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Re: new LSM ver

From: Timothy Wood <timothy_at_hallcomp.com>
Date: 08 Jul 2002 11:19:55 -0400


÷ ðÎÄ, 08.07.2002, × 10:39, Stephen Smalley ÎÁÐÉÓÁÌ:
>
> On 8 Jul 2002, Timothy Wood wrote:
>
> > So what is going ot be done about root permissions and such since you
> > are restricting them now? I mean there are just some things you have to
> > be root and have root permissions to run. Are you rewriting everything
> > to run based on security context instead of user? That would be ideal,
> > no I take that back, that would be awesome if things would run based on
> > security context of the user running them. Then you could get rid of
> > root altogether.
> >
> > Anywho (sorry for the rant) a really good/simple example of the new
> > default context is this. Lets say you want to add a new user... oh
> > wait, you can't! Why? No one but root can do this and now, not even
> > root can't do it. Did a primary service, such as named, bail out for
> > some reason? Too bad! You do not have any way to restart it except by
> > rebooting the server. Same reason, root only.
> >
> > But don't get me wrong. Getting rid of root is a good idea but it's too
> > early in the game to make changes like this. It pretty much breaks the
> > system in enforcing mode.
>
> I think you've misunderstood what we've done. We have merely changed the
> default login context for root to the user_r role, and prohibited direct
> ssh logins in the sysadm_r role. For administration, you can still login
> as yourself, run newrole to change to sysadm_r, and run su to obtain the
> Linux root user identity. Or, you can login as root if you permit direct
> root logins and then run newrole to change to sysadm_r.
>
> The change simply ensures that a vulnerability in sshd does not open a
> direct path to sysadm_r. The attacker will not be able to reach sysadm_r
> without authenticating to newrole.

This is true. You can also merely change the context when you login (if you log in as root). I suppose I jumpped the gun a little there, however I do like the idea of severely restricting root or removing root altogether. Would I be correct in that pretty much everything would have to be rewritten if this were to be accomplished (the removal of root, that is)?

Timothy,

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Received on Mon 8 Jul 2002 - 11:29:37 EDT
 

Date Posted: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Modified: Jan 15, 2009 | Last Reviewed: Jan 15, 2009

 
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