In Chambers, the Court addressed the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which imposes a 15-year mandatory prison term on a felon unlawfully in possession of a firearm who has three prior convictions for committing certain drug crimes or "a violent felony," 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(1). At issue was whether Chambers' prior Illinois conviction for failure to report for weekend confinement "involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another," §924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The District Court treated the failure to report as a form of what the relevant state statute calls "escape from [a] penal institution," and held that it qualified as a"violent felony" under ACCA. The Seventh Circuit agreed.

The Supreme Court held that the crime of failure to report for penal confinement falls outside the scope of ACCA’s "violent felony" definition under the categorical approach set forth in Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575, 602. According to the Court, while the statute at issue listed both failure to report and escape in the same section, for ACCA purposes they are treated as two separate crimes. Furthermore, failure to report does not "'involv[e] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.'" The Court reasoned, "while an offender who fails to report must of course be doing something at the relevant time, there is no reason to believe that the something poses a serious potential risk of physical injury. To the contrary, an individual who fails to report would seem unlikely, not likely, to call attention to his whereabouts by simultaneously engaging in additional violent and unlawful conduct." The Court rejected the Justice Department's argument "that a failure to report reveals the offender’s special, strong aversion to penal custody" and, as such, meets the violent felony definition. Instead, "the offender’s aversion to penal custody, even if special, is beside the point. The question is whether such an offender is significantly more likely than others" to engage in activity threatening "serious potential risk of physical injury."

In Jimenez, the Court decided that, if a state prisoner is allowed by a state court to file an appeal that ordinarily would be too late, that will delay the start of the one-year filing period for pursuing a habeas challenge until after the state appeal is resolved.

Dean v. United States (08-5274) (whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), establishing a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence for a defendant who "discharge[s]" a firearm during a crime of violence, requires proof that the discharge was volitional, and not merely accidental, unintentional, or involuntary).

Abuelhawa v. United States (08-192) (whether the use of a telephone to buy drugs for personal use "facilitates" the commission of a drug "felony," in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b), on the theory that the crime facilitated by the buyer is not his purchase of drugs for personal use (a misdemeanor), but is the seller's distribution of the drugs to him (a felony)).

Yeager v. United States (08-67) (whether, when a jury acquits a defendant on multiple counts but fails to reach a verdict on other counts that share a common element, and the only rational basis for the acquittals is that an essential element of the hung counts was determined in the defendant's favor, collateral estoppel bars a retrial on the hung counts).

Earlier this term, the Court granted cert in many other cases presenting issues of criminal law and procedure, including a case interpreting the scope of the Aggravated Identity Theft statute (see below on this page). For more information on these cert grants, and other criminal cases pending before the Supreme Court, click here.

18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) imposes a mandatory two-year prison term on any person who, during the commission of other specified crimes, "knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person." At issue is whether this clause requires proof that the defendant knew the identity card or number he or she had used belonged to another, actual person.

Flores-Figueroa, a native of Mexico, was accused of using fake Social Security and alien registration cards to secure employment. These cards bore numbers that had been assigned to someone else. Flores-Figueroa argued that he used the documents without knowledge they belonged to another. Upholding his conviction, the Eighth Circuit, joining the Eleventh and Fourth Circuits, held that it was not necessary to prove that the defendant knew he had used someone else's identifying information. The Ninth, First and D.C. Circuits have adopting a more stringent knowledge requirement.

Earlier this term, the Court granted cert in seven other cases presenting issues of criminal law and procedure. For more information on these cert grants, and other criminal cases pending before the Supreme Court, click here.