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“Welcome, Ladies and Gentlemen, to the opening hearing for the Committee on Armed Services in the 110th Congress. It is certainly a pleasure to see all of my returning colleagues, and the new faces as well. It’s also quite a pleasure to have this gavel in my hand. Welcome, everybody.
“The purpose of today’s hearing is to discuss the President’s proposal for the way forward in Iraq. Testifying to that proposal, and ready to answer our questions on it, we have before us newly appointed Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace. Secretary Gates has had a long distinguished government career culminating in his years as Director of Central Intelligence from 1991 until 1993.. Welcome, Secretary Gates, on your first visit before us.
“General Pace, of course, is an old pro in this room as he is in the United States Marine Corps and as the leader of our joint forces. As always, General Pace, we count on your candor and good judgment in performing our Constitutional responsibility for oversight. I understand that you do not have prepared testimony, but that you are standing by to answer our questions and provide insight on the President’s proposal.
“I suspect this hearing may be marked by a bit of pessimism and a couple of hard questions. So let me start on a positive note. I was enormously pleased to hear the President embrace a substantial and permanent increase in the size of our ground forces. This committee began receiving testimony to that effect in 1995 with Lieutenant General Ted Stroup. Sometimes I have felt, and my colleagues may agree, like a broken record ever since. I am delighted that to have the President and you, Mr. Secretary, chiming in on the chorus. Our soldiers, in particular, are worn out. This increase is a smart policy and I am more than pleased to say “better late than never.”
“Now I am also going to begin my first hearing in this Chair with a little history lesson. In 1942, the War Department began planning for the administration of what would become the occupied areas of Europe. These plans progressed to the point where by 1943, General George Marshall selected Major General John Hilldring to prepare plans for the civil affairs administrators and military governors in these occupied areas. Marshall told him that the Army didn’t want this job, but they were going to do it properly. And they did!
“Compare that with our situation today. After a remarkable drive into Baghdad in April 2003, our troops found themselves asking each other “well, what now?” It was a good question. There was no plan. Such plans existed, however: General Zinni had one, when he was the CENTCOM Commander. The State Department had their “Future of Iraq Project.” We’re told that some commanders subordinate to General Franks began planning on their own accord. But those plans never made it into the hands of our troops. While I could run you through the efforts of retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner and the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, his successor Ambassador Paul Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority, and what’s happened since the transition of sovereignty to the Iraqi people, I’ll spare you the litany of errors. There are detailed histories available for that, COBRA II and FIASCO, to name two. In any case, the proof, as they say, is in the pudding. And we’ve got a mess on our hands. The time for a so-called “surge” in troop numbers was back in 2003 with, as General Eric Shinseki said, several hundred thousand troops and with a coordinated political and economic plan for the post-war reconstruction. Sadly we are three and a half years too late.
“Time has passed and time has not been kind to the situation on the ground. Attacks and casualties are at an all-time high. And while there is a democratically-elected government, it is not at all clear to me that Prime Minister Maliki has the ability or the will to control the violence or broker compromise among the competing sectarian and religious groups.
“There is no silver bullet in Iraq. But I remain convinced that we must send a signal to the Iraqis that they must take a much greater responsibility for their own security. We must do this while we rebuild the strength of our forces which has been sapped by repeated deployments and decimated equipment. I continue to listen to all proposals with an open mind, but only the gradual and responsible redeployment of some number of troops achieves both goals. Both goals! Will this temporary increase in troops have a well-defined mission and will it quickly get us to the point of responsible redeployment? We’ve increased our troop levels in Baghdad before and the violence only increased.
“So, with those thoughts in mind, I visited the President earlier this week and I listened to him closely last night. Despite the President’s statement, “It is clear that we need to change our strategy in Iraq,” he did not present a new strategy. It is only a change in tactics. A new strategy would have redefined the endstate to something different, and then laid out the ways and means to accomplish it. Instead, the President has offered some adjustments to our current course, but these adjustments do not represent a radical departure from what we are doing today.
“The military side of the plan might do some good in the short term if it is executed by capable commanders and if the Iraqi forces in the field step up to the challenges presented them. But there are issues of sustainability and I hope you both will address how long this effort will be designed to be sustaining.
“But the pivotal element of this entire plan does not lie with the military plan. It is with the political will and commitment of the Iraqi leadership and people. They must be ready to seize the moment—to go after the militias, to purge sectarianism from the ministries and the military’s ranks, and to allow the Iraqi security forces to go after the targets they must to bring security. The president says he has confidence in the Prime Minister. But we need to understand how the United States will hold the Iraqis accountable by measuring their progress and what will be done if the Iraqi government fails to deliver on its promises.
“Of all my questions, I worry the most about our strategic risk. Part of this committee’s job is making sure that the military can meet its future missions, as well as today’s operational requirements. This requires an examination of how much strategic risk we are taking as a result of being in Iraq on a sustained basis with the troop levels we have there. When we look at these issues, we are trying to make sure, that in the worst case our military could deter or fight a potential adversary who threatens America’s interests. It is only by looking at our current operational demands and plans to increase those demands, and determine whether those demands increase our strategic risk for meeting future challenges. If they do, it is our obligation to take steps to reduce that risk because we must ensure we can protect the American people and its interests both today and in the future.
“This committee must take a very serious look at these questions. Today is the first of several hearings on this subject; I intend to use future hearings to pursue these issues in depth, by consulting outside experts for their views on the President’s proposal and to explore alternatives. I intend to have the Chief of Staff of the Army in with the Commandant of the Marine Corps to discuss strategic risk, and both the readiness and personnel implications of it.
“But our first step is to hear from you gentlemen and I look forward to your testimony. One administrative note—I intend to strictly adhere to the 5-minute rule at this and all other hearings. Members must allow for your full question AND answer time within those 5 minutes. However, let me first yield to a person who is exempted from that provision under the House Rules, my good friend and partner, the Ranking Member, Duncan Hunter of California.”
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