UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-8064

December 6, 2001

Gregory M. Rueger, Senior Vice
President, Generation and Chief Nuclear Officer
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
Diablo Canyon Power Plant
P.O. Box 3
Avila Beach, CA 93424

SUBJECT: DIABLO CANYON INSPECTION REPORT 50-275/01-08; 50-323/01-08

Dear Mr. Rueger:

On November 17, 2001, the NRC completed routine resident inspection which was conducted from October 7 through November 17, 2001, at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, facility. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings that were discussed on October 25 and November 20, 2001, with Mr. James R. Becker and members of your staff as discussed in Section 40A6.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your licenses. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

No findings of significance were identified.

Since September 11, 2001, Diablo Canyon has assumed a heightened level of security based on a series of threat advisories issued by the NRC. Although the NRC is not aware of any specific threat against nuclear facilities, the heightened level of security was recommended for all nuclear power plants and is being maintained due to the uncertainty about the possibility of additional terrorist attacks. The steps recommended by the NRC include increased patrols, augmented security forces and capabilities, additional security posts, heightened coordination with local law enforcement and military authorities, and limited access of personnel and vehicles to the site.

The NRC continues to interact with the intelligence community and to communicate information to Pacific Gas and Electric Company. In addition, the NRC has monitored maintenance and other activities which could relate to the site's security posture.

Pacific Gas and Electric Company operated under voluntary bankruptcy proceedings during this inspection period. The NRC has exercised communications channels to better understand your planned and implemented actions, especially as they relate to your responsibility to safely operate the Diablo Canyon reactors. NRC inspections, to date, have confirmed that you are operating these reactors safely and that public health and safety is, thus far, assured.

In response to these conditions, there will continue to be two differences in how the Region communicates its inspection findings. First, we will continue the 6-week periodicity of our integrated inspection reports (the other reactors in Region IV implemented a quarterly report frequency, with the exception of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station). Second, the description of the scope of the individual inspection activities may be significantly more detailed. This is being done to keep the public more fully informed of the breadth and depth of the NRC's inspection and oversight activities.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

William B. Jones, Chief
Project Branch E
Division of Reactor Projects

Dockets: 50-275
50-323
Licenses: DPR-80
DPR-82

Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report
50-275/01-08; 50-323/01-08

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ENCLOSURE

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket Nos:	50-275 50-323
License Nos:	DPR-80 DPR-82
Report No:	50-275/01-08 50-323/01-08
Licensee:	Pacific Gas and Electric Company
Facility:	Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 and 2
Location:	7 ½ miles NW of Avila Beach Avila Beach, California
Dates:	October 7 through November 17, 2001
Inspectors:	D. L. Proulx, Senior Resident Inspector T. W. Jackson, Resident Inspector G. F. Suber, Acting Resident Inspector G. A. Pick, Senior Project Engineer L. E. Ellershaw, Senior Reactor Inspector
Approved By:	W. B. Jones, Chief, Project Branch E Division of Reactor Projects

ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000-275-01-08, IR 05000-323-01-08, 10/7 - 11/17/01, Pacific Gas and Electric Co., Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2

This report covers a 7-week routine resident and engineering inspection from October 7 through November 17, 2001. No findings of significance were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red) using IMC 0609 "Significance Determination Process." Findings for which the Significance Determination Process does not apply are indicated by "No Color" or by the severity level of the applicable violation. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html.

A. Inspector Identified Findings

None.

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

Diablo Canyon Unit 1 began this inspection period at 100 percent power. On November 9, 2001, operators decreased reactor power to 12 percent and separated the main generator from the electrical grid. The licensee repaired a main generator exciter neutral lead cover and cleaned the circulating water system tunnels while at 12 percent power. Following completion of these tasks, operators paralleled the Unit 1 main generator to the grid on November 11 and returned Unit 1 to 100 percent power on November 14. Unit 1 continued to operate at essentially 100 percent power until the end of the inspection period.

Diablo Canyon Unit 2 began this inspection period at 100 percent power. Unit 2 continued to operate at essentially 100 percent power until the end of this inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Planning

1R02 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments (71111.02)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a selected sample of 10 licensing basis impact evaluations to verify that the licensee had appropriately considered the conditions under which the licensee may make changes to the facility or procedures or conduct tests or experiments without prior NRC approval.

The inspectors reviewed an additional 12 licensing basis impact evaluation screenings, in which the licensee determined that evaluations were not required, to ensure that the licensee's exclusion of a full evaluation was consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the licensee's corrective action process to identify and correct problems concerning their performance associated with 10 CFR 50.59 requirements. In this effort, the inspectors reviewed 12 action requests and the subsequent corrective actions pertaining to licensee-identified problems and errors in the performance of licensing basis impact evaluations to ensure that problems and deficiencies were being identified and that appropriate corrective actions were being taken. Further, the inspectors reviewed two licensee self-assessments to determine whether the licensee conducted sufficient in-depth analyses of the licensing basis impact evaluation program to allow for the identification and subsequent resolution of problems or deficiencies. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed qualification records of a sample of those independent technical reviewers identified in the licensing basis impact evaluations and screenings.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignments (71111.04)

Partial System Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

On October 24-25, 2001, with Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump 1-3 declared inoperable for preventive maintenance, the inspectors performed a partial system walkdown of portions of systems associated with CCW Pump 1-2. The inspectors reviewed valve alignment and checked for absence of leakage; verified electric power line-up; observed proper labeling, lubrication, and ventilation; and checked the functionality of seismic supports. The inspectors used the following documents during the inspection:

Procedure OP F-2:I, "Component Cooling Water System – Make Available," Revision 22

Procedure OP F-2:VI, "CCW System Alignment Verification for Plant Startup," Revision 24B

Drawing OVID 106714, "Component Cooling Water":

- Sheet 2 - Revision 45
- Sheet 3 - Revision 49
- Sheet 4 - Revision 49
- Sheet 9 - Revision 49

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer System 0-1 and Portable Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump

a. Inspection Scope

On November 1, 2001, with Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer System 0-2 undergoing preventive maintenance, the inspectors performed a partial system walkdown of portions of the systems associated with Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer System 0-1 and the Portable Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump. The inspectors reviewed valve, electrical, control, and instrument air alignment. Absence of leakage, correct labeling, and adequate physical condition of the equipment was also checked. The inspectors also considered the operational condition of the portable diesel fuel oil transfer pump by confirming that components necessary for its prompt operation were at hand.

During the partial walkdown, the inspectors used the following documents:

Procedure OP J-6C:I, "Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer System - Make Available and Place In Service," Revision 10A

Procedure OP J-6C:V, “Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer System - Use of Portable Fuel Oil Transfer Pump and DFO Day Tank LCV’s,” Revision 8A

Drawing OVID 106721, “Diesel Engine - Generator”:
- Sheet 2, Revision 38
- Sheet 5, Revision 27

Drawing OVID 107721, “Diesel Engine - Generator”:
- Sheet 2, Revision 40
- Sheet 5, Revision 25

b. Findings

No finding of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

Monthly Routine Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed fire protection walkdowns to assess the material condition of plant fire detection and suppression, fire seal operability, and proper control of transient combustibles. The inspectors used Section 9.5 of the Final Safety Analysis Report Update as guidance. The inspectors verified that the suppression equipment and fire doors complied with regulatory requirements and conditions specified in Procedures STP M-69A, “Monthly Fire Extinguisher Inspection,” Revision 30, STP M-69B, “Monthly CO2 Hose Reel and Deluge Valve Inspection,” Revision 13, and STP M-70C, “Inspection/Maintenance of Doors,” Revision 5. Specific risk-significant areas inspected included:

- Diesel engine generator and 12 kV switchgear rooms of the turbine building
- Switchgear rooms of the auxiliary building

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Operator Requalification (71111.11)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors witnessed operator performance in the simulator during routine training and requalification examinations. The inspectors also attended the crew and individual debrief to determine if the evaluators critically assessed operator performance. The inspectors observed:

- On October 16, 2001, a simulator scenario associated with: (1) failure of a first-stage turbine pressure instrument, (2) main feedwater pump high vibration, (3) a loss-of-coolant accident outside of containment, and (4) an anticipated transient without scram

- On November 16, 2001, a simulator exercise associated with a steam generator tube rupture, followed by a stuck open steam generator safety valve

The inspectors used Procedures EOP E-0, “Reactor Trip or Safety Injection,” Revision 24, EOP E-3, “Steam Generator Tube Rupture,” Revision 21, and EOP ECA-3.1, “Steam Generator Tube Rupture with Loss of Reactor Coolant.” Revision 14.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12)

.1 Routine Reviews

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee’s maintenance rule implementation for equipment performance problems. The inspectors determined if the equipment was properly placed into the scope of the rule, if the failures were properly characterized, and if goal setting was recommended, if required. Procedure MA1.ID17, "Maintenance Rule Monitoring Program," Revision 8, was used as guidance. The inspectors reviewed the following action requests (ARs):

- AR A0533150, Load tap changer will not step down
- AR A0540712, Goal setting review for Valve CVCS-2-8109
- AR A0541146, 12 kV system goal setting review
- AR A0537137, FCV-242 failed to open after testing

The inspectors reviewed the following additional corrective action documents to determine whether the licensee made an appropriate disposition: (1) AR A0536729 documents that Valve CVCS-2-8109 failed its local leak rate test, and (2) Nonconformance Report N0002130 documents the failure of a fuse box in the 12 kV system. The inspectors referred to the maintenance rule scope documents for the 12 kV system during this evaluation.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)

Risk Assessments

a. Inspection Scope

Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed daily and weekly work schedules to determine when the licensee had scheduled risk-significant activities. The inspectors reviewed selected activities regarding risk evaluations and overall plant configuration control. The inspectors verified that the licensee established the applicable contingencies, as discussed in the risk assessments. The inspectors used Procedure AD7.DC6, "On-Line Maintenance Risk Management," Revision 5, as guidance and reviewed the activities associated with the following:

- Residual Heat Removal Pump 1-2 maintenance outage window on October 23, 2001
- CCW Pump 1-3 maintenance outage window on October 25, 2001

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operability evaluations and supporting documents to determine if the associated systems could meet their intended safety functions despite the degraded status. The inspectors reviewed the applicable Technical Specification (TS) Bases and Final Safety Analysis Report Update sections in support of this inspection. The inspectors reviewed the following ARs:

- AR A0543295, Evaluate Pressurizer Safety Valve 8010B High Temperature
- AR A0543591, Evaluate Auxiliary Feedwater System Design Basis with respect to TS 3.7.1

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Postmaintenance Testing (71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope

On October 24-26, 2001, the licensee performed routine and corrective maintenance on CCW Pump 1-3. The inspectors reviewed the following work orders to determine the extent of work and the adequacy of the postmaintenance test:

- C0173711 – Replace control board lamp sockets for CCW Pump 1-3
- R0189021 – Test and calibrate CCW Pump 1-3 motor relays
- R0216363 – Sample CCW Pump 1-3 motor bearing oil
- R0188858 – Calibrate CCW Pump 1-3 panel ammeters
- R0224149 – Return to service test for Component Cooling Water Pump 1-3

The inspectors analyzed the adequacy of the test's acceptance criteria and to verify that proper test equipment was used and then removed from the equipment upon completion of the tests. Other documents that were reviewed during the course of the inspection included:

- Procedure MP E-60.55, "Relay Functional Test – Basler Type BE1-50/51B Relays," Revision 1

- Procedure MP E-57.15, "Maintenance and Calibration of Ammeters, Voltmeters, Frequency Meters and Tachometers," Revision 6

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

Routine Observations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated several routine surveillance tests to determine if the licensee complied with the applicable TS requirements. The inspectors performed a technical review of the procedure and reviewed the completed test data. The inspectors evaluated the following:

- Procedure STP I-38-A.1, "SSPS Train A Actuation Logic Test in Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4," Revision 9, on November 5, 2001

- Procedure STP M-9A, "Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test," Revision 58, on November 6, 2001

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Temporary Modification/Plant Jumper Log Entry 01-07, "Add Temporary Pressure Indication at Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger 1-2 Discharge Piping." The inspectors' review included the adequacy of the 10 CFR 50.59

screening, whether the applicable drawings were annotated, that the necessary tags were in place, and that the transient combustible administrative controls were properly implemented. This temporary alteration was performed in accordance with Procedure CF4.ID7, "Temporary Modifications - Plant Jumpers and Measuring and Test Equipment," Revision 7B, which the inspectors used as guidance.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

.1 Reactor Safety Performance Indicator Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following Safety System Unavailability Performance Indicators for the period that ranged from the third quarter 2000 through the second quarter of 2001. The inspectors confirmed the accuracy and completeness of the indicators:

- Emergency ac power system
- Auxiliary feedwater system

The inspectors evaluated the plant database used to collect plant operating log information that documents equipment unavailability. The inspectors reviewed the accuracy of the data by selecting out-of-service times in the TS Limiting Condition for Operation database and comparing it to the unavailability log. The inspectors used NEI 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Verification," Revision 0, Procedures AWP E-005, "Development of NRC Safety System Unavailability Performance Indicator Data," Revision 0, and XI1.DC1, "Collection and Submittal of NRC Performance Indicators, Revision 2, during this inspection. The inspectors interviewed personnel responsible for collecting and evaluating the performance indicator data.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Event Followup (71111.14)

Licensee Event Report (LER) Reviews

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following LERs and concluded that the issues had minor significance. The inspectors evaluated each issue to determine: (1) the risk significance of the issue using the significance determination process, (2) whether the licensee placed the issue in the corrective action program, and (3) whether any enforcement would be necessary. The inspectors determined that the licensee had identified each of the issues, that the findings involved had very low risk/safety significance, and that any violations were minor violations. The inspectors evaluated the issues using the Group 1 questions in Manual Chapter 0610*, "Inspection Reports."

- (Closed) LER 50-323/00-003-00: TS 3.6.5 Not Met Because of the Unanticipated Failure Mode of the Containment Average Air Temperature Indicator

  The inspectors verified that the licensee confirmed the temperature had remained within limits. The inspectors concluded that the root cause was poor design control for an old design issue. The licensee had included this deficiency in their corrective action program as AR A0515154 and Quality Evaluation Q0012204. This event was determined to be minor.

- (Closed) LER 50-275/00-010-00: Steam Generator Tube Plugging Because of Stress Corrosion Cracking

  The inspectors determined that the licensee complied with TS 5.6.10.c and issued this special report because more than 1 percent of the tubes inspected in Steam Generator 1-2 had been plugged. The inspectors verified that the licensee took appropriate corrective actions and documented this deficiency in their corrective action program as AR A0516883.

- (Closed) LER 50-275/00-008-00: Engineered Safety Feature Actuation - Auxiliary Saltwater Pump 1-2 Trip Because of Failed Test Switch

  The inspectors concluded that this event resulted from an isolated failure of a test circuit switch. The licensee had evaluated similar switches and found them in good condition. The inspectors confirmed that the equipment actuated as designed. The licensee assessed this event in their corrective action program as ARs A0517599 and A0517611.

- (Closed) LER 50-275/00-007-00: Engineered Safety Feature Actuation - Component Cooling Water Pump Start Because of Personnel Error

  The inspectors determined that the component cooling water pump actuated as designed. The licensee included this deficiency in their corrective action program as AR A0516463 and Quality Evaluation Q0012208.

- (Closed) LER 50-275/00-006-00: TS 3.4.9.1 Not Met Because of an Inadequate Procedure

  The inspectors determined that this event resulted from failure to properly specify TS monitoring requirements after swapping from a manual log to implementing automatic computer logging. The licensee confirmed that the operators had been aware of the reactor coolant system pressure and temperature and that the parameters had stayed within limits. The licensee included this deficiency in their corrective action program as AR A0509122.

- (Closed) LER 50-275/00-004-01: Unit 1 Unusual Event Because of a 12 kV Bus Fault

  The inspectors had reviewed the corrective actions related to this revision for Unit 2 Refueling Outage 2R10. The evaluations are documented in NRC Inspection Report 40-275;323/01-03, Section 4OA2. Since completion of that inspection, the inspectors have completed review of the vendor analysis of the Unit 2 bus bar components. The licensee added the vendor analysis to Nonconformance Report N0002112.

- (Closed) LER 50-275;323/00-003-00: Non-Load Bearing Walls in the Turbine Building Do Not Meet Design Requirements Because of Personnel Error

  The inspectors agreed with the conclusion that this resulted from poor design control during original construction. The inspectors verified the adequacy of the operability evaluation and verified that the licensee had implemented the corrective actions discussed in the LER. The licensee included this issue in their corrective action program as Nonconformance Report N0002101. The inspectors also reviewed ARs A0489004 and A0499847 during this inspection.

- (Closed) LER 323/00-01-00: Degraded Wires in 4.16kV Vital Buses Due to Bending at Cubicle Door Hinges

  This issue was reviewed as part of NRC Inspection Report 50-275;323/01-03. The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV violation that was treated as a noncited violation. The LER provided no new information that would change this previous disposition.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA5 Other

Evaluation of Diablo Canyon Safety Condition in Light of Financial Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

Because of the licensee's financial condition, Region IV initiated special review processes for Diablo Canyon. The resident inspectors evaluated the following factors each week to determine whether the financial condition and power needs of the station impacted plant safety. The resident inspectors briefed the responsible managers in Region IV on these factors. The factors reviewed included: (1) impact on staffing, (2) corrective maintenance backlog, (3) corrective action system backlogs, (4) changes to the planned maintenance schedule, (5) reduction in outage scope, including risk significant modifications, (6) availability of emergency facilities and operability of emergency sirens, and (7) grid stability (i.e., availability of offsite power to the switchyard, status of the operating reserves, especially onset of rolling blackouts and main generator VAR loading).

Additionally, the resident inspectors provided status daily on the energy supply situation (operating reserves) available in the California market. Managers have increased their presence by performing monthly visits to assess site conditions, including employee morale, licensee initiatives, and specific technical issues.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified

4OA6 Management Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. J. Becker, Station Director, and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of each regional inspection during the inspection period. The resident inspection results were presented on November 20, 2001. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

For the engineering inspection, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. D. Miklush, Director, Engineering Services, and other members of licensee management on October 25, 2001. The licensee's management acknowledged the inspection findings presented.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

ATTACHMENT

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

J. R. Becker, Station Director
D. D. Christensen, Engineer, Nuclear Quality Assurance and Licensing
R. E. Hite, Director, Radiation Protection
S. C. Ketelsen, Supervisor, Regulatory Services
D. B. Miklush, Director, Engineering Services
P. T. Nugent, Director, Regulatory Services
D. H. Oatley, Vice President
J. W. Tompkins, Director, Nuclear Quality Analysis and Licensing
R. A. Waltos, Director, Maintenance Services

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

None

Opened and Closed During this Inspection

None

Previous Items Closed

50-323/00-003-00	LER	TS 3.6.5 Not Met Because of the Unanticipated Failure Mode of the Containment Average Air Temperature Indicator (Section 4OA3)
50-275/00-010-00	LER	Steam Generator Tube Plugging Because of Stress Corrosion Cracking (Section 4OA3)
50-275/00-008-00	LER	Engineered Safety Feature Actuation - Auxiliary Saltwater Pump 1-2 Trip Because of Failed Test Switch (Section 4OA3)
50-275/00-007-00	LER	Engineered Safety Feature Actuation - Component Cooling Water Pump Start Because of Personnel Error (Section 4OA3)

50-275/00-006-00	LER	TS 3.4.9.1 Not Met Because of an Inadequate Procedure (Section 4OA3)
50-275/00-004-01	LER	Unit 1 Unusual Event Because of a 12 kV Bus Fault (Section 4OA3)
50-323/00-001-00	LER	Degraded Wires in 4.16 kV Vital Buses because of Bending at Cubicle Door Hinges (Section 4OA3)
50-275/00-003-00	LER	Non-Load Bearing Walls in the Turbine Building Do Not Meet Design Requirements Because of Personnel Error (Section 4OA3)

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

AR	action request
CCW	component cooling water
CFR	Code of Federal Regulation
LER	licensee event report
NEI	Nuclear Energy Institute
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
TS	Technical Specifications
VAR	volt-amperes reactive

PARTIAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following documents were selected and reviewed by the inspectors to accomplish the objectives and scope of the engineering inspection:

PROCEDURES

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	REVISION
TS3.ID2	Licensing Basis Impact Evaluations	13
AD1.ID2	Procedure Review and Approval	17
XI4.ID2	Commitment Change Process	4
XI3.ID1	Technical Specification Change Process	4
XI3.ID2	DCPP Final Safety Analysis Report Update Revision and Maintenance	6

ACTION REQUESTS

AO 246701	AO 524307	AO 528311	AO 530994
AO 506977	AO 525942	AO 527731	AO 532817
AO 523346	AO 526570	AO 528995	AO 538022

LICENSING BASIS IMPACT EVALUATIONS

LBIE 2001-015	LBIE 2001-022	LBIE 2001-029	LBIE 2001-033
LBIE 2001-018	LBIE 2001-023	LBIE 2001-030	LBIE 2001-037
LBIE 2001-019	LBIE 2001-027	LBIE 2001-032	

LICENSING BASIS IMPACT EVALUATION SCREENINGS

S-2001-0350	S-2001-0381	S-2001-0417	S-2001-0451
S-2001-0354	S-2001-0388	S-2001-0425	S-2001-0492
S-2001-0369	S-2001-0401	S-2001-0426	S-2001-0496
S-2001-0371	S-2001-0404		

MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	REVISION/DATE
010450093	Assessment Report - Licensing Basis Impact Evaluations Screens and Safety Evaluations	April 11, 2001
AO525766	Self-Assessment Report - Licensing Basis Impact Evaluations	January 3, 2001