Statement
of
Kenneth W. Kaiser
Special Agent in Charge, Boston Field Office
Before the
Senate Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs
Committee
February 6, 2006
INTRODUCTION
Good
afternoon Chairman Collins, Ranking Member Lieberman,
and Members of the Committee. I am pleased to be here
today to discuss the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
response to Hurricane Katrina.
We
are all aware of the catastrophic damage caused by
this storm. Although the FBI has a broad mission,
Hurricane Katrina posed unique and unprecedented challenges.
Historically, the FBI has had a very limited role
in response to natural disasters, but the large scale
destruction of the Gulf Coast region from Hurricane
Katrina, and the substantial failure of the infrastructure,
lead to post-storm events not previously experienced.
With our assets, resources, and crisis management
experience, the FBI was able to address some of the
unique law enforcement needs of the region following
the storm.
BACKGROUND
OF POST-LANDFALL DEPLOYMENT
Prior
to the landfall of Hurricane Katrina, the Special
Agent in Charge (SAC) of the FBI's New Orleans Division,
James Bernazzani, had made preparations for continuity
of his division's operations, including establishing
a protocol for communications with his employees.
These preparations included arranging for the deployment
of personnel, equipment, and supplies from the FBI's
Operational Technologies Division in Quantico, Virginia,
to Baton Rouge, Louisiana, where SAC Bernazzani intended
to temporarily relocate his field office operations
should that become necessary. As Hurricane Katrina
made landfall, SAC Bernazzani and a small staff remained
in the FBI office in New Orleans to ensure the security
of the FBI's records, equipment, and evidence. Once
the storm had passed, and FBI SWAT agents relieved
SAC Bernazzani, he immediately relocated to a mobile
FBI command post in Baton Rouge, which provided him
with the communications equipment he needed to begin
accounting for his personnel and re-establishing FBI
field operations. As it became evident that the vast
majority of FBI New Orleans Division personnel had
been displaced, additional FBI personnel from around
the country were deployed to New Orleans to ensure
FBI operations continued.
On
September 1, the Office of the Attorney General directed
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
(ATF), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the FBI,
and the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) to identify personnel,
assets, and other resources for immediate deployment
to areas impacted by Hurricane Katrina. On September
2, having received the inventory of assets and personnel
available for deployment, the Attorney General issued
a memorandum to the same agencies directing:
The
FBI to continue to deploy Special Agents (including
SWAT agents) and tactical assets (including helicopters,
boats, and technical / communications assets) to the
affected area;
The
DEA to prepare to deploy Mobile Enforcement Teams,
special agents, and tactical assets (including helicopters
and other aircraft) to the affected area;
The
ATF to establish a Violent Crime Impact Team (VCIT)
in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, with related VCIT personnel
and assets, to address any rise in criminal activity
in that city; and
The
USMS to continue to deploy Deputy U.S. Marshals and
Court Security Officers to conduct prisoner transport
operations and provide additional court security and
to prepare to utilize the Justice Prisoner and Alien
Transportation (JPATS) to deploy law enforcement personnel
to airports around the country as needed.
I
was deployed to Louisiana and designated the FBI Tactical
and Emergency Operations Commander. As such, I was
responsible for the command and control of all FBI
tactical assets deployed to the area. My role was
to coordinate and manage requests for standard SWAT
operations such as high-risk arrests or search warrants,
officer rescue operations, and other operations supporting
federal investigations. I also directed the coordination,
management, and execution of critical infrastructure
and site security operations requested by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency or other components of
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under the
National Response Plan (NRP) Emergency Support Function
13 (ESF-13).
STATE
OF LAW AND ORDER DURING HURRICANE KATRINA CRISIS
Upon
my arrival in New Orleans on September 1, 2005, it
was immediately apparent to me that the effects of
the storm and subsequent damage to the levees had
severely affected the ability of the New Orleans Police
Department (NOPD) to perform effectively. NOPD officers
were dealing with personal losses from Hurricane Katrina,
were without a supporting infrastructure, and were
depleted of such resources as communications, ammunition,
transportation, and food. Effective law enforcement
activities could not be conducted under these circumstances.
Also, many law enforcement agencies from around the
country were sending resources into New Orleans.
Under
the NRP, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and DHS are
the coordinators of ESF-13, which is designed to provide
a mechanism by which Federal law enforcement assets
can be used to support State and local authorities
with public-safety and security-related functions
during an Incident of National Significance. DOJ tasked
its coordination responsibilities for ESF-13 to ATF.
In
addition to providing for the establishment of ESF-13,
the NRP also contemplates that a Senior Federal Law
Enforcement Official will be appointed during an Incident
of National Significance to oversee the combined Federal,
State and local law enforcement response to the incident.
The FBI identified New Haven Division SAC Michael
J. Wolf as having the experience and expertise to
support this mission. SAC Wolf was deployed to Louisiana
on September 4, 2005, and arrived late that evening,
to begin the process of establishing an effective
method of command, control and coordination of law
enforcement assets in New Orleans.
SAC
Wolf and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Assistant Director Michael J. Vanacore assumed the
duties of Senior Federal Law Enforcement Officials
(SFLEOs) after being identified by their respective
agencies. In order to address the identified gaps
in the law enforcement response, SAC Wolf established
the Law Enforcement Coordination Center (LECC). The
LECC is an entity which is not defined in the NRP,
as are entities like the FBI Joint Operations Center,
or the U. S. Secret Service Multiagency Command Center.
The LECC was created as a solution to the unique challenges
facing law enforcement in New Orleans following Katrina's
landfall. The purpose of the LECC was to coordinate,
deconflict, and track requests for and response to
law enforcement support; to organize and coordinate
interaction among law enforcement; to ensure coordination
between law enforcement efforts and National Guard
and Department of Defense operations; and to provide
limited investigative and criminal law enforcement
resources, until such time as the NOPD was able to
maintain service without additional resources from
other law enforcement agencies.
NATIONAL
RESPONSE PLAN TRAINING EFFORTS
One
of the missions of the FBI's Critical Incident Response
Group (CIRG) is to provide training to select FBI
personnel in the effective response to critical incidents.
The FBI defines a critical incident as any situation,
event, or set of circumstances that poses a serious
threat, diverts significant resources, and/or demands
command level coordination. Our training includes
instruction on the National Response Plan, as well
as other national plans and policies, and the roles
and responsibilities of the FBI in accordance with
them. CIRG conducts this training on a regular basis
for members of the Senior Executive Service, including
FBI SACs, FBI middle management at the FBI's Executive
Development Institute, and field division Crisis Management
Coordinators, who are the individuals within each
field division tasked with ensuring the division's
crisis response operational readiness. Additional
training is afforded to all levels of FBI personnel
through their participation in various inter-agency
counterterrorism exercises, including the Senior Official
and TOPOFF series of exercises.
LESSONS
LEARNED
The
FBI's after action review process of our involvement
and performance in response to Hurricane Katrina is
ongoing. Our Critical Incident Response Group has
facilitated two after action review meetings. The
first of these was conducted in October and focused
on the effectiveness of national plans and policies,
as well as responses to specific questions of this
Committee in your October 7, 2005, letter to Attorney
General Gonzales. A second review was conducted on
January 17, 2006, and focused on the FBI's operational
response to this catastrophe. CIRG is preparing a
written report which will detail the outcomes of these
reviews, including lessons learned, best practices
and recommendations for improvement. FBI executives
are also engaged in the Administration's review of
the federal government's response to Katrina, and
continue discussions with other departments and agencies
about ways to improve our response to such catastrophic
events.
Thank
you for the opportunity to appear today. I would be
happy to answer your questions.