We have experienced many example6 of minor rclcase of toxic .

materials into the atmosphere, despite the most careful precautions,

in nucSear test experiments.  The Skull Valley incident was a clear

warning about similar accidents in field tests of chcr?ictrI warfare
agents.  It showed how the security blanket ';!rcvent:; xfr~ critical

forethought about unexpected hazards to the public; it also illus-
Urated how far a security-bound activity must go in covering up its

mistakes after they -a happen, again FXRXEX z.zg the full use of
                  hinderipr

informed professional judgment in protecting the ~!ublic.

dhen we consider biol'ogical warfare agents, \;c 1:11rst remember that

no reXease is a minor one.  The charac teaM&i.c of t.!:ese &@gp is
                               uh!rnor!ingly

that they propagate, so that a single particle 3~~~~~61 inhaled by a
sihgle person, hundreds of miles from the point of release could start

a devastati!ng epidemic, whose origi'nal source rll:ight never be provable.
$&se.. 6 egents can also infect wild animnls, with ,? long chain of
infection in them and in their parasites, before j:i:n is involved.   AS

dormant spores, these agents, can persist for years, ?crhaps even cen-

turies, before being unwittingly revived znd infecting n?an. Every open

field test of E human pathogen is a global c.xperll:!cnt; those who would

conduct such experiment s must answer to rnankij~ld~ t'or the consequences.