Improve Acquisition Outcomes on Major Systems

  • DOD’s weapon systems continue to take longer, cost more, and deliver fewer quantities and capabilities than planned. The total acquisition cost of DOD’s 2007 portfolio of major programs has grown by nearly $300 billion over initial estimates. Over the next 5 years, DOD plans to invest about $357 billion on major defense acquisition programs. Every dollar wasted during the development and acquisition of weapon systems is less money available for other priorities.

    Highlights of GAO-08-1159T (PDF)

  • At the strategic level, DOD’s processes for identifying needs, allocating resources, and buying weapon systems are fragmented and broken. At the program level, weapon system programs are initiated without sufficient knowledge about requirements, technology, and design maturity. Instead, managers rely on assumptions that are consistently too optimistic.

    Highlights of GAO-08-1159T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-467SP (PDF)

  • NASA is in the midst of phasing out the Space Shuttle Program and beginning another major undertaking, the Constellation Program, which will create the next generation of spacecraft for human spaceflight and is expected to cost nearly $230 billion. This effort has been launched against a backdrop of acquisition problems in NASA’s major programs. Over the past decade, several projects have experienced significant problems including unrealistic cost estimating, undisciplined requirements setting, underestimating complexity and technology maturity, and inadequate review and systems engineering processes.

    Highlights of GAO-08-186T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-06-817R (PDF), Highlights of GAO-06-634 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-06-445 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-06-218 (PDF)

  • Cost, schedule and performance issues have delayed the successful deployment of DHS’s multiyear, multibillion dollar Secure Border Initiative—designed to employ technology and infrastructure to detect and deter illegal entry between ports of entry. With respect to the technology component of this initiative, known as SBInet, DHS has not effectively managed system requirements or testing. Moreover, the scope and timing of the SBInet capabilities to be deployed have continued to change and remain unclear.

    Highlights of GAO-08-1148T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-1164T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-1086 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-1141T (PDF)

  • The Coast Guard has not effectively managed procurements of its Deepwater program—a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program to modernize and replace its aging ships and aircraft, as well as improve command and control logistics systems. The Coast Guard has recently addressed its overreliance on a contractor as system integrator by significantly strengthening government control and oversight and has begun to follow a more disciplined acquisition process. The outcome, however, remains uncertain. Among other challenges, the Coast Guard has faced obstacles in building an adequate government workforce to manage this large acquisition.

    Highlights of GAO-08-745 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-270R (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-531T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-874 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-05-757 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-04-380 (PDF)

^ Back to topWhat Needs to Be Done

Agencies with large acquisition budgets need to take steps to improve their major acquisitions.  For example,

  • Across-the-board improvements in DOD’s acquisition outcomes require fundamental changes to its requirements, funding, and acquisition systems. This involves:

    • maintaining the right mix of programs to invest in by making better decisions as to which programs should be pursued given existing and expected funding and, more importantly, deciding which programs should not be pursued;

    • ensuring that programs that are started are executable by matching requirements with resources and locking in those requirements; and

    • making it clear that programs will then be executed based on knowledge and holding program managers responsible for that execution.

    Highlights of GAO-08-1159T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-467SP (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-619 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-388 (PDF), and Highlights of GAO-06-110 (PDF)

  • NASA needs to develop a new business-oriented culture with the willingness to hold people accountable for meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals; as well as a willingness by senior leaders to stop projects that do not seem to be achieving their goals so that scarce investments can be redirected towards projects that can produce higher returns on investment.

    Highlights of GAO-06-445 (PDF)

  • On its four major development projects—the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle, the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle, the Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle, and the Altair Lunar Lander—NASA needs to develop a sound business case—supported by firm requirements, mature technologies, a preliminary design review, a realistic cost estimate, and sufficient funding and time—before proceeding beyond preliminary design review, and if necessary, delay preliminary design review until a sound business case demonstrating the projects’ readiness to move forward into product development is in hand.

    Highlights of GAO-08-186T (PDF)

  • Customs and Border Protection needs to assess the risks associated with SBInet’s acquisition, development, testing, and deployment and provide DHS senior leadership and Congress with the results, including proposed alternative courses of action for mitigating identified risks. In addition, it needs to effectively implement rigorous and disciplined requirements management and test management practices.

    Highlights of GAO-08-1086 (PDF)

  • While the Coast Guard has restructured and increased accountability for its Deepwater program, it must ensure that it effectively implements its more disciplined acquisition approach and that it develops an adequate acquisition workforce to manage the program.

    Highlights of GAO-08-745 (PDF), Highlights of GAO-08-531T (PDF), Highlights of GAO-07-874 (PDF)

^ Back to topKey Reports

Defense Acquisitions: Fundamental Changes Are Needed to Improve Weapon Program Outcomes
GAO-08-1159T, September 25, 2008
Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in Delivering Key Technology Investment
GAO-08-1086, September 22, 2008
Defense Acquisitions: A Knowledge-Based Funding Approach Could Improve Major Weapon System Program Outcomes
GAO-08-619, July 2, 2008
Coast Guard: Change in Course Improves Deepwater Management and Oversight, but Outcome Still Uncertain
GAO-08-745, June 24, 2008
Defense Acquisitions: Better Weapon Program Outcomes Require Discipline, Accountability, and Fundamental Changes in the Acquisition Environment
GAO-08-782T, June 3, 2008
NASA: Ares I and Orion Project Risks and Key Indicators to Measure Progress
GAO-08-186T, April 3, 2008
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
GAO-08-467SP, March 31, 2008
NASA: Long-Term Commitment to and Investment in Space Exploration Program Requires More Knowledge
GAO-06-817R, July 17, 2006
NASA: Implementing a Knowledge-Based Acquisition Framework Could Lead to Better Investment Decisions and Project Outcomes
GAO-06-218, December 21, 2005
GAO Contact
portrait of Paul L. Francis

Paul L. Francis

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management

francisp@gao.gov

(202) 512-2811