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SAMPLE APPLICATION NARRATIVE



Summer Seminars for College and University Teachers
Institution: Wesleyan University



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National Endowment for the Humanities Division of Education Programs

Narrative Section of a Successful Application

This sample of the narrative portion from a grant is provided as an example of a funded proposal. It will give you a sense of how a successful application may be crafted. It is not intended to serve as a model. Every successful application is different, and each applicant is urged to prepare a proposal that reflects its unique project and aspirations. Prospective applicants are also strongly encouraged to consult with staff members in the NEH Division of Education Programs well before a grant deadline. This sample proposal does not include a budget, letters of commitment, résumés, or evaluations.

Project Title: *Traditions into Dialogue: Confucianism and Contemporary Virtue Ethics*

Institution: Wesleyan University

Project Director: Stephen Angle

Grant Program: Summer Seminars for College and University Teachers

Traditions Into Dialogue
Confucianism and Contemporary Virtue Ethics
A Proposed NEH Summer Seminar for 2008

Stephen Angle and Michael Slote, Directors

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Traditions Into Dialogue

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Summary

In recent decades, virtue ethics has become increasingly prominent within Anglo-American thought. Utilitarianism stresses the moral importance of the consequences of actions, and Kantianism focuses on universal rules or principles; but virtue ethics treats individual character and motivation as central to our understanding of ethical phenomena, an emphasis that one also finds within the main traditions of Chinese philosophical thought. We propose a six-week seminar aimed at philosophers interested in virtue ethics, but with little or no background in Chinese philosophy. Our goals are to develop the capacity of Western-trained philosophers to draw on Chinese sources in their on-going philosophical research, and secondarily to facilitate the development of cross-cultural dialogue and professional relationships. The seminar will be led by two directors: one a specialist in Chinese moral thought, the other a leading figure in Western virtue ethics. It will be held at Wesleyan University's Mansfield Freeman Center for East Asian Studies. The principal activity of the seminar will be intensive, guided reading and discussion of core texts from both classical Confucianism and neo-Confucianism. Lectures by one of the directors (Angle) and by three visiting scholars will supplement the discussion sessions. In addition, we will have a weekly colloquium on recent work in virtue ethics, run by the other director (Slote), using readings that are suggestive of possibilities for constructive dialogue with the Chinese materials we have already explored. The goal of this colloquium will be collectively to work through various challenges to putting the two traditions into dialogue. All

participants in the seminar, finally, will be invited to participate in a major international conference on Chinese philosophy and virtue ethics, to be held in Beijing in the spring of 2009; the best work from the conference, much of which we hope will be developed on the basis of the 2008 seminar, will be published in a volume co-edited by the seminar's directors.

Intellectual rationale

There are several keys to the significance of our proposed seminar. First, virtue ethics is an important, dynamic, and growing field within ethics; while Aristotle is a touchstone for many in the field, sources of inspiration for contemporary work in virtue ethics are increasingly diverse, which has helped to spur some of the field's dynamism. Second, the Chinese philosophical tradition is both intrinsically interesting and broadly understood by specialists to place special importance on the idea of virtue. Third, there are isolated instances of Western-trained philosophers making constructive use of Chinese texts, which both bode well for the enterprise but also reveal how little has been done. Finally, the promotion of cross-tradition philosophical dialogue is itself an end that we should pursue, and it is best undertaken not in the abstract, but in the context of specific questions, texts, and conversations. Our seminar, and the conference that we will subsequently organize, will provide complementary, concrete ways to pursue our broad agenda of doing philosophy across traditions. We will elaborate on each of these points in turn.

1. Contemporary virtue ethics and its increasing diversity. Virtue ethics was the predominant approach to ethical theorizing in the ancient Western world, but in modern times, and until relatively recently, virtue ethics was largely dormant. In the past few decades, partly as a result

of dissatisfaction with the dominant utilitarian and Kantian traditions, virtue ethics has experienced a remarkable revival, and it now stands with these other two approaches as a leading direction of research in academic moral philosophy. At first, the revival of virtue ethics was primarily a revival of Aristotelian ethical thought, and certainly some of the most influential work on virtue ethics over the past few years—e.g. by Alasdair MacIntyre, Philippa Foot, and Rosalind Hursthouse—has been of Aristotelian inspiration. However, it has lately been recognized by philosophers like Michael Slote and Stephen Darwall that the moral sentimentalism of the eighteenth century (especially Hutcheson and Hume) is also a rich potential source for virtue-ethical ideas, and work in virtue ethics is now moving in this new direction. In addition, Plato and Stoicism are sometimes mentioned as potential inspirations for contemporary work.

In recent neo-Aristotelian ethics, the emphasis has been on adapting Aristotle to modern issues and concepts without losing those features of the Aristotelian landscape that have convinced many thinkers that it deals better with moral phenomena than either Kantianism or utilitarianism is able to do. This has meant that Aristotle's doctrines of the mean and of the unity of the virtues can be treated as less essential than his emphasis on the non-rule-bound, intuitively perceptive character of moral knowledge, and on the grounding of morality in good habits of (rational) thought, feeling, and activity. Neo-Humean or sentimentalist virtue ethics dissents from (neo-)Aristotelianism in seeing morality as based not in reason and rational perception, but in empathy-influenced "positive" feelings like caring or concern for others. Such virtue ethics has significant connections to the feminist/feminine ethics of care that Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings have recently made prominent, but it differs from the new care ethics tradition through

its emphasis on individual character, rather than relationships, as fundamental to moral understanding and evaluation.

2. *Chinese traditions and virtue.* A generation ago it was commonplace among Western-trained philosophers to wonder whether there really was such a thing as Chinese “philosophy.” Excellent work (for instance, by P.J. Ivanhoe, Kwong-loi Shun, Roger Ames, and Chad Hansen) over the last two decades by specialists in Chinese philosophy — much of it by some of the first scholars with Ph.D.s in philosophy to write on the subject — has helped to change things, as has the development of a more broad-minded spirit among philosophers in the U.S. The rise to global prominence of China itself cannot but further stimulate the attention that is now being paid to Chinese traditions within professional philosophy in the West. Major presses (Harvard, Oxford, Cambridge, etc.) now carry studies of Chinese philosophy on their lists, and some level of familiarity with Chinese thought (up to and including specialization therein) is increasingly listed as a desideratum in job listings.

In this context, it is significant that virtue (an apt translation of the Chinese term *de*) is a central notion for many Chinese traditions. Our seminar will concentrate on Confucianism, both in its classical period (roughly 500-200 BCE) and the renaissance of sophisticated Confucian philosophy that is known as neo-Confucianism (roughly 1000-1800 CE). Confucian discussion of *de* is both wide-ranging and deep, covering topics that today we would label ethics, social and political thought, moral psychology, epistemology, and metaphysics. Confucian philosophers are by no means unanimous in their interpretations of *de*, but all accord it importance in their overall understandings of humans, our place in the universe, and the sorts of lives we ought to pursue. In part because of the quite different metaphysical and epistemological backgrounds of these

Chinese theories, they are well-positioned to engage in mutual challenge and learning with existing Western discussions of virtue. In a whole variety of ways, dialogue with Confucian philosophers can enrich both the Aristotelian and the sentimentalist ways of doing virtue ethics, and perhaps other Western approaches as well.

To be sure, the genres in which Chinese philosophy comes down to us are often quite different from those with which Western-trained philosophers are familiar; one of the tasks of our seminar will be to help participants work successfully with Chinese genres. Among other things, this will involve highlighting the reasoning that is involved, if not always as explicitly as contemporary philosophers expect, throughout the Confucian traditions we examine.

3. *Existing instances of cross-tradition work.* Because our focus for the seminar is on bringing Chinese philosophy into Western discussions of virtue ethics, we will say little about the complementary goal of bringing Western philosophy into Chinese philosophical conversations. A brief word may be useful here, though, so let us note that Chinese philosophers have been taking Western philosophy seriously for more than a century. Both in the past and today, some of these philosophers end up focusing primarily on Western philosophy itself, but some of the leading Confucian philosophers of the twentieth century, who are often called “New Confucians” in order to distinguish them from neo-Confucianism, were intimately familiar with Western thinkers and drew variously on them as they sought to revise Confucianism for the present day.

Turning now to the contemporary U.S., it is significant that one of the leading figures in the revival of virtue ethics, Alasdair MacIntyre, has also been a leader in taking seriously the possibilities for cross-tradition dialogue with Confucianism.¹ Partly because his own

¹ See the following three essays: [1] “Incommensurability, Truth, and the Conversation Between Confucians and Aristotelians About the Virtues.” In *Culture and Modernity*, edited by Eliot Deutsch (Hawaii, 1991). [2] “Questions

methodology discourages synthetic philosophical construction across traditions, however, even MacIntyre has not availed himself of every opportunity that the Chinese tradition affords.² Another scholar who has made excellent, synthetic use of Confucianism is Paul Woodruff, whose *Reverence: Renewing a Forgotten Virtue* (Oxford, 2001) contains an excellent chapter on classical Confucianism, the influence of which, furthermore, is felt variously throughout the book. Joel Kupperman's fine *Learning from Asian Philosophy* (Oxford, 1999) is more focused on Chinese philosophy than any work of MacIntyre or Woodruff, but is still the product of a Western-trained philosopher who is not a specialist in Chinese thought. We hope that these instances suffice to hint at some of what can be done by bringing Confucian philosophy within the purview of a broader range of virtue-ethics scholars.

4. *Cross-tradition dialogue.* We would be remiss if we did not acknowledge that one of our motivations for pursuing the seminar is simply that we believe robust, cross-tradition dialogue and debate to be a good thing. Rather than Samuel Huntington's talk of the "clash of civilizations," we hope that philosophers can contribute to something more like a "conversation among civilizations." Or better yet, we want to let go of monolithic categories like "civilizations" altogether and see what happens when philosophers are free to draw broadly on whatever resources seem to them best-suited to their philosophical goals. Plato, Hume, and Nietzsche should be (and, by and large, are) taken seriously outside of Europe and the Americas; in the same way, Confucian concepts and insights should not be the sole property of East Asian

for Confucians." In *Confucian Ethics: A Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy, and Community*, edited by Kwong-loi Shun and David B. Wong (Cambridge, 2004). [3] "Once More on Confucian and Aristotelian Conceptions of the Virtues: A Reply to Professor Wan." In *Chinese Philosophy in an Era of Globalization*, edited by Robin R. Wang (SUNY, 2004).

² The themes of dependence and animality that are central to MacIntyre's *Dependent Rational Animals* (Open Court, 1999) are core ideas in Confucian ethics; his argument could have been much stronger if based in part of these Confucian insights, which he completely neglects.

peoples. By helping a group of American philosophers to acquire the knowledge needed to broaden their philosophical horizons, we hope to facilitate a gradual broadening throughout the U.S. philosophical world. In fact, the U.S. now plays the leading role in English-speaking and broadly European-based philosophy, so it might be hoped that what the Americans learn of Chinese ethics could also affect Western philosophers more generally.

The goals of the seminar itself are limited to these immediate and longer-term impacts on U.S. philosophers. By simultaneously pursuing a conference in Beijing for the following year, though, we hope to play a small role in furthering an even more ambitious objective, namely sustained, rich dialogue between Chinese and American philosophers. Because the conference lies outside the scope of the seminar itself, we will not go into this in detail, but suffice to say that over the last decade, certain international conferences and publications in China have begun to break out beyond the confines of specialists in Chinese thought. As we mentioned above, Chinese thinkers have for decades been seriously engaged with Western philosophy, but it is new to have specialists on Western and Chinese thinkers working together on comparative or cross-tradition topics, and especially on topics of common interest within an area like virtue ethics. The results so far have been promising, while also highlighting the work still to be done. With our seminar in its favor, we expect the conference to be among the most significant efforts to date toward furthering the robust, complex, and open-ended dialogue that we seek.

Scope and Feasibility

Supposing that the above points have convinced readers that our goals are laudable, two questions remain: why have we chosen our specific texts and scope, and is it indeed feasible for newcomers to Chinese materials to acquire enough mastery in six weeks that they can

subsequently draw on it freely in their research, as we propose? Our choice of scope — three classical and three neo-Confucian thinkers, on whom more in a moment — is driven by a balance of two factors. On one hand, we want to reveal as much of the richness and complexity of the traditions as possible; in particular, we want to include neo-Confucian as well as classical Confucian authors. Writing and teaching in a very different social and intellectual climate from their classical forbearers, neo-Confucians develop earlier Confucian ideas in important new ways. By including a range of texts, in addition, we ensure that our corpus engages with both Aristotelian and Humean-sentimentalist virtue ethics. On the other hand, we want real engagement with our texts, rather than a superficial overview of a given thinker’s teachings. As detailed below, our chosen texts are short enough that a week’s intensive study and discussion will go a long way toward giving participants what they need to do independent work with the texts — even while all should recognize that we are facilitating the beginning of a research process that will have to continue after the end of the seminar.

As mentioned, we propose to focus on six thinkers. Further detail can be found in Appendix 1, but brief introductions to the authors and texts follow here.

- Confucius (551 – 479 BCE). His teachings and those of his students, recorded in the *Analects*, set many of the terms of discussion for subsequent “Confucians.” The text’s brevity will allow us to use three different translations of the *Analects* (those of Lau; Ames and Rosemont; and Brooks and Brooks), which will give us opportunities to discuss in detail some of the differences among interpretive approaches.
- Mencius (mid-4th BCE – early 3rd BCE). Mencius is the “second sage” of the Confucian tradition, author of (at least some of) the eponymous *Mencius*. We will use Lau’s edition, supplemented where appropriate by Van Norden’s new translation (which includes Zhu Xi’s commentary on *Mencius*).
- Xunzi (mid – late 3rd BCE). The third great classical Confucian, and also the most systematic, Xunzi’s thought puts great emphasis on ritual. We will read several chapters from Hutton’s new translation-in-progress.
- Zhu Xi (1130 – 1200 CE). Not the earliest or even (arguably) the most innovative of the neo-Confucians, Zhu Xi is the great synthesizer of neo-Confucianism. He has a stature somewhat comparable to Aquinas in the West, except that the civil service examinations which shaped the Chinese educational system, and which were based on

- Zhu Xi's interpretations of the Classics, lasted until 1905. We will read Gardner's excellent translation of Zhu's thoughts on moral learning, *Learning to Be a Sage*, as well as selections from other writings.
- Wang Yangming (1472 – 1529 CE). Wang was leading neo-Confucian of the Ming Dynasty, a brilliant critic of Zhu Xi, and an inspiring thinker whose influence was felt throughout East Asia (including on the Meiji Restoration in Japan and on various Chinese revolutionaries in the 20th century). We will read Chan's translation of his collected writings, *Instructions for Practical Living*.
 - Dai Zhen (1723 – 1777 CE). Dai's *Evidential Study of the Meaning of Terms in Mencius*, despite its rather abstruse-sounding title, is a philosophical masterpiece from the greatest philosopher of the Qing dynasty. He was an incisive critic of early neo-Confucians such as Zhu and Wang and developed his own distinctive way of conceptualizing Confucian virtue ethics. We will read the translation of his *Evidential Study* in John Ewell's PhD dissertation, as this is the best available.

In each case, we have designed readings that are manageable and discussable within the one-week framework, while also providing supplementary materials and suggestions for additional reading that participants can work from if they choose to pursue a given author further in their own research.

Format and Implementation

The core of the seminar is the *Textual Seminar*, which will meet three times a week (Monday, Wednesday, and Friday mornings) for two and a half hours. Everyone will have read a relevant text or set of texts and the seminar directors will introduce them to the group and then encourage and perhaps lead discussion of that material. Some of this discussion will elicit ways in which the material being discussed bears on the projects and research within virtue ethics in which different participants in the seminar are already engaged. For example, when discussing *Mencius*, we might highlight work that has been done on his conception of courage, in

comparison to various approaches in the Western tradition.³ Seeing how Chinese material can be useful to one research program can encourage others to mine that material for their own work.

In addition, during the Textual Seminar and/or in supplemental meetings (as needed), several supporting topics will be covered:

- use of specialized electronic resources relevant to Chinese philosophy, which can also facilitate rudimentary understanding of the original-language texts (like the Shuhai Wenyuan website, the Wenlin dictionary, etc.)
- relevant background in Chinese history;
- basics of the Chinese language and the various systems for romanizing it;
- state of scholarship on particular texts (e.g., archeological results, different approaches in China and US);
- the large topic of translation, both of texts and of particular terms.

To the extent that additional sessions are needed to cover these topics, we will arrange them in afternoons or evenings, at the participants' convenience. Sessions introducing electronic resources can be held in one of Wesleyan's electronic classrooms, so that all participants can actively learn.

Three times over the seminar's six weeks, we will have visiting scholars join us for lecture, discussion, and dinner on Tuesday afternoons. The following three scholars have accepted our invitations to join us (for more details and their CVs, see Appendix 3): May Sim (College of the Holy Cross; specialist on Aristotle and Confucianism), Bryan Van Norden (Vassar College; specialist on Mencius and Chinese thought more generally), and Eric Hutton (University of Utah, specialist on early Confucianism, especially Xunzi).

Each Thursday afternoon we will have a *Virtue Ethics Colloquium* for three hours, in which we discuss specific examples of recent work in virtue ethics that are suggestive of possibilities for constructive dialogue with the Chinese materials we have been reading. We will

³ One important work here is Lee Yearley's *Mencius and Aquinas: Theories of Virtue and Conceptions of Courage* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990).

design the readings based on the specific background and interests of the Seminar's participants. Participants will also make presentations each week on the readings. In the Colloquium, directors and participants will together think through question like: how does current literature draw on historical sources, and how should this influence our approach to our Chinese texts? What topics are at the forefront of contemporary concern in virtue ethics, and why? How might this be inflected by bringing Chinese materials into the discussion?

Faculty and Staff

The two co-directors' backgrounds and strengths complement one another, and we are both excited by the prospect of U.S. philosophers being able to work more readily with Chinese materials. Stephen Angle is a specialist in Chinese philosophy with particular interests in moral and political thought, as well as in the methodology of cross-tradition philosophy. He has several essays either recently published or in press, in both English and Chinese, that draw on Confucianism and Western virtue ethics. Angle's first book, *Human Rights and Chinese Thought: A Cross-Cultural Inquiry* (Cambridge, 2002), explored the ways in which neo-Confucian traditions interacted with interpretations of Western ideas in the growth of Chinese human rights discourse. In various essays since then, he has continued to treat Chinese philosophical resources as live, significant parts of a "rooted" global philosophy. Angle is the current vice-president (and rising president) of the International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy (ISCWP). During the seminar Angle will draw on his experience using and developing electronic resources to support scholarly research, as evidenced by his pioneering Confucian Etext Project (sangle.web.wesleyan.edu/etext). Finally, Angle is a

prize-winning teacher, receiving Wesleyan University's highest teaching award, the Binswanger Prize, in May, 2006.

Michael Slote holds an endowed chair in ethics at the University of Miami. He is a leader among contemporary Western virtue ethicists and has, over the past three decades, been a major presence in the field of ethics generally. A Member of the Royal Irish Academy and former Tanner lecturer, his publications include *From Morality to Virtue* (Oxford, 1992), *Morals from Motives* (Oxford, 2001), and *The Ethics of Care and Empathy* (Routledge, 2007), as well as a great number of articles and encyclopedia entries on virtue ethics and ethics more generally. Some of this work is in the Aristotelian tradition, but more recently he has been advancing a contemporary version of Humean/sentimentalist virtue ethics. He is perhaps the only contemporary philosopher whose interests and expertise cover both of the forms of virtue ethics that are relevant to the cross-fertilization of Chinese and Western ethical thought; and he has a long history of working with Chinese Ph.D. students seeking to bring together their own cultural/ethical roots and newer philosophical developments in the West.

The Seminar will be staffed by one full-time administrative assistant and one student research assistant. Each will begin work part-time during the semester prior to the Seminar, and work full-time over the Seminar's duration.

Selection of Participants

Participants will be expected to have completed a PhD in philosophy and to have a demonstrated research interest in virtue ethics or a closely-related topic. No background in Chinese language or philosophy will be assumed or expected, though individuals with such background are welcome to apply. Applications for participation in the Seminar will be

evaluated by a committee consisting of

Institutional Context and Social Opportunities

Wesleyan University's Mansfield Freeman Center for East Asian Studies is an ideal context for our seminar. Most activities will take place in the Center's brand-new Seminar Room, which is outfitted with a full range of A/V and computer equipment, and has a floor-to-ceiling glass wall overlooking the Center's Japanese garden. The Center also has computers and limited office space available for use during the day, wireless access throughout the facility, and will house the staff (one full-time administrative assistant and one student research assistant) who will handle the logistical details of the seminar. Participants will also have full use of Wesleyan's library and information technology resources, including numerous on-line indexes, full-text databases, and other research aids that are specific to philosophy and to Asian studies, respectively.

Noting that the most important time during academic conferences is often the coffee break, we recognize the importance of informal opportunities to reflect, brainstorm, and synthesize — as well as to build a sense of collective purpose among participants, directors, and staff. We will therefore arrange some social occasions in which we can spend unstructured time together. After each lecture by a visiting scholar, we will have a reception, and on selected Thursdays, we will follow the Virtue Ethics Colloquium with a reception as well.

Middletown is a charming New England city with a thriving restaurant scene, a multiplex movie theater on Main Street, and ready access to all manner of outdoor activities. It is within half an hour of New Haven and Hartford, and two hours of New York and Boston, so a wide

variety of day- or weekend-trips are possible. Participants will be able to choose either a room in a nearby junior/senior dormitory (each room with a kitchenette and both wired and wireless internet access); a one- or two-bedroom apartment in a Wesleyan-owned lowrise building on the edge of campus (also with full internet capabilities); or sub-leased off-campus housing. The seminar staff will assist participants in choosing among the available options and making needed arrangements.

Dissemination and Evaluation

Our explicit goal is to encourage participants' research. Some of this will go on over the six weeks of the seminar, but given that we expect participants to be learning a great deal of new material, our timeline is considerably longer. First, we will offer all participants the opportunity to join the ISCWP and its mailing list (membership is free), so that they can continue conversations with one another and with other scholars interested in similar subjects. Second, the directors will facilitate introducing participants to scholars in the West or in China who are interested in topics similar to their specific research projects. Third, all participants will be invited to attend a conference on Virtue Ethics and Chinese Philosophy, sponsored by the ISCWP and currently planned for Beijing in May of 2009. The seminar's co-directors will edit a volume of papers from that conference, to be published in English and Chinese, that will include all the best essays from the conference.

The co-directors will survey the participants in the opening session of the seminar to identify their expectations and needs. Where reasonable, these will be taken into account in some of the subsequent activities, and the directors will be open to both group and private discussions of how the Seminar is progressing. During the final week, the participants will again

be surveyed to evaluate how well the Seminar met their needs and how far they advanced towards the Seminar's goal; participants will also be asked to use the NEH on-line evaluation form after they leave.

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APPENDICES

1. Full CVs of Co-Directors
2. Schedule and readings for Textual Seminar (M/W/F)
3. Schedule of lectures by visiting scholars, with CVs
4. Reference letter writers

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TEXTUAL SEMINAR SCHEDULE

We will meet M, W, F mornings from 9:30 to noon in the Mary Houghton Freeman Seminar Room of the Mansfield Freeman Center for East Asian Studies.

(Various other translations of our texts, and of other texts by our authors, will be available for participants to consult.)

Preliminary Background

Ivanhoe, *Confucian Moral Self-Cultivation* is brief and clear, and covers all our thinkers. Highly recommended.

Week 1: Confucius (Kongzi) and the *Analects*

Texts: Lau, trans., *Analects*; Ames & Rosemont, trans., *The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation*; Brooks & Brooks, trans., *The Original Analects*

M: Humaneness (*ren*) and the *junzi* (Books 1-2; 4-9)

W: Ritual and governance (Books 3, 10-20)

F: Confucian virtue; textual issues (Brooks & Brooks, all)

Week 2: Mencius (Mengzi)

Text: Lau, trans. *Mencius*; David S. Nivison, "On Translating Mencius," in Van Norden, ed., *The Ways of Confucianism* (La Salle, IL: Open Court Press, 1996).

M: Political context and moral psychology (Books 1A – 3B)

W: Education and virtue (Books 4A – 6B)

F: Conflicts and harmony (Books 7A – 7B)

Week 3: Xunzi

Text: Hutton, trans., *Xunzi* (draft translation in progress; distributed at seminar)

M: Moral psychology and Heaven (chs. 23, 22, 17)

W: Self-cultivation and moral epistemology (chs. 1, 2, 21)

F: Justification for ritual and music, and relation to human virtue (chs. 19, 20, 9)

Week 4: Zhu Xi

Text: Gardner, trans., *Learning to be a Sage*; Wittenborn, trans., *Further Reflections on Things at Hand*

M: Metaphysics and epistemology (*Further Reflections*, pp. 59-103)

W: Moral education (*Learning*, pp. 88-162)

F: The virtues (*Learning*, pp. 163-96)

Week 5: Wang Yangming

Text: Chan, trans., *Instructions for Practical Living*

M: Knowledge, action, and perception (pp. 3-87)

W: Selfishness and *liangzhi* (pp. 131-49, 272-280)

F: The virtues and the good life (pp. 118-24, 239-45, 298-306)

Week 6: Dai Zhen

Text: Ewell, trans., *Evidential Commentary on the Meaning of Terms in Mencius*

M: Critique of predecessors (pp. 99-125 and 167-208)

W: Moral psychology (pp. 126-66 and 231-55)

F: Morality and virtue (pp. 302-21 and 384-91)