Figure 4.1 Gathering Information

Understanding the hazard environment Maintaining responder and unit accountability information Collecting injury, exposure, and health status data

RAND MG170-4.1

While gathering these types of information may be fairly straightforward within the limited scope of a small-scale emergency, a major disaster is a very different story. When multiple hazards and a multiagency responder workforce increase the complexity of a response operation, the difficulty of collecting and managing any information balloons. However, the risks posed to responders by disaster situations make doing so increasingly critical.

Hazard Information: Understanding the Disaster Environment

To protect responders during a response operation, safety managers must have information on the hazards at the disaster scene. They need a reliable and comprehensive understanding of the situation—what hazards are present and what others could arise. This information is equally critical as response managers plan operational actions and responders begin to treat victims. However, several key characteristics of major disasters prevent responders from gaining sufficient information on the hazard environment.

Large Geographic Scale. When a disaster scene covers a large geographic area, collecting and managing hazard information becomes problematic because of the difficulty of getting an overview of the scene. For example, responders to the World Trade Center reported individuals near the base of the buildings had problems even seeing what was going on, much less systematically collecting information on the hazard environment [Study Interviews]. Similar problems exist in hurricane and earthquake response operations where it is difficult to amass needed information for the entire affected area.

Large Numbers of People Affected, Injured, or Killed. Efforts of local organizations to gather hazard data can be further hindered by operational demands, such as the need to devote responder resources to aiding substantial numbers of victims. This was a real issue during Hurricane Andrew, when response units tasked with assessing hazards could not complete their tasks because so many victims in the areas these units were surveying urgently needed immediate assistance [Paulison et al. 1993, 72].¹

Multiple, Highly Varied Hazards. Because the numerous hazards at the site of a major disaster are so diverse, they will inevitably go well beyond the experience of single response agencies. This makes it very difficult for individual organizations to characterize threats. At the World Trade Center site, responders faced ongoing fires, two collapsed skyscrapers, significant airborne hazards, large numbers of casualties, and the possibility of additional terrorist attack. The Northridge earthquake involved collapsed and weakened structures, hazardous materials, electrical hazards, and fires [FEMA 1994a]. The threat of violence to responders during some disasters, such as major civil unrest or terrorist events, is particularly problematic since many responders do not encounter it during their day-to-day operations and, as a result, cannot readily assess it [FEMA 1994c].² In addition, the traumatic nature of many post disaster environments also presents critical incident stress issues that are poorly understood by some responding organizations and are very difficult to assess.

Furthermore, the hazard environment itself at disaster sites can inhibit attempts to collect needed information. The loss of electric power in many natural disasters hinders hazard assessment and monitoring. At the World Trade Center, the large amounts of particulate matter in the air interfered with environmental monitoring equipment that had not been designed to operate in disaster situations [Lioy and Gochfeld 2002, 77].

Wide Range of Needed Response Capabilities. The involvement of many independent response organizations in responding to a major disaster can complicate efforts to amass accurate hazard data.³ If many agencies independently carry out hazard monitoring efforts, problems in coordinating either assessment methods or the guidelines used to interpret results can produce inconsistencies in the data. If no good method exists to resolve these differences and determine the source of any apparent contradictions, hazard monitoring results become much less useful. This was a particular problem at the World Trade Center, where federal, state, local, nongovernmental, and private-sector organizations all conducted hazard assessment [Lioy and Gochfeld 2002]. By one estimate, no fewer than nine agencies had significant roles in environmental monitoring at the site [Nordgrén et al. 2002]. Similar problems were cited at the Pentagon [see Jackson et al. 2002].

Damage to Infrastructures. Difficulties in collecting needed information are exacerbated by damage to or disruption of critical infrastructures. In many disaster situations, communications systems are damaged or overloaded with traffic, preventing responders from collecting and sharing information [Arlington County 2002, A-36; Weber et al. 2002; Auf der Heide 1989].

Direct Effects on Responder Organizations. Disasters can similarly damage response organization assets needed to gather information after an incident occurs. Response planning by the Miami-Dade Fire and Rescue Department called for aerial assessment of the damage and hazards after a hurricane by members of its air rescue division. However, during Hurricane Andrew, both of the department’s only two helicopters were damaged [Paulison et al. 1993].

Recommendation 4.1—As Part of Preparedness Efforts, Put in Place a Coordinated, Multiagency Plan for Monitoring Hazards

Although gathering information on some hazards after a disaster is straightforward —for example, determining the locations of collapsed buildings after a tornado —other hazards, such as airborne contamination or the presence of particular pathogens, are much more difficult to identify and measure. Currently there are no technological solutions able to “simply measure all possible disaster hazards simultaneously” [Study Interview]. Consequently, to acquire information on the full range of foreseeable hazards that might be present during or after a disaster, safety managers must have, or be able to access, the assessment capabilities, supplies, and expertise needed to identify, understand, and monitor those potential hazards.

To make this possible, hazard monitoring must be a critical element of preparedness activities. Response organizations must put plans in place to carry out hazard assessment in disaster situations. The preparedness effort must include the following:

1. Define the types of hazards that major disasters may present and determine the timeframes over which safety managers will need information about each hazard.
2. Put capabilities in place at the local level to enable safety managers to gather the information they will need immediately.
3. For capabilities that will not be available at the local level, establish ways for individual agencies to access hazard assessment resources from other response organizations.

Define Hazard Types and Information Needs. Because not all hazards can be measured simultaneously, choices must be made about what hazards are examined first at particular events. By defining how rapidly hazard information will be needed, local planners can determine which assessment capabilities will be needed immediately and therefore must be provided locally. Other assessment capabilities, perhaps less critical or not needed immediately, could be provided by reinforcing organizations coming from beyond the local area. Responders identified the immediate need to monitor the environment for chemical agents, biological agents, radiation, flammable gases, and oxygen deficiency as key [Study Interviews]. Such a list provides a clear strategy for what hazards should be examined as assessment resources arrive at a scene.

Develop Local Hazard Monitoring Capabilities. When a major crisis hits, safety managers will need certain hazard data immediately. Capabilities must be in place at the local level to gather that information. Data on facilities and locations that could present safety and health risks for responders is one key example of this kind of information [Study Interviews]. Such data can be acquired through facility inspections, regulatory filings, or other data collection.⁴ Because such information is only useful if it is immediately available and up to date, the importance of keeping this type of information current and readily accessible to responders cannot be overemphasized [Study Interviews].

Local response organizations also need capabilities for collecting information about hazardous or infectious materials in the air, water, ground, or debris following a disaster—for example, direct-reading instruments, field tests, and laboratory assay methods. Certain response units will routinely have some hazard assessment technologies used for these purposes—e.g., gas monitors used by firefighters. Local hazardous materials responders and other specialized response teams may have access to more sophisticated devices to measure the presence of chemicals, weapons of mass destruction, and other hazards.⁵ Other hazard assessment capabilities are based on individual responder training; for example, the capability of responders to assess the risks posed by moving water in a flood situation [FEMA 1994b]. But where local organizations do not have the capabilities needed to gather necessary information, the resources must be put in place.

Finally, major disasters require responders to have access to “big picture” hazard information. To handle this issue, systems can be put in place to ensure rapid access to overhead imagery [Study Interviews]. For example, response organizations could maintain access to public or private helicopters to provide Incident Commanders with a quick overhead perspective of a disaster scene.⁶

Access to Needed Hazard Assessment Resources in Other Organizations. The diversity of hazards that can exist after a major disaster means that individual response organizations must often rely on external organizations to provide supplemental hazard assessment capabilities and expertise.⁷ For example, external organizations possess technology and expertise to measure hazards such as airborne pollutants, heavy metals, asbestos, particulates, and others. In addition, external organizations can also provide access to technical assets that local response organizations could never support on their own. Beyond the helicopters discussed above, a range of other sophisticated overhead monitoring platforms can also contribute to management of responder safety. Depending on the disaster type, information from weather and imaging satellites, airborne infrared sensors, thermal sensors, LIDAR (light detection and ranging) instruments, or other monitoring systems can provide useful overhead viewpoints.⁸ Consequently, agreements—such as memoranda of understanding, formal plans, or mutual aid agreements—must be put in place before a major disaster occurs to enable local response agencies to coordinate efforts to assess hazards and access resources from other agencies.⁹ Agreements must also be in place to ensure that information produced by these varied sources can be effectively shared and used among response organizations.¹⁰

Safety managers at a major disaster need points of contact in key organizations at the local, state, and federal agency levels, as well as relevant nongovernmental organizations. With these contacts in place, they will have resources to call on when they face a specialized hazard assessment need. This requires developing contact lists and information about the assessment capabilities of relevant organizations, as well as building the inter organizational relationships needed to make such coordinated hazard monitoring function effectively.¹¹

Recommendation 4.2—Develop Assessment Methods, Checklists, Guidelines, and Standards to Assist in Hazard Monitoring Efforts Among Multiple Agencies

Following a disaster, responders may not know all the potential health and safety risks that should be examined or where to obtain monitoring capabilities for unfamiliar hazards. As a result, tools and resources to provide responders with guidance on hazard monitoring needs and facilitate access to outside resources are needed. As described above, development of lists of potential hazards is a critical element of disaster response planning. Beyond their utility in preparedness efforts, such lists can also provide first responders at a disaster scene with information on potential hazards that require assessment. Study discussion participants indicated that such lists—by alerting responders to the types of questions they should be asking after particular disasters—are needed to better define safety efforts, especially in the early phases of disaster operations. In addition, such common lists can also help ensure that responders from different organizations have a uniform understanding of hazard monitoring needs. To ensure that such assessment tools are readily at hand when a disaster occurs, ideally they should be tailored to be relevant to routine response operations as well.

Assessment methods are also needed to manage and assure that hazard information produced in large-scale assessment operations is uniform and comparable enough to be useful for safety management. Direct observation of the disaster aftermath is always a major source of hazard information for safety management. Although a few responders may be able to collect the necessary information at a small incident, directly assessing a hurricane or earthquake impact zone could require hundreds of individuals. To perform such an assessment effectively, many individuals must be coordinated in information gathering efforts. This need also applies to assessments performed by technical experts; for example, there were issues with consistency of the building stability assessments performed by structural engineers drawn from many organizations after the Northridge earthquake [Collins 1999]. Interviewees reported use of standardized “score cards” or templates for damage assessment by response units to ensure consistency among the efforts of many individual responders.¹²

Monitoring guidelines and standards can also contribute to ensuring that technical hazard assessment efforts—in areas such as air quality, water contamination, or other environmental threats—of different organizations can effectively contribute to safety management. Problems with different organizations using incompatible analytical methods or producing data that are not comparable can significantly undermine hazard assessment efforts. Responders indicated that efforts to standardize analytical methods and protocols to the extent possible should therefore be an important part of preparedness [Study Workshop].

Recommendation 4.3—Develop Information Management Systems and Processes So That Response Organizations Can Use Hazard Data More Effectively

The scale and multiagency nature of disaster response operations result in a requirement for information management tools to focus and integrate safety management. To make it possible to use information from different response organizations’ monitoring efforts, hazard data must be produced and presented so it can be easily compared and utilized by safety managers. In presenting the results of assessments, standard forms and formats would make it easier for Incident Commanders to readily absorb needed information [Study Workshop].¹³ When different hazard assessment organizations present their results in markedly different ways, it is more difficult for safety managers to use the information under time-limited conditions.¹⁴ If data are presented in a uniform manner, recognizing and resolving any disagreement among different data sources are also more straightforward. Addressing such issues is particularly important when the hazard situation at an incident scene is uncertain enough that appropriate monitoring and assessment strategies are not clear.

For multiagency hazard monitoring efforts, rapidly examining and assessing hazard data produced by a range of different response organizations can be difficult. Examination and assessment under high-pressure disaster situations require databases to collate data and rapidly deliver needed hazard information.¹⁵ Appropriate data-bases would make it possible for safety managers to quickly examine data produced by different response organizations to identify discrepancies, track the evolution of the hazard environment over time, and flag potential problems that require follow-up examination.¹⁶

Because disaster response operations frequently take place over large areas that involve significant differences in hazard environments, management tools that allow responders to track data spatially can also contribute to safety management. To both deliver assistance and protect responders after a major incident, it is critically important to understand differences in the hazard environment across the entire site. Depending on details of an incident, some areas might be very hazardous to responders while others pose no major safety concerns. Because of the potential for destruction of landmarks and other location indicators after a major event, strategies based on the global positioning system (GPS) to assist in locating and defining hazard areas would be valuable.¹⁷ Geographic information systems (GIS) can provide a useful tool to organize hazard information for an entire incident scene and make it readily accessible to safety managers [Greene 2002]. By building a framework to consistently present data, such technologies can make available the “panoramic view” of an incident that responders indicated can be elusive at major incidents.¹⁸

Recommendation 4.4—Undertake Joint Exercises that Include Multiagency Hazard Monitoring Efforts

To put multiagency monitoring capabilities in place rapidly after a major disaster, hazard assessment activities must be practiced and relationships built among cooperating organizations. As a result, disaster exercises should include hazard assessment components that test the adequacy of assessment plans and exercise multiagency coordination processes. All relevant organizations should be involved as a way of building relationships and experience in joint operations that pose realistic, safety related issues for responders.

Information on the Responder Workforce: Maintaining Accountability Data on Responders and Units

Along with an accurate sense of the types of hazards present, Incident Commanders need reliable and timely information on the responders operating at the disaster scene. This accountability information on both individual responders and their units is integral to effective safety management. The study recommends several ways of overcoming existing shortfalls in responder accountability during response operations. A combination of standard operating procedures, identification systems, and emerging technologies can strengthen the capability of Incident Commanders to know which responding entities are at the disaster scene, what functions they are performing, and where their personnel are located.

The nature of disaster response operations presents significant barriers to obtaining and maintaining sufficient information on the response workforce.

Large Geographic Scale. Large and complex disaster scenes undermine efforts of response managers to maintain accountability information for response units and effectively track response resources. Responding to incidents over large areas requires more responders, increasing the challenges in maintaining an awareness of individuals’ locations and activities. Complex and widespread disaster scenes also make establishing scene perimeters difficult, thereby reducing the opportunity to collect accountability information as workers enter and leave the scene.

Prolonged Duration. Because major disaster response operations often require action over days, weeks, or even months, responding organizations must manage responder shift changes and work-to-rest rotations. The evolution of responders operating at the scene over time further complicates obtaining and maintaining accurate accountability information.

Wide Range of Needed Capabilities. The involvement of responders from many organizations also makes it difficult to collect information on the capabilities, activities, training, and equipment of responders at the incident. For example, after Hurricane Andrew, the Miami-Dade Fire Department alone estimated that it received mutual aid from 100 Florida departments and 25 out-of-state departments [Paulison et al. 1993, 68]. Over 100 organizations participated in the response to the attack on the Pentagon [Institute for Crisis Disaster and Risk Management 2002] and the number of organizations involved in the World Trade Center response has been estimated to exceed 400 [Harrald 2002].¹⁹ Although individual organizations will be familiar with the capabilities of their members and have mechanisms to monitor re-ponder accountability, few mechanisms exist to provide that information effectively to Incident Commanders.²⁰

Influx of Convergent Volunteers and Supplies. Accounting for volunteers— many of whom are not connected to any organization—is even more problematic. Since they are generally not organized in a way that would allow response managers to collect and manage information on individual volunteers’ capabilities, training, and activities, it is particularly difficult to integrate convergent volunteers into safety management efforts.²¹

Recommendation 4.5—Bolster the Role of Response Units in Accounting for Personnel

For responders who are organized into defined response units, connection to the incident command structure at the unit level is a promising means for ensuring personnel accountability. Information on personnel accountability can be collected and utilized through mechanisms to link responding units to the incident command structure. Having units “report in” upon arrival at the scene is the first step. Then the Incident Commander is aware of their presence at the site and can coordinate their activities.²² Once assigned a response activity and operating location, responding units periodically report their location and activities, thus maintaining accountability. These reports ensure that the Incident Commander remains aware of their presence when he or she makes choices on how to deal with hazardous conditions at the disaster scene. Such “unit level” accountability systems work best for response organizations that have defined and stable units.²³ In other disaster response organizations, many of which are organized very differently, applying unit-based approaches may require forming responders into appropriate groups specifically for disaster response purposes. Such a strategy must be planned, exercised, and evaluated before an event occurs if it is to be successful in post-disaster conditions.

When unit-based approaches are used to support accountability, it should be noted that unit or crew integrity is essential.²⁴ As units deploy to the disaster scene, they must account for all individual responders who are members of their unit. Requiring that units enter and depart the disaster scene together, and that they operate as coherent units, ensures that individual or small groups of responders are not placed in life-threatening situations without the knowledge of their commanders.

Recommendation 4.6—Develop Personnel Identification and Credentialing Systems Better Suited to Major Disaster Response Operations

If responder identification and accountability functions cannot be provided at the unit level (Recommendation 4.5), mechanisms must be put in place to provide safety managers with this information for individual responders. Different types of identification methods exist for identifying responders in major emergency responses. Some responding units make use of high-visibility vests to identify key personnel and color coded armbands to identify types of responder personnel. Issuing “event badges” to responders is another way of identifying personnel at the disaster scene and indicating their authorized activities. In addition to including individual and unit identification, badges can be color-coded by day or can indicate the areas at the disaster site where the responder is allowed access. Although such identification systems can provide some capabilities to visually identify responders, they cannot provide the accountability information safety managers need to adequately protect responders at disaster response operations. In addition, they do not provide necessary safety-related information about responders (e.g., expertise, training, and personal protective equipment levels) for effective safety management. As a result, it is clear that more robust identification and credentialing systems are needed to protect the safety and health of responders during major disaster responses. Incident Commanders must be able to identify authorized responders at a disaster scene, track their location and activity if needed, and have access to information on whether they possess the right qualifications for working in a specific environment.

Because of the practical difficulties in implementing identification systems after a disaster,²⁵ providing these capabilities must be included in preparedness efforts. Systems must be designed not only to prevent unauthorized individuals from gaining access, e.g., by duplicating badges, but also to ensure that responders with legitimate needs to participate are not excluded. Any identification system should also provide information on responder credentials: their certifications, training levels, and other information on their general skills relevant to operating in a hazardous environment. ²⁶ It was also suggested that including information on any cross-training experience that individuals possess, as well as some medical information (e.g., vaccination history and possible antibiotic sensitivities), could be important for protecting safety in specific disaster situations.²⁷

Responders cited a range of technological approaches that could make responder identification, credentialing, and accountability information much more readily available to safety managers. Key technology options cited include “smart cards” that could be rapidly scanned at a staging area or entry point at the disaster scene to authenticate the identity and qualifications of individual responders.²⁸ Other options include the use of radio frequency tags that transmit the location and status of individual responders, or bar code identifiers or biometric systems suitable for tracking the movement of responders through entry/exit points. Responders emphasized that any new technological approaches should be subjected to pilot tests with operational units to ensure that such equipment will work well in actual disaster circumstances.

Recommendation 4.7—Utilize Scene Control to Improve Cross-Agency Accountability

Although technological solutions can contribute to improving personnel accountability, lower technology options can make a significant contribution as well. For events where a hard perimeter can be established around the incident scene, even recording units’ response assignments and activities as they enter and leave the scene could improve accountability.²⁹ Effective scene control has the benefit that it represents a critical means for ensuring multiagency accountability. Since all responders must cross the perimeter to participate in response activities, information can be collected from them independent of their “home organization.” Taking advantage of this strategy requires that establishing clear scene perimeters, supported by personnel monitoring those who enter and leave the scene, is a priority in response operations. Means to do so must be included in preparedness plans to ensure that scene control can be established as early as possible in a response.

Recommendation 4.8—Develop Minimum Standards for Safety and Health Training for All Responders Involved in Disaster Response Operations

The need for safety managers to gather information on worker capabilities and training is created by the significant differences that exist among responding organizations. If safety managers could assume a common, base level of training for all responders involved at an incident, the need to gather such information would be significantly reduced. In addition to contributing directly to better safety management, not having to devote effort to gathering information on responder capabilities would allow safety managers to give more attention to other concerns. Study discussions indicated that the curriculum should include a basic familiarity with the following:

• the ICS approach to disaster response
• common terminology for safety and health issues
• an “all-hazards” perspective on the range of hazards that could be encountered during disaster response activities
• relevant protective equipment, and when and how to use it
• decontamination and rehabilitation processes
• an overview of the diverse organizations that are likely to become involved in major disaster response.

Models could be developed from existing safety standards and training programs, such as those related to satisfying OSHA requirements for emergency response workers or skilled support personnel at sites where hazardous materials are present.³⁰ Beyond such minimum requirements, different response disciplines³¹ might add additional training requirements for their members.³²

Information on Responders’ Health and Injuries: Collecting Injury, Exposure, and Health Status Data

Information on responder injuries and health status is critically needed to allow safety managers to address safety problems and intervene to improve responder protection. The extent to which information on responder injuries and health status is available to Incident Commanders reportedly varies. For example, some study workshop participants indicated that current systems in many areas could provide this information; others, including responders involved in recent disaster response operations, contradicted that view. Project interviews indicated that the characteristics of disaster situations can make it particularly difficult to collect this information and provide it to safety managers.

Large Number of People Affected, Injured, or Killed. During project discussions, responders reported that the focus in disaster situations is on meeting the medical needs of victims, rather than on the needs of the responders serving them. The intense operational pressures compete with efforts to collect information on the health status of the responder workforce.

Large Geographic Scale. Just as the scale of disaster scenes hinders efforts to collect hazard information and maintain responder accountability, it also gets in the way of collecting needed health information on responders. Because responders are often treated at multiple locations (or individually by their peers), mechanisms are not routinely in place for injury or exposure information to feed back to safety management [Study Interviews].³³ This was a particular issue at Hurricane Andrew where both responders and victims were treated at broadly dispersed medical facilities [Study Interviews].

Wide Range of Needed Capabilities. The involvement of many different responding organizations also makes it difficult to collect needed health status information. Although some individual responder organizations may have mechanisms to collect information on injuries or exposures suffered by their own members, those mechanisms may not be effective in post-disaster conditions, and routes are often not in place to share such information to apprise safety management more broadly.

Influx of Convergent Volunteers and Supplies. Because convergent volunteers are generally not effectively organized or connected to the Incident Command System, no mechanism exists for managers to become aware of injuries or exposures that occur during such volunteer activities.

Recommendation 4.9—Develop Systems to Provide Timely Information on Responder Injuries and Exposures

Currently, self-reporting by responders is the primary method used to document injuries during response operations. However, the significant operational pressures that exist in the early phases of a response may result in responders failing to report injuries.³⁴ Getting a complete view of responder health status and potential risks is also impeded by underreporting of less serious injuries that, while not immediately disabling or life threatening, could be indicative of more serious problems [Study Interviews].³⁵ Without timely feedback on responder injuries, disaster safety managers will not have accurate information on the scope and extent of non critical injuries, as well as the specific areas of the site where particular injuries are occurring [Study Interviews].

To ensure that necessary medical information is available, the types of injury and exposure information needed should be defined—depending on the nature of the incident and hazards present—as an element of preparedness planning. Formal systems must be put in place to track injuries to emergency responders at major events.³⁶ In light of the multiagency nature of disaster operations, these systems must provide mechanisms to collect such data across different responding organizations. In addition, to be most useful for injury prevention, these systems must be able to track injuries in as close to real time as possible under the circumstances. How such systems would be implemented would clearly differ depending on the specifics of a local community. If responder injuries are all treated at the disaster scene in a centralized manner, collecting it may only require consistent reporting to incident safety managers. If responders are treated at local hospitals or at other locations away from the disaster scene, data collection and coordination mechanisms would be required to gather the needed information.³⁷ Whatever procedure is used, data collection must be systematic, using a defined set of terms and reported in a consistent manner.³⁸

Summary

Major disasters present numerous barriers for gathering key types of information required for effective safety management. The nature of major disasters, particularly in terms of a multitude of potential hazards and the diverse responder workforce, makes the gathering of safety-related information critical for protecting emergency responders. Safety managers need timely and accurate information on the range of potential hazards present (or expected) at a disaster scene. Better personnel accountability systems, including credentialing mechanisms to provide information on responder capabilities, are needed to protect responders during incident operations. Finally, innovative means are needed to provide timely feedback on the injuries and health exposures responders suffer while carrying out disaster response assignments.

¹ This problem has also been observed in earthquake response operations [Collins 1999].

² For example, in the Los Angeles riots in 1992, ten firefighters were injured by violence, including two who were shot [Taylor and Sanchez 1992]. The risk of violence is particularly pronounced during some terrorism incidents where follow-on attacks may target responders. This has occurred in attacks in Russia, Israel, Northern Ireland, and in bombings at both an abortion clinic and a nightclub in Atlanta, Ga. [RAND and Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) 2003; Thomas 1997].

³ Multiple agencies may gather hazard information to inform their own safety management efforts or they may have statutory or other responsibilities to collect and disseminate the information.

⁴ For example, during Hurricane Andrew there were problems with responders not being fully aware of hazardous materials at hurricane-damaged sites [Lewis 1993, 72; Study Interviews]. In light of what they learned during the aftermath of the hurricane, local responders indicated that the availability of regulatory information on such materials would make it much easier to assess potential hazards. Other responders cited the usefulness of inspection information on construction and building contents for hazard assessment [Study Interviews].

⁵ Although significant technology is available, assessment methods to provide first responders with needed information do not exist for all hazards or may not be broadly accessible to response organizations because of technical, resource, or other limitations. As a result, beyond the management issues, significant technical issues exist in this area as well. Improvements to the capabilities of current monitoring technologies, broader diffusion of the equipment in the response community, or the development of new strategies or technologies could contribute to providing responders with more rapid and accurate information on post-disaster operating environments.

⁶ In planning for airborne assessment, it is important to include backup options if adverse weather, flight restrictions, or disaster damage hinder the use of aerial assets.

⁷ This need to rely on capabilities maintained by a range of other organizations was a key driver for recommending the integrated, incident-wide approach described in Chapter Seven.

⁸ Immediately following the September 11 attacks, satellite imaging and aerial over flights of the World Trade Center and Pentagon sites were undertaken for damage assessment and hazard monitoring purposes [Williamson and Baker 2002, 870 873].

⁹ To ensure that critical monitoring tasks are performed, planning must include the requirements for activating agreements or calling on outside resources. Because not all contingencies can be predicted during planning, backup sources for critical monitoring capabilities should be identified where possible.

¹⁰ Failure in sharing information among response organizations can pose significant safety issues. In the California wildfires of 1993, breakdowns in communications between response services meant that some responders were not sufficiently aware of the speed and direction of movement of the wildfires [California Office of Emergency Services 1993].

¹¹ Such contact lists could be developed at the local level as individual response organizations identify hazard assessment resources they need; alternatively, for national level assets in particular, such contact lists could be developed at the federal level as part of national preparedness efforts.

¹² Such tools and training are particularly important if volunteers or other nontraditional responders participate in the hazard assessment process [Lewis 1993, 71].

¹³ Such standardized hazard assessment tools could be beneficial in routine emergency response as well as major disaster operations. In addition, use during routine events would increase familiarity with the tools and help ensure that they could be used effectively during large-scale response operations.

¹⁴ In general, safety managers must filter out needed safety-related information from the larger body of available information. The challenge is converting the quantity of information inherently involved in large-scale incidents to the quality information needed to manage responder safety.

¹⁵ During the World Trade Center response, for example, the Environmental Protection Agency developed a “Multi-Agency Data Management System” in an attempt to rationalize different organizations’ monitoring efforts [EPA 2002].

¹⁶ The common data presentation methods described above could significantly facilitate any effort to produce such hazard information databases by providing a common input format for all organizations’ monitoring information.

¹⁷ For example, Hurricane Andrew stripped road signs from a significant fraction of the roads making it difficult for even local responders to navigate the response area [Lewis 1993, 19].

¹⁸ Because specialized database or mapping systems may not be sufficiently applicable to response organizations’ day-to-day operations, these assets might be better built within states, regionally, or nationally and deployed rapidly to large-scale incident scenes.

¹⁹ The response to the September 11, 2001, plane crash in Shanksville, Pa., involved over 74 organizations [Grant and Hoover 2002].

²⁰ In Hurricane Andrew, problems tracking what federal responders were on site led to confusion about who was deployed where and resulted in duplicative staff requests [FEMA 1993, 157].

²¹ In the Oklahoma City bombing in April 1995, a volunteer nurse, who was not trained or equipped for urban search and rescue activities, was fatally injured by a piece of falling debris after arriving at the disaster scene [Irving 1995, 75; Cone et al. 2003].

²² It should be noted that it is also critical to ensure that incident managers are not overwhelmed with too much accountability data, resulting in information overload. Determining the right amount and frequency of accountability information needed to protect responders and manage operations is a key component of preparedness planning.

²³ This unit reporting mechanism has been developed extensively in the fire service [Brunacini 2002, 273; Coleman 2001, 17 18], for example, where a strong unit structure is maintained throughout a response.

²⁴ For resource accountability in emergency operations, the recommended practice of the fire service is to have supervisors “maintain constant awareness of the position and function of all personnel assigned to operate under their supervision.” One role of the ISO is to ensure that the department’s personnel accountability system is being used. See NFPA, 2002c, pp. 7, 9.

²⁵ In the Pentagon response, the initial computer production system for creating color-coded identification badges for responders was quickly overwhelmed, resulting in substantial delays for responder relief crews [Arlington County 2002, A-69, C-58]. Similar problems occurred during the Oklahoma City rescue and recovery effort. It took several days to establish a system and designate a central issuing agency [Oklahoma City MIPT 2002, 10 11].

²⁶ Examples could include training levels for hazardous materials response, compliance with training standards such as those issued by the National Fire Protection Association, or fit testing or experience in different types or levels of protective equipment.

²⁷ Alternative mechanisms for verifying responder credentials were also suggested during study discussions. Qualification information could be collected centrally—such as through a national registry of responders similar to that used in emergency medical services—providing incident managers with a quick route to assess the qualifications of potential responders. Another possibility is pursuing a “certified-organization” approach to evaluate and certify the training and skill levels of responder organizations as a whole.

²⁸ Responders cited the lack of nationwide standards for training and responder certification as a significant obstacle to developing credentialing systems for major disaster response. Setting minimum standards for certification and training of responder personnel would enable the Incident Command to more easily establish qualifications of responding units and their personnel.

²⁹ At the Pentagon, operations in some areas had tight perimeter control, while others did not [Arlington County 2002]. Such accountability strategies based on scene control are even more problematic in wide area disasters, such as Hurricane Andrew or the Northridge earthquake, where establishing a hard perimeter around the entire disaster area is not feasible.

³⁰ The OSHA regulation 29 CFR 1910.120 on Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response (HAZWOPER) sets training requirements for skilled support personnel involved in the cleanup operations at sites containing hazardous materials [U.S. Department of Labor 2003].

³¹ One example from the fire service is the consensus standards and recommended practices on fire and safety issues developed by the NFPA, which are widely used within the fire service.

³² Related to the need for common responder training standards, study discussions also highlighted the importance of having means for verifying the quality of the safety and health training provided to responders. Without such verification mechanisms, it is difficult to assess the extent and quality of the safety and health training given to responders.

³³ An exception was the World Trade Center response, where National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs) treated many responders on-site, which made it easier to collect data. Even in that case, however, responders interviewed during the study indicated that the data did not reach them fast enough or in a form that could be readily integrated into safety management [Study Interviews].

³⁴ Because of their desire to continue assisting victims, responders who sustain injuries often do not report them so that they can keep working. Responders suggested that more injuries would be reported if doing so did not necessarily result in an obligation to stop working [Study Interviews].

³⁵ For example, routine eye injuries can be indicative of problems in protection that could result in permanent disability or, in an environment with significant pathogen risks, relatively minor cuts could develop into serious medical problems if not appropriately addressed.

³⁶ We were able to find instances of systematic patient data collection systems in the literature. At Northridge, a single patient data collection system was used by DMATs and Veterans Administration clinics (that also mobilized to provide emergency medical care) to provide up-to-date data [Leonard et al. 1995]. However, this system was not specific to emergency responders, and it is not clear that the emergency responder data were available.

³⁷ The privacy requirements of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 could affect the ability to collect and utilize health information on the emergency response workforce. The requirements of the act should therefore be addressed in any preparedness planning aimed at addressing this safety need.

³⁸ Interviewees indicated that counting and data coding problems undermined data collection efforts at the World Trade Center response. For example, a visit to a medical team to get safety glasses was reportedly entered as an eye injury in the counting system [Study Interviews].