For more information, go to: Final Investigation Report

Tallahassee, Florida, March 13, 2007 - In a final investigation report released today on last year's fatal explosion at a City of Daytona Beach wastewater treatment plant, the U.S. Chemical Safety Board concluded that the city's safety programs were inadequate and called on the Florida legislature and governor to require workplace safety rules for Florida's state, county, and municipal employees.

The explosion occurred at the Bethune Point Wastewater Treatment Plant, owned and operated by the City of Daytona Beach, on January 11, 2006. Two municipal workers were fatally burned and a third suffered grave injuries. The report by federal investigators was released at a news conference in the state capital today.

on the accident and its causes. The video is posted in the Video Room of the agency's website, CSB.gov. Free DVD copies of the video are available by filling out the request form on the website.

The explosion occurred inside a methanol tank when the lead mechanic and another worker were cutting the metal roof directly above the tank vent. Sparks showered down from the cutting torch and ignited methanol vapors coming from the vent, creating a fireball on top of the tank. The CSB report states that the City of Daytona Beach has no program at city facilities to control hot work, such as the use of cutting torches.

In December 2006, the Board heard extensive testimony, investigation findings, and supportive comments from the public audience at a CSB public hearing held in Daytona Beach, Florida. The Florida Section of the American Industrial Hygiene Association, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, and the American Society of Safety Engineers presented testimony supporting public worker coverage.

The investigation found that the explosion inside the methanol tank caused multiple failures of polyvinyl chloride (PVC) piping located on the outside of the tank. Methanol then discharged from the failed pipes, ignited, and burned - spreading the fire. The burning chemical sprayed onto the cab of a crane near the tank. The worker inside the crane was one of the two workers who were fatally injured. The other worker who was fatally injured was working over the methanol tank. A third employee also working over the tank was severely injured, but survived.

Lead investigator, Robert Hall, P.E. said "It is important for the State of Florida and the City of Daytona Beach to protect its employees from tragic accidents like this by promptly enacting new safety rules."

The tank's aluminum flame arrester, a safety device designed to prevent flames from entering the methanol tank while allowing gases and vapors to flow, had not been inspected or cleaned since its installation in 1993. Any blockage in the flame arrester or corrosion of the device can render it ineffective. The CSB concluded that the flame arrester was severely corroded and did not prevent the fire and sparks outside of the tank from igniting the methanol inside the tank. The flame arrester had not been inspected in 13 years prior to the accident; investigators concluded that inspection could have revealed the corrosion before the tragic accident occurred. In addition, the CSB found no evidence that the workers at the plant received any methanol hazard training in the last decade.

The Board recommended that the Governor and Legislature of the State of Florida enact legislation to implement policies, practices, and procedures covering workplace health and safety for Florida public employees, which should be at least as effective as those established by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). Florida is one of 26 states that do not require public employees to follow OSHA standards.

Board Member William Wright said, "This accident emphasizes the need for effective hot work programs, hazard communication, and careful engineering of flammable liquid systems. If these measures had been in place this accident likely could have been prevented."

The Board also recommended that, until appropriate state laws are in place, the City of Daytona Beach adopt city ordinances to require departments to implement policies, practices, and procedures for city employees to be at least as effective as relevant OSHA standards. These should include emphasis on compliance with industrial chemical safety standards including hot work procedures.

An additional recommendation was directed to the plant's methanol piping system designer, Camp, Dresser, & McKee, Inc., to ensure that wastewater treatment plant designers are aware of the importance of selecting the proper materials for flammable liquid piping. The Board also made a recommendation to OSHA and to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) to revise their standards and codes to further restrict the use of plastic piping for flammable liquid service.

The CSB is an independent federal agency charged with investigating industrial chemical accidents. The agency's board members are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. CSB investigations look into all aspects of chemical accidents, including physical causes such as equipment failure as well as inadequacies in safety management systems.

The Board does not issue citations or fines but does make safety recommendations to plants, industry organizations, labor groups, and regulatory agencies such as OSHA and EPA. Please visit our website, www.CSB.gov.

Contact: Sandy Gilmour 202-251-5496 (cell), Jennifer Jones 202-577-8448 (cell) onsite; Public Affairs Director Daniel Horowitz 202-441-6074 (cell), Hillary Cohen 202-261-3601 at headquarters in Washington, D.C.