September 7, 2001

Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley, President
Exelon Nuclear
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
4300 Winfield Road
Warrenville, IL 60555

SUBJECT: DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION
NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-237/01-15(DRP); 50-249/01-15(DRP)

Dear Mr. Kingsley:

On August 14, 2001, the NRC completed an inspection at your Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3. The enclosed report presents the inspection findings which were discussed with Mr. P. Swafford and other members of your staff on August 16, 2001.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and to compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Specifically, this inspection focused on resident inspection activities.

Based on the results of this inspection, the inspectors identified one finding of very low safety significance (Green). This finding was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of its very low safety significance, and because the issue has been entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this issue as a Non-Cited Violation, in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. If you deny this Non-Cited Violation, you should provide a response with the basis for your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspectors at the Dresden Nuclear Power Station.

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Sincerely,

***/RA/***

Mark Ring, Chief
Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-237; 50-249
License Nos. DPR-19; DPR-25

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-237/01-15(DRP);
50-249/01-15(DRP)

cc w/encl: W. Bohlke, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Services
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

| | |
|---|---|
| Docket Nos: | 50-237; 50-249 |
| License Nos: | DPR-19; DPR-25 |
| Report No: | 50-237/01-15(DRP); 50-249/01-15(DRP) |
| Licensee: | Commonwealth Edison Company |
| Facility: | Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 |
| Location: | 6500 North Dresden Road<br>Morris, IL 60450 |
| Dates: | July 1 through August 14, 2001 |
| Inspectors: | D. Smith, Senior Resident Inspector<br>B. Dickson, Resident Inspector<br>R. Lerch, Project Engineer<br>P. Pelke, Reactor Engineer<br>R. Lloyd, Senior Reactor Systems Engineer, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research<br>R. Zuffa, Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety |
| Approved by: | Mark Ring, Chief<br>Branch 1<br>Division of Reactor Projects |

## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000237-01-15(DRP), IR 05000249-01-15(DRP), on 07/01-08/14/2001, Exelon Generation Company, Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3. Refueling and Outage Activities.

The inspection covered a 6-week routine inspection. The inspection was conducted by resident, regional and headquarters inspectors. The inspection identified one Green finding which was also a Non-Cited Violation.

The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by "No Color" or by the severity level of the applicable violation. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html.

A. Inspector Identified Findings

**Cornerstone: Initiating Events**

Green. The inspectors identified a Non-Cited Violation concerning the licensee's failure to ensure that foreign material exclusion area requirements were adhered to while performing work activities on the Unit 2/3 Reactor Building Crane (NCV 50-237/01-15-01).

The event had minimal safety significance because no foreign material entered the spent fuel pool and no mitigating systems would be affected by this issue (1R20).

B. Licensee Identified Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

## Report Details

### Summary of Plant Status

Unit 2 began the period at full power operations. Operators lowered and raised unit load throughout the inspection period due to high temperature weather conditions.

Unit 3 began the period at full power operations. On July 1, 2001, the licensee performed a forced outage on Unit 3 to replace the motor operator for the isolation condenser inboard steam isolation valve (3-1301-1). Also during the forced outage, the licensee performed work on the electro-hydraulic control system and repaired a leak on the drain line to the 3B reactor recirculation pump. The unit was returned to full power on July 4, 2001. On July 5, 2001, the licensee manually scrammed the unit and declared an Alert due to increasing high drywell pressure. The high drywell pressure was caused by the failure of a temperature control valve for the 3B reactor building closed cooling water heat exchanger. The unit was returned to full power operations on July 7, 2001. Also, operators lowered and raised unit load throughout the inspection period due to high temperature weather conditions.

### 1. REACTOR SAFETY

**Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity**

#### 1R04 Equipment Alignments (71111.04)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors selected a redundant or backup system to an out-of-service or degraded train, reviewed documents to determine correct system lineup, and verified critical portions of the system configuration. Instrumentation valve configurations and appropriate meter indications were also observed. The inspectors observed various support system parameters to determine the operational status of the system. Control room switch positions for the systems were observed. Other conditions, such as adequacy of housekeeping, the absence of ignition sources, and proper labeling were also evaluated. The systems reviewed included the Unit 3 Low Pressure Coolant Injection System and the Unit 2 Core Spray System.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

#### 1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors toured plant areas important to safety to assess the material condition, operating lineup, and operational effectiveness of the fire protection system and features. The review included control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, fire suppression systems, manual fire fighting equipment and capability, passive fire

protection features (including fire doors), and the compensatory measures. The tour included the following areas:

Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Room — Fire Zone 9.0.A

Unit 2/3 Emergency Diesel Generator Room — Fire Zone 9.0.C

Unit 2 West Low Pressure Coolant Injection Room — Fire Zone 11.2.1

Unit 3 West Low Pressure Coolant Injection Room — Fire Zone 11.1.1

Unit 2 Standby Liquid Control Pump Area — Fire Zone 1.1.1.5D

Unit 2 Refuel Floor — Fire Zone 1.1.2.6

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification (71111.11)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed and assessed the performance of operators in the control room and in the simulator to identify deficiencies and discrepancies in performance and training. The inspectors also assessed licensed operator performance for operating crew #6 during "out-of-the-box" dynamics on July 25, 2001, and the evaluators' critiques following the dynamic examination. The scenarios included the following:

Scenario F-P1 which included a loss of TR22, loss of feedwater and loss of coolant accident/recovery.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the licensee's implementation of the maintenance rule by determining if systems were properly scoped within the maintenance rule. The inspectors also assessed the licensee's characterization of failed structures, systems, and components, and determined whether goal setting and performance monitoring were adequate for the Unit 2 and 3 Shutdown Cooling System and the Unit 2 Condensate Feedwater Heaters.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Work Prioritization & Control (71111.13)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before maintenance activities were conducted on structures, systems, and components and verified how the licensee managed the risk. The inspectors evaluated whether the licensee had taken the necessary steps to plan and control emergent work activities. The inspectors reviewed maintenance activities on the 3B Standby Liquid Control Pumps and the Unit 3 Intermediate Range Monitoring System.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Personnel Performance Related to Non-routine Evolutions and Events (71111.14)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operator logs, problem identification forms, the sequence of events recorder, and alarm printer outputs associated with the manual scram and alert declaration on July 5, 2001. The inspectors interviewed operations, maintenance, and engineering personnel concerning the cause of the failure and the resulting sequence of events.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operability evaluations to ensure that operability was properly justified and the component or system remained available, such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors reviewed an operability evaluation which addressed the failure of the Unit 3 main turbine oil system to trip during a weekly functional check, on August 12, 2001. The inspectors also reviewed an operability evaluation which addressed the capability of Unit 2 control rod drive pump to support safe shutdown of both Unit 2 and Unit 3.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Workarounds (71111.16)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed all open operator workarounds that were active as of August 2, 2001. The inspectors assessed any potential effect on the functionality of mitigating systems to determine whether functional capability of the system was affected. The inspectors also determined if the operators' ability to implement abnormal or emergency operating procedures was impacted.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing (71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed post maintenance test results to confirm that the tests were adequate for the scope of the maintenance being performed, and that the test data met the acceptance criteria. The inspectors reviewed testing on the Unit 2 'D' low pressure coolant injection pump, the intermediate range monitor number 17, and the flow indicator for Low Pressure Coolant Injection system, Division II.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities (71111.20)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed activities associated with the Unit 3 forced outage that occurred from July 1 through July 4, 2001. The outage was necessitated by the failure of the isolation condenser condensate return valve. The inspectors also observed startup activities on July 3, 2001.

The inspectors reviewed Unit 2 pre-refueling outage activities including new fuel receipt inspections and refuel floor preparations.

b. Findings

The inspectors identified one Green finding involving a Non-Cited Violation.

On August 7, 2001, inspectors observed refuel floor activities and noted that licensee personnel were performing work activities on the Unit 2/3 reactor building crane. The reactor building crane was docked over the Unit 2 spent fuel pool. Dresden administrative procedure MA-AA-AD-6-03008, Revision 0, "Foreign Material Exclusion," designated the spent fuel pool as permanent foreign material exclusion area (FMEA) 1.

Section 2.1 of this procedure specified the following requirements for FMEA 1 areas: posting FMEA boundaries and signs, establishing equipment logging requirements and securing tools and equipment that are not fail-safe with lanyards to prevent loss. Additionally, Section 4.1.2 of this procedure stated that prior to commencing work, the work group supervisor shall review the work scope to determine that the foreign material exclusion area designation and special requirements are appropriate.

The following observations were contrary to requirements established in MA-AA-AD-6-03008:

1) There were no FMEA area signs on the reactor building crane designating the walkway as an FMEA 1 area,

2) No logging of tools or material into the area had taken place,

3) Worker tools and equipment were not secured with lanyards or otherwise secured, and

4) Operations and reactor services were unaware that these activities were ongoing and, therefore, had not considered special requirements.

Failure to follow the requirements of MA-AA-AD-6-03008 could lead to the introduction of foreign material into the Unit 2 spent fuel pool. If left uncorrected, this issue could result in foreign material being unknowingly introduced into the reactor cavity during refueling outage activities (with the reactor head and internals removed). This foreign material could create unanalyzed flow disturbances and even flow blockage in the reactor core with resultant fuel cladding integrity issues. The inspectors did not witness any foreign material introduced into the spent fuel pool and this issue would not have affected the availability of any mitigating system. Therefore this finding was considered to be of very low safety significance (Green).

Section 5.4 of Dresden's Improved Technical Specification states that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Administrative procedures addressing foreign material exclusion are listed in this regulatory guide. Contrary to the above, on August 7, 2001, the inspectors identified that work activities over the Unit 2 spent fuel pool were not in accordance with Section 2.1 and Section 4.2.1 of Dresden's administrative procedure MA-AA-AD-6-03008, Revision 0, "Foreign Material Exclusion." This was an apparent violation. This violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section VI.A.1, of the NRC Enforcement Policy **(NCV 50-237/01-15-01(DRP)).** This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report (CR) D2001-04122.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed surveillance testing on risk-significant equipment. The inspectors assessed whether the selected plant equipment could perform its intended safety function and satisfy the requirement contained in the Technical Specifications. Following the completion of the test, the inspectors determined that the test equipment was removed and the equipment returned to a condition in which it could perform its intended safety function. The review included surveillance testing activities for the Unit 2/3 Emergency Diesel Generator, Unit 2 Reactor Wide Range Pressure Transmitter and Post Loss of Coolant Accident Containment Hydrogen and Oxygen Analyzer Flow Transmitter.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors screened an active temporary modification on a system ranked high in risk and assessed the effect of this temporary modification on safety-related systems. The inspectors also determined that the installations were consistent with the system design. The inspectors reviewed the 2/3 reactor building crane fast speed mode of operation modification.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

## 4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA3 Event Follow-up (71153)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee event reports to ensure that issues documented in these reports were adequately addressed in the licensee's corrective action program. The inspectors also interviewed plant personnel and reviewed operating and maintenance procedures to ensure that generic issues were captured appropriately. The inspectors also followed up on unresolved items.

The inspectors reviewed operator logs, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and other documents to verify the statements contained in the Licensee Event Reports.

b. Findings

.1 (Open) Unresolved Item (URI) 50-237/01-13-03(DRP): Inadequate Surveillance Acceptance Criteria. This URI questioned whether the acceptance criteria contained in the warm fast start portion of the Dresden Operation Surveillance (DOS) 2300-03, "High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) Operability Verification," Revision 67, met the intent of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and Dresden's Improved Technical Specifications.

The licensee acknowledged that the procedure adequacy was in question because the discharge pressure was not part of the acceptance criteria. Despite this inadequacy, the licensee stated that the warm-fast start test was not intended to be a demonstration of the system operability but was intended to demonstrate a specific portion of system design. Moreover, the licensee concluded that there were no technical specification requirements or in-service testing requirements to perform the high pressure coolant injection system warm-fast initiation test. The licensee added that the demonstration of HPCI to automatically startup and inject into the core was demonstrated in DOS 2300-07, "High Pressure Coolant Injection Fast Initiation Test." Despite the licensee's conclusion that the part of the test was not required, the licensee had an action item to evaluate the warm-fast start procedure with regard to these weaknesses. According to the licensee, the evaluation would result in either enhancing the procedure to require demonstration of discharge pressure or deleting the warm-fast initiation portion of the test. The licensee later deleted this portion of the test.

During a review of DOS 2300-07, the inspectors noted this procedure also did not contain an associated discharge pressure head as part of the timed cold fast-start acceptance criteria. DOS 2300-07 is performed to satisfy Dresden's Improved Technical Specification surveillance requirement 3.5.1.8. This surveillance requirement requires the licensee to verify each emergency core cooling system (ECCS) injection and spray system actuates on an actual or simulated automatic initiation signal.

The purpose of this fast start requirement is to ensure that the HPCI system can meet the design basis as described in Chapter 6 of the UFSAR. In particular, UFSAR Section 6.3.3.1.3.2, "Evaluation of HPCI Subsystem Performance (Historical Information)," describes the performance of an unassisted HPCI subsystem during a typical small break loss of coolant accident which is graphically depicted in Figure 6.3-14, "Unassisted HPCI Performance." This figure shows that with the reactor vessel at operating pressure, HPCI starts up, begins to depressurize the reactor vessel and starts to recover reactor vessel level within a short time period (seconds) following a small break accident.

10 CFR 50 Appendix A, Criterion 37, "Testing of Emergency Core Cooling System," states that testing for the operability of the HPCI system should be done under conditions as close to design as practical, and the test should include the performance of the full operational sequence that brings the system into operation. Because a reasonable discharge pressure acceptance criteria is not included in the timed portion of DOS 2300-07, the test does not demonstrate that the HPCI system can automatically startup and inject into the reactor pressure vessel as depicted in Figure 6.3-14 of the

UFSAR. The inspectors were continuing to evaluate DOS 2300-07 and DOS 2300-03 at the end of the inspection period; therefore, this URI will remain open.

.2 (Closed) Unresolved Item (URI) 50-237/01-13-04(DRP): Improper Crediting of Manual Operator during Surveillance. The inspectors questioned whether the HPCI system was fully functional due to the failure of the system to automatically maintain a design flow of greater than 5000 gallons per minute (gpm) during a quarterly operability surveillance test.

During the surveillance test, the operators established the required pump discharge header pressure. The HPCI system failed to automatically respond to the pressure increase, and system flow decreased below the acceptable range. The operators were eventually able to manually achieve a flow above 5000 gpm.

The licensee described the need to manually adjust HPCI flow was an inherent controller dead band issue. The licensee also stated that the test condition during this particular operability test did not reflect design basis conditions. The licensee commented that during an accident requiring HPCI, reactor pressure will not increase as HPCI injects into the reactor core. Instead, when water is injected system pressure will decrease and flow will increase to 5600 gpm. The motor gear unit would then slow the turbine and the motor gear unit high speed stop limit will automatically reset at 3900 rpm. Thus operation of the HPCI system would be automatic and would require no manual intervention. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's response to this issue and this URI is closed.

.3 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-237/1999-005-00/1999-005-01: Inadvertent Reactor Vessel Drain Down Through an Electromatic Relief Valve Caused by Procedure Non-Adherence Due to Inadequate Supervision and Ownership of Work. This issue was discussed in Inspection Report 50-237/1999018(DRP); 50-249/1999018(DRP), and Non-Cited Violation 50-237/1999018-04(DRP) was identified for the issue. The LER revealed no new information. This LER is closed.

.4 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-249/1999-004-01: Enforcement Discretion Required for Target Rock Safety/Relief Valve Inoperability. This issue was discussed in Inspection Report 50-237/1999008(DRP); 50-249/1999008(DRP). The NRC also issued a Notice of Enforcement Discretion and a technical specification change for this issue. The LER revealed no new information. This LER is closed.

OA6 Meetings, including Exit

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Swafford and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on August 16, 2001. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identified.

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

K. Bowman, Operations Manager
V. Castle, Training Operations Manager
R. Fisher, Plant Manager
T. Fisk, Chemistry Manager
V. Gengler, Security Manager
T. Luke, Engineering Manager
J. Nalewajka, Acting Nuclear Oversight Manager
B. Norris, RP Engineering Supervisor
R. Peak, Design Engineering Manager
R. Ruffin, NRC Coordinator
R. Rybak, Regulatory Assurance
W. Stoffels, Maintenance Manager
R. Whalen, System Engineering Manger

NRC

D. Smith, Dresden Senior Resident Inspector
B. Dickson, Dresden Resident Inspector

IDNS

R. Zuffa, Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 50-249/2001-13-01 | NCV | Inadequate Controls of Foreign Material Exclusion Area |

Closed

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 50-249/2001-13-01 | NCV | Inadequate Controls of Foreign Material Exclusion Area |
| 50-237/2001-13-02 | URI | High Pressure Coolant Injection Flow Controller Dead Band |
| 50-249/1999-04-01 | LER | Enforcement Discretion Required for Target Rock Safety/Relief Valve Inoperability |
| 50-237/1999-05-00<br>50-237/1999-05-01 | LER | Inadvertent Reactor Vessel Drain Down Through an Electromatic Relief Valve Caused by Procedure Non-Adherence Due to Inadequate Supervision and Ownership of Work |

Discussed

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 50-237/01-13-03 | URI | High Pressure Coolant Injection System Warm Fast Start Operability Surveillance Test Acceptance Criteria |

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

| | |
|---|---|
| CR | Condition Report |
| DOS | Dresden Operating Surveillance |
| ECCS | Emergency Core Cooling System |
| FMEA | Foreign Material Exclusion Area |
| gpm | gallons per minute |
| HPCI | High Pressure Coolant Injection |
| IDNS | Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety |
| LER | Licensee Event Report |
| NCV | Non Cited Violation |
| SDP | Significance Determination Process |
| UFSAR | Updated Final Safety Analysis Report |
| URI | Unresolved Item |
| WO | Work Order |

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

1R04 Equipment Alignment

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| CR D2001-03984 | Motor Operated Valve 3-1501-5C Limitorque Actuator Power Cable Seal Tite Pulled Away from Actuator | July 31, 2001 |
| Dresden Operating Procedure 1500-E1 | Unit 3 Low Pressure Coolant Injection and Containment Cooling Service Water System Electrical | Revision 11 |
| Dresden Operating Procedure 1500-M1 | Unit 3 Low Pressure Coolant Injection and Containment Cooling Valve Checklist | Revision 24 |

1R05 Fire Protection

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| CR D2001-03371 | Fire Extinguisher with Missing Seal | June 26, 2001 |
| CR D2001-03694 | Plant Barrier Impairment Program not used for Initial Condensate Prefilter Project | July 11, 2001 |
| CR D2001-03887 | Tamper Seals Removed and Not Replaced on Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Packs | July 25, 2001 |
| CR D2001-04099 | During Replacement of Flow Switch 2-4141-194C, Technical Requirement Manual 37JA1 Fire Watch Requirements were Missed | August 7, 2001 |
| | Updated Fire Safety Analysis Report, Unit 2 Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Room | Section 4.2.7 |
| | Updated Fire Safety Analysis Report, Unit 3 Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Room | Section 4.5.8 |
| | Updated Fire Safety Analysis Report, Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator | Section 4.8.10 |
| | Updated Fire Safety Analysis Report, Unit 2/3 Emergency Diesel Generator | Section 4.7.1 |

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| CR D2001-03803 | Unplanned Technical Specification Entry | July 20, 2001 |
| CR D2001-03854 | Buzzing Relay on Hydrogen-Oxygen Analyzer System Causes ½ Group 2 | July 24, 2001 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| CR D2001-03956 | Unit 1 Chimney Spring Failed Maintenance Rule Criteria | July 30, 2001 |
| CR D2001-03659 | Time Domain Reflectometer Results Incorrectly Predict Fault Location for Isolation Condenser 1301-1 Valve | July 1, 2001 |
| | Dresden Calculation No. DRE97-0241, Revision 2 | |
| | Dresden Calculation No. DRE98-0021, Revision 2 | |

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| CR D2001-03491 | Potential Rework Identified for Service Water Radiation Monitor 3-3941-887 | July 2, 2001 |
| WO 033407501 | Unit 3 'A' Control Rod Drive Pump Suction Pressure Switch Replacement | July 31, 2001 |
| CR D2001-03508 | U2 Service Water Radiation Monitor Failure Results in Unexpected Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Entry | July 2, 2001 |
| WO 99143801-01 | Unit 3 'B' Standby Liquid Control System, Replacement of Loss of Continuity Detector Relay | August 11, 2001 |
| WO 033726501 | Replaced Brushes on Positioner Direct Current Motor for 2A Reactor Recirculation Motor Generator Set | July 21, 2001 |

1R15 Operability Evaluation

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| CR D2001-03773 | Drywell to Torus Vent Dust Cover Bolting | July 13, 2001 |
| CR D2001-03791 | Bellows Covers on Torus/Drywell Vacuum Breakers 3-1601-32 / 3 A-F are Bolted at Both Ends | July 19, 2001 |
| CR D2001-03793 | High Pressure Coolant Injection Support Baseplate Anchor Pulled Out of Underside of 517 Slab | July 19, 2001 |
| CR D2001-03895 | Primary Vent Bellows Covers | July 25, 2001 |
| CR D2001-03715 | Use of Combustion Engines in Buildings that Communicated with Standby Gas Treatment System Not Evaluated | July 14, 2001 |
| Operability Evaluation 01-023 | Unit 2 Main Turbine Control Valve Oil Trip Functional Surveillance Failure | August 12, 2001 |

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| CR D2001-03714 | Operations Not Notified of Unit 2 Reactor Building Trackway Outer Door Testing Completed Prior to Use of Inner Manway | July 14, 2001 |
| | Dresden Operating Surveillance Procedures 1100-4 Quarterly Standby Liquid Control System Pump Test for the Inservice Testing (IST) Program | |
| WO 9923814701 | Replacement of Low Pressure Coolant Injection Loop II Flow Indicator to Recirculation Loop Injection | August 18, 2001 |
| WO 9916001301 | Unit 2 Intermediate Range Monitor 17 Replacement, Erratic Operation | August 3, 2001 |
| WO 034647501 | Dresden Instrument Surveillance 2400-01, Post Loss of Cooling Accident Containment Hydrogen Oxygen Analyzer Flow Transmitter Calibration Test | August 11, 2001 |
| | Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section 9.3.5 Standby Liquid Control System | |

1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| CR D2001-04122 | NRC Identifies Potential Foreign Material Exclusion Concern on Refuel Floor | |
| CR D2001-04031 | Historical Operating Practice Identified | July 5, 2001 |

1R22 Surveillance Testing

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| CR D2001-03530 | 2/3 Quarter Dresden Administrative Technical Requirement Security Uninterrupted Power Source 125v Battery Surveillance Scheduled Past Preventative Maintenance “Late” Date | July 4, 2001 |
| CR D2001-03692 | D-3 Source Range Monitor 24 High Voltage Inoperable Out of Calibration | July 13, 2001 |
| CR D2001-03741 | U3 Station Blackout Did Not Enter Station Blackout Mode per Dresden Operating Surveillance Procedures 6620-03 | July 16, 2001 |
| CR D2001-03832 | Instrument Maintenance Department Surveillance Dresden Instrument Surveillance 250-01 Test Summary Sheet is Incorrect | July 19, 2001 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| CR D2001-03816 | NRC Identified Deficiencies | July 21, 2001 |
| CR D2001-03874 | NRC Concerns with Dresden Operating Procedure 1500-E1 | July 24, 2001 |
| CR D2001-03888 | Nuclear Oversight Identified Non-Compliance with Standing Order 01-01 | July 25, 2001 |
| CR D2001-03938 | U-3 Main Turbine Oil Trip Failed | July 28, 2001 |
| CR D2001-03712 | Requirements of Technical Specification 3.10.3.c.1 not Met when Performing Dresden Operating Surveillance Procedures 0400-04 during U3 Start Up | July 14, 2001 |
| CR D2001-73006 | NRC Identifies Inadequate Acceptance Criteria for Dresden Operating Surveillance Procedure 2300-07 | |
| CR D2001-04167 | #3 Turbine Stop Valve Failure to Stroke with Test Push Button | August 12, 2001 |
| CR D2001-04168 | Turbine Combination Intercept Valve #2 Stop Valve did not Cycle with Test Push Button | August 12, 2001 |

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| CR D2001-03376 | Electrical Jumper not Removed Under Field Change Requirement 99088 for 3A Off Gas Train | June 26, 2001 |
| CR D2001-03677 | Reactor Building Crane Operation Exceeded its Electrical Duty Cycle Rating | July 11, 2001 |
| CR D2001-03673 | Reactor Building Crane Motor Duty Cycle | July 12, 2001 |
| CR D2001-03812 | Nuclear Oversight Identified two Temporary Modifications Procedure Adequacy Issues | July 20, 2001 |
| CR D2001-03892 | Nuclear Oversight Identifies Temporary Modifications with Unclear Pressure Test Documentation | July 25, 2001 |
| Design Change Package #331632 | Disable Encoder Function for Reactor Building Crane | July 2, 2001 |

1R14 Personnel Performance Related to Nonroutine Evolutions and Events

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|---|---|---|
| CR D2001-03515 | Recirculation Motor Generator Set Failed to Null When System Restarted in Prep for Unit Restart | July 2, 2001 |
| CR D2001-03610 | 3A Recirculation Pump Runup | July 10, 2001 |
| CR D2001-03675 | U3 A Recirculation Pump Increase in Speed Causes Unplanned Technical Specification Entry into 3.4.10. For Reactor Pressure | July 12, 2001 |
| CR D2001-03732 | 2B Reactor Recirculation Pump Speed Oscillations | July 16, 2001 |