

**From:** "Shaw Canale" <shaw@cascadiafund.org> on 10/30/2003 12:40:24 PM  
**Subject:** Risk-Based Capital Guidelines; Implementation of New Basel Capital Accord

October 30, 2003

Ms. Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary,  
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System<?xml:namespace prefix = o ns  
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20th Street and Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20551

**Re: Docket No. R-1154**

To Whom It May Concern:

On behalf of the Cascadia Revolving Fund, a community development financial institution (CDFI), we are pleased to provide comments in response to the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the proposed Risk-Based Capital Rules, published on August 4, 2003.

In the past 18 years, Cascadia Revolving Fund has provided more than \$25 million in financing and offered technical assistance to entrepreneurs and organizations in both Washington and Oregon states. We lend to women, immigrant, minority, rural, and low-income entrepreneurs, as well as non-profits engaged in community building activities. Cascadia's +\$16 million in capitalization comes from an array of both public and private investors, including regulated financial institutions. Despite providing capital to high risk, largely unbankable small business, we can claim an 18-year loan loss rate of less than 1%. In our history, we have never failed to pay back an investor.

Cascadia Revolving Fund and our peer community development financial institutions (CDFIs) invest in small businesses, quality affordable housing, and vital community services in underserved markets. Nationwide, CDFIs manage more than \$8 billion that they lend and invest to create opportunities for economically disadvantaged people and communities. CDFIs have helped move economically underserved people and markets into the mainstream financial system, provided an alternative to predatory lenders, opened new markets to banks, and successfully redefined the perception of risk in low-income communities.

Cascadia applauds U.S. bank regulators and others who recognized the vital role of Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) investments in the U.S., and negotiated for a special rule for "Legislated Program Equity Exposures." This section wisely preserves the current capital charge on most equity programs made under legislated programs that involve government oversight. CRA-related investments are generally held harmless under the proposed rule. Insured depository institutions investing in such programs therefore would set aside, by and large, the same amount of capital for CRA investments under the new rules as they do now—about \$8.00 for every \$100 of capital invested.

Given that CRA investments in affordable housing, and community and economic development, have a different risk/return profile than other equity investments, that treatment is appropriate. Based on considerable experience in the U.S. to date, CRA equity investments may sometimes provide lower yields than other investments but they also have lower default rates and volatility of returns than other equity investments. *For example, CDFIs in the network I represent have cumulative default rates of less than 2.3%, which is comparable to major banks.*

We are extremely concerned about the potential consequence of the proposed rules that could affect adversely the amount of equity capital flowing into investments under the CRA. Specifically, the "materiality" test of the proposed rules requires institutions that have, on average, more than 10 percent of their capital in ALL equity

investments, to set aside much higher amounts of capital on their non-CRA investments, such as venture funds, equities and some convertible debt instruments. As drafted, this calculation includes even CRA investments that are specifically excluded from the new capital charges.

Having to include CRA investments, with their very different risk/reward profile, in the “materiality” bucket of more liquid, higher-yielding, more volatile equity exposures could have an unintended chilling effect on the flow of equity capital to communities in need. CDFIs and their bank partners have invested substantially in affordable housing and economic development (for example, through Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) or New Markets Tax Credits (NMTC)) that currently approach, or even exceed, the 10 percent threshold just from CRA-qualified investments alone. If the materiality test is adopted as proposed, it could discourage banks from making CRA investments to avoid triggering the higher capital charges on non-CRA investments. We understand that these higher capital charges could be twice as much on publicly-traded equities, and three times as much on non-publicly traded ones.

Financial institutions’ support for affordable housing and community revitalization is well-established public policy in the United States. Bank regulators and the Congress have encouraged and provided incentives to encourage investment in poor communities through such public policy initiatives as the 1992 Public Welfare Investments (Part 24), the 1995 CRA revisions that specifically encouraged equity investments, and both the LIHTC and NMTC program incentives. Furthermore, in 2000, the Federal Reserve Board released a study confirming that CRA-related investing is by-and-large profitable and, more importantly, it pleases the double-bottom line—social impact and financial reward, with little or no risk to investors. These facts, combined with a remarkable performance record of CRA-related investments and more than a \$1 trillion invested to date, provide a strong rationale to exclude CRA investments from the materiality test calculation.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Shaw Canale, Executive Director & CEO  
Cascadia Revolving Fund  
1901 NW Market St.  
Seattle, WA 98107-3912

206-447-9226 ext. 104  
[shaw@cascadiafund.org](mailto:shaw@cascadiafund.org)  
[www.cascadiafund.org](http://www.cascadiafund.org)