UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
61 FORSYTH STREET SW SUITE 23T85
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931

April 29, 2002

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
ATTN: Mr. H. L. Sumner, Jr.
Vice President - Hatch Plant
P. O. Box 1295
Birmingham, AL 35201-1295

SUBJECT: EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 50-321/01-08, 50-366/01-08

Dear Mr. Sumner:

On March 30, 2002 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Hatch Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on April 4, 2002 with Mr. P. Wells and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

No findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be available in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at *http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html* (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Stephen J. Cahill, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 50-321, 50-366
License Nos.: DPR-57, NPF-5

Enclosure: Integrated Inspection Report
50-321/01-08, 50-366/01-08
w/Attachment

cc w/encl: (See page 2)

cc w/encl:
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos:	50-321, 50-366
License Nos:	DPR-57, NPF-5
Report No:	50-321/01-08, 50-366/01-08
Licensee:	Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC)
Facility:	E. I. Hatch Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2
Location:	P. O. Box 2010 Baxley, Georgia 31515
Dates:	December 30, 2001 - March 30, 2002
Inspectors:	J. Munday, Senior Resident Inspector M. Giles, Acting Senior Resident Inspector N. Garrett, Resident Inspector J. Kreh, Health Physicist (Sections 1EP2 thru 5 and 4OA1) K. Green-Bates, Project Engineer (Section 1R08)
Approved by:	Stephen J. Cahill, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000321-01-08, IR 05000366-01-08 on 12/30/2001 - 03/30/2002, Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2, routine resident report.

The inspection was conducted by resident inspectors, a regional reactor inspector, and a regional health physicist. No findings of significance were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at *http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html*.

A. Inspector Identified Findings

None

B. Licensee Identified Violations

A violation of very low significance identified by the licensee has been reviewed by an inspector. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee appear reasonable. The violation is listed in section 4OA7 of this report.

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 operated at or near full Rated Thermal Power (RTP), until February 8. Power was reduced to about 27% RTP and then the unit was manually scrammed due to off-gas system equipment failures. The unit was restarted on February 12 and operated at or near 100% RTP until March 24 when the unit was shutdown for a planned refueling outage.

Unit 2 began the inspection period in cold shutdown. A reactor startup commenced on January 9 and reached 100% RTP on January 12. The unit maintained 100% RTP, with the exception of planned maintenance and testing, for the remainder of the inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of safety-related systems to verify the availability of redundant or diverse systems and components during periods when safety equipment was inoperable and to ensure that proper levels of defense-in-depth were maintained. The inspectors reviewed plant drawings, licensee procedures, and valve alignment documents listed in the Attachment to verify systems and components were correctly aligned. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed selected condition reports to determine if equipment alignment issues were being identified and adequately resolved. Systems verified included the following:

- Unit 1 Core Spray (CS) 'A' and Residual Heat Removal (RHR) 'A' and 'C'
- 1A, 1C, 2A, and 2C Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)
- Alignment of 1B EDG Plant Service Water (PSW) to Unit 1 Division 1 PSW
- Unit 1 CS 'B' and RHR 'B' and 'D'

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors toured risk significant areas based on a review of the licensee's Independent Plant Evaluation for External Events to assess the material condition of the fire detection and suppression equipment and to verify fire protection system equipment was not obstructed. The inspectors reviewed Procedure 40AC-ENG-008-OS, Fire Protection Program, the Site Fire Hazards Analysis and applicable Pre-fire Plan drawings. The inspectors performed area walkdowns to verify that the licensee was controlling transient combustibles and that the necessary fire fighting equipment was in accordance with design requirements. The fire areas toured included:

- Intake Structure Unit 1 & 2, Fire Areas 0501
- Control Building Unit 1 & 2, Fire Areas 1104, 2104, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2021
- Unit 1 Reactor Building, 185 and 203 ft levels, Fire Areas 1203I, 1205R, 1205S, 1205T, 1205X, and 1205Y
- Unit 1 Turbine Building, 112, 130, and 147 ft levels, Fire Areas 1101C, 1101H, 1101J, 1101M, 1101N, 1102, and 1103 Areas that were accessible
- Unit 1 & 2 Emergency Bus Switchgear Rooms, Fire Areas 1402, 1404, 1406, 1408, 1410, 1412, 2402, 2404, 2406, 2408, and 2409
- Unit 1 & 2 Control Building, Switchgear Room Fire Area 024A

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R08 Inservice Inspection (ISI) Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the implementation of the licensee's inservice inspection program for monitoring degradation of vital system boundaries. This inspectable area verifies aspects of the Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity cornerstones for which there are no indicators to measure performance. The inspection was conducted immediately prior to the Hatch Unit 1 1R20 refueling outage which was in the first of three period examinations planned for the Third Ten Year Inservice Inspection interval. Nondestructive testing activities were reviewed including the planning, scope, and method employed, as well as portions of applicable test procedures and initial findings, to verify that the licensees' program met the requirements of ASME Code Section XI, 1989 Edition (no addenda). For performance demonstrated initiative (PDI) ultrasonic examinations the inspectors verified that 1995 and 1996 Addenda ASME Code requirements were met. The inspectors observed in-progress examinations, reviewed flaw evaluations, and reviewed activities associated with ISI problem identification and resolution. The ISI activities reviewed included:

- Ultrasonic calibrations and examination of Class 1 residual heat removal (RHR) pipe welds (1E11-2RHR-14B-SS-4, 1E11-2RHR-24B-BP-6), and magnetic particle examinations for welds on Class 1 RHR piping (E11-2RHR-20-RS-7, 1E11-2RHR-20-RS-7)

- Repair and replacement program Section XI radiographs and radiographic documentation for a Class 1 reactor water clean-up carbon steel to stainless steel valve flange, Class 2 RHR welds, and a core spray valve weld

- Repair and replacement program weld documentation and fabrication for ASME code plant service water supply piping to the 1B Diesel Generator

- A sample of refueling outage inservice inspection examination records and interviewed Hatch and NDE contractor ISI personnel.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the simulator scenario LT-SG-50421, Leaking SRV Vacuum Breaker Sticks Open, SRV Fails Open. The inspectors reviewed licensee Procedures 10AC-MGR-019-0S, Procedure Use and Adherence, and DI-OPS-59-0896N, Operations Management Expectations, to verify operator performance for the following: communications; procedure usage; alarm response; control board manipulations; and supervisory oversight. The inspectors also reviewed licensee Procedure 73-EP-EIP-001-0S, Emergency Classification and Initial Actions, to verify that the event action level was correctly identified and reported. The inspectors attended the licensee's critique of operator performance to verify that the licensee was identifying operator performance issues as required by licensee Procedure DI-TRN-24-0885N, Simulator Documentation.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operator logs and Condition Reports (CR) for the following performance-based problems to verify that the licensee met the requirements of the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65). The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's procedures listed in the Attachment to verify that the licensee was properly classifying maintenance preventable functional failures, personnel were properly evaluating maintenance effectiveness on equipment important to safety, and that equipment failures were being identified, properly assessed, and corrective actions established to return the equipment to a reliable condition.

- 2B Recirculation Pump Flow Change, CR 2001009843
- Trip of 2P63-B016A Turbine Building Chiller, CR 2001010299
- Trip of 2P63-B016B Turbine Building Chiller, CR 2001010579
- Failure of Traveling Water Screens to Automatically Cycle, CR 2001010548 and 2001010770
- Failure of 1X41-B005B Intake Structure Heater, CR 2001010802 and 2001010819
- Failure of Unit 1 1A MSR Drain Tank, CR 2001010884

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee Plan of the Day (POD) documents listed below to verify that risk assessments were performed prior to components being removed from service. In addition, when emergent work was identified, the inspectors held discussions with licensee personnel and walked down plant systems to verify that actions were taken to minimize increased initiating event probability and maintain the functional capability of mitigating systems. Documents reviewed to support this inspection are listed in the Attachment of this report.

- POD for work week of January 25 - January 31, 2002
- POD following 1B EDG Battery Bank Inoperable due to degraded voltage on 1R42-S001B Cell #28
- POD following Unit 1 Forced Shutdown, Off-Gas System Failure
- POD following 1B Emergency Diesel Generator inoperable and Emergent Switchyard Work on Disconnect 179481
- POD following Standby Plant Service Water Pump inoperability
- POD following Standby Plant Service Water Pump Failure of Retest

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operability determinations to verify that the operability of systems important to safety was properly established, that the system or component remained available to perform it's intended function, and that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. In addition, the inspectors assessed the implementation of required compensatory measures as a result of the degraded condition. Operability evaluations were reviewed for the following:

- Unit 1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) pump increased testing due to flow uncertainties, CR 2001011086
- Unit 1B EDG Battery, Cell #28 Jumpered Out Of Service, CR 2002001038
- 2P41-C002, Standby Plant Service Water pump reduced flow, CR 2002001823

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator WorkArounds

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the cumulative effects of operator workarounds on the reliability, availability, and potential for misoperation of a system to verify that there was no increased overall plant risk. This included increased initiating event frequencies or

effects on multiple mitigating systems and the ability of operators to correctly respond to abnormal plant conditions.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Design Change Request (DCR) 00-025, Delete RCIC Electronic Overspeed Trip, Unit 1, applicable 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations, and the RCIC system licensing design basis to verify the modification did not affect RCIC system function. The inspectors also reviewed the modification package to verify that changes to applicable procedures and licensing basis documents were completed or were scheduled for revision. The inspectors also reviewed the post-modification testing to verify the requirements for RCIC system operability were met. Applicable documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed or reviewed post-maintenance tests for the following work activities to verify that equipment was properly returned to service and that the testing demonstrated the equipment was operable.

The post-maintenance tests were:

- Repair of Unit 2 'B' Outboard Main Steam Isolation Valve, Maintenance Work Order (MWO) 2013746,
- Replacement of Unit 2 Safety Relief Valve (SRV) 'M' Pilot Valve, MWO 20103755
- Replacement of Unit 2 'B' Recirculation Pump Scoop Tube Amplifier Circuit Board, MWO 2020026
- Adjustment of Limit Switch Arm (Unit 2 'B' Outboard Main Steam Isolation Valve), MWO 20200200
- Replacement of Drywell Personnel Airlock Seals, MWO 10200507
- Replacement of Unit 1 SRV 'G', 'H', and 'L' Pilot Valves, MWO 10101314, MWO 10101315, and 10101318
- Repair of fuel oil system leaks (1B Emergency Diesel Generator), MWO 10002986
- Repair of oil separator system (1B Emergency Diesel Generator), MWO 10200621
- Replace fuel plug O-rings and gaskets (1B Emergency Diesel Generator), MWO 10200403
- Replace and Calibrate the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) EGM, MWO 20200141

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted reviews and observations for selected licensee outage activities to ensure that: (1) the licensee considered risk in developing the outage plan; (2) the licensee adhered to the outage plan to control plant configuration based on risk; (3) that mitigation strategies were in place for losses of key safety functions; and (4) the licensee adhered to operating license and TS requirements. Between March 23 and March 30, the inspectors reviewed or observed activities related to the following to verify that operations were being conducted safely and that procedural adherence guidelines were followed. Applicable documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment of this report.

Review of Outage Planning: The inspectors reviewed the licensee's outage schedule and shutdown risk assessment to determine if the licensee had appropriately considered risk, industry experience, and previous site experience. Additionally, the inspectors assessed the licensee's mitigation strategies for limiting those times of highest risk.

Monitoring of Shutdown Activities: The inspectors performed a review of operating logs to verify that reactor coolant system cooldown rates met TS 3.4.9 cooldown limits.

Licensee Control of Outage Activities: The inspectors periodically reviewed the outage safety assessment to verify the licensee was considering which equipment was available for service. In addition, the inspectors reviewed contingency procedures and equipment relied upon to mitigate an event to verify procedures were consistent with the assumptions in the shutdown risk assessment and equipment was in place. In addition,

the inspectors reviewed the Decay Heat Removal System configuration to verify it was properly aligned to remove decay heat. The secondary containment configuration was reviewed to verify it was intact to support the refueling functions with the appropriate Standby Gas Treatment Units operable. The inspectors walked down two clearances to verify the associated equipment was properly configured to support the function of the clearance.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed surveillance test procedures to verify the test scope demonstrated the affected equipment was being tested to meet the operability requirements of TS. The inspectors also either observed the test or reviewed test results to verify preconditioning of equipment, procedure adherence, and valve alignment following completion of the surveillance. The inspectors reviewed licensee Procedure AG-MGR-21-0386N, Evolution and Pre-and Post-Job Brief Guidance, and attended selected briefings to verify that procedure requirements were met. Documents reviewed to support this inspection are listed in the Attachment of this report. Test procedures either reviewed or witnessed included the following:

- 34SV-E21-001-1S, Core Spray Pump Operability
- 34SV-E41-002-2S, HPCI Pump Operability
- 34SV-E51-002-1S, RCIC Pump Operability
- 34SV-T48-002-1S, Suppression Chamber To Drywell Vacuum Breaker Operability And Containment Purge/Vent Valve Position Check
- 34SV-R43-012-2S, Diesel Generator 1B 18 Month Operability Test
- 57SV-CAL-003-1S, ATTS Transmitter Calibration
- 34SV-SUV-027-1S, Reactor Building Isolation LSFT
- 34SV-T22-001-0S, Secondary Containment Test

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following temporary modifications (TMM) and safety evaluation to verify the TMM's met the requirements of licensee procedure 40AC-ENG-018-0S, Temporary Modification Control, and 10 CFR 50.59. The inspectors also walked down these modifications to verify they were installed as described in the TMM.

- Removal of SRV Relay Indicating Lights on Panel P628, TMM 2-01-24
- Install Blank Flange on Standby Plant Service Water System, TMM 2-02-004

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP2 Alert and Notification System Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the licensee's testing and maintenance programs for the alert and notification system (ANS) to determine whether those programs were being implemented in accordance with Emergency Plan commitments. The ANS comprised approximately 3090 tone-alert radios provided by the licensee to residences, businesses, and schools located within the ten-mile emergency planning zone. The testing program involved weekly activation tests (initiated by the National Weather Service) as well as an annual telephone survey (conducted by the licensee) to determine whether the ANS met the acceptance criterion of 70 percent notification coverage, as established by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The maintenance of the ANS was administered primarily by means of an annual mailing (to all addresses of radio installations) which provided a replacement battery and emergency information calendar and solicited feedback regarding any tone-alert radio operability problems.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP3 Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Augmentation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the maintenance and testing of the licensee's capability to staff emergency response facilities (ERFs) in accordance with the requirements of the Emergency Plan. The licensee's new automated system (implemented on May 1, 2001) for call-out of ERO personnel was reviewed to determine whether it would support augmentation of the ERO in accordance with the ERF activation criteria. Records of an off-hour ERO augmentation drill (which included travel to the plant and activation of ERFs) conducted on May 14, 2001 were reviewed. Records of ERO notification drills (which involved report of availability and estimated travel time to the plant) conducted on December 6, 2001 and February 28, 2002 were also reviewed. Follow-up activities for a sample of problems identified through augmentation testing were evaluated to determine whether appropriate corrective actions were implemented. A Shift Operations Supervisor (interim Emergency Director upon declaration of an emergency) was interviewed to determine the adequacy of call-out system activation procedures and associated personnel training.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP4 Emergency Action Level (EAL) and Emergency Plan Changes

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed changes to the Emergency Plan as contained in Version 17 against the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q) to determine whether any of the changes decreased Plan effectiveness. All changes made to the EALs had received NRC approval prior to implementation. The inspector determined whether the EAL modifications were reviewed with, and agreed upon by, State and local officials prior to implementation, as required by Section IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector evaluated the effectiveness of licensee processes that addressed the correction of weaknesses and deficiencies in emergency preparedness (EP). Documents reviewed included various CRs, Audit No. 01-EP-1 (onsite EP), Audit Report No. 01-01 (offsite EP support), self-assessment reports, and critique reports for ERO drills conducted on February 14 and November 14, 2001. The inspector reviewed in detail the licensee's documentation (including CR No. 2001006308) regarding a failure on July 23, 2001 to declare a Notification of Unusual Event in a timely manner (a Green finding for this failure is documented in Section 4OA7).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone

On March 12, 2002, licensee records were reviewed to determine whether the submitted PI values (through the fourth quarter of 2001) were calculated in accordance with the guidance contained in Section 2.4 (Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone) of NEI 99-02, Revision 1, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline."

.1 Emergency Response Organization Drill/Exercise Performance PI

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector assessed the accuracy of the PI for ERO drill and exercise performance (DEP) through review of a sample of drill records. Documentation was reviewed for ERO drills conducted on February 14 and November 14, 2001, a sample of licensed operator requalification drills conducted during May-July 2001, and a Notification of Unusual Event declared on July 23, 2001 to verify the licensee's reported data regarding successes in emergency classifications, notifications, and protective action recommendations. The currently reported DEP PI value (an aggregate of data from the past eight quarters) was 95.7 percent.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 ERO Drill Participation PI

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector assessed the accuracy of the PI for ERO drill participation through review of the training records for 12 of the 138 key positions in the ERO as of the end of the fourth quarter of 2001. The currently reported ERO drill participation PI value was 94.9 percent.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Event Follow-up

.1 Unit 1 Reactor Scram Due to Failure of Off-Gas System

a. Inspection Scope

On February 8, Unit 1 was manually scrammed from approximately 27% RTP when hydrogen levels in the off gas system reached about 4%. The Unit 1 Technical Requirements Manual requires a unit shutdown when hydrogen levels exceeded 4%. The inspectors reviewed the control room logs, discussed the plant shutdown with control room licensed operators, and observed engineering and maintenance activities involved in the diagnosis and repair of the off gas system to verify that licensee procedures were followed. The licensee determined that this event was caused by multiple equipment failures associated with the off gas system. This event was documented in the licensee's corrective action program as CR 2002001309.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-366/01-02-00: Reactor Recirculation Pump Flow Rate Changes Cause Reactor Scram on APRM High Flux

This LER addressed the Hatch Unit 2 reactor scram which occurred on October 26, 2001. The cause and details of the event were documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-321,366/01-07. No new findings of significance were identified. This event was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 2001009834.

.3 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-366/01-03-00: Sudden Closure of Main Steam Isolation Valve Causes Pressure Increase and Reactor Scram on APRM High Flux

This LER addressed the Hatch Unit 2 reactor scram which occurred on December 25, 2001. The cause and details of the event were documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-321,366/01-07. No new findings of significance were identified. This event was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 2001011345.

4OA6 Management Meetings

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Pete Wells, General Manager, and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on April 4. No proprietary information was identified.

.2 Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) - Annual Assessment Meeting

On April 18, 2002, the NRC Division of Reactor Projects Branch Chief and the Senior Resident Inspector assigned to the HNP met with SNC to discuss the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) and the HNP annual assessment of safety performance for the period of April 1, 2001 - December 31, 2001. This meeting was open to the public. The major topics addressed were: the NRC's assessment program, the results of the HNP assessment, and the NRC's Agency Action Matrix. Attendees included FNP site management, members of site staff, members of the local new media and members of the public.

Information used for the discussions of the ROP is available from the NRC's document system (ADAMS) as accession number ML020600179. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at *http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html*.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Issues

The following finding of very low significance was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which met the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV). If the licensee denies this NCV, they should provide a response with the basis of their denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant.

NCV Tracking Number	Requirement Licensee Failed to Meet
50-321, 366/01-08-01	On July 23, 2001, the licensee failed to promptly declare a Notification of Unusual Event in accordance with 73EP-EIP-001-0S after information (low water level at the plant intake) was available to Control Room personnel that applicable emergency classification criteria had been exceeded. 10 CFR 50.54(q) requires that nuclear power plant licensees follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b). Planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) specifies the use of a "standard emergency classification and action level scheme", which was delineated in the licensee's emergency plan and implemented via procedure 73EP-EIP-001-0S, Emergency Classification and Initial Actions. This has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 2001006308.

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

50-321, 366/01-08-01	NCV	Failure to Declare NOUE Promptly (Section 4OA7)

Closed

50-366/01-02-00	LER	Reactor Recirculation Pump Flow Rate Changes Cause Reactor Scram on APRM High Flux (Section 4OA3.2)
50-366/01-03-00	LER	Sudden Closure of Main Steam Isolation Valve Causes Pressure Increase and Reactor Scram on APRM High Flux (Section 4OA3.3)
50-321, 366/01-08-01	NCV	Failure to Declare NOUE Promptly (Section 4OA7)

Supplementary Information

LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

Betsill, J., Assistant General Manager - Plant Support
Burkett, E., Operations Support Superintendent
Cowan S. Radiation Protection Manager
Davis, D., Plant Administration Manager
Dedrickson, R., Operations Manager
Googe, M., Performance Team Manager
Hammonds, J., Engineering Support Manager
Johnson, G., Safety Audit and Engineering Review Supervisor
Kirkley, W., Health Physics and Chemistry Manager
Lewis, J., Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager
Madison, D., Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations
Reddick, R., Site Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
Roberts, P., Outage and Planning Manager
Smith D., Chemistry Manager
Thompson, J., Nuclear Security Manager
Tipps, S., Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager
Underwood, P., Unit Superintendent
Varnadore, R., Unit Superintendent
Wells, P., General Manager - Nuclear Plant

NRC

S. Cahill, Chief, Region II Reactor Projects Branch 2

INSPECTION DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1R04

Plant Drawings - H-16329, Rev. 61; H-16330, Rev. 51; H-16331, Rev 26; and H-11600, Rev. 31
34SO-E21-001-1S, Core Spray System Valve Lineup, Rev. 19 Ed. 1
34SO-E11-010-1S, Residual Heat Removal System, Rev. 29.1
34SO-R43-001-1S, Diesel Generator Standby AC System, Rev. 21.5
34SO-R43-001-2S, Diesel Generator Standby AC System, Rev. 23.6
34SO-P41-005-2S, Standby Diesel Service Water System, Rev. 8 Ed. 3

Section 1R08

Condition Reports

CR 2002002703: Core Spray system flange has 6 studs which do not meet Site General Maintenance Procedure 51GM-MNT-033-0 Requirements dated March 22, 2002
CR 2002002704; RHR system 1E11-F072 has some studs which do not meet Site General Maintenance Procedure 51GM-MNT-033-0 Requirements dated March 22, 2002

CR 2002002733; Documentation of N2D Second Interval Reactor Recirculation Nozzle Weld Coverage dated March 22, 2002

Procedures

Southern Nuclear Plant Hatch Ultrasonic Examination Procedure UT-H-401; “Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Full Penetration Ferritic Welds”; Revision 3

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