| CASE
|
DATE RENDERED
|
QUESTION PRESENTED
|
HOLDING
|
IMPLICATION OF
DECISION |
| Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998) |
June 15, 1998 |
Whether Title II of the ADA covers
state prisons and prisoners. |
Title II of the ADA unambiguously
extends to state prison inmates. |
Demonstrates that the ADA covers
some categories of enterprises not expressly mentioned in the Act. Demonstrates
breadth and broad coverage of the ADA. |
| Bragdon v. Abbott, 524
U.S. 624 (1998) |
June 25, 1998 |
1) Whether asymptomatic HIV is
a disability under the ADA. 2) When deciding whether a private health care
provider must perform invasive procedures on an infectious patient in his
office, should courts defer to the provider's professional judgment, as
long as it is reasonable in light of then current medical knowledge? |
1) Asymptomatic HIV infection
is a physical impairment under the ADA. 2) Reproduction is a major life
activity under the ADA, which HIV infection substantially limits within
the meaning of the ADA. 3) The existence of a significant health risk from
treatment or accommodation of person who is disabled must be determined
from the standpoint of the person refusing treatment or accommodation, but
the risk assessment must be based on medical or other objective evidence,
and not simply on that person's good-faith belief that a significant risk
exists. |
The list of major life activities
in the ADA regulations is not exhaustive. This ruling should be very helpful
to most persons with HIV trying to establish they have a disability under
the ADA. Major life activities under the ADA are not limited to activities
that have a public, economic, or daily character. |
| Wright v. Universal Maritime
Service Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998)
|
November 16, 1998 |
Whether a general arbitration
clause in a collective bargaining agreement requires an employee to use
the arbitration procedure to address an alleged violation of the ADA. |
There is "a presumption
of arbitratability" in collective bargaining agreements, but the presumption
extends only to interpreting or applying the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement. Any union-negotiated waiver of employees' statutory right to
a judicial forum for claims of employment discrimination, if valid at all,
must be "clear and unmistakable." |
The Court did not reach the
question whether a waiver would be enforceable if it was, in fact, clear
and unmistakable.
|
| Cleveland v. Policy Management
Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999)
|
May 24, 1999 |
The extent to which application
for and receipt of disability benefits precludes a person with a disability
from bringing an ADA claim. |
The Court identified five rationales
for claimants making legitimate representations of total disability while
pursuing ADA claims. A negative judicial presumption of direct conflict
between the two claims should not be applied. |
Interrupted a large body of lower
court decisions that had prevented individuals who had filed for or were
awarded Social Security disability benefits from pursuing ADA employment
discrimination claims. |
| Sutton v. United Airlines,
527 U.S. 471 (1999)
|
June 22, 1999 |
Whether corrective and mitigating
measures should be considered in determining whether an individual is disabled
under the ADA. |
Determinations of disability
under the ADA must take corrective (mitigating) measures into account. |
If a disability is corrected
by medication or an assistive device, ADA protections are not available
unless the condition still substantially limits or the person is regarded
as still substantially limited in a major life activity. If regarded as
substantially limited in the major life activity of working, plaintiff must
show that employer believed the limitation affected a range of jobs in various
classes or a class of jobs, not just a single, particular job. Has the illogical
result of permitting employers to terminate a person from a job because
of a physical or mental condition and then to argue the condition is not
serious enough to constitute a disability.
|
| Murphy v. United Parcel Service,
527 U.S. 516 (1999)
|
June 22, 1999 |
1) Whether conditions that are
improved with medication should be considered in the medicated or non-medicated
state for purposes of determining disability. 2) What does the "regarded
as" prong mean under the ADA. |
1) Medication is considered a
mitigating measure for purposes of determining whether someone has a disability.
2) The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute
a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. 3) Likewise,
being regarded as unable to perform a single, particular job does not constitute
discrimination under the ADA "third prong." |
Same principles as Sutton. |
| Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,
527 U.S. 555 (1999)
|
June 22, 1999 |
1) Whether having monocular vision
constitutes per se disability under the ADA. 2) Whether an employer
who requires as a job qualification that an employee meet an otherwise applicable
federal safety regulation must justify enforcing the regulation solely because
its standard may be waived in an individual case. |
1) A showing of significant restriction
is required in order to establish substantial limitation. Mitigating measures
can include the body's own systems (sometimes subconscious), not just medication
and devices. An individual must offer evidence that in their own personal
situation, the extent of the limitation is substantial (case by case basis).
2) An employer does not need to justify enforcing a waivable regulation. |
Per se disability status
could be appropriate in some circumstances. People with monocular vision
would not have an "onerous burden" in showing they have a disability.
However, a mere difference in an individual's manner of performing an activity
does not necessarily constitute a substantial limitation. |
| Olmstead v. L.C., 527
U.S. 581 (1999)
|
June 22, 1999 |
Whether the ADA requires a state
to place persons with mental disabilities in community settings rather than
in institutions when the state's treatment professionals have determined
that community placement is appropriate, and what standard is to be applied
in assessing a state's assertion of a fundamental alteration defense to
the obligation to afford such community placement. |
Undue institutionalization qualifies
as discrimination by reason of disability. States are required to place
persons with mental disabilities in community settings rather than in institutions
when the State's treatment professionals have determined that community
placement is appropriate, the transfer from institutional care to a less
restrictive setting is not opposed by the individual, and the placement
can be reasonably accommodated, taking into account the resources available
to the State and the needs of others with mental disabilities. States can
resist program modifications that would fundamentally alter the nature of
the services or programs. |
This decision has become the
new impetus for a national effort to increase community-based alternatives
and eliminate unjustified institutional placements. The Court indicated
that the fundamental alteration defense may be upheld when 1) the cost of
community-based care is equitable in view of resources available for the
range of services a State provides to others with disabilities; and 2) the
State's waiting list for transferring people out of institutions moves at
a reasonable pace. |
| Board of Trustees of the University
of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)
|
February 21, 2001 |
Whether the 11th Amendment bars
employees of a state from recovering monetary damages from the state for
violations of Title I of the ADA. |
Suits by employees of a state
to recover money damages from the state for violations of Title I of the
ADA are barred by the 11th Amendment. |
It is possible that analytical
standards applied here will be applied also to bar private suits for monetary
damages against states under Title II. However, in footnote 9 of the opinion,
the Court indicated that Title I of the ADA is still applicable to the states,
and can be enforced by the United States in actions for money damages. |
| PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin,
532 U.S. 661 (2001)
|
May 29, 2001 |
Whether Title III of the ADA
protects qualified entrants with disabilities participating in professional
golf tournaments, and whether allowing a golfer with a disability to use
a golf cart when all other competitors must walk would "fundamentally
alter the nature" of the tournaments. |
The concept of public accommodations
should be construed liberally to afford people with disabilities equal access
to a wide variety of establishments available to people without disabilities.
Title III specifically identifies golf courses as a type of public accommodation.
PGA Tour's golf tours and their qualifying rounds are covered by Title III
of the ADA. The walking rule in golf is not an essential attribute of the
game and waiving it will not, therefore, fundamentally alter the nature
of the game. |
Significant in guiding the application
of the reasonable modification requirement in future cases. Professional
sports and participants in them are covered by the ADA. |
| Buckhannon Board and Care
Home, Inc. v. W.Va. Dep't of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598
(2001)
|
May 29, 2001 |
Whether federal statutes that
allow courts to award attorney's fees and costs to the "prevailing
party" authorize awards of fees to parties whose lawsuits brought about
voluntary changes in the defendants' conduct but did not result in judgments
on the merits or court ordered consent decrees. |
A judgment, consent decree, or
settlement in a party's favor is required before attorney's fees will be
awarded. |
Significant turnaround from prevailing
view and practices. Defendants will be able to moot an action before a judgment
in an effort to avoid an award of attorney's fees, and plaintiffs with meritorious
but expensive cases will be deterred from bringing suit. |
| Toyota Motor Manufacturing,
Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 122 S.Ct. 681 (2002)
|
January 8, 2002 |
What is the proper standard for
determining whether an individual is substantially limited in performing
manual tasks. |
The proper standard for demonstrating
"a substantial limitation in the major life activity of performing
manual tasks" is whether or not the impairment prevents or restricts
performing manual tasks that are "of central importance to most people's
daily lives" and has "permanent or long-term" impact. Being
limited in performing a "class of manual activities," (i.e., activities
affecting the ability to perform specific manual tasks at work) is an insufficient
standard for meeting the definition of a qualified individual with a disability
under ADA. |
Suggests that Congress intended
to create a demanding standard for meeting the definition of "disabled"
and suggests that people must be visibly and functionally unable to perform
in certain specific, socially expected ways before they are entitled to
the protection of the ADA. |
| EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.,
122 S.Ct. 754 (2002)
|
January 15, 2002 |
Whether an agreement between
an employer and an employee to arbitrate employment-related disputes bars
the EEOC from pursuing victim-specific judicial relief under the ADA. |
An arbitration agreement does
not bar EEOC from pursuing victim-specific judicial relief on behalf of
an employee. |
Limits an employer's ability
to keep disputes out of courts and partially reverses last year's ruling
in which the Court said that an employee's signature on an employment contract
containing an arbitration agreement waives an employee's right to go to
court on their own behalf. Affirms EEOC's ability to assist people with
disabilities in asserting their civil rights protections in the workplace. |
| U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122
S.Ct. 1516 (2002) |
April 29, 2002
|
Whether the rights of a worker with a disability
who seeks assignment to a particular position as a reasonable accommodation
under the ADA take precedence over other workers’ rights to bid for
the position under the employer’s seniority system. |
The ADA does not ordinarily require the assignment
of an employee with a disability to a particular position to which another
employee is entitled under an employer’s established seniority system,
but might in special circumstances. |
The Court’s characterization of reasonable
accommodations as “special” and “preferential” fuels
the misconception that the ADA gives people with disabilities some type
of advantage over people without disabilities. |
| Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal,
122 S.Ct. 2045 (2002) |
June 10, 2002 |
Whether the EEOC regulation that allows employers
to refuse to hire applicants because their performance on the job would
endanger their health due to a disability is permitted under the ADA. |
The EEOC regulation allowing employers to
refuse to hire applicants because their performance on the job would endanger
their health due to a disability is permissible under the ADA. |
This decision invites paternalistic conjecturing
by employers and their physicians about perceived dangers to individuals
with disabilities, often based on ignorance and misconceptions about particular
conditions, and fosters perceptions that individuals with disabilities are
commonly irrationally self-destructive. |
| Barnes v. Gorman, 122 S.Ct. 2097 (2002) |
June 17, 2002 |
Whether punitive damages may be awarded in
private causes of action brought under either Title II of the ADA or under
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. |
Punitive damages are not available under
either Section 504 or Title II of the ADA. |
Removes a potent potential sanction against
egregious violators of Section 504 and Title II of the ADA. |
