

Authenticating Firewalls

JET Workshop, 13-15 April, 2004 Jefferson Lab


Bill Allcock
Argonne National Laboratory












Client





Where are we at today?

- Applications often can't run, and if they are high bandwidth apps, the firewall often limits performance.
- Today, it means negotiating (arguing, threatening?) with the security people and the admins to open holes, but then they stay open too long, and anyone can exploit them.
- We need something better...



An Idea

- First, this is an idea, and we don't have all the angles figured out, so please throw stones... well, not really, but you get the idea.
- We need
 - To open holes in the firewall
 - Only when absolutely necessary
 - For a specific party
 - With confidence that the use of that port falls within authorized behavior


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How can we do that?

- We envision two services
 - A service proxy
 - Intercepts incoming service requests (SOAP in Web Services)
 - Validates / Authorizes the request
 - Pluggable framework so it can be easily extended
 - Once authorized forwards it to the service
 - A secure, dynamic firewall "automatic garage door opener"
 - Temporarily opens holes through the firewall
 - Uses lifetime management to ensure the holes close
 - Ideally can specify exact host and service that will contact
 - Possibly have no monitoring of packets after that?
 - But could work with IDS, if it were fast enough.
 - Could, in theory, use these separately



A picture







Issues

- You might notice the picture does not show who talks to the opener, this has significant security and effort impacts
 - ◆ The Proxy?
 - The Service?
 - The Client?
- Stability / Security of plug-ins
- What about non-SOAP requests?
- Would this be secure enough to let the fat pipe run un-monitored?

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Fusion Collaboratory







Even with Optical Paths...

