The entrance of a tunnel destroyed in an Israeli airstrike near the border between Gaza and Egypt. The tunnels are used for arms smuggling.(Photo: Eyad Baba/Associated Press)
Dr. Ronen Bergman, a correspondent for Yedioth Ahronoth, an Israeli daily, is the author of the “The Secret War With Iran.” He joins an ongoing discussion on the war in Gaza at Room for Debate.
After three weeks of combat, with the end of the Gaza operation in sight, and confronted with harsh criticism by the global media, the Israeli public is engaged by one question: once a cease-fire is declared, how would the new situation differ from the six months of cease-fire that so recently exploded in its face?
The attributes of such a cease-fire are not yet clear, nor is how long would it last and who will enforce it. But two major factors that may drastically alter the result are plain to see.
The Israel-Gaza Conflict
Other experts in previous discussions on the war in Gaza.
The first is the success of what is best described by the common Israeli phrase “the proprietor went mad.” In other words, Hamas, whose actions at the end of the cease-fire last month were certainly unwise, did not anticipate Israel’s harsh reaction; did not expect the severe blow delivered by Israel’s air strikes; and furthermore did not realize that despite the trauma of the war in Lebanon in summer of 2006 Israel would not stop short of entering Gaza with ground troops. Hamas, Israel hopes, now understands that the rules were changed, that from now on any rocket fired on Israeli civilians will be retaliated against with disproportional force and thus will hesitate to open fire again.
I believe this is a realistic goal. Hamas was indeed delivered a severe, yet far from fatal, blow, and it will not wish to risk its forces in their current fragile state for any cause other than a paramount one. Note that despite Hezbollah’s victory over Israel in 2006, Hassan Nasrallah’s men are keeping the peace along the border, a reality very different from the prewar state of affairs.
“Any agreement signed by the Palestinian Authority or Hamas will also be of no consequence. What will matter is Egypt’s conduct alone.”
Israel also hopes that Gaza’s population will take to the streets and rebel against the Hamas government that brought on the attack. This is unrealistic. There is not a house in Gaza devoid of at least one member of Hamas, and the people will not stand against their own families. This Israeli tactic of subjecting a civilian population to pressure, hoping it will voluntarily divulge the hostile elements within it, failed time and again in Lebanon. There is no reason it will work in Gaza.
The other factor is the level of Egyptian resolve to act against the arms smuggling from its territory into the Gaza Strip. Given the Israeli command over all aerial and naval routes to the strip, the ground rout from Egypt remains Hamas’s lifeline. Only the Egyptians can cut it.
The memorandum of understanding signed by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni this morning is of no real effect. It mentions international bodies that will act against the arms smuggling, but they are unlikely to intervene. For example, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, general secretary of NATO, which is mentioned in the memorandum, told me himself about a month ago that his forces will not be stationed in the Middle East.
Moreover, the U.N. observers stationed in Lebanon since 2006 prevent only some arms smuggling to Hezbollah, and, according to Israeli intelligence, Hezbollah is far better equipped than it was in 2006.
Any agreement signed by the Palestinian Authority or Hamas will also be of no consequence. What will matter is Egypt’s conduct alone.
Since Israel left the Gaza Strip and the Egyptian army was stationed on the strip’s border, Egypt’s efforts to prevent the arms smuggling have been harshly criticized by the Israeli General Security Service. Bottom line is, according to the security service, that Egypt intentionally shies away this task. Mubarak’s regime dreads a confrontation with Hamas as it may lead to outbursts by supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic opposition. Egypt denies the allegations. Even so, the vast amount of weaponry, advanced rockets and antitank missiles used by Hamas against Israeli forces did not materialize out of thin air.
The arms smuggling into the strip means a quick rebuilding of Hamas’s infrastructure and weaponry stocks. The prevention of arms smuggling calls for a complete change of approach by Egypt, and a lot more of its resources put into it.
Moreover, Israel itself did not manage to stop the smuggling completely when its troops were stationed along the border. The only solution will be widening the buffer zone between Egypt and Gaza by a few kilometers, making a border line that will make tunnel-digging an enormous, almost impossible, effort. On the ground, the area should be cleared so the tunnels’ air and escape shafts will be clearly visible. All that, in addition to high-tech detectors that can be supplied by the West, will, at the very least, decrease the amount of arms smuggled, and, in a direct relationship, reduce the possibility of another violent outburst in the world’s most explosive area.
