|
| |
NRCS History Articles
Bringing Federal Coordination to Snow Surveys
by Douglas Helms
Reprinted from "Bringing Federal Coordination to Snow Surveys." Proceedings of the
Western Snow Conference, 1991, pp. 119-125.
Presented at the Western Snow Conference, Juneau, Alaska.
The author thanks Anne Henderson and J.D. Ross of the Soil Conservation
Service for their editing assistance. The author also thanks John P. Butler
of the National Archives for his assistance with the research.
Daily, even hourly, the federal government is monitoring numerous aspects
of the environment. Though not so well-known as satellite images or
the daily weather report, stations in the mountains of the West keep
track of the amount of snow. A major objective is to know the amount of
runoff in the spring and summer. Snow surveying is part of the development
of science in government, as well as the growing demand for information
by individuals and businesses in the interest of economic growth. Also, snow
has been one of the more striking examples of federal, state, and
local cooperation. This article recounts the entrance of the federal government
into the snow surveying field.
As agriculture and recreation expanded in the West, some
individuals, universities, and companies began collecting information on winter
snows so as to predict snowmelt runoff in the spring and summer. Of
necessity these surveys were limited to the watersheds of immediate interest;
the forecasts were directed to specific purposes such as irrigation, hydroelectric
power, and predicting floods. The idea of coordinating snow surveys
so that forecasts of spring runoff would be available for all the West
may have occurred to many people, but Walter Wesley McLaughlin, chief of
the Division of Irrigation in the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Bureau
of Agricultural Engineering (BAE) was in a position to promote the
idea. A Nebraska native, McLaughlin had earned a degree in civil
engineering at Utah State University in 1896 and an M.S. degree in soil physics
and irrigation from the University of California at Berkeley in 1924. McLaughlin
embarked on a career in irrigation engineering in 1904 in USDA while also
teaching at Utah State University. In 1925, he became head of
the irrigation division, which was in the Bureau of Public Roads before being
transferred to the Bureau of Agricultural Engineering.
Since Utah was one of the pioneering states in snow surveying, McLaughlin
undoubtedly knew about its value. From his headquarters in Berkeley, California,
he followed the growth of snow surveying in the West and participated
in some of the snow survey meetings in 1933 and 1934. By mid-1934, he
had decided the time was ripe for getting the federal government
involved. He sent his supervisor, Samuel Henry McCrory, Chief of the Bureau of Agricultural
Engineering, a project proposal entitled "Snow Survey and Stream Flow Forecasting."
McLaughlin had observed that neither the Weather Bureau nor the Water Resources
Division of the U.S. Geological Survey was particularly active in
snow surveying. The pioneers in snow surveying were the users and their allies
in industry, public utilities, state agencies, and agricultural experiment
stations. Viewing the vacuum, McLaughlin proposed "to set up at the proper
time a snow survey project under the Bureau of Agricultural
Engineering, believing it to be the logical agency to undertake this work and the best
agency to make the greatest possible use of the information in the interest
of agriculture."
According to McLaughlin, he was waiting for the perfect
opportunity; the drought of 1934 provided it. In May 1934, he had an opportunity
to explain the importance of snow surveys to Secretary of Agriculture
Henry A. Wallace. He told Wallace how snow surveys could have helped
farmers adjust to the drought.l Also, McLaughlin saw the emergency
employment programs under the Public Works Administration (PWA) and
the Works Progress Administration (WPA) as an opportunity to expand snow surveys
and provide a way for coordinated forecasting. The Great Depression
and employment programs of the New Deal elicited hundreds of proposals
for a more activist federal role in social and natural resources areas.
Thus the economic conditions provided the climate in which the federal government
expanded its responsibilities in numerous areas.
The Farm Bureau Federation endorsed McLaughlin's proposal in 1934, and
he submitted a request for PWA funds for snow measuring stations, snow
courses, shelters, equipment, and maintenance for the first year. Despite
their inactivity to date, McLaughlin believed the Department of the Interior
would make a similar request if USDA did not take the initiative.2
McLaughlin specified mostly research projects in his proposal.
McCrory agreed that the drought and depression had indeed provided an
excellent opportunity, but McLaughlin was taking the wrong tactic. The
emphasis must be placed on actually providing forecasts to farmers and
other water users, rather than on research.3 McCrory knew
how to spot opportunities. His agency was one of the smallest in USDA,
and he had won a reputation for aggressively competing with larger agencies
for funding. BAE had neither the manpower nor the large constituencies
of agencies such as the Weather Bureau or the Forest Service.4
In addition to the $36,000 requested from the Bureau of the Budget for
research, McCrory requested $40,000 of the emergency drought funds from
USDA for making snow surveys and forecasts.5
The Bureau of the Budget rejected both requests.6 Having
become a convert to the idea, McCrory pushed the issue. In November
1934 Secretary Wallace met with Harry Hopkins, head of the federal relief
effort, to discuss money for snow surveys. Rather than having a large project
at the federal level, Hopkins suggested requests for the snow survey work
should come from the states through their regular procedure for requesting
project approval.7 Meanwhile, in late 1934 McLaughlin
continued his campaigning in the West. The Association of Western State
Engineers and the National Reclamation Association adopted resolutions
calling on the Secretary of Agriculture to undertake a coordinated, comprehensive
snow survey in the West. McLaughlin and his allies blocked moves to have
the Weather Bureau and the Forest Service named as the agencies to lead
the effort. They much preferred that the Secretary of Agriculture delegate
the authority. In the interest of making sure that the Bureau of Agricultural
Engineering was given the authority, McLaughlin reminded McCrory to keep
the Secretary advised. "We must, however, put the matter up to the Secretary
so he will be prepared for any move by Forestry or Weather Bureau. Forestry
grabs at every thing all the time."8
Legislation
Having failed, at least temporarily, with the regular budgetary process
and the emergency employment funds routes, the campaign now turned to the
legislative process. Governor C. Ben Ross of Idaho wrote to U.S. Senator
James P. Pope of Idaho to introduce him to McCrory.9 McCrory
kept the Secretary informed of these meetings and his activities to promote
snow surveys.10
The western Congressional delegation was easily convinced of the need
for snow surveys and requested funding in 1935. The Senate appropriations
committee discussed the item, but did not include it in the bill submitted
to the full Senate. They wanted to resolve the matter of who was going
to be in charge of the snow surveys. Senator Frederick A. Steiwer of Oregon
contacted Assistant Forester Earle H. Clapp and others in USDA, who told
him that authority should be assigned to the Bureau of Agricultural Engineering.
The amendment to the appropriations bill in the Senate gave BAE authorities
and funding for "snow surveys and forecasts of irrigation water
supplies."ll
Designing the Program
Before the appropriations bill was signed on May 17, 1935, McLaughlin
had already asked James C. Marr, a Division of Irrigation engineer at Boise,
Idaho, to familiarize himself with snow surveys in the northwestern states.12
McLaughlin travelled to Logan, Utah, to discuss snow surveys with George
D. Clyde, a professor of engineering at Utah State University and head
of Utah's snow survey effort. McLaughlin considered Clyde "the best informed
man in the country on this subject." In addition to his expertise, Clyde
already had "very pleasant contacts with other agencies," which would be
crucial to the success of a cooperative snow survey effort.13
McLaughlin thought Clyde would be the only additional employee BAE would
need for their new role in snow surveying. He would be a collaborator for
two or three months each year. Marr would have general supervision of the
snow survey work. Clyde and Marr worked on the general plan of action in
early May, preparatory to visiting existing snow surveying operations and
prospective cooperators. Clyde and Marr would locate the snow courses in
the states selected for work the first summer.
Despite McLaughlin's original intentions, he also signed on James Edward
Church to help get the cooperative snow survey program started in the summer
of 1935. Church's interest in snow led him from his fairly obscure position
as a classics professor at the University of Nevada in Reno to being the
most renowned figure on snow surveying in the United States. Undoubtedly,
it was a wise move to solicit Church's advice and to add his reputation
to the cause. Unlike Clyde, who immersed himself in developing the structure
of the program and laying out snow courses, Church conferred with officials
in the various states and explored the areas where cooperation could be
had. He talked to the hydroelectric power interests in Los Angles, the
irrigators in the Imperial Valley, and the Forest Service and National
Park Service people in Arizona. One of the cooperators referred to Church's
"goodwill tour." Church liked the term and continued the tour at Marr's
behest.14
Church was a willing cooperator. If he resented the fact that Clyde
had a greater hand in designing the coordinated system, he did not betray
it in writing to McLaughlin or Marr. Furthermore there was much in the
operations of the new group to enhance his reputation. Church felt that
the Weather Bureau had rebuffed his earlier efforts to prod them into developing
a national system. Worse, some of the Weather Bureau people preferred snow
stakes for measurement, rather than Church's snow courses and tube sampling.
(McLaughlin's group would use Church's methods.) Finally, Church held that
streamflow forecasting required engineering, rather than meteorological
analysis. Accordingly, most of the recent conferences have been held with
engineers rather than meteorologists.15
Early Decisions on Standardization
The survey was obviously going to rely on a great deal of cooperation.
But McLaughlin believed some of the methods and equipment must be standardized.
His group decided to spend their scant funds, $15,000, on equipment. A
standard type would be selected and purchased in volume so as to reduce
costs. His group well understood that experience in the field would lead
to improvements and correction of defects. Nonetheless they intended to
start out with established standards for the equipment and methods. They
would use Church's method for snow cover measurements rather than the stake
method. The former involved taking a core sample of the snow so as to measure
volume and water content. The stake method simply measured snow depth without
regard to density or water content. Another Church contribution, "the Mount
Rose tube in its original form or as modified in Utah," would be used.16
The scale to measure the weight of the snow sample would also be standardized.
As two of the innovators of snow surveying equipment, Church and Clyde
both had a personal interest in the writing of standards. During the first
year the Bureau of Agricultural Engineering purchased 150 sets of snow
sampling equipment with half going to Marr and the other half to Clyde
for distribution.17 But when they received the equipment,
Clyde and Church both had some objections. Church found a deficiency in
the weighing mechanism; Clyde found fault with the sampling tube from Nevada.
McLaughlin wryly noted that snow surveyors from Colorado had no difficulty
in using the equipment, and attributed "some of the comments of Clyde and
Church to a little prejudice. This is only natural, since we all have our
weakness in this regard."18 In addition to the snow sampling
tubes and the weighing mechanism, the group also supplied skis and snow
shoes in some cases.19
Organization
The absence of long-term data plus the need to emphasize the cooperative
nature of the work influenced McLaughlin's organizational decisions. There
would be regional offices, rather than a national one. Without historical
data, personal knowledge of the rivers and streams would be required if
the snow survey group expected to make worthwhile forecasts in the first
few years. They needed, and wanted, to make their presence known. They
definitely planned to make forecasts from the new snow course data the
first year. After some years' accumulation of data, McLaughlin believed
it would be possible to have a national office. But there was another reason
for regional structure. McLaughlin wanted to have the state agencies involved
not only in the surveying, but also in the forecasting. The matter of organization
illustrated the sensitivity required in federal-state cooperation on the
project and how such cooperation could best be achieved. McLaughlin thought
his bureau should insist on being involved in all local forecasting. He
wrote to McCrory, "Otherwise the work would soon drift out of our hands
and we would find ourselves in a position of supplying funds and some state
agency making the forecasts."20
Establishing Snow Courses
The first year McLaughlin planned to expand existing networks in the
key drainages and the most accessible areas of Oregon, Idaho, Utah, Wyoming,
Colorado, Nevada, and California. As Clyde and Marr travelled about, locating
snow surveys, they were "to interest local and state agencies and stimulate
an interest in local agencies for snow surveys so they will demand the
work."21
McLaughlin's group hoped, and suggested, that the cooperators in Nevada,
California, Utah, and Oregon who already had extensive networks of snow
courses would establish additional ones as well as surveying and mapping
existing courses. BAE was to supply the additional snow surveying equipment
needed. During the summer of 1935, Marr concentrated on the Snake River
and Clyde on the Colorado in establishing new snow courses in Wyoming,
Idaho, and Colorado.22 In selecting the new snow courses,
the two considered serviceability, accessibility, and the key areas in
a statewide plan, as well as the most urgent requests from cooperators.23
During the first ten days of August, 1935, Marr covered 2,300 miles
over little travelled roads and trails as he established snow courses in
Wyoming and Yellowstone National Park. To avoid the cost of installing
a course, he selected areas where little construction work would be needed.
Where work was needed he managed to get the cooperation of the Civilian
Conservation Corps. Thanks to the cooperation of agencies, the only cost
to BAE would be the snow sampling equipment.24
Marr's enthusiasm for the work even brought a reaction from McCrory
in Washington. He advised McLaughlin to "put on the brakes on a little
in his case. He is working so hard that I am afraid he faces a nervous
breakdown if he does not ease off somewhat."25 At the
end of 1935, Marr thought the snow surveying group had about a fourth of
the 1,000 courses they would eventually need.26
Cooperation with Other Federal Agencies
McLaughlin believed the Forest Service, as part of their cooperation,
would clear and mark courses, build and equip snow shelters at their own
expense and with CCC labor. He hoped that some of the cooperating state
agencies such as the state engineers would be able to use CCC labor and
successfully apply for Federal Emergency Relief Act funds for similar work.
McLaughlin planned to use all of the scant $15,000 appropriation for equipment.
To establish the whole network in the West would eventually require about
$100,000 to $300,000.27
The Division of Irrigation group never quite secured the large allocation
of emergency funding with which to rapidly expand the network by clearing
snow courses, building snow cabins, and doing other construction work.
Thus they tended to work through the states or with the federal land management
agencies. Marr helped Idaho prepare applications for funds to work on snow
courses.28 The federal land management agencies eventually
did much of the construction on the lands in their charge. Seeing that
BAE had only $15,000 to get the work started, the other agencies knew well
that success depended upon their cooperation. Evan w. Kelly, the U. S.
Forest Service's regional forester in Missoula, Montana, wrote to his forest
supervisors: "The Bureau of Agricultural Engineering is pitifully short
of the necessary appropriation from which to finance this important activity;...the
various agencies of the Government directly or incidentally interested,
must cooperate to the fullest practical extent."29 The
Bureau of Agricultural Engineering had reason to be pleased with the degree
of cooperation the first year. They wrote not only to cooperators, but
also to their supervisors thanking them. Success the first year accelerated
the degree of cooperation. The Corps of Engineers had been doing some snow
surveying work on the watershed of the Missouri River. In 1936 they contributed
$3,000 so that BAE could set up courses on the Columbia River basin.31
Expansion of Work
Following the forecasting work in the spring of 1936, BAE expanded the
program in the summer. In all the states there was cooperation with the
state engineer and the land-grant agricultural college. Each of the district
representatives of the Division of Irrigation made arrangements for the
snow cover surveys, provided the equipment, and stocked the cabins. Essentially
they handled all of the operations in their state. They reported the snow
survey data to the Berkeley office and the Boise office. Clyde handled
the work in Utah while Church handled Nevada. Marr, at Boise, and Louie
T. Jessup at Yakima, Washington, did Idaho and part of the Columbia drainage.
Ralph Parshall at Ft. Collins was responsible for Wyoming and Colorado;
and temporarily responsible for New Mexico and Arizona. Arch Work surveyed
Oregon and northern California from his office at Medford, Oregon. The
state engineer of California did the rest of that state. The district engineer
of the U. S. Geological Survey at Helena, Montana, did the Missouri River.
The Berkeley and Boise offices jointly publicized the information.32
By the second season they had perfected the publicity arrangements.
They made measurements monthly from January 1 to May 1. Water supply
forecasts were made following the February measurement
and the April or May measurement, depending on the state. Broadcasts of
information went out on the Farm and Home Hour and various state stations.
The cooperating agencies, usually the state engineer or the state agricultural
college, put out mimeographed releases. The Weather Bureau also published
the data for the federal government. As part of the original agreement
with the Weather Bureau, BAE supplied information to them for flood predictions.
Sampling for flood predictions required additional visits to the snow courses.
The snow survey work was actually a part-time duty for the BAE people,
except Marr, who would work full-time on it until no longer needed.33
Winter Sports Radio Broadcasts
By the second year of forecasts, the snow survey group began receiving
requests for information from winter sports enthusiasts. McLaughlin wanted
to get immediately involved since it was a public service and was another
"most worthwhile public contact for us...."34 Initially
McCrory resisted, believing that BAE had to strictly limit itself to the
authority in the legislation for forecasting irrigation water.35
Never easily discouraged, McLaughlin managed a meeting with Paul
Appleby, Assistant to the Secretary of Agriculture, and got his endorsement.
Following the meeting with Appleby, McLaughlin worked out an agreement
with the National Broadcasting Company to devote five minutes each Friday
on the Farm and Home Hour to reports from each state. Also, many of the
state weather bureaus and state highway departments agreed to issue the
forecasts. As far a McLaughlin was concerned the service was "an excellent
contact with the public."36
Different Visions
The issue of the winter sports forecasts illustrated some of the differences
in outlook, or zeal, between McCrory and his people in the West. McCrory
saw the value for irrigated agriculture and strongly supported the work,
but he saw it as only one aspect of BAE's work. When he thought he detected
Marr and others working exclusively on the snow survey project, yet charging
a large part of their salaries to other accounts, he chided them. He warned
McLaughlin to stay within the appropriation for snow surveys and vowed
not to siphon funds from other work for it.37 He wanted
to adhere strictly to the authorization for predicting irrigation water
supplies. As far as he was concerned, the agreement with the Weather Bureau
was well understood by both parties, and each group would cleave honorably
to the agreement.
In practically all these matters, McLaughlin had a different view. Success
in the snow survey required a quick success the first year and thus demanded
almost undivided attention. Though an irrigation engineer by training,
he understood the other uses and potential for the snow survey and moved
aggressively into those areas. Given the sparse BAE staff in the West,
compared to other Federal agencies, McLaughlin cherished the publicity
value and resulting clout that came from activities such as the winter
sports radio broadcasts. McLaughlin's operation depended upon the cooperation
of the land management agencies, but he also viewed them as potential competitors
for the snow survey prize. In his opinion the Weather Bureau had to be
watched at every turn. Offers of cooperation must be analyzed closely for
ulterior motives.38 For all these reasons McLaughlin and
his people in the Division of Irrigation zealously set out to make the
program a success.
Summary
More than fifty years after federal coordination of snow surveys was
begun, its value is recognized more than ever. The competition for water
in the West due to the explosion in population, industry, and agriculture
created a demand to know as precisely as possible the amount of water available
from snowmelt. The various enterprises whose operations cut across political
boundaries demand the basinwide information that a coordinated system produces.
In retrospect, many of the decisions made by McLaughlin and his colleagues
were wise beyond their time. One thing they wanted, but did not get, was
a large appropriation or allotment from the emergency employment funds
to rapidly clear snow courses, build snow cabins, and do other types of
construction associated with snow surveys. Would this have changed the
course of the history of snow survey? It is difficult to know. As
it developed, the enforced reliance on the state and other federal agencies
to do much of the work probably was beneficial to the strength of the program.
Although the snow survey is operated under the Soil Conservation Service,
it is responsible to, and draws strength from, all the cooperating agencies.
In a sense it has a separate existence. The users and gatherers of the
snow survey information seem likely to continue to demand some coordination
at the federal level for the foreseeable future.
Endnotes
1 Walter Wesley McLaughlin to Samuel Henry McCrory, July 25, 1934, File
3-234, General Correspondence, 1931-1939, Records of Bureau of Agricultural
Engineering, Record Group 8, National Archives and Records Administration,
Washington, D.C. All of the correspondence cited in this article is from
the same file.
2 McLaughlin to McCrory, August 6, 1934.
3 McCrory to McLaughlin, August 23, 1934.
4 Wayne Rasmussen, former historian of USDA, knew McCrory and provided
this characterization. Conversation with Rasmussen, March 25, 1991.
5 McCrory, Memorandum for the Secretary, September 4, 1934.
6 McCrory to McLaughlin, November 18, 1934.
7 McCrory to McLaughlin, November 27, 1934.
8 McLaughlin to McCrory, December 8, 1934.
9 C. Ben Ross to James P. Pope, December 27, 1934.
10 McCrory, Memorandum for the Secretary, January 31, 1935.
11 U. S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 74th Cong. 1st. sess.,
1935, 79, pt. 5: 4699.; Public Law No. 62, 74th Congress.
12 James C. Marr to M. R. Lewis, April 26, 1935.
13 McLaughlin to McCrory, May 6, 1935.
14 James Edward Church to McLaughlin, July 23, 1935.
15 Quotes of a letter from Church to McLaughlin found in McLaughlin
to McCrory, August 9, 1935.
16 McLaughlin to Church, August 3, 1935.
17 McLaughlin to George R. Boyd, Acting Chief, Bureau of Agricultural
Engineering, August 3, 1935.
18 McLaughlin to McCrory, January 23, 1936.
19 Mc McLaughlin to McCrory, October 19, 1935.
20 McLaughlin to McCrory, December 30, 1935.
21 McLaughlin, Memo--Snow Surveys, July 5, 1935.
22 Marr to H. P. Boardman, August 12, 1935.
23 McLaughlin to McCrory, December 30, 1935.
24 Marr to McLaughlin, August 12, 1935.
25 McCrory to McLaughlin, August 12, 1935.
26 McLaughlin to McCrory, December 30, 1935.
27 McLaughlin to McCrory, May 6, 1935.
28 Marr to H. P. Boardman, August 12, 1935.
29 Evan W. Kelly to Forest Supervisors, July 24, 1936.
30 McLaughlin to McCrory, August 12, 1936.
31 McLaughlin to McCrory, August 10, 1936.
32 McLaughlin to McCrory, January 23, 1937.
33 McLaughlin to McCrory, January 23, 1937.
34 McLaughlin to McCrory, February 3, 1937.
35 McCrory to McLaughlin, February 6, 1937.
36 McLaughlin to McCrory, July 13, 1937.
37 McCrory to McLaughlin, January 6, 1937 and January 18, 1937; McLaughlin
to McCrory, January 12, 1937.
38 McLaughlin to McCrory, December 21, 1936, McLaughlin to George R.
Boyd, Acting Chief, Bureau of Agricultural Engineering, August 16,
1937.
< Other Articles
< Back to History
| | |
About Us
Back to Top