

March 15, 2001

Mr. M. Reddemann
Site Vice President
Kewaunee and Point Beach Nuclear Plants
Nuclear Management Company, LLC
6610 Nuclear Road
Two Rivers, WI 54241

SUBJECT: KEWAUNEE NUCLEAR PLANT
NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-305/01-04(DRP)

Dear Mr. Reddemann:

On February 13, 2001, the NRC completed an inspection at your Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant. The enclosed report presents the results of that inspection, which were discussed on February 13, 2001, with you, Mr. K. Hoops, and other members of your staff.

The inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selected examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, the inspectors identified one issue of very low safety significance (Green). This issue was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the issue's very low safety significance and because it has been entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this issue as a non-cited violation, in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. If you deny this non-cited violation, you should provide a response with the basis for your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Kewaunee facility.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief
Projects Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 50-305
License No. DPR-43

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-305/01-04(DRP)

cc w/encl: K. Hoops, Plant Manager, Kewaunee Plant
D. Graham, Director, Bureau of Field Operations
Chairman, Wisconsin Public Service Commission
State Liaison Officer

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Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief
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Docket No. 50-305
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Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-305/01-04(DRP)

cc w/encl: K. Hoops, Plant Manager, Kewaunee Plant
D. Graham, Director, Bureau of Field Operations
Chairman, Wisconsin Public Service Commission
State Liaison Officer

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket No: 50-305
License No: DPR-43

Report No: 50-305/01-04(DRP)

Licensee: Nuclear Management Company, LLC

Facility: Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant

Location: N 490 Highway 42
Kewaunee, WI 54216

Dates: January 1 through February 13, 2001

Inspectors: J. Lara, Senior Resident Inspector
Z. Dunham, Resident Inspector
T. Madeda, Regional Security Inspector

Approved By: Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief
Projects Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects

NRC's REVISED REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS

The federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recently revamped its inspection, assessment, and enforcement programs for commercial nuclear power plants. The new process takes into account improvements in the performance of the nuclear industry over the past 25 years and improved approaches of inspecting and assessing safety performance at NRC licensed plants.

The new process monitors licensee performance in three broad areas (called strategic performance areas): reactor safety (avoiding accidents and reducing the consequences of accidents if they occur), radiation safety (protecting plant employees and the public during routine operations), and safeguards (protecting the plant against sabotage or other security threats). The process focuses on licensee performance within each of seven cornerstones of safety in the three areas:

Reactor Safety	Radiation Safety	Safeguards
<ul style="list-style-type: none">● Initiating Events● Mitigating Systems● Barrier Integrity● Emergency Preparedness	<ul style="list-style-type: none">● Occupational● Public	<ul style="list-style-type: none">● Physical Protection

To monitor these seven cornerstones of safety, the NRC uses two processes that generate information about the safety significance of plant operations: inspections and performance indicators. Inspection findings will be evaluated according to their potential significance for safety, using the Significance Determination Process, and assigned colors of GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW, or RED. GREEN findings are indicative of issues that, while they may not be desirable, represent very low safety significance. WHITE findings indicate issues that are of low to moderate safety significance. YELLOW findings are issues that are of substantial safety significance. RED findings represent issues that are of high safety significance with a significant reduction in safety margin.

Performance indicator data will be compared to established criteria for measuring licensee performance in terms of potential safety. Based on prescribed thresholds, the indicators will be classified by color representing varying levels of performance and incremental degradation in safety: GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW, and RED. GREEN indicators represent performance at a level requiring no additional NRC oversight beyond the baseline inspections. WHITE corresponds to performance that may result in increased NRC oversight. YELLOW represents performance that minimally reduces safety margin and requires even more NRC oversight. And RED indicates performance that represents a significant reduction in safety margin but still provides adequate protection to public health and safety.

The assessment process integrates performance indicators and inspection so the agency can reach objective conclusions regarding overall plant performance. The agency will use an Action Matrix to determine in a systematic, predictable manner which regulatory actions should be taken based on a licensee's performance. The NRC's actions in response to the significance (as represented by the color) of issues will be the same for performance indicators as for inspection findings. As a licensee's safety performance degrades, the NRC will take more and increasingly significant action, which can include shutting down a plant, as described in the Action Matrix.

More information can be found at: <http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html>.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000305-01-04(DRP), on 1/1-2/13/2001, Nuclear Management Company, LLC, Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1. Fire Protection.

The inspection was conducted by resident inspectors and a regional security specialist. The inspection identified one Green finding which was a non-cited violation. The significance of all findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 "Significance Determination Process."

A. Inspector Identified Findings

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

- Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for failure to properly test a fire door in accordance with the facility's fire protection program plan.

The finding was of very low safety significance because, although the fire door separated both trains of service water pumps and did not fully close as designed when subsequently tested, the fire loading in the area was insufficient to credibly impact more than two of the four service water pumps in the area (Section 1R05).

B. Licensee Identified Findings

None

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status:

The unit was operated at approximately 96 percent power during the inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency Preparedness

1R04 Equipment Alignments

a. Inspection Scope

During this inspection period, the inspectors conducted a walkdown of the systems listed below and the associated support systems. Correct valve positions were verified using the system piping and instrumentation drawings and the system lineup checklist. The inspectors observed that instrumentation valve configurations and appropriate pressure and flow meter indications were also acceptable. Proper installation of hangers and supports, proper control room switch positions and local breaker positions for the system were also verified. Additionally, abnormal system operating procedures were reviewed. The inspectors also evaluated other conditions such as adequacy of housekeeping, the absence of ignition sources, and proper component labeling. The following systems and associated documents were reviewed:

'A' Diesel Generator (DG) while 'B' DG Inoperable due to Surveillance Testing

- N-DGM-CLA, "Diesel Generator A Prestartup Checklist," Revision F
- N-DGM-10A, "Diesel Generator A Manual Operation," Revision F
- A-DGM-10A, "Abnormal Diesel Generator A Operation," Revision B
- E-DGM-10, "Diesel Generator Emergency Shutdown," Revision E

Component Cooling Water System

- N-CC-31-CL, "Component Cooling System Prestartup Checklist," Revision T
- A-CC-31B, "Leakage into Component Cooling System," Revision I
- A-CC-31A, "Abnormal Conditions in the Component Cooling System," Revision M
- N-CC-31, "Component Cooling System Operation," Revision R
- E-CC-31, "Loss of Component Cooling," Revision L

125Volts Direct Current (VDC) and 120Volts Alternating Current (VAC) Systems.

- N-EDC-38-CL, "Battery Room DC and 120V AC Prestartup Checklist," Revision L
- N-EDC-38, "DC Supply and Distribution System," Revision K

- N-EDC-38B, "Operation of Station Inverters," Revision T
- E-EDC-38A, "Loss of 'A' Train Safeguards DC Power," Revision D

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors walked down the following areas to assess the overall readiness of fire protection equipment and barriers:

- Auxiliary Building Fan Floor
- Screenhouse

Emphasis was placed on the control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, the material condition of fire protection equipment, and the material condition and operational status of fire barriers used to mitigate fire damage or propagation. Additionally, fire hoses, sprinklers, portable fire extinguishers, and fire detection devices were inspected to verify that they were installed at their designated locations, were in satisfactory physical condition, and were unobstructed. Passive features such as fire doors, fire dampers, and fire zone penetration seals were also inspected.

The following documents were reviewed:

- Fire Plan Procedure (FPP) 08-07, "Control of Ignition Sources," Revision D
- FPP 08-01, "Fire Plan Operability, Surveillance, and Contingency Requirements," Revision C
- FPP 08-08, "Control of Transient Combustibles," Revision A
- FPP 08-12, "Fire Prevention Tour," Revision B
- FPP 08-14, "Fire Protection Shutdown Policy," Original Revision
- N-FP-08-CL, "Fire Protection System Checklist," Revision AL
- Kewaunee Fire Protection Program Plan, Revision 4

b. Findings

Degraded 3-Hour Fire Barrier

One Non-Cited Violation (NCV) (Green) was identified by the inspectors. In response to inspectors' questions, on January 15, 2001, the licensee determined that two normally open roll-up fire doors (Doors 279 and 281) which separated the 'A' and 'B' train service water (SW) pumps had not been periodically tested every 18 months as required by the facility's fire protection plan. The doors were last functionally tested in 1994. The inspectors interviewed licensee personnel and observed the subsequent testing of both fire doors on January 18, 2001. During the subsequent testing, one of the two fire doors failed to completely close as designed. The following documents were reviewed:

- Fire Protection Program Plan, Revision 4
- Appendix R Description, Revision 3
- Preventative Maintenance Procedure 08-19, "FP-Inspection of Fire Doors," Revision G
- Kewaunee Assessment Process (KAP) 01-000401, 01-000405, 01-000388, and 01-000308

The licensee identified that roll-up fire doors (Doors 279 and 281) had last been documented as tested in 1994. The inspectors noted that Procedure PMP 08-19 data records indicated that Doors 279 and 281 had both been documented as being tested every 18 months in accordance with the facility's fire plan. However, the procedure contained instructions specific to testing standard fire doors and did not address how to test roll-up fire doors. These fire doors are the only roll-up fire doors located at the facility and utilized fusible links as the actuation mechanism. However, the roll-up fire doors were of a sufficiently different design such that the instructions for testing standard fire doors were not adequate for testing roll-up fire doors. The licensee determined through interviews of maintenance personnel that the roll-up fire doors had been tested based on maintenance personnel's "best interpretation" of the documented instructions, but may not have been correctly tested every time. Through the interviews, the licensee determined that the last known test which had been performed correctly was in 1994. Although the licensee's evaluation had not been completed at the end of this inspection period, the licensee had conclusively determined that the last known test of the doors, which took place in 1999, had not been performed correctly. Subsequent to this determination, the licensee declared Doors 279 and 281 inoperable and established a 1-hour fire watch in the affected area in accordance with the facility's fire plan. The licensee documented the issue in KAP 01-000308.

The inspectors observed the licensee test both fire doors on January 18, 2001. Fire Door 279 closed as designed, but fire Door 281 failed to completely close when actuated. The licensee documented the failure of Door 281 to fully close in KAPs 01-000401 and 01-000405, and made a 1-hour non-emergency report to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 for not meeting Appendix R design requirements. Additionally, the licensee fully closed Door 281 as a compensatory measure. The licensee planned to submit a licensee event report (LER) on this issue.

The inspectors determined that the failure of Door 281 to fully close had a credible impact on safety and affected a mitigating system, specifically both trains of SW pumps. The inspectors assessed the issue utilizing the Significance Determination Process as provided in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F. The failure of fire Door 281 to fully close when tested represented a degradation of a defense-in-depth fire protection element and compromised the 3-hour fire barrier separation requirements for redundant safe shutdown trains. A Phase 2 Significance Determination Process analysis was performed. This analysis resulted in the classification of the finding as "Green." Factors and assumptions which primarily contributed to this classification included the following:

- Although Door 281 failed to fully close when properly tested, the failure only resulted in a 4 to 6 inch gap between the door and the screen house floor.

- Since there was no automatic suppression features available for the screen house, no credit for automatic fire suppression was given. However, the historical effectiveness of the fire brigade resulted in maximum credit for manual fire suppression and detection.
- A fire ignition frequency of 1.6E-3, as stated in the licensee's plant specific Individual Plant Examination for External Events, was utilized to represent the probability of a SW pump fault initiated fire. Analysis conservatively assumed a fire ignition frequency of 3.2E-3.
- Minimal fire loading (primarily 6 gallons of lubricating oil located in the SW pump motor) and physical separation between components located in the screen house resulted in an assumed fire scenario in which only 2 of 4 SW pumps were impacted by the degraded fire barrier.

KNPP Facility Operating License No. DPR-43, Section 2.C(3) required, in part, that the licensee shall implement and maintain all provisions of the approved Fire Protection Program as described in the facility's fire plan. Appendix A of the KNPP Fire Protection Program Plan (fire plan) required that fire doors be functionally tested at an 18-month frequency. Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to adequately test fire Doors 279 and 281 at an 18-month frequency. The failure was considered a violation of the facility's license condition. However, this Severity Level IV violation is being treated as an NCV (NCV 50-305/01-01-04, Failure to test Fire Door in Accordance with Fire Plan), consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted an inspection of the control room air conditioning unit room. The licensee's individual plant examination on internal flooding was reviewed to evaluate the licensee's internal flooding assumptions. The inspectors inspected the room to confirm the flooding analysis assumptions, inspected door seals and clearances, inspected available drainage capability, and examined the room for unsealed penetrations which could be potential flood sources from outside the room.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

On January 9, 2001, the inspectors observed a licensed operator requalification simulator dynamic exam. The inspectors observed the performance of the licensed operators to determine whether plant operating procedures and standards were implemented during the scenario. The post-scenario critique was attended to determine whether performance issues were accurately identified and addressed. The inspectors

verified that emergency plan requirements were recognized and addressed during the scenario. Additionally, appropriate use of the plant emergency operating procedures was also reviewed.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of the maintenance rule requirements to ensure that component and equipment failures were identified, entered, and scoped within the maintenance rule and that select structures, systems, or components were properly categorized and classified as (a)(1) or (a)(2) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65. The inspectors also verified that issues were identified at an appropriate threshold and entered in the corrective action program.

Specific components or system problems evaluated were:

- Component Cooling Water System
- 480 V Bus 62
- Safety Injection Accumulators
- Containment Fan Coil Units

The inspectors reviewed various KAPs in addition to the following documents:

- Nuclear Administrative Directive 8.20, "Maintenance Rule Implementation," Revision B
- General Nuclear Procedure 8.20.1, "Maintenance Rule Scoping and Performance Criteria," Revision B
- General Nuclear Procedure 8.20.2, "Maintenance Rule Data Evaluation," Revision B

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation of plant risk, scheduling, and configuration control during the planned and emergent work activities listed below. In particular, the inspectors verified that the licensee's planning and management of on-line risk were adequate. The inspectors also verified that licensee actions to address increased on-line risk during these periods were in accordance with approved administrative procedures. The inspectors reviewed appropriate sections of

Surveillance Procedures (SPs), the Updated Safety Analysis Report and Technical Specifications, interviewed licensee personnel, reviewed Nuclear Administrative Directive 8.2, "Work Request/Work Order," Revision D, and General Nuclear Procedure 8.21.01, "Risk Assessment for Plant Configurations," Revision A, and reviewed the licensee's Individual Plant Examination, Section 5.0, "Core Damage Frequency Quantification."

- Review of planned work activities and operations logs between 1/1/01 and 1/19/01 to verify that planned and actual maintenance configurations were bounded by the licensee's risk analysis
- Review of planned main work schedule for week of 2/5/01 and associated risk analysis using risk monitor and importance measures
- Reviewed risk analysis of work associated with SP 05B-305/306/307, "Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Low Discharge Pressure Switch Calibrations"

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of operability evaluations to ensure that the system operability was properly justified and the system remained available, such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred.

The inspectors reviewed the following operability evaluations:

- KAP 01-000226, Incorrect acceptance criteria in residual heat removal pump and valve surveillance test procedure
- KAP 01-000210, Main feedwater flow higher than indicated
- KAP 01-000394, 'B' Diesel Generator keep warm oil pump air bound
- KAP 01-000670, Inoperable CO2 suppression system for Diesel Generator Rooms A and B and relay room

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Work Around (OWAs)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a review of OWAs to identify the impact on safety system availability and reliability, to review any cumulative effects that could increase an initiating event frequency or could affect multiple mitigating systems, and review the cumulative effects of OWAs on the ability of operators to respond in a correct and timely manner to plant transients and accidents. The inspectors also evaluated whether there

were OWAs within operating procedures which had not been identified by the licensee. The following OWA's and documents were reviewed:

- OWA 01-01, Computer Points for Individual Rod Position Indication Not Updated
- KAP Work Order (WO) 01-000100
- Operations Procedure E-O-14, "Steam Generator Tube Leak," Revision A

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

During post maintenance testing activities, the inspectors verified that the test was adequate for the scope of the maintenance work which had been performed and that the testing acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness consistent with the design and licensing basis documents. The inspectors also verified that the impact of the testing had been properly characterized during the pre-job briefing; the test was performed as written and all testing prerequisites were satisfied; and the test acceptance criteria were satisfied. Following the completion of the test, test equipment was verified to be removed and that the equipment was returned to a condition in which it could perform its safety function. Post maintenance test activities were observed for the following components:

- Valve RC-423, Reactor Coolant System hot leg sample valve, following maintenance performed via WO 00-004398-000.
- Charging Pumps 'A' and 'B' following maintenance performed via Procedure PMP 35-09, "CVC-QA-1 Charging Pump Pulsation Dampener Maintenance," Revision N.
- Forebay level trip setpoint adjustments during removal of Temporary Change 00-01

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed surveillance testing on risk-significant equipment and verified that the equipment was capable of performing its intended safety function and that the surveillance tests satisfied the requirements contained in Technical Specifications, the Updated Safety Analysis Report, and licensee procedures. During the surveillance tests, the surveillance test was verified to be adequate to demonstrate operational

readiness consistent with the design and licensing basis documents, and that the testing acceptance criteria were clear. The inspectors also verified that the test was performed as written, that all testing prerequisites were satisfied, and that the test data were complete, appropriately verified, and met the requirements of the testing procedure. Following the completion of the test, the inspectors verified that the test equipment was removed and that the equipment was returned to a condition in which it could perform its safety function.

The inspectors observed and reviewed the performance of the following surveillance testing on risk significant equipment:

- SP 33-098, "Safety Injection Pump and Valve Test - IST," Revision AS
- SP 18-043, "Containment Pressure Instrument Monthly Channel Test," Revision V
- SP 18-44A, "Containment Pressure Transmitters Calibration," Revision H

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

.1 Safety Injection System

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's performance indicator data collection process and historical data through the fourth quarter of 2000. The following documents were reviewed:

- Nuclear Administrative Directive 3.18, "NRC Performance Indicators," Revision A
- "Guideline for Data Collection and Reporting NRC Performance Indicators," dated June 22, 2000
- Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 0
- Maintenance rule data for equipment out-of-service
- Control room logs
- SP 55-155, "Engineered Safeguards Train A Monthly Logic Channel Test," Revision K
- SP 33-098, "Safety Injection Pump and Valve Test - IST," Revision AS

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Event Follow-up

(Closed) Unresolved Item (URI) URI 305/99009-01: Minimum Required Forebay Level to Support Service Water Pump Operability.

This URI was opened pending the inspectors' review of the licensee's completed analysis of the adequacy of the design basis supporting SW system operability. At the time of that inspection, the licensee could not provide sufficiently detailed answers to the following questions as outlined in the URI:

- Service water flow rate through the containment fan coil units under an accident condition safety injection line up
- Minimum required SW flow through the containment fan coil units during a design basis accident
- Service water flow rate through the shroud cooling coils during a normal operating lineup
- Impact of instrument inaccuracies, SW pump degradation, and high rotating strainer differential pressure on SW design basis

Subsequent to that inspection, the licensee performed extensive flow testing on the SW system in various configurations during the May 2000 refueling outage. The inspectors reviewed the results of the testing as outlined in KAP WO 00-001825, Calculations C11177 and C11163. The inspectors determined that the testing results adequately answered the questions as outlined in the URI. No findings of significance were identified during the review.

(Closed) URI 305/2000002-01: Minimum Required Forebay Level to Support Service Water Pump Operability.

This URI was opened pending the inspectors' review of the licensee's completed analysis of vortex formation at the suction of the SW pumps and adequacy of the circulating water pump forebay level trip setpoint to ensure SW pump operability at reduced forebay levels. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's analysis as documented in KAP WO 00-000119 and in the hydraulic modeling study "Hydraulic-Model Study of Water Intake, Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant, Wisconsin," produced by the Iowa Institute of Hydraulic Research, Report No. 288. The licensee concluded that the original circulating water pump forebay level trip setpoint of 42 percent was sufficient to preclude vortex formation in the SW pumps and that the setpoint was adequate to ensure SW pump operability at reduced forebay levels. No findings of significance were identified during the review.

(Closed) LER 305/2000-013: Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications

Inadvertently Entered Due to Inoperable Containment Isolation Valve.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions as stated in LER 2000-013 and KAP WO 00-2573. No findings of significance were identified during the review. The failure to maintain containment integrity as identified in the LER was identified as a violation of Technical Specification 1.g.4. However, due to the short period of time in which the affected containment isolation valve was open (23 minutes) and due to the fact that the valve, although inoperable, was able to perform its design function during that time period, this issue was determined to be a violation of minor significance that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with Section IV of the NRC's Enforcement Policy.

(Closed) LER 305/2000-S01-00: Former Plant Employee Access Denied Due to Falsification of Access Request and Employment Application Information.

A former licensee employee's access authorization was revoked because of an education deficiency problem. The licensee was not able to verify the education level identified by the individual on the licensee's access authorization records. Regional review determined the issue to be of a minor nature and no enforcement action was taken. The event was entered into the licensee's corrective action program system (Reference No. 01-000132).

4OA6 Meetings

Management Meetings

On January 10, 2001, the NRC held a public meeting with the Nuclear Management Company (NMC) at the Region III offices, in Lisle, Illinois. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss NMC's corrective actions following the NRC's Problem Identification and Resolution inspection. The NMC presented an overview of the revised corrective action program being implemented at the Kewaunee facility. A list of attendees is provided at the back of this report. The handout provided by the NMC at the meeting is attached to this report.

Exit Meeting

On February 13, 2001, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. M. Reddemann, Mr. K. Hoops, and other members of the Kewaunee staff. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Nuclear Regulatory Commission - RIII

R. Lanksbury, Branch Chief, DRP, Branch 5

Nuclear Management Company, LLC

R. Farrell, Superintendent, Radiation Protection
J. Fletcher, Security Manager
G. Harrington, Licensing
K. Hoops, Plant Manager, Kewaunee Plant
B. Koehler, Manager, Quality Assurance Programs
M. Reddemann, Site Vice President
J. Schweitzer, Manager, Engineering and Technical Support
J. Stoeger, Superintendent, Operations
T. Taylor, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations
T. Webb, Nuclear Licensing Director

Attendees at January 10, 2001, Public Meeting

NRC

S. Burgess, Senior Reactor Analyst, Division of Reactor Safety, RIII
J. Caldwell, Deputy Regional Administrator, RIII
R. Caniano, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety, RIII
C. Craig, Section Chief, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
B. Daley, Reactor Engineer, Division of Reactor Safety/EEB, RIII
R. Gardner, Engineering Branch Chief, Division of Reactor Safety, RIII
G. Grant, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, RIII
J. Lamb, Kewaunee Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
K. Lambert, Enforcement Specialist, RIII
R. Lanksbury, Branch Chief, Branch 5, RIII
J. Lara, Senior Resident Inspector-Kewaunee, RIII
M. Leach, Technical Assistant, Division of Reactor Projects, RIII
S. Orth, Senior Radiation Specialist, Division of Reactor Safety, RIII
T. Ploski, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector, Division of Reactor Safety, RIII
W. Slawinski, Senior Radiation Specialist, Division of Reactor Safety, RIII

NMC, LLC

M. Aulik, Process Leader-Physical Changes
D. Cole, Assessments
K. Hoops, Plant Manager-Kewaunee
D. Johnson, Director-Regulatory Services
B. Koehler, Site Quality Assurance Manager
R. Nicolai, Process Leader-Corrective Action Program
R. Pulec, Assessment Manager
M. Reddemann, Site Vice President
R. Repshas, Site Services Manager
C. Schrock, Senior Vice President-Operations
M. Wadley, Chief Nuclear Officer
T. Webb, Site Licensing Director

Wisconsin Public Service

D. Molzahn, Director-Nuclear Oversight

Other

T. Thiesfeld, AEMRI-President

Members of Public

J. Kitsembel, Engineer, Public Service Commission of Wisconsin
R. Vincent, Licensing Supervisor, Consumers Energy-Palisades

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

50-305/01-04-01	NCV	Failure to Test Fire Door in Accordance with Fire Plan
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Closed

50-305/01-04-01	NCV	Failure to Test Fire Door in Accordance with Fire Plan
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50-305/99009-01	URI	Minimum Required Forebay Level to Support Service Water Pump Operability
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50-305/00-02-01	URI	Minimum Required Forebay Level to Support Service Water Pump Operability
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50-305/2000-013	LER	Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Inadvertently Entered Due to Inoperable Containment Isolation Valve
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50-305/2000-S01-00	LER	Former Plant Employee Access Denied Due to Falsification of Access Request and Employment Application Information
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Discussed

None

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
DRP	Division of Reactor Projects, Region III
FPP	Fire Plan Procedure
IST	In-Service Testing
KAP	Kewaunee Assessment Process
LER	Licensee Event Report
NMC	Nuclear Management Company
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OWA	Operator Work Around
PDR	Public Document Room
SP	Surveillance Procedure
SW	Service Water
URI	Unresolved Item
WO	Work Order