No. S-08-024

PDF Version

“Source Security and Public Safety”

Prepared Remarks for

The Honorable Gregory B. Jaczko
Commissioner
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

at the

Steel Manufacturers Association Radiation Issues Seminar
Washington, DC

May 21, 2008

I am pleased to be here with you today. I know that radiation sources are a concern for your industry and I am glad to be able to discuss some of the issues of concern to the environment managers, radiation safety officers, and other representatives of the U.S. steel production industry.

Let me begin by saying that I am one of four Commissioners at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission charged with regulating the civilian nuclear industry – including nuclear power plants and tens of thousands of radiation sources used in research, industry, and medicine. The views I offer today are my own and not necessarily those of my three other colleagues.

I also want to say up front I completely agree that organizations making steel utilizing a feedstock of scrap metal should not have to suffer the potential health and safety concerns, and the certain economic consequences, of improperly disposed of radiation sources. You make more than half of the steel produced in this country using scrap metal, and the strong productivity rates of your minimills are the keys to your competitiveness. The inadvertent presence of radioactive materials in scrap metal supplies can have dramatic affects on those efforts, and this morning I will outline some of the additional steps the NRC is taking that will serve to prevent such incidents at your facilities.

But first, I wanted to talk to you about a visit I made to a recycling facility in Jacksonville, Florida, in February of 2007. I visited Gerdau Ameristeel, the fourth largest overall steel company and the second largest minimill steel producer in North America. Donnie Shumake, Vice President & General Manager, was nice enough to show me the recycling line and the electric arc furnace. I was impressed with the efficiency of the process and with the lengths they go to to scan incoming scrap metal in an effort to detect radioactivity. They did miss one in 2001 when a cesium-137 source was melted, and while thankfully no one was hurt, the clean up cost millions of dollars.

The agency has public health and safety regulations in place that are designed to prevent these types of incidents, but the threat of terrorism has led us to implement additional security requirements that should make these type of events even more rare.

First, the Commission has approved the development of a National Source Tracking System that will allow the agency to better track the location of high-risk sources. This system will not yet include real time tracking – something I hope it will in the future – but will help the agency and its state partners have better visibility on the location of sources. It should be fully up and running by December of this year. In addition, the Commission has decided to expand this tracking system so that it includes not only the two highest risk categories of sources that could be used to make a dirty bomb (so-called category one and two material), but also category three and a portion of category four radioactive sources as well. That initiative to expand beyond categories one and two is the subject of an ongoing rulemaking and those sources should also be included in the National Source Tracking System by the middle of next year. What this means for you is that the NRC will have an even better tool in place for monitoring the whereabouts of not only the biggest and highest risk radioactive sources, but also smaller sealed sources that if misplaced, could inadvertently end up at your minimills.

In addition, the agency is proceeding with a proposal to require greater controls on generally licensed devices, and potentially to allow individual states to implement even tighter controls than those national standards. The staff is evaluating our regulatory framework to identify any gaps in how we control generally licensed materials based on safety and security. I believe that this is an important step because generally licensed material could be obtained without prior NRC approval and the same security concerns that the agency is evaluating for specifically licensed materials need to be considered for generally licensed materials. The proposed rule should be out for public comment by the end of this year.

A related issue that the NRC is focused on involves the security of cesium – a radioisotope that Gerdau Ameristeel is all too familiar with – that is widely used in irradiators in the field of medicine.

Many commercial irradiators use sources such as cobalt-60, which is extremely difficult for someone to use maliciously to cause widespread contamination. Some, mostly blood irradiators found at blood banks, use cesium chloride, which could potentially pose a higher risk. The agency is working to come up with options to address the challenges posed by the use of cesium chloride, but I believe we should be doing more, consistent with recent recommendations from the National Academy of Sciences. The NRC should be actively working to eliminate or require the use of alternative forms of category 1 and 2 cesium chloride sources in the United States on a timeline that is as ambitious as possible without negatively impacting public health.

I do not know exactly how such a regulation should look but the beauty of a formal public rulemaking is that it is an opportunity to gather information and views from all stakeholders and to then resolve them in a way that best protects public health and safety and common defense and security. The NRC should not wait until it has perfect information about alternatives, we should put a proposal out and let people comment on it so that we can get moving in the right direction.

In addition to these efforts to ensure the security and safety of the thousands of radioactive sources in use around the country today, the federal government, working with the states, also has an active program to recover abandoned and excess sources no longer being used. These efforts began in earnest in 1993 and they continue today, resulting in the recovery and safe disposition of more than 10,000 sealed sources. This work provides additional assurance that unwanted sources are accounted for and protected against the risk of malevolent or accidental misuse.

Finally, the agency is in the process of developing a rulemaking that would make changes to how we currently approve the import of high-risk sources. The proposal, which is due to the Commission in 2009, would allow high-risk sources to be imported under a general license. In my view, this proposed rule would take us backwards.

That is because back in 2005, the agency recognized the potential for improperly handling risk-significant quantities of radioactive sources and amended the regulations to require these sources be specifically licensed and tracked to prevent them from being diverted for illicit purposes. I joined my colleagues in unanimously approving these new requirements regarding the agency’s export and import security policies. In approving that final rule, the Commission agreed with staff that the amendments would address the “fact that most radioactive materials subject to NRC’s authority may be imported or exported without specific authorization by NRC and without NRC’s knowledge.”  

I continue to believe that the Commission should remain cognizant of the export and import of risk-significant quantities of radioactive sources using the current provisions, and I oppose any changes to revert back to a general license. I understand that some minor improvements or clarifications in 10 CFR Part 110 may result in efficiencies in the agency’s process for authorizing exports and imports; however, without a significant change in the current threat environment, I see no reason for amending Part 110 for the export and import of risk-significant sources.

In summary, the NRC has orders and regulations in place to protect radioactive sources in place around the country. We are looking at strengthening our ability to track a wide range of sources, and to better protect generally licensed devices.

At this point, I want to ask something of you and your organizations. All of the changes I have discussed today – those I agree with and the one I do not – are developed through these public rulemaking processes. You have a definite stake as members of the public and as steel manufacturers in the requirements we put in place for radioactive material.

Therefore, I urge you to stay involved and participate in these efforts to establish national policy. In addition, I commend and encourage the voluntary efforts you have put in place to protect the public by detecting the rare radiation sources that may end up at your facilities.

Thanks again for the opportunity to speak with you today, and I would welcome any questions you may have.

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