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Re: [patch] selinux_capget()

From: Russell Coker <russell_at_coker.com.au>
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2004 12:16:19 +1100


On Wednesday 15 December 2004 03:22, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> > How does the application determine the real
> > effective set?
>
> The short answer is that it doesn't. How do you
> determine if you can really open a file for write
> access? The real world behavior is to check what
> you know about (e.g. UID, mode bits) and hope that
> you'll pass any additinoal constraints (e.g. ACLS,
> capabilities, mount options) that might apply. Then
> try it and check the error return.

Doesn't access(2) deal with ACLs and mount options?

> which is a generalized version of access(2), that
> notoriously unuseful syscall. Needless to say, such
> an inferface is impracticle and would still yield
> false positives.

A faccess(2) syscall would be handy if you are contributing to further POSIX standards...

-- 
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Received on Sun 19 Dec 2004 - 20:16:31 EST
 

Date Posted: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Modified: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Reviewed: Jan 15, 2009

 
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