UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4005

May 16, 2005

Joseph E. Venable
Vice President Operations
Waterford 3
Entergy Operations, Inc.
17265 River Road
Killona, LA 70066-0751

SUBJECT: WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000382/2005002

Dear Mr. Venable:

On April 7, 2005, the NRC completed an inspection at your Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on April 21, 2005, with you and other members of your staff.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selected examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has identified an issue that was evaluated under the risk significance determination process as having very low safety significance (Green). The NRC has also determined that a violation is associated with this issue. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VI.A of the Enforcement Policy. These findings are described in the subject inspection report. If you contest the subject or severity of this noncited violation, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas 76011; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, facility.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

/RA/

William B. Jones, Chief
Project Branch E
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket: 50-382
License: NPF-38

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SISP Review Completed: _WBJ__ ADAMS: / Yes ☐ No Initials: __WBJ____
/ Publicly Available ☐ Non-Publicly Available ☐ Sensitive / Non-Sensitive

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RIV:RI/DRP/E	SRI:DRP/E	PE/DRP/C	C:DRS/PSB	C:DRS/EB
GFLarkin	MCHay	RVAzua	MPShannon	JAClark
E - WBJones	***NA***	***/RA/***	***/RA/***	***/RA/***
5/16/05	5/ /05	5/12/05	5/5/05	5/6/05

C:DRS/OB	C:DRS/PEB	C:DRP/E	
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV

Docket No.:	50-382
License No.:	NPF-38
Report No.:	50-382/05-002
Licensee:	Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:	Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3
Location:	Hwy. 18 Killona, Louisiana
Dates:	January 1 through April 7, 2005
Inspectors:	M. C. Hay, Senior Resident Inspector R. V. Azua, Acting Senior Resident Inspector G. F. Larkin, Acting Senior Resident Inspector P. J. Elkmann, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
Approved By:	W. B. Jones, Chief, Project Branch E
ATTACHMENTS:	Supplemental Information

Enclosure

CONTENTS

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR05000382/2005-002; 01/01-04/07/2005; Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3; Identification and Resolution of Problems.

The report covered a 14-week period of inspection by resident inspectors and a regional emergency preparedness inspector. The inspectors identified one Green finding. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process." Findings for which the significance determination process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.

A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green. The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for the failure to implement effective corrective actions to prevent recurrence for a significant condition adverse to quality affecting operability of the essential chillers. Specifically, on multiple occasions the essential chillers have failed to function as required due to cycle timer switch failure. Essential chiller malfunction could result in elevated chilled water system temperature used to cool areas containing safety significant equipment.

This finding was more than minor in significance because it affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability of systems that respond to initiating events and would become a more significant condition if left uncorrected. The inspectors utilized NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix A, Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, dated December 1, 2004, for Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Cornerstones to assess the safety significance. The finding was determined to be of very low risk significance because, for each essential chiller malfunction, the affected train was inoperable for less than the Technical Specification allowed outage time. A problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspect was identified for the failure to correct the condition which resulted in multiple timer failures (Section 4OA2).

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

None

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status: The plant was operated at approximately 100 percent power from January 1 through April 7, 2005, except when reactor power was reduced to approximately 88 percent on February 23, 2005, to conduct high-pressure turbine valve testing.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed a review of Entergy's preparation for cold weather including a review of plant procedures, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and the corrective action program to ensure the weather readiness of safety-related and risk significant systems. The inspectors also walked down portions of the ultimate heat sink, emergency feedwater system, nitrogen accumulators, and main steam and main feedwater systems to ensure that the cold weather protection features were sufficient for their safe shutdown functions and accident mitigation, and that operator staffing would ensure the readiness of these systems.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)

.1 Partial System Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed the following three partial system equipment alignment inspections during this inspection period. The inspectors performed a walkdown of accessible portions of these systems assessing material condition, housekeeping issues, and system configuration:

- On January 16, 2005, the inspectors walked down the mechanical and electrical components of a critical portion of auxiliary component cooling system Train B. The inspectors considered whether the system was properly aligned as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and Technical Specifications. This inspection focused on verifying that system valve and electrical breaker alignments were appropriate and that system instrumentation was both available and functional. The walkdown was conducted using Operating Procedure OP-002-001, "Auxiliary Component Cooling Water," Revision 13. The inspectors reviewed the auxiliary component cooling system design requirements in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report with the installed system to assess the system’s ability to provide water to containment when required for safety-related mitigation operations.

- On March 9, 2005, the inspectors performed a partial equipment alignment inspection of emergency diesel generator system Train B while planned repairs were being performed on the other redundant train. A review of select maintenance work orders and corrective action documents was performed to assess the material condition and performance of emergency diesel generator Train A. System configuration was assessed using Operating Procedure OP-009-002, "Emergency Diesel Generator," Revision 18. A walkdown of accessible portions of the system was performed to assess material condition, such as system leaks and housekeeping issues, that could adversely affect system operability.

- On March 24, 2005, the inspectors performed a partial equipment alignment inspection of the mechanical and electrical components of containment spray system Train B while planned repairs were being performed on the other redundant train. A review of select maintenance work orders and corrective action documents was performed to assess the material condition and performance of emergency diesel generator Train A. The inspectors performed the inspection using Operating Procedure OP-009-001, "Containment Spray," Revision 11.

b. Findings

No Findings of significance were identified.

.2 Complete System Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a complete equipment alignment inspection of the emergency feedwater system. A walk down of the mechanical and electrical components in the system was performed to verify that the system was configured and operated in accordance with operating procedures. The inspectors reviewed the system design requirements in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report to verify the system's ability to perform its safety function for design-basis events. The inspectors reviewed applicable design documentation and selected condition reports to verify that degraded conditions were identified at the appropriate threshold and that corrective actions were adequate and implemented in a timely manner.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

.1 Routine Fire Protection Inspections

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted six inspections to assess whether Entergy had implemented a fire protection program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within the plant, effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capabilities, and maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition.

The following areas were inspected:

- Fire Zone TGB 15, TGB 40, RAB Roof East and West, and RAB 1A on January 11, 2005
- Fire Zone RAB 2, 17, 18, 23, 32, 37, and 38 on January 18, 2005
- Fire Zone RAB 1A, 2, 33, 35, 36, and Cooling Tower B on February 3, 2005
- Fire Zone RAB 16, 19, 20, and 22 on February 16, 2005
- Fire Zone RAB 1B, 1C, 1D, 8A, 8B, 8C, 11, 12, and 13 on March 6, 2005
- Fire Zone RAB 3A, 30, 31, and 39 on March 16, 2005

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification (71111.11)

a. Inspection Scope

On March 24, 2005, the inspectors observed a licensed operator simulator training examination. During the examination, the inspectors evaluated the operator's ability to recognize, diagnose, and respond to: failed instruments (steam generator number 1 level and atmospheric dump valve controller setpoint); an automatic reactor trip signal without a coincident reactor trip; a small break loss-of-coolant accident on the number 1 hot leg; failure of a containment spray valve to open; and a high-pressure safety injection pump trip on overcurrent. The inspectors observed and evaluated the following areas:

- Understanding and interpreting annunciator and alarm signals
- Diagnosing events and conditions based on signals or readings
- Understanding plant systems
- Use and adherence of Technical Specifications
- Crew communications including command and control
- The crew's and evaluator's critiques

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12)

a. Inspection Scope

During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed licensee implementation of the Maintenance Rule. The inspectors considered the characterization, safety significance, performance criteria, and the appropriateness of goals and corrective actions. The inspectors assessed Entergy's implementation of the Maintenance Rule to the requirements outlined in 10 CFR 50.65, and Regulatory Guide 1.160, "Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 2. The inspectors reviewed the following two components and/or systems:

- High pressure safety injection
- Chemical volume and control system

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation (71111.13)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed risk assessments for planned or emergent maintenance activities to determine if Entergy met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for assessing and managing any increase in risk from these activities. The following four risk evaluations were reviewed:

- On January 10-20, 2005, for emerged maintenance to correct control element drive mechanism control system logic power circuitry

- On February 17, 2005, during planned maintenance on the startup Transformer A motor-operated disconnect switch concurrent

- On February 4-17, 2005, for emerged maintenance to correct main generator potential transformer Phase C degraded voltage output

- On March 6-10, 2005, for planned inspection and maintenance outage for both emergency diesel Generators A and B

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of four operability evaluations to verify that they were sufficient to justify continued operation of a system or component. The inspectors considered that, although equipment was potentially degraded, the operability evaluation provided adequate justification that the equipment could still meet its Technical Specification, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and design-bases requirements and that the potential risk increase contributed by the degraded equipment was thoroughly evaluated. The following four evaluations were reviewed:

- Operability evaluation addressing the automatic restart of reactor auxiliary building normal ventilation Train B following an engineered safety features actuation system test signal and its impact on emergency diesel generator fuel oil consumption (Condition Report CR-WF3-2005-0208)

- Operability evaluation addressing a small leak in a sample line off the bottom of the volume control tank in the chemical and volume control system (Condition Report CR-WF3-2005-0883)

- Operability evaluation addressing the unplanned simultaneous start of dry cooling tower Fans 5 through 12 following an engineered safety feature actuation test signal (Condition Report CR-WF3-2005-1104)

- Operability evaluation addressing deficiencies associated with the calibration and operation of emergency diesel generator Trains A and B differential relays (Condition Report CR-WF3-2005-0758)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing (71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed postmaintenance tests to verify system operability and functional capabilities. The inspectors considered whether testing met design and licensing bases, Technical Specifications, and licensee procedural requirements. The inspectors reviewed the testing results for the following five components:

- Nitrogen accumulator number 8 following a planned maintenance outage on January 26, 2005

- Auxiliary feedwater pump following planned 18-month maintenance on February 15, 2005

- Emergency diesel generator B following the completion of the 2-year inspection and maintenance effort on March 5, 2005

- Containment spray containment isolation Valve CS-125B following solenoid replacement on March 24, 2005

- Fuel oil storage tanks A and B discharge header piping and valves, following installation of bypass lines and valves around EGF-105A(B) and EGF-106A(B) (Emergency Diesel Generator FOST outlet and crosstie valves respectively) on March 4 and 11, 2005

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed or reviewed the following six surveillance tests to ensure the systems were capable of performing their safety function and to assess their operational readiness. Specifically, the inspectors considered whether the following surveillance tests met Technical Specifications, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and licensee's procedural requirements:

- Surveillance Procedure OP-903-046, "Emergency Feedwater Pump Operability Check," Revision 15, performed on January 24, 2005. This surveillance verified operability of emergency feedwater Pump B.

- Surveillance Procedure OP-903-046, "Emergency Feedwater Pump Operability Check," Revision 15, performed on January 24, 2005. This surveillance verified operability of emergency feedwater Train B and containment and flow control valves.

- Surveillance Procedure OP-903-006, "Reactor Trip Circuit Breaker Test," Revision 8, performed on February 3, 2005. This quarterly surveillance manually tripped four reactor trip circuit breaker channels, one channel at a time, to functionally verify that each channel is able to be tripped.

- Surveillance Procedure OP-903-068, "Emergency Diesel Generator and Subgroup Relay Operability Verification," Revision 13, performed on February 14, 2005. This surveillance tested the functional capability of emergency diesel generator Train A to start, load (4.2 MW), and run.

- Surveillance Procedure OP-903-024, "Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance," Revision 13, performed on March 7, 2005. This surveillance is used to determine the rate of identified and unidentified reactor coolant system leakage during steady-state operations required by Entergy's Technical Specifications reactor coolant system leak rate. In addition, the inspectors evaluated Entergy's accumulated results for both the months of February and March 2005 against the criteria set forth in Manual Chapter 2515, Appendix D, Attachment 1, "Assessing Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Unidentified Leakage Rate Trend." Trends that resulted in Entergy entering one or more of the actions levels were found to have been appropriately evaluated and dispositioned.

- Surveillance Procedure STA-001-005, "Leakage Testing of Air and Nitrogen Accumulator for Safety Related Valves," Revision 6, performed on April 4, 2005. This surveillance performs a pressure decay test of nitrogen accumulator number 4 to verify that accumulator number 4 could provide a 10-hour air supply to safety-related loads following a loss of instrument air service.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector performed an in-office review of Revision 31 to the Waterford 3 Emergency Plan, implemented December 29, 2004. This revision:

- Added details on the review of emergency action levels by offsite authorities,

- Revised the description of the radiochemistry counting room to more accurately describe its arrangement,

- Added details regarding the training of station emergency response personnel,

- Added details regarding the conduct of remedial exercises,

- Added details regarding the conduct of emergency exercises with nonparticipating offsite authorities,

- Added details regarding the conduct of ingestion pathway exercises, and

- Added Memoranda of Agreement with two additional helicopter services.

The revision was compared to its previous revision, to the criteria of NUREG-0654, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and

Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, and to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 50.54(q) to determine if the revision decreased the effectiveness of the plan.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)

a. Inspection Scope

On February 17, 2005, the inspectors reviewed the drill scenario and observed activities in the simulated control room and the emergency operations facility. The drill scenario simulated equipment failures, a site evacuation, a reactor core transient with leakage of reactor coolant, and the release of radioactive material offsite. The inspectors evaluated performance by focusing on the risk-significant activities of emergency classification, notification and protective action recommendations. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the drill critiques and the resolution of identified performance weaknesses.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)

.1 Annual Sample Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed implementation of Entergy's corrective action process involving multiple failures of essential chiller cycle timer switch.

b. Findings

Introduction. The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for the failure to implement effective corrective actions to prevent recurrence for a significant condition adverse to quality affecting operability of the essential chillers. Specifically, on multiple occasions the essential chillers have failed to function as required due to cycle timer switch failure. Essential chiller malfunction could potentially result in elevated chilled water system temperature used to maintain safety significant space cooling cool enough to prevent equipment failure during accident conditions.

Description. The inspectors reviewed Condition Report CR-WF3-2005-0346 pertaining to the failure of essential Chiller B to maintain local chill water outlet temperature less than the

system design temperature of 42EF. The essential chillers each supply water at less than 42EF and 510 gpm to the chilled water system. The chilled water system furnishes chilled water for space cooling purposes and rejects heat through the component cooling water system to the ultimate heat sink. The chilled water system consists of two 100 percent capacity trains, each consisting of an essential chiller and a chill water pump. In addition, a third essential chiller (A/B) can be aligned to tither the A or B train. The cycle timer functions to gradually load the chiller compressor by moving the guide vanes in a stepped fashion (open for 1 second, then pause for 3 seconds, etc.). This prevents the essential chillers from loading too quickly and tripping on electrical overloads.

On January 29, 2005, the essential chill water Loop B was declared inoperable due to essential Chiller B not maintaining outlet temperature below 42EF. Locally, essential Chiller B guide vanes were found to be in a minimum open position. Shortly afterward, the guide vanes changed to the full open position. After a few minutes, the guide vanes began changing state from its full open position to its minimum open position. Essential Chiller B began surging for the next 10 to 15 minutes. Subsequent troubleshooting determined that the chiller cycle timer was malfunctioning. The cycle timer was replaced and essential Chiller B was retested satisfactorily. The inspectors found that three previous cycle timer failures occurred, which resulted in the unavailablility of the essential chillers on June 11, 2001, March 23, 2002, and on May 5, 2004. Entergy treated failures on June 11, 2001, and March 23, 2002, as a “broke and fix” repair. No failure analysis was performed nor were any corrective actions specified to prevent recurrence. On April 25, 2002, Entergy initiated an engineering request to install a more robust cycle timer in the essential chiller. However, these new, more robust, cycle timers were not scheduled to be installed until 2004, and that activity was postponed. Additional cycle timer failures occurred on May 5, 2003, and January 29, 2005, prior to Entergy finally installing a more robust replacement cycle timer on February 14, 2005. The inspectors determined that Entergy’s corrective actions to prevent the cycle timer failure from affecting the operability of the main feedwater isolation valves have not been effective and have repeatedly failed to prevent recurrence of this significant condition adverse to quality.

Analysis. The deficiency associated with this finding was the failure to establish corrective measures to prevent recurrence of a significant condition adverse to quality. Specifically, corrective actions established to address cycle timer failures were not effectively implemented and failed to prevent recurrence resulting in the essential chillers being declared inoperable. The inspectors determined that the issue was more than minor in significance because it affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability of systems that respond to initiating events. The inspectors utilized NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process [SDP], Appendix A, SDP Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, dated December 1, 2004, for Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Cornerstones to assess the safety significance. The finding was determined to be of very low risk significance because, in each essential chiller malfunction, the affected train was inoperable for less than the Technical Specification allowed outage time. A problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspect was identified for the failure to correct the condition which resulted in multiple timer failures.

Enforcement. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," requires in part, that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. The failure to establish corrective measures to prevent recurrence of essential chiller failures is a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. Because the failure to prevent recurrence was of very low safety significance and has been entered into Entergy's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-WF3-2005-0346, this violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000382/2005002-01 Failure to Prevent a Reoccurrence Cycle Timer Failure in the Essential Chiller.

4OA6 Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

.1 On March 21, 2005, the inspector presented the inspection results to Mr. J. Lewis, Manager, Emergency Preparedness, and other members of his staff who acknowledged the findings. The inspector confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

.2 The resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. J Venable and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on April 21, 2005. Entergy acknowledged the findings presented.

The inspectors asked Entergy whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

S. Anders, Superintendent, Plant Security
J. Brawley, ALARA Coordinator, Radiation Protection
N. Brumfield, Manager, Quality Assurance
L. Dauzat, Supervisor, Radiation Protection
R. Dodds, Manager, Plant Licensing Staff
C. Fugate, Assistant Manager, Operations (Shift)
J. Holman, Manager, Nuclear Engineering
B. Pilutti, Manager, Radiation Protection
B. Lanka, Supervisor, Design Engineering
J. Laque, Manager, Maintenance
J. Lewis, Manager, Emergency Preparedness
R. Madjerich, Manager, Operations
T. Mitchell, Director, Engineering
R. Murillo, Senior Staff Engineer, Licensing
R. Osborne, Manager, Programs and Components
J. Rachal, Supervisor, Design Engineering
J. Reese, Manager, Design Engineering
G. Scott, Licensing Engineer
C. Tacazar, Supervisor, System Engineering
J. Venable, Vice President, Operations
K. Walsh, General Manager, Plant Operations

NRC

W.B. Jones, Chief, Project Branch E

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

0500382/2005002-01	NCV	Failure to Prevent a Reoccurrence Cycle Timer Failure in the Essential Chiller (Section 4OA2)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1R04: Partial System Walkdown

Condition Reports

CR-WF3-1996-1208
CR-WF3-2002-0258
CR-WF3-2005-0191
CR-WF3-2005-1136
CR-WF3-2005-0181

Miscellaneous Documents

NUMBER	TITLE/SUBJECT	REVISION
Ebasco Specification 8-69	Motors for Station Auxiliary Service	0
W3-DBD-003	Emergency Feedwater System	2

Work Orders

28112
52983866

50993266
50990644

Section 1R05: Fire Protection

Procedures:

NUMBER	TITLE	REVISION
Maintenance Procedure MM-007-010	Fire Extinguisher Inspection and Extinguisher Replacement	13
Administrative Procedure UNT-005-013	Fire Protection Program	9
Fire Protection Procedure FP-001-015	Fire Protection System Impairments	17

Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments

Condition Reports

CR-WF3-2005-0445 CR-WF3-2005-0083
CR-WF3-2005-0451

Miscellaneous Documents

NUMBER	TITLE/SUBJECT	REVISION
ODMI	Operational Decision Making Issue Implementation Degraded Output Voltage on Generator Metering PT Phase C	0
ER-W3-2005-0018	Temporary Alteration for CEDMCS	0

Section 1R15: Operability Evaluations

Procedures:

NUMBER	TITLE	REVISION
ME-005-087	Westinghouse SA-1 Generator Differential Relay	4 and 5
OP-902-009	Standard Appendices	1.2

Condition Reports

CR-WF3-2005-0758	CR-WF3-2005-1104	CR-WF3-2004-3669
CR-WF3-2004-3986	CR-WF3-2005-0208	CR-WF3-2003-0073
CR-WF3-2004-3891	CR-WF3-2005-0344	CR-WF3-2003-0989
CR-WF3-2004-3413	CR-WF3-2005-0208	CR-WF3-2005-0339
CR-WF3-2003-0724	CR-WF3-2004-2520	
	CR-WF3-2004-3244	

Miscellaneous Documents

NUMBER	TITLE/SUBJECT	REVISION
ODMI	Operational Decision Making Issue Implementation Action Plan Boric Acid Leak Upstream of CVC-180	0
EC-I91-036	Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Outlet Temperature (Dry Fan Control) Instrument Loop Uncertainty	1
TG-OP-902-002	Technical Guide for Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery Procedure	9
EC-E91-176	Load Study for PDP-SA	3

Section 1R19: Postmaintenance Testing

Condition Reports

CR-WF3-2005-0966	CR-WF3-2004-3277	CR-WF3-2004-0483
CR-WF3-2005-0107	CR-WF3-2004-0494	

Miscellaneous Documents

NUMBER	TITLE/SUBJECT	REVISION
EC-E90-006	Emergency Diesel Generator Loading and Fuel Oil Consumption	6
ER-W3-2003-0055-001	Diesel Oil Storage Tank Level Instrumentation Loop Uncertainty Calculation	1
ANSI N195-1976	Fuel Oil Systems for Standby Diesel-Generators	1976
MN-62	Auxiliary Feedwater System	1

Work Orders

50987216	29110
50984871	55049

Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing

Procedures

NUMBER	TITLE	REVISION
OP-903-024	Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance	13
OI-040-000	Reactor Coolant System Leakage Monitoring	0
CEP-IST-1	IST Bases Document	3

Condition Reports

CR-WF3-2002-0090	CR-WF3-2003-0167
CR-WF3-2005-1135	CR-WF3-2005-1136
CR-WF3-2005-1138	

Miscellaneous Documents

NUMBER	TITLE/SUBJECT	REVISION
EOS 05-0239	Nitrogen Header 4 Pressure Indicating Switch	0

Work Orders

28112	50993266	50990644
50991808		

Section 4OA2: Identification and Resolution of Problems

Condition Reports

CR-WF3-2002-0470	CR-WF3-2003-0448	CR-WF3-2005-0346
CR-WF3-2002-1540	CR-WF3-2002-1989	CR-WF3-2005-0346
CR-WF3-2001-0673	CR-WF3-2005-0458	
CR-WF3-2003-1192	CR-WF3-2002-1202	

Miscellaneous Documents

NUMBER	TITLE/SUBJECT	REVISION
OE16484	Essential Chiller Cycle Timer Reliability	0
ER-W3-2002-0278-000	Essential Chiller Cycle Timer Improvement	0
W3-DBD-037	Essential Chilled Water System	1