Protecting People and the EnvironmentUNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
ACCESSION #: 9607250114
NIAGARA
MOHAWK
NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION
P.O. BOX 63, LYCOMING, NEW YORK 13093
FAX COVER LETTER
NINE MILE POINT UNIT 2
FROM: FAX TELEPHONE NUMBER: (315) 349-1400
NAME:
DEPARTMENT: LICENSING/ENVIRONMENTAL
TELEPHONE NUMBER:
FAX #
TO:
TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES FAXED (INCLUDING COVER LETTER):
DATE: TIME:
MESSAGE:
6.3.3 Obtain the concurrence of the appropriate Vice President or
designated alternate that notification is required. If no Vice
President (Nuclear) or other responsible Corporate Officer
(Nuclear) is available, within two (2) working days, make the
NRC notification required by Section 6,3.5 and inform the
appropriate Vice President or other responsible Corporate
Officer (Nuclear) of the condition when they are available.
6.3.4 Notify the Supervisor of Site Licensing of reportable
conditions and jointly determine if the written notification is
to be submitted as a 10CFR21 report or as part of a report
submittal under other reporting requirements (e.g. 10CFR50.9,
10CFR50.72, 10CFR50.73, 10CFR73.71).
If the NRC has been previously notified in writing by another
reporting method (e.g. vendor or other utility Part 21,
10CFR50.9, 10CFR50.72, 10CFR50.73, 10CFR73.71), then the
reporting requirements of 10CFR21 have already been met.
6.3.5 If required, inform the NRC Operations Center by facsimile at
(301)492-8187 (preferred method) or by telephone at (301)951-
0550 of the condition that results in a substantial safety
hazard or Significant implication for public health and safety
or common defense and security within two (2) calendar days of
informing the appropriate Vice President or other responsible
Corporate Officer (Nuclear). Verification that the facsimile
has been received should be made by calling the NRC Operations
Center.
6.3.6 When oral notification to the NRC is made (by facsimile or
telephone), ensure that a written report is submitted to the
NRC Document Control Desk within thirty (30) calendar days
after the appropriate Vice President or other responsible
Corporate Officer (Nuclear) is informed that a substantial
safety hazard exists. A copy must also be sent to the Regional
Administrator, Region I.
6.3.7 If required, prepare a written notification per NIP-IRG-01
containing the following information (required by 10CFR21.21
(b)(3)] as a minimum:
a. Name of Niagara Mohawk Officer informing the NRC and the
Niagara Mohawk address.
b. Identification of the Unit, the activity or the basic
component that contains a defect, deviation, or fails to
Comply.
c. Identification of the firm supplying the component or
activity.
Page 7 NLAP-IRG-140
Rev 01
ENCLOSURE 1
EVALUATION OF DEVIATION, DEFECT, FAILURE TO COMPLY FORM
PART I - REPORTING
Nine Mile Point 2 (Affected Unit) DER No. 2-96-1058
Date of Discovery 5/23/96
TYPE OF CONDITION
A. Deviation B. Defect
1. Basic Component [x] 1. Deviation [x]
a. Structure [ ] 2. Other Condition [ ]
b. System C. Failure to Comply
c. Component [ ] 1. Atomic Energy Act [ ]
d. Design [ ] 2. Rule [ ]
e. Inspection 3. Regulation [ ]
f. Testing 4. Order
g. Consulting 5. License [ ]
Service [ ]
2. Other Condition [ ]
Description: Standby Gas Treatment System valve 2GTS*MOV3B failed to a
potential manufacturing process deficiency which allowed pin affixing the
sub to the disk to fall out.
PART II - EVALUATION CHECKLIST
A deviation related to a Basic Component or a failure to comply shall be
evaluated to determine if it presents a substantial safety hazard. A
condition is a substantial safety hazard if it causes a major reduction
in the degree of protection to the public. Criteria for determining
substantial safety hazards include: a) Moderate exposure to or release of
licensed material; b) Major degradation of essential safety-related
equipment; and c) Major deficiencies involving design, construction,
inspection, test or use of license facilities or materials (see NUREG-
302).
The following checklist is used to determine if a major reduction in
safety exists. If the answer is "yes" to any of the following, it may be
reportable per 10CFR part 21 and requires further evaluation.
Page 10 NLAP-IRG-140
Rev. 01
ENCLOSURE 1 (Cont)
PART II - EVALUATION CHECKLIST (Cont)
CONSEQUENCE YES NO
1. Exposures received in excess of 10CFR20
limits for immediate notification.
2. Exposure of an individual in an
unrestricted area in excess of 10CFR20
limits.
3. Release of radioactive material to an
unrestricted area in excess of 10CFR20
limits.
4. Exceeding a safety limit as defined in
the facility technical specifications.
5. A condition which could disable or
prevent operation of a system required
for safe shutdown, emergency core
cooling, post accident containment heat
removal or post accident containment
atmosphere cleanup.
6. A condition which could disable or
reduce the safety margins for the reactor
coolant pressure boundary, core or
reactor internals, functions or operation.
7. A condition which could disable or prevent
operation of the spent fuel storage pool
cooling and storage including the fuel racks.
8. A condition which could disable or prevent
operation of redundant Class IE electrical
systems, including electric and mechanical
devices and circuitry.
9. A condition which could disable or prevent
operation of the reactivity control systems;
that is, control rods, control rod drives,
and boron injection systems.
10. A condition which could disable or prevent
operation of radioactive waste systems that
could create offsite doses greater than Part
100.
11. A condition which could disable or prevent
operation of the primary and secondary
containment.
NLAP-IRG-140
Page 11 Rev. 01
ENCLOSURE 1 (Cont)
PART II - EVALUATION CHECKLIST (Cont)
CONSEQUENCE YES NO
12. A condition which could disable or prevent
VI operation of structures, components,
or systems whose continued function is not
required, but whose failure could reduce
or disable systems that are required.
13. A condition involving the security system
which could cause a substantial safety hazard.
14. Other deviations in Basic Components or
failures to comply which cause a substantial
safety hazard.
15. A condition that creates an unreviewed
safety question (10CFR50.59).
16. A condition which does not meet a rule,
regulation, license or order and creates a
substantial safety hazard.
PART III - EVALUATION (to be completed by Nuclear Licensing)
(check applicable category)
[] Condition does not meet criteria for a potential defect or failure
to comply because (attach additional sheets as necessary):
[] Condition does not involve a substantial safety hazard because
(attach additional sheets as necessary):
[] Condition involves a potential substantial safety hazard (attach
additional sheets as necessary):
[] Condition does not meet criteria for Potential Defect or Failure to
Comply, but is reportable under 10CFR50.9.
NLAP-IRG-140
Page 12 Rev. 01
ENCLOSURE 1
EVALUATION OF DEVIATION, DEFECT, FAILURE TO COMPLY FORM
PLANT: Nine Mile Point Unit 2 DER NO. 2-96-1058
TITLE: Potential Manufacturing Process Deficiency in 2GTS*MOV3B
DESCRIPTION OF CONDITION:
During pre-planned maintenance activities associated with Standby Gas
Treatment System (GTS) Clow valve 2GTS*MOV3B, the valve's stub shaft
dowel pin fell out of its hole and into the GTS discharge piping.
Although the ensuing investigation did not positively identify a root
cause, Engineering conservatively dispositioned the associated Deviation
Event Report (DER) indicating that the cause of this event was a
manufacturing process deficiency (Niagara Mohawk believes this is an
isolated event based on the number of Clow valves inservice and years of
service without a similar failure). Specifically, this deficiency was
identified as the failure to fully peen over the dowel pin hole in the
valve disk. Consequently, the valve stub shaft failed to rotate
respective to the main shaft, thus preventing the valve limit switches
from property displaying valve position. These valve limit switches are
used as input permissives for the GTS train start logic.
EVALUATION:
The GTS is designed to prevent leakage of radioactive gases and
particulates to the environment during accidents by maintaining a
negative pressure on the Reactor Building. The GTS consists of two
parallel and redundant air filtration assemblies with associated duct
work, dampers, controls, and exhaust fans. The discharge of each fan has
a normally closed isolation valve (2GTS*MOV3A/3B) which will open upon
receiving a GTS start signal. Once 2GTS*MOV3A/3B is fully open, the GTS
filter train fans (2GTS*FN1A/1B) are given a permissive signal to start.
In the event the GTS was called upon to function, discharge valve
2GTS*MOV3B would have received an open signal. If the dowel pin had
already or were to fall out prior to the valve fully opening, the valve
would still have opened. However, the valve stub shaft, which positions
the valve limit switches, would not have rotated as the valve moved to
the open position. Since limit switches indicating the discharge valve
in the open position is a permissive to GTS operation, the respective fan
would not have started resulting in an inoperable GTS. Assuming a single
failure in the redundant GTS train, both trains were potentially
inoperable, Therefore, a substantial safety hazard existed.
RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION (IF REPORTABLE):
1) The redundant GTS train was started and verified operable. Both
trains are subject to Technical Specification required surveillance
testing to verify operability. 2GTS*MOV3A will be inspected in RFO5. 2)
Maintenance personnel reinstalled the dowel pin that fell from 2GTS*MOV3B
and re-peened the dowel hole, restoring the valve to operable status.
EVALUATION PREPARED BY:
Signature Date
CONCURRENCE BY:
Manager Engineering Date
EVALUATION REVIEWED BY:
Supervisor Licensing Support Date
CONCURRENCE BY:
Manager Licensing Date
NLAP-IRG-140
Page 13 Rev.01
ENCLOSURE 2
GUIDELINES/CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REPORTABLE
CONDITIONS UNDER 10CFR50.9 FORM
DER NO. 2-96-1058
1. Does the condition have significant implication for public health
and safety?
Yes, No
2. Does the condition have significant implication for common defense
and security?
Yes, No
3. Information regarding the condition has been/will be provided to the
NRC by other reporting or updating requirements.
Yes, No
If the answer to question 1 or 2 is "YES" and the answer to question
3 is "NO", the condition is reportable under 10CFR50.9 and Procedure
Steps 6.3.2, 6.3.3 and 6.3.5 must be completed.
COMPLETED BY: Signature DATE:
(Title)
NLAP-IRG-140
Page 14 Rev- 01
ENCLOSURE 3
REPORTING SUMMARY FORM
DER NO. 2-96-1058
A. RESULT OF EVALUATION:
REPORTABLE UNDER 10CFR21: YES, NO
REPORTABLE UNDER 10CFR50.9: YES, NO
B. REPORTED BY OTHER REPORTING REQUIREMENT. NO YES:
Letter No. Reported Per Date
C. NOTIFY NMPC RESPONSIBLE OFFICER/DIRECTOR:
NAME: C. D. Terry
TITLE: Vice President - Nuclear Engineering
DATE NOTIFIED: 7/22/96
CONCURRENCE WITH EVALUATION: YES NO
If NO. Explanation:
(No further action required).
D. NOTIFY - NRC
NRC CONTACT: BY:
NAME NAME
HOW: Oral Written
DATE: (Must be within two calendar days of date in C above).
If NRC is notified orally, a written report must be submitted within
thirty (30) calendar days of the date in Section C above for
reportable conditions under 10CFR21 only.
DATE: LETTER NO.
E. COMPLETED BY: (Signature) DATE.
NLAP-IRG-140
Page 15 Rev. 01
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