (CDBI) such that the resolution
adequately addressed causes and extent of condition (MC 0305, aspect P.1.c).
[Section 1R21.2.2]
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Significance: Mar 14, 2008
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Inadequate Verification of Local Manual Operating Capability for EFW Flow Control Valves (Section 1R21.2.6)
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a
NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control. Specifically, the
licensee failed to establish measures to verify the design capability for local manual
handwheel operation of the emergency feedwater (EFW) flow control air operated valves (AOVs). Local manual operation was an alternate method of controlling EFW
flow specified in station emergency procedures.
The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the design control
attribute of the Mitigating System Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective
to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to
initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was of very low
safety significance since it did not result in a loss of system safety function.
Specifically, the licensee performed a technical evaluation during the inspection
which demonstrated that a plant operator would be able to successfully cycle the
valves using the manual handwheel. [Section 1R21.2.6]
Inspection Report# : 2008006 (pdf)
Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.
Last modified : November 26, 2008