January 12, 2001

Mr. J. Sorensen
Site General Manager
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
Nuclear Management Company, LLC
1717 Wakonade Drive East
Welch, MN 55089

SUBJECT: PRAIRIE ISLAND INSPECTION REPORT 50-282/00-17(DRP);
50-306/00-17(DRP)

Dear Mr. Sorensen:

On December 31, 2000, the NRC completed an inspection at your Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on January 5, 2001, with you and other members of your staff.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

No findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available **electronically** for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room **or** from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

Original signed by
Roger D. Lanksbury

Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 5

Docket Nos. 50-282; 50-306
License Nos. DPR-42; DPR-60

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-282/00-17(DRP);
50-306/00-17(DRP)

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REGION III

Docket Nos:	50-282, 50-306
License Nos:	DPR-42, DPR-60
Report No:	50-282/00-17(DRP); 50-306/00-17(DRP)
Licensee:	Nuclear Management Company, LLC
Facility:	Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
Location:	1717 Wakonade Drive East Welch, MN 55089
Dates:	November 17 - December 31, 2000
Inspectors:	S. Ray, Senior Resident Inspector S. Thomas, Resident Inspector G. Pirtle, Physical Security Inspector
Approved by:	Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects

NRC's REVISED REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS

The federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recently revamped its inspection, assessment, and enforcement programs for commercial nuclear power plants. The new process takes into account improvements in the performance of the nuclear industry over the past 25 years and improved approaches of inspecting and assessing safety performance at NRC licensed plants.

The new process monitors licensee performance in three broad areas (called strategic performance areas): reactor safety (avoiding accidents and reducing the consequences of accidents if they occur), radiation safety (protecting plant employees and the public during routine operations), and safeguards (protecting the plant against sabotage or other security threats). The process focuses on licensee performance within each of seven cornerstones of safety in the three areas:

Reactor Safety

- Initiating Events
- Mitigating Systems
- Barrier Integrity
- Emergency Preparedness

Radiation Safety

- Occupational
- Public

Safeguards

- Physical Protection

To monitor these seven cornerstones of safety, the NRC uses two processes that generate information about the safety significance of plant operations: inspections and performance indicators. Inspection findings will be evaluated according to their potential significance for safety, using the Significance Determination Process, and assigned colors of GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW, or RED. GREEN findings are indicative of issues that, while they may not be desirable, represent very low safety significance. WHITE findings indicate issues that are of low to moderate safety significance. YELLOW findings are issues that are of substantial safety significance. RED findings represent issues that are of high safety significance with a significant reduction in safety margin.

Performance indicator data will be compared to established criteria for measuring licensee performance in terms of potential safety. Based on prescribed thresholds, the indicators will be classified by color representing varying levels of performance and incremental degradation in safety: GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW, and RED. GREEN indicators represent performance at a level requiring no additional NRC oversight beyond the baseline inspections. WHITE corresponds to performance that may result in increased NRC oversight. YELLOW represents performance that minimally reduces safety margin and requires even more NRC oversight. And RED indicates performance that represents a significant reduction in safety margin but still provides adequate protection to public health and safety.

The assessment process integrates performance indicators and inspection so the agency can reach objective conclusions regarding overall plant performance. The agency will use an Action Matrix to determine in a systematic, predictable manner which regulatory actions should be taken based on a licensee's performance. The NRC's actions in response to the significance (as represented by the color) of issues will be the same for performance indicators as for inspection findings. As a licensee's safety performance degrades, the NRC will take more and increasingly significant action, which can include shutting down a plant, as described in the Action Matrix.

More information can be found at: http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000282-00-16; 05000306-00-17, on 11/17 - 12/31/2000; Nuclear Management Company, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2: resident inspector report.

The inspection was conducted by resident inspectors and a regional physical security specialist. No findings of significance were identified.

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status: Unit 1 operated at or near full power until it was shutdown for a planned maintenance outage on December 1, 2000. Unit 1 was restarted on December 13 and reached full power on December 14, 2000. Unit 1 was then operated at or near full power until December 27, 2000, when a gradual power coastdown was started for a January 2001 refueling outage. Unit 2 operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period except that power was reduced to about 45 percent of full power on December 22-23 for turbine valve testing.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency Preparedness

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors focused on verifying that the design features and implementation of the licensee's procedures protected mitigating systems from the affects of extremely cold weather. Of special concern were remote areas and buildings that housed safety significant equipment and components, such as the condensate storage tanks. The inspectors also performed partial system walkdowns to ensure that the cooling water to the station air compressors and the heating steam systems were in their winter line-ups.

During the conduct of this inspection, the inspectors reviewed the following documents:

- System Prestart Checklist C28-11, "Condensate Storage Tank Winter Operations, Revision 8;
- Operating Procedure C34, "Station Air System," Revision 16;
- Operating Procedure C36, "Heating Steam," Revision 11;
- Operating Procedure C28.6 "Condensate Storage Tank Freeze Protection System," Revision 7; and
- Periodic Test Procedure 1637, "Winter Plant Operations," Revision 26.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of systems to verify that critical portions of the redundant system or train, or other significant protected equipment, was in the correct lineup during the time when the one system or train was out-of-service.

- The inspectors walked down the B train of the Unit 1 component cooling system during the time that D1 diesel generator was unavailable due to surveillance testing. The inspectors reviewed Integrated Checklist C1.1.14-1, "Unit 1 Component Cooling System," Revision 16, as part of this inspection.

- The inspectors walked down the D1 diesel generator during the time that the D2 diesel generator was unavailable due to a 24-hour surveillance test. The inspectors reviewed the following Integrated Checklists as part of this inspection:

  - C1.1.20.7-1, "D1 Diesel Generator Valve Status," Revision 17;
  - C1.1.20.7-2, "D1 Diesel Generator Auxiliaries and Room Cooling Local Panels," Revision 8;
  - C1.1.20.7-3, "Diesel Generator D1 Main Control Room Switch and Indicating Light Status," Revision 12; and
  - C1.1.20.7-4, "D1 Diesel Generator Circuit Breakers and Panel Switches," Revision 10.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns focused on the condition and operating status of installed fire barriers. The inspectors selected the following fire areas for inspection based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk, as documented in the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE):

- Fire Area 13, Control Room;
- Fire Area 25, D1 Diesel Room;
- Fire Area 26, D2 Diesel Room; and
- Fire Area 1, Unit 1 Containment 697 Foot Elevation.

As part of these inspections, the inspectors reviewed the following documents:

- IPEEE, NSPLMI-96001, Appendix B, "Internal Fires Analysis," Revision 1; and
- Plant Safety Procedure F5 Appendix F, "Fire Hazard Analysis," Revision 12.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified the licensee's implementation of the maintenance rule for structures, systems, or components (SSCs) with performance problems. This evaluation included the following aspects:

- whether the SSC was scoped in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65;
- whether the performance problem constituted a maintenance rule functional failure;
- safety significance classification;
- the proper 10 CFR 50.65 a(1) or a(2) classification for the SSC; and
- the appropriateness of the performance criteria for SSCs classified as a(2) or the appropriateness of goals and corrective actions for SSCs classified as a(1).

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of the maintenance rule requirements for the following SSCs:

- Containment Penetrations;
- Unit 1 Chemical and Volume Control System; and
- Unit 1 Component Cooling System.

As part of these inspections, the inspectors reviewed the 1999 Annual and First Quarter Equipment Performance Report, dated May 2, 2000, Second Quarter Equipment Performance Report, dated July 28, 2000, Third Quarter Equipment Performance Report, dated October 26, 2000, Prairie Island Maintenance Rule System Basis Document, as well as the following work orders (WOs) and condition reports (CRs):

Containment Penetrations

- WO 0008419, "Modify Unit 1 Maintenance Airlock Door Shaft Seals";
- WO 9909047, "SP [surveillance procedure] 2072 Local Leakage Rate Test of Containment Penetration";
- WO 0004506, "Outer (Auxiliary Building) Station Air Flange Failed Local Leakage Rate Test";
- WO 0004762, "SP 10-72 Local Leakage Rate Test of Containment Penetration";
- WO 0009480, "SP 1132 Unit 1 Personnel and Maintenance Airlock Door Seal Test";
- WO 0013150, "SP 1072.41A Local Leakage Rate Test 11 Vacuum Breaker";
- WO 0013151, "SP 1072.41B Local Leakage Rate Test 12 Vacuum Breaker";
- WO 0013857, "SP 1072.42B Local Leakage Rate Test 42B Containment In-Service Purge";
- WO 0013858, "SP 1072.43A Local Leakage Rate Test 43A Containment In-Service Purge";
- WO 0013980, "SP 1072.42B Local Leakage Rate Test 42B Containment In-Service Purge";

- WO 0013981, “SP 1072.43A Local Leakage Rate Test 43A Containment In-Service Purge”;
- WO 0013882, “SP 1072 Local Leakage Rate Test of Containment Penetration”; and
- CR 20005661, “Unit 1 Maintenance Airlock did not Pass the Volumetric Leak Rate Test Of SP 1132.2 While Performing Post Maintenance Test.”

Unit 1 Chemical and Volume Control System

- WO 9811654, “Replace Packing in 12 Charging Pump”;
- WO 9900919, “11 Charging Pump Discharge Relief Leak”;
- WO 9904460, “Replace Mechanical Seal on 11 Boric Acid Transfer Pump”;
- WO 9908080, “The Outboard Packing Assembly Came Apart on 13 Coolant Charging Pump”;
- WO 9911947, “Packing Leak on 12 Charging Pump”;
- WO 9803833, “Replace 11 and 12 Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Injection Flow Transmitters”,
- WO 9811791, “12 Charging Pump Lost Pumping Capacity”;
- WO 9912507, “12 Charging Pump Discharge Manifold is Leaking”;
- WO 9801336, “P32086 Emergency Boration Valve D70 Inspection”;
- WO 95065485, “P32072 Remove/Reinstall Actuator and Test MV-32060 [Refueling Water Storage Tank to Charging Pump Suction Isolation Valve]”;
- WO 9801336, “P32086 Emergency Boration Valve D70 Inspection”;
- WO 9905074, “Inspect Torque Switch of MV-32086 [Emergency Boration to Charging Pump Suction Valve] After Manual Declutch When Shut”;
- H Procedure H12, “Plant Check Valve Program,” Revision 3;
- H Procedure H10.1, “ASME [American Society of Mechanical Engineers] Section XI Inservice Testing Implementing Program,” Revision 9; and
- H Procedure H5, “Motor Operated Valve Program,” Revision 6.

Unit 1 Component Cooling System

- CR 20000274, “11 Component Cooling Pump Preventive Maintenance has not been Completed in a Timely Manner”;
- CR 20001019, “Work Performed Without Generating a Temporary Change Notice When Scope of Original WO Changed”;
- CR 20001156, “Lack of Questioning Attitude Allowed Operation of Component Cooling Flow to the Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanges to be 2150 Gallons per Minute Vice 1800 Gallons per Minute for the Last 25 Years”;
- CR 20003977, “Update Form 1180 to Record Surge Tank Levels and Instructions for Operators to Contact the Control Room in Abnormalities Noted”;
- WO 0008145, “Component Cooling Heat Exchanger Outlet Flows Calibration”;
- WO 0010409, “P3119-4-1B Disassemble and Inspect CC-61-2;”
- WO 0010623, “Packing Leak on MV-32093;”
- WO 9803881, “11 Component Cooling Pump Outboard Motor Bearing Oil Leak”; and
- WO 9812768, “Replace Impeller for 11 Component Cooling Pump.”

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's management of plant risk for high risk configurations during routine maintenance activities and its control of emergent work activities. The inspectors verified that evaluation, planning, control, and performance of the work was done in a manner to reduce risk where practical, and that contingency plans were in place where appropriate. The following activities were inspected:

- emergency work on the Bus 15 load sequencer in accordance with WO 0013735, "Bus 15 Load Sequencer has Bad Input Card";
- elevated hydrogen levels in the Unit1 pressurizer and pressurizer relief tank following a unit shutdown to repair 11 reactor coolant pump seal; and
- review of new procedure H24.1, "Assessment and Management of Risk Associated With Maintenance Activities," Revision 0, which dealt with implementing the new requirements of subpart (a)(4) of 10 CFR 50.65.

As part of these inspections, the inspectors reviewed the following documents:

- Technical Specification Interpretation 3.7-5, "Preventive Maintenance Definition for Diesel Generator Testing," dated December 5, 1996;
- SP 1094, "Bus 15 Load Sequencer Test," Revision 13;
- Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 1C20.7 AOP 2, "Bus 15 Load Sequencer Out-of-Service," Revision 5;
- AOP 1C20.5 AOP 1, "Reenergizing 4.16 KV [kilovolts] Bus 15," Revision 6;
- Emergency Operating Procedure 1E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," Revision 18;
- CR 20005356, "Bus 15 Sequencer Failed SP 1094;"
- Technical Manual XH-2713-21, "Safeguard Load Sequencer Instruction Manual," Revision 3; and
- CR 20005824, "Problem Encountered During Burping of the Pressurizer Relief Tank During 12/2/00 Maintenance Outage Lead to Rad Gas and Hydrogen Gas Problems in Containment."

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Personnel Performance During Non-routine Plant Evolutions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed operator performance during work in accordance with WO 0013704, “Adjust VC-14-1 and VC-14-2.” The purpose of the work was to cycle the Unit 1 reactor coolant pump seal injection throttle valves in an attempt to increase seal leakoff flow from the 11 reactor coolant pump. This work was selected because it was infrequently performed and because of the relatively high probability that mismaniplation of the valves could have caused an initiating event. This was a planned non-routine evolution for which the inspectors attended the briefings and reviewed the plan, procedures used, continency plans, and actual performance of the job.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sampling of operability evaluations for safety significant systems and conditions to determine that operability was justified, that availability was assured, and that no unrecognized increase in risk had occurred. The following evaluations were reviewed:

- CR 20005356, “Bus 15 Sequencer Failed SP 1094";
- Safety Evaluation 297, Addendum 1, “Reduced Tave [average reactor coolant system temperature] Operation - LOCA [loss of coolant accident] Hydraulic Forces,” Revision 0; and
- Safety Evaluation 538, “Operation of Unit 1 Reactor with Spring in Lower Vessel,” Revision 1.

As part of these inspections, the inspectors reviewed the following additional documents:

- WCAP-14748, “Justification for Increasing Postulated Break Opening Times in Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactors,” Revision 0;
- Safety Evaluation 297, Addendum 0, “Reduced Tave Operation.”

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Workarounds

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the cumulative effect of all identified operator workarounds, including the cumulative effect of the conditions on plant risk and on the operators ability to respond to a transient or accident situation. As part of this inspection, the inspectors reviewed the following documents:

- Aggregate Assessment of Current Operator Workarounds and Open Operability Determinations for the 3rd Quarter of 2000, dated November 15, 2000; and
- Operations Committee Meeting Minutes #2616.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance testing activities to ensure that the testing adequately verified system operability and functional capability. The post-maintenance testing activities were selected based on the respective system's importance to mitigating core damage or protecting barrier integrity.

The inspectors observed post-maintenance testing associated with the following work:

- 121 instrument air compressor 4000 hour inspection; and
- modification to the Unit 1 containment maintenance airlock door shaft seals.

As part of these inspections, the inspectors reviewed the following documents:

- Preventive Maintenance Procedure 3505-1-121, "121 Instrument Air Compressor 1000 Hour Inspection," Revision 13;
- Preventative Maintenance Procedure 3505-2-121, "121 Instrument Air Compressor 4000 Hour Inspection," Revision 7;
- Station Air Compressor Technical Manual XH-52-32;
- WO 0008419, "Modify Unit 1 Maintenance Airlock Door Shaft Seals"; and
- Temporary Change Notice 2000-1761 (to WO 0008419).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed activities associated with the Unit 1 planned outage to replace the 11 reactor coolant pump seal, that began on December 1, 2000. The inspectors reviewed the reactor cooldown rate, configuration management for risk, conformance to the applicable procedures, and compliance with technical specifications. The following major activities were observed:

- outage planning meetings;
- reactor shutdown;
- initial establishing of decay heat removal using steam generators;
- transition to phase two cooling using the residual heat removal system;
- 11 reactor coolant pump seal replacement; and
- other general outage activities.

In addition to attending several outage planning meeting and pre-evolution briefings, the inspectors also reviewed the following documents:

- The Daily Unit 1 Shutdown Safety Assessment [PINGP Form 1102] Worksheets throughout the outage;
- Operating Procedure 1C15, "Residual Heat Removal System," Revision 21;
- Operating Procedure 1C19.1, "Containment System Integrity - Unit 1," Revision 10;
- Maintenance Procedure D15.1, "Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Replacement," Revision 21;
- Operating Procedure 1C1.3, "Unit 1 Shutdown," Revision 44;
- WO 0013631, "Check RHR Suction Pressure Prior to Phase II Cooldown"; and
- WO 0013936, "Drain/Fill 11 Accumulator."

b. Issues and Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified, by witnessing selected surveillance testing and reviewing test data, that the equipment tested by the SPs met technical specifications, the Updated Safety Analysis Report, design basis documents, and licensee procedural requirements, and demonstrated that the equipment was capable of performing its intended safety functions. The following tests were evaluated:

- SP 1335, "D2 Diesel Generator 18 Month 24 Hour Load Test," Revision 6;
- SP 1128, "Monthly Backflush of Emergency Bay Intake Pipe," Revision 4; and

- SP 1100, “12 Motor Driven AFW [auxiliary feedwater] Pump Monthly Test,” Revision 58.

The inspectors reviewed the following additional documents as part of these inspections:

- SP 1305, “D2 Diesel Generator Monthly Slow Start Test,” Revision 20; and
- Preventive Maintenance Procedure PM 3108-2, “Cooling Water Emergency Intake Structure 5 Year Inspection,” Revision 1.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed a licensed operator simulator evaluation scenario which required one event classification and notification. The classification was considered unsuccessful by the licensee evaluators and will be reported as such in the fourth quarter performance indicators. The unsuccessful classification has been entered into the licensee’s corrective action system as part of the crew evaluation form. As part of this inspection the inspectors reviewed Lesson Plan P9160S-001, “Simulator Cycle Quiz #19,” Revision 2.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

3. SAFEGUARDS

Cornerstone: Physical Protection

3PP4 Security Plan Changes

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Revision 8 of the Prairie Island Safeguards Contingency Plan, which was submitted by licensee letter, dated September 14, 2000, to verify that the changes did not decrease the effectiveness of the security contingency plan. The security plan was submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(p).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified that the performance indicator data submitted by the licensee was accurate and complete for Reactor Coolant System Leakage. This was accomplished by review of the control room logs for the period of October 1999 through September 2000 for Unit 1 and Unit 2. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees leak rate determination methodologies by reviewing the following documents:

- SP 1001A, "Reactor Coolant System Leakage Test Manual Method," Revision 3;
- SP 1001AA, "Daily Reactor Coolant System Leakage Test," Revision 33;
- SP 1001AAA, "Reactor Coolant System Leakage Investigation," Revision 6;
- SP 2001A, "Reactor Coolant System Leakage Test Manual Method," Revision 3;
- SP 2001AA, "Daily Reactor Coolant System Leakage Test," Revision 31; and
- SP 2001AAA, "Reactor Coolant System Leakage Investigation," Revision 4.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Event Follow-up

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Licensee Event Reports (LERS) 50-282/2000-003-00; 50-306/2000-003-00, "Flooding from Postulated Failure of Air/Vacuum Valve Has Potential to Disable Both Trains of Essential Service (Cooling) Water," and 50-282/2000-004-00; 50-306/2000-004-00, "Inoperability of Safeguards Cooling Water (Essential Service Water) Pumps Caused by Unqualified Lubricating Water Supply to the Pump Shaft Bearing."

b. Findings

No additional findings of significance were identified in this inspection. These issues were first identified by the NRC during a Safety System Design and Performance Capability Inspection and the associated findings were discussed in Inspection Report 50-282/00-13(DRS); 50-306/00-13(DRS)).

4OA5 Other

The inspectors reviewed the final Institute of Nuclear Power Operations report of its January 2000 evaluation of the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant.

4OA6 Management Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. J. Sorensen and other members of licensee management on January 5, 2001. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors informed the licensee that one proprietary technical manual was reviewed during the inspection but that no material from that source would be used in this report. No other proprietary information was identified.

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

T. Allen, General Superintendent Engineering, Nuclear Generation Services
T. Amundson, General Superintendent Engineering
T. Breene, Manager Nuclear Performance Assessment
L. Gard, General Superintendent Plant Maintenance
A. Johnson, General Superintendent Radiation Protection and Chemistry
T. Silverberg, General Superintendent Plant Operations
M. Sleigh, Superintendent Security
J. Sorensen, Site General Manager
M. Werner, Interim Plant Manager

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

None.

Discussed

50-282/2000-003-00; 50-306/2000-003-00	LER	Flooding from Postulated Failure of Air/Vacuum Valve Has Potential to Disable Both Trains of Essential Service (Cooling) Water (Section 4OA3)
50-282/2000-004-00; 50-306/2000-004-00	LER	Inoperability of Safeguards Cooling Water (Essential Service Water) Pumps Caused by Unqualified Lubricating Water Supply to the Pump Shaft Bearing (Section 4OA3)