U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DIRECTIVE TRANSMITTAL

TN: DT-01-03

To: NRC Management Directives Custodians

Subject: Transmittal of Directive 8.3, "NRC Incident Investigation

Program"

Purpose: Directive and Handbook 8.3 are being revised in their entirety

to more broadly address the risk-significant criteria regarding the activation criteria for Incident Investigation Teams and Augmented Inspection Teams. The revision also includes a reference regarding Special Inspections. In addition, because of the AEOD/IRO reorganization, MD 8.3 is being revised, in part, to clearly designate the Director of Incident Response Operations (IRO) as the individual responsible for administering the Incident Investigation Program to meet the objectives set forth in IRO's mission. Finally, MD 8.3 is being revised to require that the resolution of staff actions be documented by the assigned NRC lead office and tracked by the EDO's Work

Item Tracking System (WITS).

Office and

Division of Origin: Office of Incident Response Operations

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Directive: 8.3 NRC Incident Investigation Program

Availability: Rules and Directives Branch

Office of Administration

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NRC Incident Investigation Program

Directive 8.3

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Volume: 8 Licensee Oversight Programs

IRO

NRC Incident Investigation Program Directive 8.3

Policy (8.3-01)

It is the policy of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to ensure that significant operational events involving reactor and materials facilities licensed by the NRC are investigated in a timely, objective, systematic, and technically sound manner; that the factual information pertaining to each event is documented; and that the cause or causes of each event are ascertained. The events may involve responses by an incident investigation team (IIT) or less formal responses by an augmented inspection team (AIT) or a special inspection team (SIT), depending upon the level of response required.

Objectives (8.3-02)

- To promote public health and safety, instill public confidence, and provide for the common defense and security by reducing the frequency of incidents and preventing accidents. (021)
- To increase the efficiency and effectiveness of NRC regulatory programs and licensee operations by the prompt dissemination of the facts, conditions, circumstances, and causes of significant operational events and the identification of appropriate followup actions. (022)

Objectives

(8.3-02) (continued)

- To improve regulatory oversight of licensee activities by uncovering facts that may indicate a need to reevaluate whether a particular aspect of the regulatory process before the event contributed directly to the cause or course of the event. (023)
- To ensure that IIT, AIT, and SIT findings are properly dispositioned. (024)

Organizational Responsibilities and Delegations of Authority (8.3-03)

Commission (031)

Approves the followup actions assigned as a result of IIT investigations.

Executive Director for Operations (EDO) (032)

Approves an IIT investigation of a significant operational event and ensures that resultant followup actions are taken, as defined in Parts I and II of Handbook 8.3.

Director, Incident Response Operations (IRO) (033)

Administers the incident investigation program with the assistance of other NRC offices. In addition, establishes and maintains an NRC investigatory capability and identifies and coordinates training requirements for IIT candidates, as defined in Part I of Handbook 8.3.

Organizational Responsibilities and Delegations of Authority (8.3-03) (continued)

Office Directors and Regional Administrators (034)

Participate in the incident investigation program as defined in this directive and handbook.

Applicability (8.3-04)

The policy and guidance of this directive and handbook apply to all NRC employees.

Handbook (8.3-05)

The handbook discusses the major components of the NRC's response to significant operational events (i.e., Incident Investigation, Augmented Inspection, and Special Inspection).

References (8.3-06)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Inspection Manual Chapter 1301, "Response to Radioactive Material Incidents That Do Not Require Activation of the NRC Incident Response Plan."

— 1302, "Action Levels for Radiation Exposures and Contamination Associated With Materials Events Involving Members of the Public."

Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs NRC Incident Investigation Program Directive 8.3

References (8.3-06) (continued)

Inspection Procedure 71153, "Event Followup."

- 93800, "Augmented Inspection Team."
- 93812, "Special Inspection."

IRO Administrative Procedure 12, "Incident Investigation Team Administrative Requirements."

Management Directive 8.2, "NRC Incident Response Program."

- 8.5, "Operational Safety Data Review."
- 8.10, "NRC Medical Event Assessment Program."

NUREG-1303, "Incident Investigation Manual."

NRC Incident Investigation Program

Handbook 8.3

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Part I Major Components and Responsibilities of the Program

Coverage (A)

"Incident investigation" is a formal process conducted for the purpose of accident prevention. The process includes gathering and analyzing information; determining findings and conclusions, including the cause(s) of a significant operational event; and disseminating the investigation results for NRC, industry, and public review. The components of the process follow.

Incident Investigation Team (IIT) (1)

This group consists of technical experts who, to the extent practicable, do not have, and have not had, previous significant involvement with licensing and inspection activities at the affected facility and who perform the single NRC investigation of a significant operational event as described in Part II of this handbook. An NRC senior manager leads the IIT. Each IIT reports directly to the Executive Director for Operations (EDO) and is independent of regional and headquarters office management.

Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) (2)

This group consists of technical experts from the region in which the incident took place, augmented by personnel from headquarters or other regions or by contractors. The group performs an inspection of a significant operating event as described in Part III of this handbook. AIT members may have had prior involvement with licensing and inspection activities at the affected facility. The AIT reports directly to the appropriate regional administrator.

Special Inspection (SI) (3)

This inspection is similar to an AIT inspection except that the group generally is smaller (the number of members is based on management's judgment) and is generally not augmented by personnel from headquarters or other regions or by contractors. The special inspection team (SIT) reports directly to the appropriate regional administrator. Inspection Procedure 93812, "Special Inspection," provides implementing procedures for SIs.

Licensee and Licensed Operations (4)

The licensee is an individual or organization that is authorized by the Commission to conduct activities under a license issued by the NRC. (a)

Licensed operations are those activities or facility operations that are permitted under an NRC license. (b)

Significant Operational Event (5)

A significant operational event is any radiological, safeguards, or other safety-related operational event at an NRC-licensed facility that poses an actual or a potential hazard to public health and safety, property, or the environment. A significant operational event also may be referred to as "an incident." (a)

The decision regarding an "investigatory response" for a significant operational event is defined by its risk significance, complexity, and generic safety implications. Significant operational power reactor events are evaluated on the basis of both deterministic criteria and risk significance such as conditional core damage probability (CCDP) in order to define the level of investigatory response. Other significant operational events (e.g., material, non-power reactor, and safeguards events) are currently evaluated on the basis of deterministic criteria in order to define the level of investigatory response. (b)

Significant Operational Event (5) (continued)

Significant events may involve responses by an IIT or less formal responses by an AIT or an SIT, depending upon the level of response deemed appropriate. The level of investigatory response for significant power reactor events is based on both the deterministic criteria and the risk criteria included in this section. (c)

Upon notification of a significant operational power reactor event, the regional administrator and staff should perform the initial review to assess the safety significance of the event in order to assess the level of response required. (The Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research [RES] will provide risk analysis support [coordinated by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)] to the regions for power reactor events that warrant at least consideration of an AIT. Risk analysis support for events for which only consideration of the need for an SI may be warranted will be provided if requested by the regional administrator.) (d)

If the initial review indicates that the event warrants at least consideration of an AIT response, the regional administrator shall consult with the Director of Incident Response Operations (IRO) and the Director of NRR (power reactor events) or the Director of the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) (materials events) to decide if an AIT or an IIT response is appropriate on the basis of their collective judgment. (e)

Upon notification of a significant operational event at a non-power reactor, the Director of NRR and staff should perform the initial review to assess the safety significance of the event to determine the level of response required. (f)

If the results of the initial review conclude that the event warrants at least consideration of an AIT response, the Director of NRR

Significant Operational Event (5) (continued)

shall consult with the Director of IRO and the appropriate regional administrator to decide if an AIT or an IIT is the proper response. (g)

If an IIT is agreed upon, the initiating office makes that recommendation to the EDO. Differences among offices concerning whether an AIT or an IIT is the proper response are submitted to the EDO for resolution. (h)


- Significant operational power reactor events meeting the following deterministic criteria should be evaluated for risk to aid in determining the level of response, if any. These events may include significant unplanned degraded conditions identified by the licensee or NRC. Plant configurations due solely to planned maintenance need not be considered. (i)
 - Involved operations that exceeded, or were not included in, the design bases of the facility (a)
 - Involved a major deficiency in design, construction, or operation having potential generic safety implications (b)
 - Led to a significant loss of integrity of the fuel, the primary coolant pressure boundary, or the primary containment boundary of a nuclear reactor (c)
 - Led to the loss of a safety function or multiple failures in systems used to mitigate an actual event (d)
 - Involved possible adverse generic implications (e)
 - Involved significant unexpected system interactions (f)
 - Involved repetitive failures or events involving safety-related equipment or deficiencies in operations (q)

Significant Operational Event (5) (continued)

- Involved questions or concerns pertaining to licensee operational performance (h)
- Significant operational power reactor events meeting the above deterministic criteria should be evaluated for risk as follows: CCDP best reflects loss of defense in depth due to the event, regardless of whether the cause is deficient licensee performance or otherwise. CCDP accounts for actual plant configuration, including equipment unavailable because of maintenance and testing. Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," addresses CCDP determination. Although CCDP represents a fundamentally different concept for events than for degraded conditions that do not initiate an event, the same guidelines may be applied to each in assisting management in its risk-informed decisionmaking. (ii)
- The lack of complete event information at the time of the NRC response decision focuses attention on the uncertainty of influential assumptions and their effect on the risk significance. Inspection Procedure 71153, "Event Followup," discusses inspector inputs to risk analyses that are needed to understand the risk significance. In determining risk significance of an operational event, NRC should assess the potential influence on risk of the following: (iii)
 - Dominant core damage sequence(s) (a)
 - Level of confidence in failure/unavailability values assumed for the sequence(s) (b)
 - Influence on the CCDP estimate of contributing factors where the confidence level is low (c)

Significant Operational Event (5) (continued)

• The following table lists appropriate power reactor operational event response options as a function of CCDP. The overlap of options relative to CCDP levels provides the opportunity to select different inspection or investigation options on the basis of such factors as uncertainty of the risk estimate coupled with the deterministic insights. Risk insights should also be used in considering the number of inspectors, their expertise, and the areas of focus. In addition to risk, NRC should assess whether degraded conditions could increase the likelihood of a large early release resulting from containment failure. (iv)



- In addition to the above guidance for power reactor events, the following guidance should be considered for any significant reactor or materials event: (v)
 - An IIT should be considered for significant operational events with one or more of the following characteristics: (a)
 - Led to a significant radiological release (levels of radiation or concentrations of radioactive material in excess of 10 times any applicable limit in the license or 10 times the concentrations specified in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Table 2, when averaged over a year) of byproduct, source, or special nuclear material to unrestricted areas (1)

Significant Operational Event (5) (continued)

- Led to a significant occupational exposure or significant exposure to a member of the public. In both cases, "significant" is defined as five times the applicable regulatory limit (except for shallow-dose equivalent to the skin or extremities from discrete radioactive particles) (2)
- Led to a site area emergency (3)
- Exceeded a safety limit of the licensee's technical specifications (4)
- Involved the medical use of byproduct, source, or special nuclear material and may have resulted in deterministic effects to a significant number of patients or individuals over a long period (months or years) (5)
- Involved the medical, academic, or commercial use of byproduct, source, or special nuclear material and resulted in the potential exposure of a significant number of individuals above occupational or public dose limits (6)
- Involved the deliberate misuse of byproduct, source, or special nuclear material from its intended or authorized use, which resulted in the exposure of a significant number of individuals (7)
- Involved byproduct, source, or special nuclear material, which may have resulted in a fatality (8)
- Involved circumstances sufficiently complex, unique, or not well enough understood, or involved safeguards concerns, or involved characteristics the investigation of

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Significant Operational Event (5) (continued)

which would best serve the needs and interests of the Commission ($\underline{9}$)

- An AIT inspects events of lesser health and safety or safeguards significance. The characteristics of these events may include one or more of the following: (b)
 - Led to a radiological release of byproduct, source, or special nuclear material to unrestricted areas that resulted in occupational exposure or exposure to a member of the public in excess of the applicable regulatory limit (except for shallow-dose equivalent to the skin or extremities from discrete radioactive particles) (1)
 - Involved the deliberate misuse of byproduct, source, or special nuclear material from its intended or authorized use and had the potential to cause an exposure of greater than 5 rem to an individual or 500 mrem to an embryo or fetus (2)
 - Involved a significant infraction or repeated instances of safeguards infractions that demonstrate the ineffectiveness of facility security provisions (3)
 - Involved repeated instances of inadequate nuclear material control and accounting provisions to protect against theft or diversions of nuclear material (<u>4</u>)
 - Involved the failure of the dam for mill tailings with substantial release of tailings material and solution off site (<u>5</u>)

Significant Operational Event (5) (continued)

Involved the failure of radioactive material packaging that resulted in external radiation levels exceeding 10 rads/hr or contamination of the packaging exceeding 1000 times the applicable limits specified in 10 CFR 71.87 (6)

Responsibilities (B)

The responsibilities and functions of the various NRC offices for establishing and implementing IITs and AITs are described below.

Executive Director for Operations (EDO) (1)

Determines whether a potentially significant operational event is to be investigated by an IIT. (a)

Selects the IIT leader and members, provides policy and technical direction, and ensures the independence of the IIT. (b)

Concurs with the decision, made by the appropriate regional administrator and office director following an event that involves an IIT response, that facility operations may resume. (c)

Resolves conflicts between a regional office and/or one or more program offices regarding such matters as the need to initiate an AIT or an IIT, the office assigned the responsibility for AIT implementation, and office representation on an AIT. (d)

Director, Incident Response Operations (IRO) (2)

Administers the incident investigation program to meet the objectives set forth in this directive, with the assistance of other NRC offices. (a)

Director, Incident Response Operations (IRO) (2) (continued)

Ensures that procedures governing IITs are developed, coordinated, approved, distributed, and maintained. (b)

Provides administrative support staff to IITs (and as requested for AITs) as necessary to achieve objectives defined in Part II of this handbook, with assistance from other NRC offices. (c)

For events warranting consideration of an AIT or an IIT response, consults with the appropriate regional administrator and the Director of NRR (reactor events) or the Director of NMSS (materials events) to decide if an AIT or an IIT is the proper response. Identifies the potential safety or safeguards issues and provides recommendations to the EDO on events warranting consideration of an IIT and on the composition of the IIT. (d)

Establishes and maintains rosters of potential team leaders and team members who are certified through formal training in incident investigation. (e)

Identifies needed training and coordinates training requirements for IIT candidates through the Technical Training Center. (f)

Assesses the effectiveness of the incident investigation program activities and recommends action, as appropriate, to improve the program. (g)

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (3)

Ensures that procedures governing SITs and AITs for reactor events are defined, developed, coordinated, approved, distributed, and maintained. (a)

Identifies and provides staff to be members and leaders of IITs and AITs. (b)

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (3) (continued)

Provides assistance in implementing the incident investigation program. (c)

Recommends to and coordinates with the appropriate regional administrator and the Director of IRO on events that warrant consideration of an AIT or an IIT as defined in this part. (d)

For reactor events warranting consideration of an AIT or an IIT, consults with the appropriate regional administrator and the Director of IRO to decide if an AIT or an IIT is the proper response. Identifies the potential reactor safety or reactor safeguards issues and provides recommendations to the EDO on events warranting consideration of an IIT and on the composition of the IIT. (e)

Provides and coordinates risk analysis support (from both NRR and RES) to the regions for reactor events that warrant at least an AIT. Risk analysis for reactor events where only an SIT may be warranted must be provided if requested by the regional administrator. (f)

Discusses with the appropriate regional administrator the acceptability of the decision by the affected licensee to resume facility operations following an event that involves an IIT response and obtains the EDO's concurrence. (g)

Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (4)

Ensures that procedures governing AITs for nonreactor events are defined, developed, coordinated, approved, distributed, and maintained. (a)

Identifies and provides staff as members and leaders of IITs and AITs. (b)

Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (4) (continued)

Provides assistance in implementing the NRC incident investigation program. (c)

Recommends to and coordinates with the appropriate regional administrator and the Director of IRO on events that warrant consideration of an AIT or an IIT as defined in this part. (d)

For materials events warranting consideration of an AIT or an IIT, consults with the appropriate regional administrator and the Director of IRO to decide if an AIT or an IIT is appropriate. Identifies the potential nuclear material safety, health, or safeguards issues and provides recommendations to the EDO on events warranting consideration of an IIT, including the composition of the IIT. (e)

Discusses with the appropriate regional administrator the acceptability of the decision by the affected licensee to resume facility operations following an event that involves an IIT response where the facility has been shut down and obtains the EDO's concurrence. (f)

Office of the Chief Information Officer (5)

Provides staff to assist IITs in writing, editing, printing, and distribution of reports through the Division of Information Management.

Director, Office of Administration (6)

Provides advice and assistance on the protection of classified or sensitive unclassified information related to the incident.

Director, Office of Human Resources (7)

Assists the Technical Training Center with IIT training on an as-needed basis.

Regional Administrators (8)

In coordination with the Directors of IRO and NRR or NMSS, as appropriate, determine those operational events warranting consideration of investigation by an AIT or an IIT. As soon as it becomes clear that at least an AIT is warranted (preferably before an AIT is actually established) and when information identified in connection with an established AIT indicates significantly increased event significance, consult with the Directors of IRO and NRR or NMSS, as appropriate, to consider whether an upgrade of an IIT response is appropriate. Identify the potential health and safety issues and provide recommendations to the EDO on events warranting consideration of an IIT. (a)

For operational reactor events or events that do not warrant consideration of an AIT, determine if an SIT is the appropriate NRC response. (b)

Select the SIT and the AIT leader and members and direct. coordinate, and approve the performance of SITs and AITs. (c)

Provide assistance in implementing the NRC incident investigation program. (d)

Identify and provide staff as members and leaders of IITs, AITs, and SITs. (e)

Make appropriate State notifications of NRC responses to operational events. (f)

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Regional Administrators (8) (continued)

For all IITs and some AITs, issue a confirmatory action letter, as appropriate, to the affected licensee confirming the licensee's agreement that within the constraints of ensuring health and safety, relevant failed equipment and areas are quarantined and subject to agreed-upon controls for troubleshooting; that information and data related to the event are protected; that the facility is maintained in a safe condition, and that if the facility, or any part, had been shut down as a result of the event, it shall not resume operation until concurrence is received from the NRC. (g)

Consult with the Director of NRR (or, as appropriate, the Director of NMSS) to ensure a collegial decision is reached that it is acceptable for the affected licensee to resume facility operations following an event that involves an IIT response where the facility has been shut down and obtains the EDO's concurrence. (h)

Director, Office of Public Affairs (9)

Follows established NRC public affairs policies for keeping the press and the public informed of information related to NRC investigatory responses to operational events (see Parts II and III of this handbook). (a)

Supports IITs. (b)

Issues press releases announcing the formation of all AITs and IITs and of SITs on a case-by-case basis, as deemed appropriate; arranges for press briefings. Informs the public of all AIT exit meetings, IIT status briefings, and meetings on the final investigation results. (c)

Director, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (10)

Identifies and provides staff as members and leaders of IITs and AITs. (a)

Director, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (10) (continued)

Provides assistance in implementing the NRC incident investigation program. (b)

Provides risk analysis support (coordinated by NRR) to the regions for power reactor events that warrant consideration of at least an AIT. Risk analysis support for power reactor events where only an SIT may be warranted will be provided if requested by the appropriate regional administrator. (c)

Assists in identifying the potential nuclear material safety, health, or safeguards issues. (d)

Office of the General Counsel (11)

Provides legal assistance in implementing the NRC incident investigation program. (a)

Identifies and provides legal staff to support IITs. (b)

Director, Office of Congressional Affairs (12)

Makes congressional notifications and arranges congressional briefings, as appropriate, to ensure Congress is informed of NRC responses to operational events.

Office of the Inspector General (13)

Participates as an observer during IITs in coordination with the Director of IRO.

Office of Investigations (OI) (14)

Provides assistance in implementing the incident investigation program. (a)

Office of Investigations (OI) (14) (continued)

Identifies and provides staff as members of IITs and AITs. (b)

For AITs, promptly coordinates with the appropriate region and headquarters offices information obtained in connection with any parallel OI investigation that indicated significant increases in the health or safety significance of the event. (c)

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (15)

Provides professional stenographers to transcribe formal interviews conducted by the IIT.

Part II **Incident Investigation Team**

The investigatory initiative involving a response by an incident investigation team (IIT) is described in this part.

Objectives of an Incident Investigation Team (A)

The objectives of an IIT are to—

- Conduct a timely, thorough, systematic, formal, independent investigation of certain safety-significant events occurring at facilities licensed by the NRC. (1)
- Collect, analyze, and document factual information and evidence sufficient to determine the probable cause(s), conditions, and circumstances pertaining to the event. (2)

Scope of an Incident Investigation (B)

An IIT investigation should emphasize factfinding and determination of probable cause for a significant operational event (as defined in Part I of this handbook). The scope of the investigation must be sufficient to ensure that the event is clearly understood, the relevant facts and circumstances are identified and collected, and the probable cause(s) and contributing cause(s) are identified and substantiated by the evidence associated with the event. The investigation must consider whether licensee and NRC activities preceding and during the event were timely and adequate. (1)

The scope of an IIT investigation must include conditions preceding the event, event chronology, systems response, human factors considerations, equipment performance, precursors the event, emergency response, safety significance, radiological

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Scope of an Incident Investigation (B) (continued)

considerations, and findings and conclusions. The scope of the IIT investigation will be established by a charter attached to the initiating memorandum from the Executive Director for Operations (EDO). (2)

The scope of the investigation shall exclude— (3)

- Specific assessment of violations of NRC rules and requirements (a)
- Review of the design and licensing bases for the facility, except as necessary to assess the cause for the event under investigation (b)
- Assessment of reasonable assurance of offsite emergency response capabilities of State and local agencies (c)
- Determination for resumption of licensed operation (d)

The NRC will consider information collected as part of the IIT process when a decision is made by the affected licensee to resume facility operations before issuance of the IIT report. Such instances require close coordination between the IIT leader, the regional administrator, and the appropriate program office director. (4)

Schedule (C)

The IIT must be activated as soon as practicable after the health and safety significance of the operational event is determined and will begin its investigation as soon as practicable after the facility has been placed in a safe, secure, and stable condition. If there is an NRC incident response, the IIT investigation will begin after the incident response is deactivated. (1)

Schedule (C) (continued)

The IIT must issue interim reports at appropriate intervals outlining the status, plans, and relevant new information related to its investigation. (2)

The IIT must prepare and transmit its final report to the Commission and the EDO in 45 days from activation of the team, unless relief is granted by the EDO. The EDO will normally schedule a meeting approximately 1 week after receipt of the final report for the IIT to brief the Commission on its investigation. (3)

Information contained in the report is not to be released until a copy of the final report is placed in the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), which normally occurs during the day of the Commission briefing, if one is conducted. If deemed necessary, the EDO may forward a copy of the final report to the affected licensee before the Commission briefing simultaneously forward a copy of the final report to ADAMS. Following the Commission briefing, the EDO will transmit a copy of the final report to the licensee and the NRC staff for review and comment before the EDO defines the followup actions and assigns them to NRC offices. (4)

Team Composition and Qualifications (D)

The IIT will be composed of technical experts selected on the basis of expertise relevant to the event under investigation and their freedom from significant involvement in the licensing and inspection of the facility involved or other activities associated with issues that had a direct effect on the course or consequences of the event. The number of members and areas of technical expertise required for each IIT will be determined on the basis of the type of facility and characteristics of the event. (1)

Note: The special procedures for clearing non-Government individuals, which are outlined in NUREG-1303, "Incident Investigation Manual," apply whenever they are used to support an IIT. (2)

Team Composition and Qualifications (D) (continued)

The team leader and expert members should, to the extent practicable, be selected from rosters of candidates who have been certified through formal training in incident investigation. An NRC senior manager from the Senior Executive Service shall be the team leader. (3)

Duties (E)

The IIT carries out the single NRC factfinding investigation of the event and is authorized to pursue and is responsible for pursuing all aspects of an event that are within its scope as defined above. NRC response personnel on site shall provide support as needed to ensure the efficient and effective transition to investigation of the event in a manner that does not interfere with facility safety. (1)

The following duties are in addition to the duties defined elsewhere in this directive and handbook. (2)

Executive Director for Operations (a)

- Approves the formation of an IIT, selects the team leader and members, provides policy and technical direction to the IIT, and ensures the independence of the IIT. (i)
- Concurs in the decision made by the appropriate regional administrator and office director following an event that involves an IIT response that the affected licensee may resume regulated activities or facility operations. (ii)
- Determines that the investigation was effectively conducted and was consistent with the goals of the incident investigation program. (iii)
- Assigns followup actions associated with the IIT report. (iv)

- Monitors the closure of IIT findings (i.e., staff actions) of the assigned NRC office (via the EDO's work item tracking system [WITS]) and evaluates the staff's actions to confirm that pertinent aspects of each IIT finding are addressed in the implemented resolution. (v)
- Resolves conflicts between a regional office and/or one or more program offices regarding such matters as the need to initiate an AIT and the office assigned the responsibility for an AIT versus an IIT. (vi)

Director, Incident Response Operations (IRO) (b)

- Provides administrative support staff to the IIT to help the team to meet its objectives and schedule. (i)
- Provides advice and consultation to the IIT leader on procedural matters and suggestions regarding completeness of the IIT report. (ii)
- Coordinates with the Division of Information Management in the Office of the Chief Information Officer to provide support necessary to publish an IIT report as a NUREG document. (iii)

Regional Administrators (c)

- Provide assistance in briefing and supplying background information to the IIT when it arrives on site. (i)
- Provide onsite support for the IIT during its investigation. (ii)
- Identify and provide staff to monitor licensee troubleshooting activities to assess equipment performance. (iii)
- Consult with the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) (or, as appropriate, the Director of the Office

of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards [NMSS]) to ensure that a collegial decision is reached that the affected licensee may resume facility operations following an event that involves an IIT response. (iv)

The IIT Leader (d)

- Directs and manages the IIT in its investigation and ensures that the objectives and schedules are met for the investigation as defined in this handbook. (i)
- Identifies, adds, and removes equipment and areas from the quarantined list to ensure facility safety. In addition, ensures that the licensee is able to perform appropriate maintenance and testing of equipment and determine causes for equipment anomalies. (ii)
- Works with the Office of Public Affairs in providing the news media with information on IIT activities. (iii)
- Serves as principal spokesperson for the IIT activities in interacting with the licensee, NRC offices, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste, news media, and other organizations on matters involving the investigation. (iv)
- Prepares frequent status reports documenting IIT activities, plans, significant findings, and health and safety concerns that may require timely remedial actions or issuance of information notices, bulletins, or orders. (v)
- Receives direction from and supervision by the EDO. (vi)
- Identifies and requests that the EDO provide additional IIT resources (e.g., additional members, consultants, contractor assistance) as needed. (vii)

- Identifies and recommends to the EDO further studies and investigations, such as those involving staff performance in regulatory activities before the event, when significant concerns could not be thoroughly evaluated because of time or resource limitations. (viii)
- Ensures, in cooperation with the IIT members and the technical writer/editor, preparation of the final report within the due date established by the EDO. (ix)
- Briefs the Director of NRR (or, as appropriate, the Director of NMSS) and the regional administrator on the facts surrounding the event in support of decisionmaking concerning resumption of facility operations by the affected licensee. (x)
- Promptly documents and conveys significant ancillary findings or information outside the scope of the IIT charter to regional management for followup action. (xi)
- Ensures that a lessons-learned evaluation is conducted and documented on the IIT efforts and results. (xii)

Conduct of an Investigation (F)

The investigation process is based on the principles of incident investigation provided in IIT training programs and described in NUREG-1303, "Incident Investigation Manual." (1)

The composition of the IIT must be structured and the procedures developed to maintain independence and objectivity. Personnel possessing a high degree of independence, ingenuity, and resourcefulness should be selected to ensure that the investigation is conducted in a timely, professional, thorough, and coordinated manner. (2)

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Conduct of an Investigation (F) (continued)

Implementing procedures to guide and control the establishment and investigatory activities of an IIT are included in NUREG-1303 and IRO Administrative Procedure 12, "Incident Investigation Team Administrative Requirements." These procedures provide guidance for— (3)

- Activating an IIT, including responsibilities, coordination, communication, team composition, and guidance (a)
- Outlining an IIT investigation of an operational event, including responsibilities, work plan, communication, interfaces, scope, and schedule (b)
- Interviewing personnel (c)
- Collecting and maintaining records, documents, data, and other information (d)
- Treating guarantined equipment and areas (e)
- Preparing, reviewing for classified or sensitive unclassified information, and distributing the IIT report and related documents (f)
- Defining administrative support requirements for an IIT (g)

For an IIT involving a medical event, additional guidance is provided in Management Directive 8.10, "NRC Medical Event Assessment Program." (4)

Followup (G)

Following NRC staff and licensee review and comment on the IIT report, the EDO shall identify generic and facility-specific staff actions resulting from the investigation that are safety significant and warrant additional attention or action. Following Commission

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Followup (G) (continued)

approval, the EDO shall assign NRC office responsibility for each action. Office directors shall provide a written status report on the disposition of each assigned action as directed by the EDO. (1)

The memorandum assigning followup actions (i.e., staff actions) should address all IIT findings, including those that are judged to require no followup action, in order to document the consideration of all findings. The resolution of each staff action will be documented by the assigned NRC lead office in a single safety evaluation report, and each staff action will be individually tracked by the EDO's WITS. (2)

Part III

Augmented Inspection Team

The investigatory initiative involving a response by an augmented inspection team (AIT) is described in this part.

Objectives of an Augmented Inspection Team (A)

The objectives of an AIT are to—

- Conduct a timely, thorough, and systematic inspection related to significant operational events at facilities licensed by the NRC. (1)
- Assess the health and safety significance of the event and communicate to regional and headquarters management the facts and safety concerns related to the event so that appropriate followup actions can be taken (e.g., study a generic concern, issue an information notice or bulletin). (2)
- Collect, analyze, and document factual information and evidence sufficient to determine the cause(s), conditions, and circumstances pertaining to the event. (3)

Scope of an Augmented Inspection (B)

The AIT response should emphasize factfinding and determination of probable cause(s), as well as the conditions and circumstances relevant to issues directly related to the event. (1)

The AIT response should be sufficiently broad and detailed to ensure that the event and related issues are well defined, the relevant facts and circumstances are identified and collected, and the findings and conclusions are identified and substantiated by the information and evidence associated with the event. The

Scope of an Augmented Inspection (B) (continued)

inspection should consider the adequacy of the licensee's actions during the event. (2)

The regional administrator directing the AIT inspection shall define and revise the scope of the inspection, as appropriate. (3)

It is not the responsibility of an AIT to— (4)

- Examine the regulatory process (to determine whether that process contributed directly to the cause or course of the event) (a)
- Determine whether NRC rules or requirements were violated, or recommend enforcement actions (b)
- Address licensee actions related to plant restart (c)
- Address the applicability of generic safety concerns to other facilities (d)

Schedule (C)

The AIT must be activated as soon as practicable after the health and safety significance of the event is determined and should begin its inspection as soon as practicable after the facility has been placed in a safe, secure, and stable condition.

Team Composition and Qualifications (D)

The AIT will be composed of technical experts from the responsible regional office, augmented by personnel from headquarters or other regions or by outside contractors with special technical qualifications to complement the technical expertise of the regional response. The size of the AIT and the areas of expertise will be determined by the regional administrator

Team Composition and Qualifications (D) (continued)

and coordinated with other NRC offices on the basis of the event and its implications. (1)

Note: The special procedures for clearing non-Government individuals, which are outlined in NUREG-1303, "Incident Investigation Manual," apply whenever they are used to support an AIT. (2)

The AIT leader will normally be selected from the responsible regional office unless the lead is transferred to another NRC office by mutual consent. (3)

Duties (E)

The AIT is responsible for pursuing all pertinent aspects of an operational event. The following duties of NRC offices are in addition to those defined elsewhere in this directive and handbook.

Executive Director for Operations (EDO) (a)

 Resolves conflicts between a regional office and/or one or more program offices regarding such matters as the need to initiate an AIT, the office assigned the responsibility for AIT implementation, and office representation on an AIT.

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) (b)

- For reactor events, monitors and evaluates the AIT process and products and ensures that AIT procedures are properly maintained. (i)
- Defines, develops, coordinates, approves, and maintains the necessary procedures for reactor events to guide and control AIT activities at a reactor facility. Reviews the draft AIT charter. (ii)

 For reactor events, reviews the AIT report for generic safety implications and initiates followup action, as appropriate. (iii)

Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) (c)

- For materials events, monitors and evaluates the AIT process and products and ensures that AIT procedures are properly maintained. (i)
- Defines, develops, coordinates, approves, and maintains the necessary procedures that guide and control AIT activities at non-reactor facilities and reviews the draft AIT charter. (ii)
- For materials events, reviews the AIT report for generic safety implications and initiates followup action, as appropriate. (iii)

Regional Administrators (d)

- Select the AIT leader and members in coordination with the appropriate headquarters office. (i)
- Staff, direct, supervise, coordinate, and approve the performance of AITs. (ii)
- Prepare, in coordination with NRR or NMSS, a written charter for the AIT. The charter shall include the basis for the formation of the AIT. (iii)
- Ensure that the AIT response is initiated, defined, and conducted in a manner that achieves the objectives of the AIT. (iv)
- Evaluate if and when the AIT inspection should be upgraded to an incident investigation team (IIT) investigation and, in consultation with the Directors of NRR and/or NMSS and

Incident Response Operations, recommend to the EDO that an IIT response is warranted. (v)

- Provide administrative support and resources to assist the AIT in meeting its objectives and schedule. (vi)
- Issue a periodic Daily Staff Note and Preliminary Notification, if warranted, to the EDO and coordinate development of a press release with the Office of Public Affairs (OPA) when an AIT response is implemented; provide updates, as appropriate. (vii)
- Identify and request additional expertise for AIT response from other NRC offices. (viii)
- Identify followup actions needed based on the AIT findings and forward to the appropriate headquarters office for action. (ix)
- Coordinate with OPA and appropriate headquarters offices to ensure that the AIT exit meeting is open to the public for observation, as appropriate. (x)

AIT Leader (e)

- Manages the AIT in its inspection and ensures that the objectives and schedules are met for the inspection as defined in this handbook. (i)
- With the approval of the appropriate regional administrator, adds and removes equipment and areas from a quarantined list (if applicable) to ensure facility safety. In addition, ensures that the licensee is able to perform appropriate maintenance and testing of equipment and determine causes for equipment anomalies. (ii)

- Serves as principal spokesperson for the AIT activities in interacting with the licensee, NRC offices, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), news media, and other organizations on matters involving the inspection. (iii)
- Prepares interim status reports documenting AIT activities, plans, and new information. Communicates to NRC offices any significant findings or health or safety concerns that may require timely remedial actions or issuance of information notices, bulletins, or orders. Identifies where new information indicates a significant increase or decrease in event significance, which should be considered in any recommendation to upgrade the AIT response to an IIT investigation or downgrade the AIT response to an SI. (iv)
- Receives direction and supervision from the appropriate regional administrator. (v)
- Coordinates with OPA in providing the news media with information on AIT activities. (vi)
- Identifies and requests that the regional administrator provide additional AIT resources (e.g., additional members, consultants, contractor assistance), as needed. (vii)
- Ensures the issuance of the AIT final report within 30 calendar days of inspection completion (the day of the exit meeting). The AIT report distribution list shall include the EDO, the ACRS, the Commissioners, the appropriate headquarters project manager, the Division of Information Management of the Office of the Chief Information Officer, and for power reactor events, the branch responsible for event assessments. A copy of the report should be placed in the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System immediately after it is provided to the affected licensee. (viii)

 Ensures that a lessons-learned evaluation is conducted and documented on the AIT effort and results. (ix)

Conduct of an Augmented Inspection (F)

The AIT process is based on the in-house principles of incident investigation provided in NRC's incident investigation training courses and the general principles described in NUREG-1303 and IRO Administrative Procedure 12, "Incident Investigation Team Administrative Requirements." (1)

The composition of the AIT must be structured and the procedures developed to maintain objectivity. Personnel selected shall possess a high degree of technical capability and should be able to ensure that the inspection is conducted in a timely, professional, thorough, and coordinated manner. (2)

The procedures that guide and control the establishment and investigatory activities of an AIT are included in Inspection Procedure 93800, "Augmented Inspection Team," and as necessary, NUREG-1303. These documents provide guidance for— (3)

- Activating an AIT, including responsibilities, coordination, communication, team composition, and guidance (a)
- Outlining the work plan for conducting an AIT investigation of an operational event, including responsibilities, communication, interfaces, scope, and schedule (b)
- Interviewing personnel (c)
- Collecting and maintaining records, documents, data, and other information (d)

Conduct of an Augmented Inspection (F) (continued)

- Controlling quarantined equipment and areas (e)
- Providing administrative support, as necessary, for an AIT (f)
- Upgrading an AIT response to an IIT investigation or downgrading it to an SI (g)
- Interfacing with other parallel investigations such as those by the Office of Investigations, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or State authorities (h)

For an AIT investigation involving a medical event, additional guidance is provided in Management Directive 8.10, "NRC Medical Event Assessment Program." (4)

Followup (G)

Identification, review, and approval of licensee corrective actions, licensee actions before resumption of facility operations, and NRC enforcement actions must be accomplished through the normal organizational structure and procedures. (1)

The appropriate regional administrator will initiate followup actions needed on the basis of AIT findings. Generally, followup actions will be handled through normal office procedures. For example, the regional office might initiate a task interface agreement with NRR to examine a particular issue and track it. Specific guidance on resolution and closeout of followup actions will be provided in the NRC Inspection Manual and inspection procedures. (2)

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