

The Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board

FISCAL YEAR 2002





DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

JUN 25 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board for Fiscal Year 2002

Annual Report of the Reserves Forces Policy Board for Fiscal Year 2002 is provided to you in compliance with Title 10, United States code, Section 113(c) (2).

The report represents the collective views of the members of the Board, and not the official policy positions of this Department or any other Department or Agency of the United States Government.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Paul Wolfowitz", is positioned to the right of the main text.

Attachment:
RFPB Annual Report



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

JUN 25 2003

Honorable Richard B. Cheney
President of the Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. President:

Annual Report of the Reserves Forces Policy Board for Fiscal Year 2002 is provided to you in compliance with Title 10, United States code, Section 113(c) (2).

The report represents the collective views of the members of the Board, and not the official policy positions of this Department or any other Department or Agency of the United States Government.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Paul Wolfowitz", is positioned below the word "Sincerely,".

Enclosure:
RFPB Annual Report



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

JUN 25 2003

Honorable J. Dennis Hastert
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Annual Report of the Reserves Forces Policy Board for Fiscal Year 2002 is provided to you in compliance with Title 10, United States code, Section 113(c) (2).


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Enclosure:
RFPB Annual Report

This report represents the Reserve Forces Policy Board's independent review of Reserve Component issues and provides a consensus evaluation of Reserve component programs. It includes the collective views of the Board members and does not necessarily reflect the official policy position of the Department of Defense or any other department or agency of the United States Government.



Reserve Component Programs

The Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board

Data Based on Fiscal Year 2002

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, DC 20301-7300

April 2003

Reserve Forces Policy Board Members

CHAIRMAN



Honorable Albert C. Zapanta
Chairman, Reserve Forces Policy Board
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MILITARY EXECUTIVE



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Naval Surface Force Pacific Fleet
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MajGen Frances Wilson, USMC
Director, Personnel Management Division (MM)
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MajGen Arnold L. Punaro, USMCR
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Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
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Maj Gen John M. Speigel, USAF
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Maj Gen E. Gordon Stump, ANG
Adjutant General, Michigan



Maj Gen Edward Mechenbier, USAFR
Mobilization Assistant to the Commander, AFMC
Wright Patterson AFB, OH



Maj Gen John Bradley, USAFR
Deputy Commander
JTF Computer
Network Operations
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UNITED STATES COAST GUARD



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Director of Reserve and Training USCG
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RADM Mary P. O'Donnell, USCGR
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EXOFFICIO



MG Gerald A. Rudisill, Jr., USA
Assistant to the Chairman
JCS for National Guard Matters
Washington, D.C.



Maj Gen Robert A. McIntosh, USAF
Assistant to the Chairman
JCS for Reserve Matters
Washington, D.C.

**CHAIRMAN
RFPB ALUMNI
STANDING COMMITTEE**



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RFPB Staff Members

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Senior Policy Advisor, ARNG

COL Mari K. Eder
Senior Policy Advisor

COL Stewart E. Goesch
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LtCol Otis W. Ledbetter, Jr.
Senior Policy Advisor, USMCR

Col Francis (Rocky) L. Templon
Senior Policy Advisor, ANG


Col Richard O. Roberts, Jr.
Senior Policy Advisor, USAFR


SFC Michael E. Biere, USAR
Personnel Operations NCOIC

LCDR Katherine McHale, USNR
IMA

Ms. Patricia A. Elkins
Executive Assistant

Reserve Forces Policy Board Membership Matrix





The logo of the Reserve Forces Policy Board represents the Total Force as the shield for the Nation. The United States is identified by its national symbol, the eagle. A blue field represents the Military Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Marine Corps is a part of the Department of the Navy. The Coast Guard may become a part of the Navy Department in time of war. Three stars depict the Active component, National Guard, and Reserve. Seven vertical stripes of the shield stand for the seven Reserve components: Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve.

The Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board reflects a consensus of the 24-member Board. Although most policy recommendations and Board positions have the unanimous support of the Board, this report does not purport that individual Board members, the Military Services, or the Department of Defense concur with every recommended action or position. This report covers the period from 1 October 2001 through 30 September 2002.

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Chairman's Overview and Executive Summary

Introduction

As FY 2002 began, the nation was still reeling from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, but many Reserve component individuals and units were already on active duty, both as volunteers and in quick response to the President's call. All seven Reserve components rapidly answered this unprecedented call up, a partial mobilization in support of a different type of war, one with two fronts, at home and abroad and with no national enemy to provide focus.

The Reserve component contributions to the War on Terrorism this year were immediate and lasting. As the fiscal year ended, there were still 65,411 members of the Reserve components on active duty. This included 34,727 members of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve; 5,968 members of the Naval Reserve; 20,053 members of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve; 3,805 Marine Corps reservists; and 858 members of the Coast Guard Reserve.

Executive Summary

The challenges posed by homeland defense and security and mobilization and demobilization this past year have driven the issues addressed by the Reserve Forces Policy Board and given new urgency to this Board's mission and renewed focus to our efforts on behalf of the nearly 1.3 million men and women in uniform with the National Guard and Reserve. In many

instances, we were confronted with recurring issues, ones created by bureaucratic Cold War constructs that continue to survive. The RFPB has examined these issues in one form or another since its inception in 1952. The difference this year was that the same barriers were highlighted, most publicly and painfully, as they continued to obstruct and often restrain the services' best efforts to achieve Total Force integration.

The Cold War era has conclusively passed; the War on Terrorism is taking its place and America's contract with the Reserve components has changed. It is time for this Board to act decisively, to provide insights and recommendations that apply a new paradigm for service, compensation, and benefits, with the accompanying legal and policy applications that define the roles and missions of the Reserve components and the vision for reserve service to the nation in the 21st century. To this end, the Reserve Forces Policy Board intends to sponsor a symposium in 2003 to examine many of these issues.

It is equally important the Reserve components reconnect with our stakeholders, the American people. Since the Revolutionary War and the establishment of General George Washington's Citizen Patriot militia, Citizen Patriots have traditionally been the mainstay of our national security. As community leaders, they provide a reservoir of unique civilian skills and capabilities not normally resident within DoD. Secretary Rumsfeld's reform and transformation initiatives offer a unique opportunity to define a new Total Force Policy that ensures a strong bond with our country's Citizen Patriots.

The Citizen Patriot Forum is an information-gathering tool used by the Reserve Forces Policy Board to gain insight from American stakeholders and opinion leaders on Guard and Reserve issues that impact them. Forums are conducted in conjunction with Board visits to major command locations and field units and usually involve approximately 40 community, public and private sector leaders from local communities.

Citizen Patriot Forums focus on communication and information gathering. Attendees include Board members and staff, local Active and Reserve component military leaders, and a representative cross section of the local community: civic, religious, and education leaders; senior public service personnel; first responders and leaders from the private sector.

In FY 2002, CPFs raised and validated five common issues including the willingness of local community leaders to volunteer to support the War on Terrorism, the need to include first responders in strategy and planning, the importance of sharing threat analyses and intelligence with local agencies and the untapped resource that lies within state militias. Most importantly we witnessed that the Citizen Patriot Forums have proved to fill a significant communications need across the public and private sector. The uncertainties associated with the potentially long duration of this mobilization impact families, employers, educations, incomes and the futures of everyone involved which, in turn, may impact future recruiting and retention. This is an overarching issue and one that cannot be ignored.

Recommendations

The Board's recommendations concerning the most significant issues covered in this Annual Report are summarized as follows:

Mobilization

- The Board recommends that a single office be given responsibility for coordinating all mobilization actions in each of the services. A single headquarters staff office will greatly improve the mobilization and demobilization process, reduce inherent turbulence, expedite movement of forces into theater, and provide for equity in treatment of personnel.
- The Board further recommends that the services continue to ensure equity and fairness in application of stop-loss and involuntary mobilization policies. Perception issues can limit policy effectiveness and even if mutually exclusive, the mere appearance of inequitable treatment can produce a negative impact. Education is essential to ensuring that critical information is available on stop loss and mobilization policies as well as the attendant issues.

Modernization and Interoperability

- An effective Total Force policy necessitates side-by-side modernization, fielding of technology and equipment acquisition, resulting in effective interoperability.
- The Board supports the continuation of NGREA funding until solutions are found for the National Guard and Reserve equipment readiness issues.

Compensation

- Reserve and Guard personnel should receive the same compensation as Active component personnel when performing similar or comparable duties, regardless of the various types of orders requiring or specifying service.

- One third of all mobilized Reserve component members earn less than their civilian salaries while on active duty. While a number of compensation protection or supplemental proposals support supplementing military pay they do so at tremendous cost, to employers, military operational budgets or directly to taxpayers. The Board favors a review of all proposals, to include a form of income loss tax credit or reduction as the less costly option.

Transformation

- The Board recommends that the fundamental question of the proper role of the RC must be consciously addressed and defined as a necessary first step in the transformation planning process. For 30 years, the post-Vietnam Abrams Doctrine has influenced the apportionment of key mission areas to the Guard and Reserve to ensure the will of the American people supports the Armed Forces in future conflicts. The relevance of this doctrine in the 21st century is central to resolving that fundamental question.
- The Board urges caution as we move ahead with an examination of the Posse Comitatus act and the potential implications that a change could have on traditional Active duty and National Guard law enforcement activities within the continental United States.
- The Board supports the GAO recommendations that Reservists receive clear and direct information on TRICARE options and TRICARE assistance during mobilization. Accessible and affordable healthcare remains a vital issue for at least 20 percent of the Reserve components.

Conclusion

This year's report has been redesigned to support the Secretary of Defense initiative to eliminate redundancy and minimize the number of reports sent to Congress. The RFPB's charter however is to report directly to the Secretary and to Congress. Our report for FY 2002 does that, fully and concisely. The strategic recommendations contained within this report reflect the views of the Chairman and the members of the Board, not necessarily those of the Department of Defense.

Albert C. Zapanta
Chairman
Reserve Forces Policy Board

Introduction

Mission

The Reserve Forces Policy Board, as provided for in Title 10 of the US Code, is the principal policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Congress on National Guard and Reserve component matters. It acts independently to monitor, review and evaluate proposals, actions and situations impacting National Guard and Reserve forces. The Board reports annually to the Secretary of Defense, the President and Congress.

The Chairman's Vision

The Reserve Forces Policy Board provides independent, timely advice and recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and Congress on challenges facing the Reserve components. Our direct charter from the current Secretary of Defense is to aid efforts to strengthen the Reserve components, support transformation and to assist the Reserve components in reconnecting with America.

History of the Reserve Forces Policy Board

The Reserve Forces Policy Board was established in 1952, just five years after the Department of Defense itself was set up in 1947. This was also the year that President Harry Truman ordered his Secretary of Defense to strengthen all elements of the Reserve components. In response, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal appointed the Committee on Civilian Components to make a comprehensive, objective and impartial study of the Reserve components of the armed forces. The committee recommended that the Secretary of Defense create a standing committee to recommend policies

and procedures affecting the Reserve components. The Secretary of Defense adopted the committee's recommendation, and on June 14, 1949, created a Civilian Components Policy Board.

In 1951, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall changed the name of the Board to the Reserve Forces Policy Board to more accurately reflect the Board's focus. The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 codified a Reserve Forces Policy Board in the Department of Defense. Although the RFPB had existed via regulations for a number of years, the Congress envisioned a somewhat different purpose for the RFPB. As outlined in 10 USC 10301, the Board, acting through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, is the principal policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the Reserve component. The law further stipulated that this Board would act independently to monitor, review and evaluate proposals, actions and situations impacting the National Guard and Reserve forces, a goal it has steadfastly maintained.

In September 2002, the Board commemorated its 50th anniversary with the establishment of an annual "Citizen Patriot Awards" program. The 2002 Awards were presented to the Honorable John O. Marsh Jr. and to the WWII Women's Air Service Pilots (WASPS), Citizen Patriots who made considerable contributions to the national defense.

The Board's charter as it was originally envisioned has enabled it to keep pace with the evolving role of the Reserve components over the years. As the Guard and Reserve mobilizations in support of the GWOT have illustrated, we are once again at the beginning of a new era, where the windows of opportunity are enormous, the challenges equally daunting. The Reserve Forces Policy Board stands ready to continue its important role in support of the Reserve components in successfully carrying out the roles and missions specified in the latest National Security Strategy.

Current and Future Challenges

Mobilization

Although the partial mobilization in support of Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) has not been of the magnitude of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the duration is longer. ONE and OEF have given us the opportunity to assess our mobilization and demobilization policies and procedures that, while generally effective, still suffer from certain inefficiencies and inequities, the same issues, in fact, that have been noted in every mobilization since 1990.

Process Improvements

Certainly a number of process improvements are necessary. The construct for mobilization remains a relic of the Cold War. Mobilization processes are conducted sequentially, which presupposes long time periods for notification and processing. Consideration should be given to the development of parallel processes to save time and resources. Process improvements also apply to the Active force. Many Reserve component members certainly noted the differences in service obligations; several services lifted their “stop loss” programs for active duty personnel while their RC counterparts faced active duty orders extensions. While the statutes for these actions are mutually exclusive, there was the perception of a relationship that caused some difficulty for the services. Perceptions of equity are important. These remain significant issues that process improvements must address.

There should be a single office given responsibility for coordinating all mobilization actions in each of the services. All services should have a single headquarters level staff officer or command that is responsible for the mobilization

of its Guard and Reserve forces. Sharing mobilization responsibilities between the personnel and operations directorates causes considerable confusion. Designating a single responsible staff directorate will enhance communication and reduce the confusion associated with trying to determine who is responsible for different mobilization functions. Likewise the supported combatant commander needs a single office to which he can turn, both as a force provider and for mobilization information.

No joint personnel accountability tracking system provides visibility of requirements, personnel to fill those requirements, or synchronization of transportation to move Reserve component personnel into theater. Current service mobilization processes use many different automated and manual systems but what is needed is a system that provides for a global capabilities search for either individuals or units. Current service personnel systems do not track personnel throughout the mobilization and demobilization processes. The current process is a series of handoffs from one system to another, which prevents planners from being proactive in tailoring forces and anticipating requirements. Active and Reserve pay and personnel systems differ and often experience difficulties communicating with each other, if at all. The Joint Staff is relying on implementation of the Defense Integrated Military Human Resource System (DIMHRS) to resolve these problems in the future.

While the mobilization system needs flexibility, Reservists need predictability and reliability. Families and employers encounter considerable hardships upon mobilization of a member of the Guard and Reserve for months or years at a time, so predictability is an important issue for the member’s family and employer. Today, the National Guard and Reserve are an integral part of our defense forces. Nearly half of the

men and women serving in our armed forces are members of the National Guard and Reserve. Each employer has a role in maintaining a strong national defense.

The National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR) is an operational committee of DoD, under the direction, authority and control of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. Its mission is to gain and maintain active support from all public and private employers for the men and women of the National Guard and Reserve as defined by demonstrated employer commitment to employee military service.

The Board recommends that the services continue to ensure equity and fairness in application of stop-loss and involuntary mobilization policies. Perception issues can limit policy effectiveness and even if policies are mutually exclusive, the mere appearance of inequitable treatment can produce a negative impact. Education is essential to ensuring that critical information is available on stop loss and mobilization policies as well as the attendant issues.

Common Access Card (CAC)

Combatant Commanders have advised the Board of their frustration with the cumbersome processes in place to mobilize, deploy and track Reserve component personnel in-theater. The Reserve Forces Policy Board endorses “Smart Card” technologies as a vehicle to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Total Force to support the joint warfighter. The Board has two concerns with the current DoD CAC card: first, the lack of functionality to support the joint warfighter and second, the requirement to issue additional cards to Reservists who are activated for over 30 days.

The CAC represents the culmination of nearly a decade’s worth of prior smart card technology development efforts by each of the services. These development efforts have unequivocally

demonstrated that smart card technology can be a powerful enabler, significantly improving both the efficiency and effectiveness of support to the joint warfighter in key mission support areas. Previous service-sponsored smart card development efforts have resulted in a family of government-owned, mature software products designed, tested and proven to provide dramatic improvements in key logistical and personnel support functions, including manifest tracking, deployment readiness evaluation, weapons issuance and food service. US Pacific Command’s Oahu Project demonstrated that these smart card applications can dramatically improve key logistical and personnel support processes, providing a measurable return on DoD’s smart card investment.

Although the CAC program is committed to ultimately producing a single card for both Active and Reserve personnel, current policy directs issuance of separate Active and Reserve versions, only to verify eligibility for commissary access. Reservists are issued active versions of the CAC for periods of extended active duty in excess of 30 days. Storing the member’s status electronically eliminates the annual requirement to issue over 100K of these additional cards at an estimated annual cost of approximately \$1M. The interim plan to issue separate “ACTIVE”, “RESERVE” and “GUARD” versions of the CAC places a financial and administrative burden on the Guard and Reserve. The goal of a single CAC for all Armed Forces personnel with the member’s status maintained electronically, should be expeditiously implemented.

Continuity of Healthcare for Members and Families

A September 2002 GAO Study indicates that nearly 80% of Reservists have health care coverage when they are not on active duty, which is similar to that of comparable groups within the overall U.S. population. Additionally, the study revealed that of the Reservists who have civilian coverage, about 90% maintained it while mobilized, thus minimizing interruption

of health care coverage to the member and his/her family. Transitional health care benefits, available in the military health care system, have been extended for service members who were released from active duty on or after January 1, 2002. Service member categories include a member who is involuntarily separated from active duty; a Reserve component member who is separated from active duty and who was called up or ordered in support of a contingency operation for an active duty period of more than 30 days; a member who is separated from active duty and is involuntarily retained in support of a contingency operation; and a member who is separated from active duty following a voluntary agreement to stay on active duty for a period of less than one year in support of a contingency mission.

Because most Reservists have civilian insurance and maintain it while mobilized, few dependents experience problems with disruptions to their health care, such as being forced to change providers, learn new health care plan requirements, and adjust to different benefit packages. However, when using TRICARE some dependents of mobilized Reservists have experienced certain problems—in part, because they do not adequately understand how the plan works.

Problems that Reservists and their dependents face with health coverage during mobilizations could be mitigated if DoD improved the information and assistance provided them. Many TRICARE problems stem from DEERS eligibility verification. Reservists are confronted with choices and circumstances that are more complex than those faced by active duty personnel. Their decisions about healthcare are affected by a variety of factors—length of orders, where they and their dependents live, whether they or their spouses have civilian health coverage, and the amount of support civilian employers would be willing to provide with healthcare premiums.

The Board supports GAO recommendations that Reservists, as part of their ongoing readiness training, receive clear and direct information and training on healthcare coverage available to them and their dependents when mobilized; and provide TRICARE assistance during mobilizations targeted to the needs of Reservists and their dependents.

Modernization and Interoperability

Modernization and interoperability of Reserve component equipment are key to their relevance and effectiveness. Achieving this goal is impossible unless Reserve components modernize concurrently with their active duty counterparts. New equipment and emerging technologies are expensive, and the procurement of equipment for Active component requirements, let alone the Reserve components, has proven to be erratically paced. DoD policy requires the services be responsible for funding the equipment needs of their Reserve components. Yet, competing budget demands have rendered this directive impractical and RC modernization has lagged as the result.

It is important to note that each Reserve component is unique in its roles and missions, and level of integration with its parent Active component. There are differences among the components regarding average age of equipment, shortages of equipment, compatibility and interoperability problems. The hand-me-down equipment strategy that relied on the Guard and Reserve to be a force in reserve rather than an active participant in the Defense Strategy simply doesn't work today. In FY 02 we found the Guard and Reserve deployed overseas for long periods of time, often in combat intermixed with Active units or replacing them altogether. If the equipment these units bring with them is not interoperable with that used by the active force their effectiveness declines rapidly, and they become limited in the missions they can be assigned. This creates serious tasking problems for combatant commanders charged with executing the strategy in their areas of responsibility.

Active component dependence on the Reserves necessitates side-by-side modernization and effective interoperability. Certainly much National Guard and Reserve component equipment is worn out or obsolete, but the same can be said of the equipment in the Active force. This can be attributed to the virtual military procurement hiatus during the last decade. Both the Administration and the Congress are now addressing the critical national need for new military equipment.

The National Guard and Reserve provide 47 percent of the end-strength of the Armed Forces, including the majority of Total Force capabilities in several key mission areas within each service. DoD is in the midst of an extensive, formal effort to update and enhance its readiness reporting system. DoD, in concert with the Joint Staff, is working with each of the Services to ensure all necessary units and agencies, to include the Reserve components, are part of this upgraded, enhanced readiness system. The Board recommends that any change to Congressional readiness reporting requirements include Guard and Reserve unit data.

Absent a concerted effort to fully resource modernization and recapitalization efforts, unit equipment will continue to age and become obsolete. Significant equipment expenditures during the 1980s and force structure reductions during the 1990s have helped to maintain the capability of current equipment. Over the next ten years, without a change in equipment policies, aging RC equipment inventories will increase substantially. If recent history holds, this will disproportionately affect the Reserve components in terms of interoperability, training, maintenance, and ultimately in readiness.

Compensation

The RFPB has received numerous comments about pay issues from recalled Reserve component members this year. Equity in personnel administration and treatment is always a matter

of concern for Reserve component members. Identifying inequities and proposing solutions will continue to be a priority for the Board.

Reserve and National Guard personnel should receive the same compensation as Active component personnel performing similar or comparable duties. It should not matter whether the duty is being performed under authority of Title 10 (Armed Forces), Title 14 (Coast Guard), or Title 32 (National Guard), nor should it matter that the duty is labeled “active duty for training” instead of “active duty.” Our focus is not only on base pay, but also on the entire compensation package, including basic allowance for quarters, variable housing allowance and entitlement to medical and dental care, etc.

Income protection upon mobilization is another important issue. Roughly one-third of Reserve component members earn more in their civilian jobs or business pursuits than they earn when on active duty. The loss of income when mobilized is indeed a problem for this group.

The Department of Defense implemented a mobilization income insurance program during the last decade, with disastrous results. The program was not based on realistic actuarial assumptions, and many of those who chose to enroll in the program had advance knowledge they would likely be mobilized. Congress found it necessary to appropriate substantial money to bail out the program before terminating it.

Since the failure of the mobilization insurance system, a consortium of private insurance companies has contacted the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs to express tentative interest in administering a new mobilization insurance system. All such private sector expressions of interest have diminished since September 11, 2001. The events of that day and the resulting Reserve component call-up demonstrated that the risk to be insured against is too great and too unpredictable for any private company or group of companies to undertake.

Privately administered mobilization insurance would likely require a substantial U.S. government underwriting in the case of a major conflict.

Administering an insurance system is not within DOD's core competencies. There are enormous conflicts of interest, in that the same department charged with mobilizing Reserve component members would then have to adjudicate and pay their claims for the proceeds of such insurance. DOD should not be in the insurance business.

The Board foresees major morale problems if some recalled service members are paid much more than other members of the same grade and longevity of service, based on disparities in prior civilian earnings. The Board also sees difficulties in determining exactly what the recalled Reserve component member would have earned, but for the mobilization, especially in the case of self-employed members.

It would be neither fair nor realistic to require the civilian employer of the recalled Reserve component member to make up the difference in pay, but many employers do this voluntarily, especially for involuntary national emergency service. To the extent that civilian employers make up the difference in pay, this income reduction problem is substantially mitigated. Of course, this approach cannot assist the Reserve component member who is self-employed.

One possible solution is to give each private employer a tax deduction as the employer makes up the difference in pay, up to a ceiling amount per month, for each employee who has been activated. This is an expensive option, but it would compensate the employer fairly for the cost of mobilization. An individual who is employed by a state or local government could possibly receive a similar differential pay, to be paid out of an account managed by the state personnel agency. A Federal employee could receive such differential pay from the employee's agency. A tax credit or deduction for individual reservists is also an option.

The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act (SSCRA) has several provisions that are most useful to the recalled member. He or she can terminate a lease (residential or commercial), by giving notice of the recall to the landlord. If the member's family remains in leased residential quarters, there is a protection against eviction, if the service member can truthfully state that the recall has materially affected his or her ability to pay the rent. This provision applies only if the monthly rent does not exceed \$1,200.

The best-known provision of the SSCRA enables the recalled member to get interest rates on pre-existing financial obligations (mortgages, credit cards, etc.) reduced and capped at six per cent, if the member can document that the entry on active duty has materially affected his or her ability to meet financial obligations.

Unfortunately, any expansion of this benefit would substantially increase the burden on creditors, especially banks, and would probably make it more difficult for Reserve component members to get loans in the first place. The Board is also concerned that a proposed amendment to the SSCRA would give the banking industry the opportunity to lobby to decrease the protections already included in Federal law.

There is no easy answer to the loss of income upon mobilization. While a number of compensation protection or supplemental proposals support supplementing military pay they do so at tremendous cost, to employers, military operational budgets or directly to taxpayers. The Board favors a review of all proposals, to include a form of income loss tax credit or deduction as less costly options.

Transformation

The Reserve Forces Policy Board believes that one fundamental question concerning transformation must be answered: is the Abrams Doctrine still relevant in the 21st century? The answer to this question is key to determining

the proper role for the Reserve components in a “transformed” Total Force. Active and Reserve component force structure, the kind and degree of AC/RC integration and their employment roles will be driven by this answer as will innumerable changes to training, equipping, deploying and administering the Total Force. The Government’s relationship with the private sector, and public perception of the Department of Defense will be greatly affected by the future role of the Reserve components.

The Abrams Doctrine has profoundly influenced our national defense strategies and plans since the Vietnam War. Lt.Gen. Thomas J. Plewes, former Chief of the Army Reserve, summarized Gen. Creighton W. Abrams’ concept with the statement: “You are not going to go to war again without calling up the spirit of the American people and you do that by calling up the National Guard and Reserve.” The original intent of the Abrams Doctrine was to keep the hearts and minds of the citizenry closely involved in their government’s military activities. This occurs through the hometown link, when local Guard and Reserve units are “temporarily” called up for national service. When public perception of this is positive, support continues. If perceptions turn negative, hometown America communicates their concerns to their Congressional representatives and popular support may be diminished or withdrawn.

DoD entered into the War on Terrorism dependent on the Reserve components as the cumulative effect of 30 years of adherence to the Abrams doctrine. The Reserve components are a full partner, providing nearly half of the personnel who currently comprise the Total Force. They remain committed in the War on Terrorism for the foreseeable future as a result of this fundamental policy decision from the 1970s. President Bush has told us to prepare for a war of many years duration. If we retain this doctrine, the Reserves are indeed committed for the long haul and will be utilized and stressed as never before. Appropriate adjustments must

be made to spread the burden and provide for the long-term sustainability of the force.

Abandoning the Abrams Doctrine while sustaining our current level of effort in the War on Terrorism would require the Active components to modify their force structures to absorb a significant percentage of key functions currently performed by the Reserve components. Without an increase in endstrength, this could only be done at the expense of current forces trained and equipped for high-end spectrum conflict. Our ability to deter more traditional, yet very real threats (i.e., North Korea) would be degraded. Preserving the doctrine leaves the current AC/RC combat, combat support and combat service support force structure mix intact. However, it will require the Reserves to adjust force structure, eliminating disproportionate burdens currently being experienced by personnel in certain highly committed military specialties, such as aviation, civil affairs and military police.

Retaining the Abrams Doctrine keeps the burden on the private sector as businesses lose valuable personnel to support an extended War on Terrorism. Presently, a growing number of corporations support their Reserve personnel either through generous leave of absence policies, continuation of insurance benefits or even positive salary differentials. This cost is borne voluntarily by the most patriotic among us, giving others the opportunity for a national defense “free ride.” Federal government policies should be developed to provide financial incentives to employers who support their Reserve personnel. This may also induce other businesses to offer this type of support to their Reserve employees.

A key component of the War on Terrorism is Homeland Security, which includes responsibilities to respond to terrorist threats within the United States. The Posse Comitatus Act was passed in the 19th century, when the distinction between criminal law enforcement and defense of the national borders was clear. The intent of the act is to prevent the military forces of

the United States from becoming a national police force or *guardia civil*. Accordingly, the act prohibits the use of the federal or federalized military to “execute the laws.” The advent of technology that permits weapons of mass destruction—chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons—to be transported by a single person, blurs the line between police functions and national security concerns. As a matter of policy, Western nations have labeled terrorists “criminals” to be prosecuted under domestic criminal laws. The Board urges caution as we proceed with any revision to the current Posse Comitatus Act. There are concerns that use of the military to perform domestic law enforcement missions could detract from the traditional military mission to fight and win our nation’s wars. In the case of the National Guard there is also the need to

maintain flexibility to respond to state missions, including civil unrest and disaster response, that must remain intact.

As we posture ourselves for a “marathon” war against terrorism, it is difficult to overstate the effects that reaffirming, modifying or abandoning the Abrams Doctrine could have on the Reserve components, the Department of Defense and the entire national security apparatus. The current transformation effort offers an outstanding opportunity to fully debate this doctrine that has influenced Active and Reserve force structure decisions for the past 30 years. However, the relevance of the Abrams Doctrine in the 21st Century must be reviewed before any meaningful discussion regarding the proper role of the Guard and Reserve can be undertaken.

APPENDIX I: FY 2002 Board Activities

The RFPB set and maintained an aggressive pace this year with four Quarterly Board Meetings, visits to three Combatant Commander's and the hosting of six Citizen Patriot Forum's (CPF). The CPF is addressed in greater detail in the "Current and Future Challenges" Section (Part III) of this report. As a side trip to the visit to SOUTHCOM, the Board also traveled to Naval Air Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to visit, and meet with Guard and Reserve personnel serving with JTF-160.

Quarterly Board Meetings

The Board met four times in FY 02 to explore a wide range of critical RC issues ranging from mobilization to recapitalization. This was a very unique year with the 85,000+ RC members called to active duty as the GWOT began and evolved. Ironically, on September 11 of 2001, the RFPB was meeting for it's final FY 01 Board Meeting.

The first quarter FY 02 Board meeting convened 29 November 2001. Topics of discussion and subject matter expert briefings included a legislative update, a Reserve Component directors' and chiefs' update, an RC directors and chiefs panel, a QDR briefing, and a Homeland Security roundtable discussion. An executive session was called in the afternoon to discuss Board involvement in HLS initiatives.

The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, the Honorable Reginald J. Brown, assumed the responsibility of Acting Chairman for the purpose of conducting the second quarter board meeting 7 February 2002. Topics of discussion and subject matter expert briefings included briefings on the RC Joint Officer Management Policy, RC JPME, Continuity of Health Care, the TRANSCOM

"Prime the Pump" FY03 Omnibus issue, legislative update, EUCOM trip update, and an update on the RC Comprehensive Review (QDR).

The Honorable Albert C. Zapanta, was sworn-in as Chairman on 5 May 2002 by the Secretary and presided over the third quarter meeting on 16 May 2002. This meeting included briefings from the eight associations dedicated to supporting Guard and Reserve members followed by a round table discussion of their top issues, a working lunch that included briefings on e-Army U, an update by OSD/RA on the Reserve Component Comprehensive Review, an update on healthcare issues, and a briefing on the upcoming 2004 CIOR event.

The fourth quarter Board meeting was conducted 23-25 September 02. Historically, the Board convenes a special Annual Alumni Meeting as the final quarterly meeting each fiscal year. This year's Annual Alumni Meeting marked the Board's 50th anniversary and included a dinner held at the Army Navy Country Club, Army Navy Drive, Arlington, Virginia to mark this special occasion. This three day event also included a Citizen Patriot Forum held on the afternoon of the 23rd at the Arlington Main library. On 24 September, the Board focused on a series of strategy and policy briefings that served to focus the Board on the Department's interpretation on the President's new National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy and strategic and policy reviews that are at the forefront of emerging doctrine for the employment of the RC in the new era of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Afternoon service chief briefings dovetailed with the policy briefs, serving to emphasize that the RC have an unprecedented opportunity at this time to influence, develop, and determine future roles as full and forceful partners in transformation.

On the 25th, the Board focused on the issues raised throughout the year in trips, at board meetings and in informal discussions among board members. These issues were highlighted during a panel discussion with the RC service chiefs. Discussion focused on RC utilization during mobilization, compensation and the awkward and often unresponsive service pay systems in place, support to transformation, equipment and technology issues; medical support and TRICARE, as well as full time unit support.

The annual meeting was highlighted by the award of the first annual Citizen Patriot awards for exemplary service to the nation. The Honorable John O. Marsh, former Board Chairman, and the WWII Women Airservice Pilots (WASPS) were honored at the Board's jubilee dinner.

EUCOM

Nine members of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, four alumni, a general officer representing the service Reserve policy committees, and the national president of the Reserve Officers Association visited senior leaders and major commands in Western Europe and the Balkan States from 23 February to 2 March 2002. The purpose of this trip was to provide Reserve Forces Policy Board members with insight into the deployment of Reserve forces throughout the European theater and to gather information on Reserve Component issues faced by both theater commanders and Reserve Component personnel. The last time the Board visited European Command was in 1998.

The Board received briefings from European Command; Special Operations Command, Europe; Marine Forces Europe; US Army Europe; 7th Army Reserve Command; US Air Forces Europe; Ambassador Jacques Klein; Commander, Stabilization Forces; 29th Infantry Division; and Naval Forces Europe. A consistent theme in briefings was the critical role of Reserve forces in enabling theater commanders to meet

mission requirements. The importance of the Reserve Components has increased since the terrorist attacks of September 11. Commanders emphasized that they would not be able to keep up with the increased operations tempo without Reserve Component support.

Key issues included: heavy use of Individual Mobilization Augmentees within European Command; uncertainties about the length of time Guard and Reserve personnel will be on orders; the need to coordinate and streamline Reserve requirements that are common across the services; the need to improve the mobilization process; the need to designate Individual Mobilization Augmentees in some services who can deploy on 24 to 48 hours notice and full-time support equal to theater commander in chief needs.

STRATCOM

Twelve members and staff of the Reserve Forces Policy Board traveled to USSTRATCOM in Omaha, Nebraska on 28-29 May 2002 for a series of command briefings focusing on the STRATCOM mission and employment of reserve forces. Two enlisted forums with Reservists, mobilized to support the STRATCOM mission, were held. Additionally, Chairman Zapanta hosted a Citizen Patriot stakeholder's Forum for Omaha and Lincoln community leaders at the Omaha Press Club the evening of May 28th.

The majority of issues raised during this visit involve challenges faced by both the STRATCOM staff and individual Reservists with the current mobilization and demobilization process in support of the GWOT. STRATCOM's concerns involve cumbersome service manpower and funding processes, long-term sustainment and retention of highly trained Reservists. Reservists were primarily concerned with lengthy pre-mobilization processing and the current lack of work in direct support of Operation Enduring Freedom following intense

workload supporting combat operations in Afghanistan. Omaha/Lincoln community leaders cited a potentially huge pool of untapped volunteers that could (and should) be organized to assist the domestic GWOT effort.

STRATCOM has effectively integrated Navy and Air Force Reservists into all levels of its joint intelligence mission. STRATCOM's innovative use of the Joint Reserve Intelligence Center (JRIC) in Phoenix provides additional Reserve intelligence support at minimal cost to the command while maximizing utilization of these highly trained Reservists.

SOUTHCOM

Twelve members of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, four staff and one special guest traveled to the USSOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility to discuss Reserve Component issues with the Combatant Commander and his subordinate commanders in Puerto Rico and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The Board also visited Reserve Component personnel and units of the US Coast Guard and Air Force Reserve. The Board conducted Citizen Patriot Forums in the Greater Miami area and in San Juan, Puerto Rico. The Board visited Coast Guard Station Miami, 482nd Fighter Wing at Homestead ARB, USARSO Headquarters, NAVSOUTH, SOCSOUTH, Reserve Component personnel (JTF-160, JTF-170, USCGR PSU 307) at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The Board also met with Governor Jeb Bush to discuss Guard and Reserve issues in Florida. A CPF was held

in Coral Gables, Florida attended by 23 first responders, organizational leaders, educators, professionals, and opinion leaders; and a CPF in San Juan, Puerto Rico where 70 senior community leaders, professionals and opinion leaders participated in an open forum in conjunction with ESGR

Citizen Patriot Forums

Six Citizen Patriot Forums (CPF's) were scheduled this year, throughout the United States. In May, one convened in Omaha, Nebraska. In June, one convened in West Hollywood California. In July, two were held; one in Miami and one in San Juan, Puerto Rico. A special Senior Leader Hispanic Forum was convened at the Pentagon with the Secretary of Defense providing opening remarks and participating in the discussion. The final CPF for FY 02 was held in Arlington, Virginia in late September.

At each CPF, the overarching concern and desire of the citizen Patriots (attendees) was to address and brief how they were serving the GWOT. Support came in many forms, from employers supporting the Guardsmen and Reservists who work for them to providing goods and services to the first responders when and if another event will occur. There is a large corps of citizens who want to serve this great nation in non-traditional capacities. These forums provide a means to discuss options to involve these Citizen Patriots and tap into a vast in the Global War on Terrorism.

APPENDIX II: FY 2002 Data Summaries


Figure 1
TOTAL MILITARY MOBILIZATION MANPOWER
 Total Personnel = 4,570,108

	Active	SelRes			IRR/ING	Standby Reserve	Military Retirees*	Total
		Guard	Reserve	Total				
Army	486,542	351,078	206,682	557,760	141,788	726	665,066	1,851,882
Navy	385,051		87,958	87,958	71,140	4,051	473,278	1,021,476
Marine Corps	173,733		39,905	39,905	58,039	605	89,765	362,047
Air Force	368,251	112,071	76,632	188,703	41,095	17,430	667,847	1,283,326
Coast Guard	38,238		7,816	7,816	5,117	204		51,375
TOTAL	1,451,815	463,149	418,993	882,142	317,179	23,016	1,895,956	4,570,108

	Active	SelRes			IRR/ING	Standby Reserve	Military Retirees*	Total
		Guard	Reserve	Total				
Army	26.3%	19.0%	11.2%	30.1%	7.7%	0.0%	35.9%	100.0%
Navy	37.7%		8.6%	8.6%	7.0%	0.4%	46.3%	100.0%
Marine Corps	48.0%		11.0%	11.0%	16.0%	0.2%	24.8%	100.0%
Air Force	28.7%	8.7%	6.0%	14.7%	3.2%	1.4%	52.0%	100.0%
Coast Guard	74.4%		15.2%	15.2%	10.0%	0.4%	0.0%	100.0%
TOTAL	31.8%	10.1%	9.2%	19.3%	6.9%	0.5%	41.5%	100.0%


* Non-disabled retirees

TOTAL MILITARY MOBILIZATION MANPOWER
 Total Personnel = 4,570,108



Data as of September 30, 2002.


Figure 2
OUTPUT DELIVERED: TOTAL FORCE CONTRIBUTION



Note: Data shows "Direct Support" only, NOT "Indirect Support" (e.g., Recruiting, USPFO, most AGR support).


Figure 3
CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE TOTAL MILITARY FORCE
 (Strengths in Percentages)

	Active	Reserve	ARNG	ANG	IRR	ING	Total
Army	41.0%	17.4%	29.6%		11.7%	0.3%	100.0%
Navy	70.8%	16.2%			13.1%		100.0%
Marine Corps	63.9%	14.7%			21.4%		100.0%
Air Force	61.6%	12.8%		18.7%	6.9%		100.0%
Coast Guard	74.7%	15.3%			10.0%		100.0%




Data as of September 30, 2002.

Figure 4
TOTAL OBLIGATION AUTHORITY



Percentages represent Operation & Maintenance and Military Personnel accounts only.
Source: The Reserve components.
Data as of September 30, 2002.

Figure 5
THE TREND (FY86-FY02)
 Active and Reserve Forces



Data as of September 30, 2002.

Figure 6
COMPOSITION OF THE READY RESERVE

Ready Reserve 1,199,321			
Selected Reserve 882,142			Individual Ready Reserve/ Inactive National Guard 317,179
Units & Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) 855,307			
Units ¹ (Paid Drill Strength Only) 788,858	AGR ² 66,449		
Individual ³ Mobilization Augmentees 26,835			

¹Includes training pipeline.

²Includes 65 USCGR RPAs.

³Includes USCGR IMA (most of the USCGR).

Data as of September 30, 2002.

Figure 7
SELECTED RESERVE AUTHORIZED/ASSIGNED END STRENGTHS

Component	FY 2001			FY 2002			FY 2003
	Authorized	Assigned	Fill Rate	Authorized	Assigned	Fill Rate	Authorized
Army National Guard	350,526	351,829	100.4%	350,000	351,078	100.3%	350,000
Army Reserve	205,300	205,628	100.2%	205,000	206,682	100.8%	205,000
Naval Reserve	88,900	87,913	98.9%	87,000	87,958	101.1%	87,800
Marine Corps Reserve	39,558	39,810	100.6%	39,558	39,905	100.9%	39,558
Air National Guard	108,022	108,485	100.4%	108,400	112,071	103.4%	106,600
Air Force Reserve	74,358	74,869	100.7%	74,700	76,632	102.6%	75,600
Coast Guard Reserve	8,000	7,976	99.7%	8,000	7,816	97.7%	9,000
Total	874,664	876,510	100.2%	872,658	882,142	101.1%	873,558

Data as of September 30, 2001.

Figure 8
BUDGET AUTHORITY
(Dollars in Millions)

Component	FY 1999	FY 2000	FY 2001	FY 2002
Army National Guard				
Personnel	3,636.2	3,732.3	3,806.4	4,300.9
Operations & Maintenance	2,805.6	3,177.8	3,344.2	3,746.9
Military Construction	148.8	236.2	285.6	400.1
Procurement ¹	746.9	958.0	1,203.6	1,295.6
Army Reserve				
Personnel	2,182.9	2,318.1	2,457.7	2,682.4
Operations & Maintenance	1,258.5	1,481.3	1,577.1	1,766.6
Military Construction	102.1	123.1	108.5	165.1
Procurement ¹	187.6	217.8	294.6	287.3
Naval Reserve				
Personnel	1,450.6	1,454.4	1,576.2	1,660.9
Operations & Maintenance	982.0	972.2	983.6	1,012.6
Military Construction	31.6	28.3	64.3	52.6
Procurement ¹	172.1	132.9	122.5	38.5
Marine Corps Reserve				
Personnel	401.3	414.3	448.9	467.1
Operations & Maintenance	127.0	141.6	147.6	139.8
Military Construction (included with NR)	(4.1)	(10.8)	(15.5)	
Procurement ¹	59.9	79.6	48.7	45.4
Air National Guard				
Personnel	1,452.0	1,584.2	1,641.1	1,696.8
Operations & Maintenance	3,216.1	3,292.4	3,472.1	3,935.1
Military Construction	164.8	262.4	203.4	250.5
Procurement ¹	605.1	634.7	862.3	693.8
Air Force Reserve				
Personnel	856.7	884.9	971.0	992.0
Operations & Maintenance	1,790.2	1,779.8	1,903.6	1,999.0
Military Construction	34.4	63.8	36.5	74.0
Procurement ¹	210.5	186.7	132.6	186.5
Coast Guard Reserve				
Personnel	62.0	64.0	70.5	
Operations & Maintenance	12.0	8.0	9.5	
Military Construction	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Procurement	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Totals				
Personnel	10,041.7	10,452.2	10,971.8	11,800.10
Operations & Maintenance	10,191.4	10,853.1	11,437.7	12,600.00
Military Construction	481.7	713.8	698.3	942.30
Procurement ¹	1,982.1	2,209.7	2,664.3	2,547.10

¹Procurement includes P-1R Exhibit amounts budgeted by the Services and NGREA funds.

Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller OUSD(C).

FY02 CIS data as of January 3, 2003.

Figure 9
FY 2002 MAJOR EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES

Army National Guard

UH-60 Black Hawk Helicopters
SINCGARS Radios
Bradley Fire Fighting Vehicle Modifications
Striker
MLRS Upgrades
22.5T Semi-Trailers
Enhanced Position Location Reporting System
Hercules
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles
HMMWV

Naval Reserve

C-40 Transport Aircraft
Individual Protective Equipment
P-3C Aircraft BMUP Kits
P-3C Aircraft AIP Kits
Ground Equipment for Expeditionary Units
F/A-18 ECP 560
F-5 Aircraft Avionics Modernization Program
C-130T Aircraft Avionics Modernization Program
SH-60B Helicopter FLIR Kits
F-5 Aircraft Global Positioning Systems

Air National Guard

F-16 Precision Attack Targeting System
F-16C/D Color Displays
F-16 Advanced Central Processing Unit
F-16 Heads-up Display/Electronics Unit
C-130H2 APN-241 Radar
Situational Awareness Data Link
C-130H2 Night Vision Imaging System
F-16/A-10 ALR-69 Antenna Optimization
F-16 Block 42 Re-engine
A-10 Re-engine

Coast Guard Reserve

Tractor Trailer Truck
Connex Box Trailers
Pick-up Trucks
Stake-bed Trucks
10K Forklifts
Generator Sets
Welders
MSU Equipment Package
Trailer Heating System
Port Security Equipment

Army Reserve

UH-60 Black Hawk Helicopters
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles
HMMWVs
HF Radios
Tactical Fire Fighting Truck
All Terrain Lifting Army System
Biological Integrated Detection System
Rough Terrain Container Handler
Medical Materiel Systems
22.5T Drop Deck Semi-Trailers

Marine Corps Reserve

F/A-18A+ ECP-583
CH-53 Helicopter Night Vision Systems "B" Kits
Essential Combat Individual Equipment
KC-130T Communications, Navigation,
Surveillance/Air Traffic Management
FM-Immunity Modifications
Commercial Embarkation Mobility Box
KC-130T Obsolescence Modernization Program
Supplemental Aviation Spares Support Packages
HIMARS Rocket Pods
Family of Containers
Advanced Targeting Forward Looking Infrared

Air Force Reserve

C-130J Aircraft
KC-135 Engine Kits
F-16 Advanced Central Interface Unit
and Color Displays
F-16D Situational Awareness
Data Link (SADL)
C-130 Armor
C-130 and A-10 Training Devices Upgrade
Survival Radios
Tactical Radios
F-16 Helmet Mounted Cueing System
F-16 Pylon Integrated Universal Upgrade

Source: FY 2003 National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report (NGRER)



RESERVE FORCES POLICY BOARD
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-7300

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