

August 14, 2001

Mr. Douglas E. Cooper
Site Vice President
Palisades Nuclear Plant
Nuclear Management Company, LLC
27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway
Covert, MI 49043-9530

SUBJECT: PALISADES NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-255/01-10(DRP)

Dear Mr. Cooper:

On August 9, 2001, the NRC completed an inspection at your Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed with members of your staff at the end of the inspection period.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspector reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, the inspectors identified one issue of very low safety significance (Green), which was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance and because the issue was entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating the issue as a Non-Cited Violation, in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. If you deny the Non-Cited Violation, you should provide a response with the basis for your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant.

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Sincerely,

/RA/

Anton Vogel, Chief
Branch 6
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 50-255
License No. DPR-20

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-255/01-10(DRP)

cc w/encl: R. Fenech, Senior Vice President, Nuclear
Fossil and Hydro Operations
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket No: 50-255
License No: DPR-20

Report No: 50-255/01-10(DRP)

Licensee: Nuclear Management Company, LLC

Facility: Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant

Location: 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway
Covert, MI 49043-9530

Dates: July 1 through August 11, 2001

Inspectors: J. Lennartz, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Maynen, Resident Inspector, D.C. Cook
R. Walton, Reactor Engineer, RIII
J. Gavula, Senior Reactor Inspector, RIII
T. Madeda, Physical Security Inspector, RIII
D. E. Funk, Jr., Physical Security Inspector, RIII

Approved by: Anton Vogel, Chief
Branch 6
Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000255-01-10 on 07/01 - 08/11/2001, Nuclear Management Company, LLC, Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant. Physical security and Access Control (Personnel, Packages, and Vehicles; Identification and Authorization).

This report covers a 6-week routine inspection and a baseline safeguards inspection. The inspections were conducted by resident and specialist inspectors.

A. Inspector Identified Findings

Cornerstone: Physical Protection

Green. The inspectors identified a Non-Cited Violation of the approved licensee's security plan for the failure of a metal detector to detect a licensee's test device. A detection gap was identified in one zone, which during testing, allowed the licensee's test weapon to pass through undetected on five of five tests. Also, the licensee test procedure was not adequate to identify this detection vulnerability.

This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) by the significance determination process. This issue could have a credible impact on safety because a weapon could enter the protected area undetected. The failure to detect a weapon was contrary to NRC and licensee security plan requirements. This was a Green finding because no malevolent act had occurred, and there had not been greater than two findings in the last four quarters.

B. Licensee Identified Violations

None

Report Details

A list of documents reviewed to accomplish each inspection area is included at the end of the report.

Summary of Plant Status

The plant was in cold shutdown for the entire inspection period. Licensee personnel continued to investigate and evaluate extent of condition for a small leak from an axial crack that was identified in Number 21 control rod drive mechanism pressure housing which required the plant to be shut down on June 20, 2001.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity and Emergency Preparedness

1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a walk down on Emergency Diesel Generator 1-2 and Diesel Fire Pump P-41 while the redundant equipment was out of service for maintenance. The inspectors also walked down the automatic fire suppression system for required safety-related equipment in the 4160 volt bus 1D switchgear room, cable spreading room and Emergency Diesel Generator 1-2 room. The walk downs verified that accessible equipment and components were appropriately aligned, and that no discrepancies existed which would impact the system's functions.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05Q)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors toured the following areas in which a fire could affect safety related equipment:

- Control Room Complex (Fire Area 1)
- Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1 Room (Fire Area 5)
- East Engineered Safeguards Room (Fire Area 10)
- Station Battery No. 1 Room (Fire Area 12)

During the fire area tours, the inspectors verified that associated sprinkler fire suppression systems, smoke detection systems, and manual fire fighting equipment designated in the Final Safety Analysis Report and plant procedures were available in the

areas. The inspectors also verified that transient combustibles and ignition sources were appropriately controlled, and assessed the material condition of the passive fire protection features. In addition, the inspectors reviewed documentation to verify that fire barrier penetration surveillances had been completed as required by the licensee's fire protection program.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05A)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed an unannounced fire drill on August 1, 2001, to evaluate the licensee's fire brigades' ability to mitigate a simulated fire in the Cable Spreading Room. The inspectors assessed the fire brigades' readiness to fight the fire which included verifying the following:

- fire brigade responded to the scene in a timely manner,
- sufficient amount of manual fire fighting equipment was readily available and brought to the fire scene,
- fire hoses were handled appropriately and capable of reaching the fire location,
- fire brigade consisted of at least the minimum number designated by licensee procedures,
- pre-fire plans were utilized by the fire brigade leader,
- fire brigade leader was able to direct the fire brigade actions in an effective manner,
- communications between the fire brigade leader and the control room were clear and effective; and
- fire brigade members entered the fire area in a controlled manner as demonstrated by checking the door for heat prior to entering and by staying low to the floor.

The inspectors also verified that the pre-planned drill scenario was followed and that the drill objectives were accomplished. In addition, the inspectors reviewed records for the fire brigade members who participated in the drill to verify that the qualification requirements specified in the licensee's procedures were satisfied. Further, the inspectors verified that designated corrective actions were appropriate and had been implemented for a condition report that had been generated from a fire protection program audit that was completed by the licensee's nuclear oversight department.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11Q)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed a simulator training session for licensed operators on August 3, 2001, to assess the licensed operators ability to mitigate the consequences of events and the effectiveness of the training. The training session exercised Off Normal Operating Procedure 23.2, "Steam Generator Tube Leak," which progressed into a steam generator tube rupture that modeled a recent industry event. The inspectors also verified that the objectives identified in the simulator exercise guide were satisfied during the training session.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12Q)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's Maintenance Rule Scoping Document for the following plant equipment designated as having high safety significance within the licensee's maintenance rule program:

- Control Room Heating, Ventilation and Air-Conditioning System
- Component Cooling Water System

The inspectors reviewed the system's maintenance rule performance criteria to verify appropriateness. The inspectors also reviewed several condition reports written over the last year and the associated maintenance rule evaluations to verify that equipment performance issues were appropriately characterized in accordance with the licensee's corrective action and maintenance rule programs. In addition, the inspectors reviewed condition reports that were documented in the corrective action program to verify that the designated corrective actions were appropriate and had been implemented. Applicable portions of the Final Safety Analysis Report, Technical Specifications, piping and instrumentation drawings, and emergency operating procedures were also reviewed.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation (71111.13Q)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures for control of required safety equipment after the plant was placed in cold shutdown because of the emergent small leak from Control Rod Drive No. 21 pressure housing. On July 9 through 13, 2001, the inspectors conducted plant tours using the protected equipment checklist to verify that

the required equipment was available to minimize shutdown risk. The inspectors discussed protected equipment configuration control with operations and work control center personnel to verify that the protected equipment checklists were implemented correctly and appropriately maintained during shutdown operations.

The inspectors also verified that appropriate controls were in place and that Emergency Diesel Generator 1-2 was maintained operable from August 5 through 10, 2001, during a scheduled maintenance outage on Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1. The inspectors verified that scheduled work activities did not increase the risk of losing electrical power required for plant equipment while in cold shutdown.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15Q)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the operability assessment as documented in the associated condition reports for a pinhole leak in the service water tubes of Containment Air Cooler 4 that licensee personnel identified on May 21, 2001. The inspectors reviewed applicable sections of the Technical Specifications, Final Safety Analysis Report, and operating procedures to verify that the operability assessment was technically adequate and that the components remained available, such that no unrecognized increase in plant risk had occurred.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications (71111.17A)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the modification package for Engineering Assistance Request EAR-2000-0404 that added oil crankcase heaters and an automatic aftercooler drain solenoid valve to High Pressure Air Compressors C-6A, C-6B and C-6C. The inspectors reviewed the associated safety analysis and design review checklists to verify that the design bases and the performance capability of the high pressure air system was not degraded by implementing the modification. The inspectors also verified that required procedure changes had been initiated and that piping and instrument drawings were revised as needed.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing (71111.19Q)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed portions of post maintenance testing on Fire Pump P-41 and reviewed documented testing activities following scheduled maintenance to determine whether the test was performed as written. The inspectors verified that applicable testing prerequisites were met prior to the start of the test and that the effect of testing on plant conditions was adequately addressed by control room personnel. The inspectors reviewed post maintenance testing criteria specified in the applicable preventive and corrective work orders to verify that the test criteria was appropriate with respect to the scope of work performed and that the acceptance criteria were clear.

In addition, the inspectors reviewed the completed tests and procedures to verify that the tests adequately verified system operability. Documented test data was reviewed to verify that the data was complete, and that the equipment met the procedure acceptance criteria which demonstrated that the equipment was able to perform the intended safety functions. Lastly, the inspectors reviewed condition reports regarding post maintenance testing activities to verify that identified problems were appropriately characterized.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Modifications (71111.23)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the documentation packages and assessed the installation for the following two temporary modifications to verify that the system's safety functions were not affected:

- TM-2001-010, Install Expanding Rubber Mechanical Plugs in Containment Air Cooler VHX-4; and,
- TM-2000-013, Remove Internals From Manual Valve MV-SW281, service water inlet isolation valve to control room heating and ventilation condensing unit VC-11.

The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the Control Room Heating, Ventilation and Air-Conditioning System. The inspectors also reviewed the temporary modification's associated safety reviews, applicable portions of the Final Safety Analysis Report, Technical Specifications, and piping and instrumentation drawings.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

3. SAFEGUARDS

Cornerstone: Physical Protection

3PP1 Access Authorization (AA) Program (Behavior Observation Only) (711130-01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors interviewed five supervisors and five non-supervisors (both licensee and contractor employees) to determine their knowledge level and practice of implementing the licensee's behavior observation program responsibilities. Selected procedures pertaining to the Behavior Observation Program and associated training activities were also reviewed. Also licensee fitness-for-duty semi-annual test results were reviewed. In addition, the inspectors reviewed a sample of licensee self-assessments, audits, and security logged events. The inspectors also interviewed security managers to evaluate their knowledge and use of the licensee's corrective action system.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

3PP2 Access Control (Identification, Authorization and Search of Personnel, Packages, and Vehicles) (71130.02)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's protected area access control testing and maintenance procedures. The inspectors observed licensee testing of all access control equipment to determine if testing and maintenance practices were performance based. On three occasions, during peak ingress periods, the inspectors observed in-processing search of personnel, packages, and vehicles to determine if search practices were conducted in accordance with regulatory requirements. Interviews were conducted and records were reviewed to verify that security staffing levels were consistently and appropriately implemented. Also the inspectors reviewed the licensee's process for limiting access to only authorized personnel to the protected area and vital equipment by a selective review of licensee protected and vital area access authorization reviews. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program to control hard-keys and computer input of security-related personnel data.

The inspectors reviewed a sample of licensee self-assessments, audits, maintenance request records, and security logged events for identification and resolution of problems. In addition, the inspectors interviewed selective security managers to evaluate their knowledge and use of the licensee's corrective action system.

b. Findings

A finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated Non-Cited Violation were identified by the inspectors in that, a metal detector on multiple occasions failed to detect a licensee's test weapon.

On July 10, 2001, licensee protected area metal detectors were tested, at the request of the inspectors, using the licensee's weapon testing device. Test results showed that one of two metal detectors failed on five of five occasions to detect the testing device in one detection zone. The specific zone was considered to be Safeguards Information. The tests were conducted at various locations in that zone. The remaining detection zones of both metal detectors performed as designed.

Our review determined that when the metal detector in question had been installed on June 18, 2001, the sensitivity of the deficient detection zone had been set at a less sensitive level than the remaining detection zones on the detector. The maintenance technician stated that the metal detector had been setup to pass the licensee's weapon testing procedure and to reduce false alarms. During our review, the licensee's testing procedure was used and the detector passed. The inspectors concluded that the procedure was not adequate because it did not require the zone in question to be tested. In addition, the inspectors determined that during initial setup the manufacturer calibration recommendations were not followed in that, sensitivity adjustments in each zone were to be set to define the size of the metal object to be detected to have the optimum level of detection. This was not done.

Licensee security personnel initiated Condition Report CPAL0102333 to address the inspectors finding. Initial corrective action included the immediate re-calibration of the detector, and a procedure change that modified the testing procedure to assure that the detection zone in question is tested.

This issue had a credible impact on safety because the observed weakness could allow a weapon to enter the protected area undetected. This issue also involved a failure to meet commitments in the licensee's security plan. The safety significance of this finding was determined to be very low (Green) because no malevolent act had occurred and there had been no greater than two findings in the last four quarters. Additionally, the deficient condition was restricted to only one specific detector zone.

Section 3.8.1 of the licensee's approved security plan requires that walk-through metal detectors detect firearms and that their sensitivity shall be set so an alarm is activated if an attempt is made to carry a weapon through a detector.

In accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, this inspection identified violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CPAL0102333 (NCV 50-255/01-10-01).

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified that the data submitted by the licensee was accurate and complete for the Unplanned Transients performance indicator. The inspectors reviewed control room logs and the licensee's Incident Analysis System logs for the periods of January 2001 through July 1, 2001, to verify that the licensee had accurately reported this performance indicator for those two quarters.

In addition, the inspectors verified the data for the Physical Protection Performance Indicator (PI) pertaining to Fitness-For-Duty Personnel Reliability, Personnel Screening Program, and Protected Area Security Equipment. Specifically, a sample of plant reports related to security events, security shift activity logs, fitness-for-duty reports, and other applicable security records were reviewed for the period between April 2000 and June 2001.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Event Follow-up (71153)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed and verified the accuracy of Event Notification No. 38169 that licensee personnel reported to the NRC on July 25, 2001, for the discovery of additional crack indications to those reported earlier on control rod drive mechanism pressure housings. The indication was discovered during the licensee's extent of condition evaluation for Control Rod Drive Mechanism No. 21 pressure housing leak. The event notification was an 8-hour Non-Emergency report for the degraded condition per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3).

An NRC special inspection to review the circumstances surrounding these events will be documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-255/01-11.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Meeting

Exit Meetings

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Cooper and other members of licensee management at the end of the inspection period on August 9, 2001. Licensee personnel acknowledged the findings presented. Additionally, the inspectors presented the results of the baseline safeguards inspection to licensee management on July 13, 2001. No proprietary information was identified at either of the exit meetings.

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

M. P. Banks, Corrective Action Program Supervisor
D. E. Cooper, Site Vice President
S. Cote, Property Protection Supervisor
B. Dotson, Licensing Analyst
B. Gerling, Licensing Support Supervisor
P. Harden, Director, Engineering
D. G. Malone, Acting Director, Licensing and Performance Assessment
G. C. Packard, Operations Superintendent
C. Ritt, Director, Plant Support
K. Smith, Operations Manager
R. A. White, Programs Engineering Supervisor

NRC

D. Hood, Project Manager, NRR

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

50-255/01-10-01	NCV	Failure of a metal detector to detect a test weapon (Section 3PP2)
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Closed

50-255/01-10-01	NCV	Failure of a metal detector to detect a test weapon (Section 3PP2)
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Discussed

None

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

1R04 Equipment Alignment

SOP-22	Standard Operating Procedure, Emergency Diesel Generators	Revision 31
SOP-22, Attachment 8	Checklist 22.1, Diesel Generator System Checklist	Revision 31
FPSP-MO-1, Attachment 2	Fire Suppression Water System Valve Alignment Verification Checkoff Sheet	Revision 2
SOP-21	Standard Operating Procedure, Fire Protection System	Revision 16

Condition Reports Reviewed for Problem Identification Characterization

CPAL0102373	Extra Items On GOP-14 Shutdown Cooling Operations Checklist
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1R05 Fire Protection

Fire Protection Implementing Procedures

FPIP-4, Attachment 5	Fire Detection Systems	Revision 15
FPIP-3	Plant Fire Brigade	Revision 8
FPIP-2	Fire Emergency Responsibility and Response	Revision 6
FPIP-6	Fire Suppression Training	Revision 9
FP-PE-3	Fire Protection Check Sheet, Fire Extinguishers - Auxiliary Building	Revision 2

Fire Protection Surveillance Procedures

FPSP-SI-1, Attachment 14	Zones 1 and 2, Control Room and Adjacent Offices Detector Locations	Revision 2
FPSP-SI-7, Attachment 17	Zone 22, Battery Room Detectors Locations	Revision 2
FPSP-SI-1, Attachment 23	Zone 14, Engineering Safeguards Room Detector Locations	Revision 2
FPSP-RO-9, Attachment 5	Diesel Generator 1-1 Room #116 and Diesel Generator 1-2 Room #116B Sprinkler Head Locations	Revision 0

FPSP-MO-1, Attachment 2	Fire Suppression Water System Valve Alignment Verification Checkoff Sheet	Revision 2
FPSP-RP-11, Attachments 2, 6, 9 and 23	Fire Barrier Penetration Seal/Conduit Seal Inspection Form - Fire Areas 1 (Control Room Complex), 5 (Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1 Room), 10 (East Engineered Safeguards Room) and 12 (Battery No. 1 Room)	Revision 4

Other Documents

	Pre-Fire Plan No. 5, Cable Spreading Room	
A-01-015	Nuclear Oversight Fire Protection Triennial Audit, Section 3.14, Fire Brigade	July 12, 2001
Sections 9.6.9.1, 9.6.9.5, 9.6.9.10 and 9.6.9.12	Final Safety Analysis Report - Fire Areas 1 (Control Room Complex), 5 (Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1 Room), 10 (East Engineered Safeguards Room) and 12 (Battery No. 1 Room)	Revision 22
EA-PSSA-00-001	Engineering Analysis, Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis for Fire Areas 1 (Control Room Complex), 5 (Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1 Room), 10 (East Engineered Safeguards Room) and 12 (Battery No. 1 Room)	Revision 1
	Palisades Nuclear Plant Fire Hazards Analysis for Fire Areas 1 (Control Room Complex), 5 (Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1 Room), 10 (East Engineered Safeguards Room) and 12 (Battery No. 1 Room)	Revision 4
ONP-25.1 Attachments 1, 5, 10 and 12	Off Normal Procedure for fire in Fire Areas 1 (Control Room Complex), 5 (Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1 Room), 10 (East Engineered Safeguards Room) and 12 (Battery No. 1 Room)	Revision 11

Condition Reports Reviewed for Problem Identification Characterization

CPAL0102587	Corrective Actions Not Completed As Recommended In Corrective Action Document
CPAL0102630	Fire Drill Critique Of August 1, 2001, Did Not Discuss Actions To Isolate Sprinkler System

Condition Reports Reviewed For Implementation of Corrective Actions

CPAL0000095	Fire Protection Checklists Not In Accordance With Administrative Procedures	
CPAL0102093	Unapproved Gasoline Container Found In Fire Proof Cabinet (Audit 00-015)	
<u>1R11</u>	<u>Licensed Operator Requalification</u>	
ONP-23.2	Off Normal Procedure 23.2, Steam Generator Tube Leak	Revision 11
TBAF-SEG.01B	Simulator Exercise Guide, ONP 23.2 and EOP 5.0	Revision 0
SEN-213	Significant Event Report, Steam Generator Tube Failure	April 12, 2000
<u>1R12</u>	<u>Maintenance Rule Implementation</u>	
	Control Room Heating, Ventilation and Air-Conditioning Maintenance Rule Scoping Document	
Section 9.8	Final Safety Analysis Report - Heating, Ventilation, and Air-Conditioning System	Revision 22
TS 3.7.10	Technical Specification, Control Room Ventilation Filtration	Amendment 189
TS 3.7.11	Technical Specification, Control Room Ventilation Cooling	Amendment 189
EOP 1.0	Emergency Operating Procedure, Standard Post-Trip Actions	Revision 10
EOP 4.0	Emergency Operating Procedure, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery	Revision 12
M-208-1A	Piping and Instrument Drawing, Service Water System	
M-218-6	Piping and Instrument Drawing, Heating, Ventilation and Air-Conditioning, Control Room	
M-218-6A	Piping and Instrument Drawing, Heating, Ventilation and Air-Conditioning, Control Room	
M-218-7	Piping and Instrument Drawing, Heating, Ventilation and Air-Conditioning, Control Room	

CPAL003125 Condition Report, VH-12 is Controlling With a 6 Percent Offset Low In the Main Control Room

Condition Reports Reviewed for Problem Identification Characterization

CPAL0102649 Corrective Action Not Identified For Apparent Cause
CPAL0102324 Clarification Needed In Control Room HVAC Maintenance Rule Scoping Regarding Humidity

Condition Reports Reviewed For Corrective Action Implementation

CPAL0100792 RV-2109 Spent Fuel Pool SX E-53A & 53B Relief Valve Failed As Found Setpoint And Leakage Test
CPAL0003319 Standby Button For CCW P-52C Stuck In the Depressed (On) Position During QO-1
CPAL0101826 CCW Flow Rate To Spray Pump Seal Water Heat Exchanger Found Below Minimum Expected Value

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation

SOP-24 Standard Operating Procedure - 24, Ventilation and Air Conditioning System Revision 32
GOP-14, Attachment 15 General Operating Procedure, Shutdown Operation Protected Train Equipment List Revision 14
Shift Supervisor Logbook entries for July 9 through July 13, 2001
Shift Supervisor Logbook entries for August 4, through August 10, 2001

1R15 Operability Evaluations

CPAL0101971 Condition Report - Leak into Containment Sump Caused by Pinhole Leak in VHX-4 Cooler Clearable return Bend
CPAL0102086 Condition Report - Containment Air Cooler Inlet Valve Will Not Isolate Flow
CPAL0102102 Condition Report - Containment Sump Fill Rate Increase

TS 3.6.1	Technical Specification, Containment	Amendment 194
TS 3.6.6	Technical Specification, Containment Cooling Systems	Amendment 189
Section 6.3	Final Safety Analysis Report, Containment Air Coolers	Revision 22

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications

EAR#2000-0404	Engineering Assistance Request 2000-0404, Add oil crankcase heaters and automatic aftercooler drain to high pressure air compressors C-6A, C-6B and C-6C	Revision 0
SOP-20 Attachment 3	Standard Operating Procedure - 20, Air Systems - Low Points Weekly Blow Down	Revision 18
SDR2001-0078	Palisades Nuclear Plant Safety Analysis, EAR-2000-0404 Operations Review Considerations Checklist, EAR-2000-0404 Seismic Design Considerations Checklist, EAR-2000-0404	
PCR-14802	Procedure Change Request, SOP-20 Design Change Checklist, EAR-2000-0404	
M-225, Sheets 1, 1A and 2	Piping and Instrument Diagram, High Pressure Air Operated Valves	

Condition Reports Reviewed For Problem Identification Characterization

CPAL0102493	Clarification of AP-9.28, Att 8, Ops Review/Considerations Checklist For EAR-2000-0404	
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1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

Work Orders

24111723	Fire Pump P-41 Diesel Driver
24112472	Fire Pump P-41 Diesel Driver

Other Documents

X-OPS586	Predetermined Preventive Maintenance Activity Control, Fire Pump P-41 Diesel Driver	
MO-7B	Technical Specification Surveillance Test, Fire Water Pumps P-9A, P-9B, and P-41	Revision 25
	Technical Specification Surveillance Procedure Basis Document for MO-7B	Revision 5
Section 9.6.7.2.2.1	Final Safety Analysis Report - Fire Pump, Valve, and Hydrant Testing	Revision 22

Condition Reports Reviewed For Problem Identification Characterization

CPAL0102411	Minor External Fuel Oil Leaks On Fire Pump P-41	
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1R23 Temporary Modifications

TM-2001-010	Temporary Modification to Install Expanding Rubber Mechanical Plugs in Containment Air Cooler VHX-4	5/29/2001
CPAL0102086	Condition Report - CV-0869 Containment Air Cooler Inlet Valve will not Isolate Service Water to VHX-4	
	Relief Request from Specific ASME Code Requirements - Containment Air Cooler Code Repair	3/31/1992
	Relief Request from Specific ASME Code Requirements - Containment Air Cooler Leakage	3/6/1991
TM-2000-013	Remove Internals from MV-SW281	Revision 0
Section 9.1	Final Safety Analysis Report, Service Water System	Revision 22
Section 9.8	Final Safety Analysis Report, Heating, Ventilation, and Air-Conditioning System	Revision 22
M-208-1B	Piping and Instrument Diagram, Service Water System	
CPIT 289248	Component Problem Identification Tag, Valve stem and disc separated	March 8, 2000

3PPX Physical Protection

FFD-01	Fitness-For-Duty Requirements and Responsibilities	July 16, 1999, Revision 12
FFD-02	Fitness-For-Duty Collection Site Procedures	July 16, 1999, Revision 11
FFD-03	Medical Review Officer Guidelines	July 16, 1999, Revision 6
FFD-PO-01	NRC Employee Fitness-For-Duty Policy	July 16, 1999, Revision 9
FFD-PO-02	NRC Contractor/Vendor Fitness-For-Duty	July 16, 1999, Revision 5
FFD-WLP-01	Director, Substance Abuse Compliance Programs Responsibilities	July 16, 1999, Revision 6
FFD-WLP-02	For Cause and Post-Accident Testing	July 16, 1999, Revision 8
FFD-WLP-03	Actions Taken When NRC Employee is Unfit for Duty	December 10, 1998, Revision 4
FFD-WLP-05	Actions Taken When Positive FFD Test Occurs	July 16, 1999, Revision 8
Alco III	Alco-Sensor III Standard for Breath Alcohol Testing	April 14, 2000, Revision 7
Alco IV	Alco-Sensor III Standard for Breath Alcohol Testing	April 14, 2000, Revision 4
	Plant Access Training Student Handout	February 5, 1999, Revision 1
	Semi-Annual Fitness-For-Duty Program Performance Report	January 1 - June 30, 2000
	Semi-Annual Fitness-For-Duty Program Performance Report	July 1 - December 31, 2000
	Palisades Nuclear Plant Safeguards Event Logs	July 2000 - July 2001
SIP-18	Security System and Equipment Testing	November 29, 2000
9100 082-4VE	Metor 220/250 Installation and Operating Manual	Edition 1.01
	Security Incident Reports	July 2000 - June 2001
	Condition Reports (Security Related)	July 2000 - June 2001
	Access Search Detection Drills (65 Drills)	January - July 2001
	Vehicle Search Detection Drills (36 Drills)	January - July 2001

SIP-16	Lock, Key, and Photo Badge Control	July 21, 2000
Procedure No. 3.03	Corrective Action Process	March 27, 2001
AP-10.24	Access Authorization Program for Company/Non-Company Employees	January 19, 2001
SIP-7	Photo Badging Process	January 22, 2001
<u>4OA3</u>	<u>Event Follow-up</u>	
EN-38169	Event Notification No. 38169 for the discovery of additional crack indications to those reported earlier on control rod drive mechanism pressure housings.	July 25, 2001