Federal Reserve Policy on Payment System Risk1
|
Cap category | Single day | Two-week average |
---|---|---|
High | 2.25 | 1.50 |
Above average | 1.875 | 1.125 |
Average | 1.125 | 0.75 |
De minimis | 0.40 | 0.40 |
Exempt-from-filing53 | $10 million or 0.20 | $10 million or 0.20 |
Zero | 0.0 | 0.0 |
An institution is expected to avoid incurring daylight overdrafts whose daily maximum level, averaged over a two-week period, would exceed its two-week average cap, and, on any day, would exceed its single-day cap.54 The two-week average cap provides flexibility, in recognition that fluctuations in payments can occur from day to day. The purpose of the higher single-day cap is to limit excessive daylight overdrafts on any day and to ensure that institutions develop internal controls that focus on their exposures each day, as well as over time.
The Board's policy on net debit caps is based on a specific set of guidelines and some degree of examiner oversight. Under the Board's policy, a Reserve Bank may limit or prohibit an institution's use of Federal Reserve intraday credit if (1) the institution's use of daylight credit is deemed by the institution's supervisor to be unsafe or unsound; (2) the institution does not qualify for a positive net debit cap (see section II.C.2., "Cap categories"); or (3) the institution poses excessive risk to a Reserve Bank by incurring chronic overdrafts in excess of what the Reserve Bank determines is prudent.
While capital measures differ, the net debit cap provisions of this policy apply to foreign banking organizations (FBOs) to the same extent that they apply to U.S. institutions. The Reserve Banks will advise home-country supervisors of the daylight overdraft capacity of U.S. branches and agencies of FBOs under their jurisdiction, as well as of other pertinent information related to the FBOs' caps. The Reserve Banks will also provide information on the daylight overdrafts in the Federal Reserve accounts of FBOs' U.S. branches and agencies in response to requests from home-country supervisors.
The policy defines the following six cap categories, described in more detail below: high, above average, average, de minimis, exempt-from-filing, and zero. The high, above average, and average cap categories are referred to as "self-assessed" caps.
a. Self-assessed. In order to establish a net debit cap category of high, above average, or average, an institution must perform a self-assessment of its own creditworthiness, intraday funds management and control, customer credit policies and controls, and operating controls and contingency procedures.55 The assessment of creditworthiness is based on the institution's supervisory rating and Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) designation.56 An institution may perform a full assessment of its creditworthiness in certain limited circumstances, for example, if its condition has changed significantly since its last examination or if it possesses additional substantive information regarding its financial condition. An institution performing a self-assessment must also evaluate its intraday funds-management procedures and its procedures for evaluating the financial condition of and establishing intraday credit limits for its customers. Finally, the institution must evaluate its operating controls and contingency procedures to determine if they are sufficient to prevent losses due to fraud or system failures. The Guide includes a detailed explanation of the self-assessment process.
Each institution's board of directors must review that institution's self-assessment and recommended cap category. The process of self-assessment, with board-of-directors review, should be conducted at least once in each twelve-month period. A cap determination may be reviewed and approved by the board of directors of a holding company parent of an institution, provided that (1) the self-assessment is performed by each entity incurring daylight overdrafts, (2) the entity's cap is based on the measure of the entity's own capital, and (3) each entity maintains for its primary supervisor's review its own file with supporting documents for its self-assessment and a record of the parent's board-of-directors review.57
In applying these guidelines, each institution should maintain a file for examiner review that includes (1) worksheets and supporting analysis used in its self-assessment of its own cap category, (2) copies of senior-management reports to the board of directors of the institution or its parent (as appropriate) regarding that self-assessment, and (3) copies of the minutes of the discussion at the appropriate board-of-directors meeting concerning the institution's adoption of a cap category.58
As part of its normal examination, the institution's examiners may review the contents of the self-assessment file.59 The objective of this review is to ensure that the institution has applied the guidelines appropriately and diligently, that the underlying analysis and method were reasonable, and that the resultant self-assessment was generally consistent with the examination findings. Examiner comments, if any, should be forwarded to the board of directors of the institution. The examiner, however, generally would not require a modification of the self-assessed cap category, but rather would inform the appropriate Reserve Bank of any concerns. The Reserve Bank would then decide whether to modify the cap category. For example, if the institution's level of daylight overdrafts constitutes an unsafe or unsound banking practice, the Reserve Bank would likely assign the institution a zero net debit cap and impose additional risk controls.
The contents of the self-assessment file will be considered confidential by the institution's examiner. Similarly, the Federal Reserve and the institution's examiner will hold the actual cap level selected by the institution confidential. Net debit cap information should not be shared with outside parties or mentioned in any public documents; however, net debit cap information will be shared with the home-country supervisor of U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks.
The Reserve Banks will review the status of any institution with a self-assessed net debit cap that exceeds its cap during a two-week reserve-maintenance period and will decide if the cap should be maintained or if additional action should be taken (see section II.F., "Monitoring").
b. De minimis. Many institutions incur relatively small overdrafts and thus pose little risk to the Federal Reserve. To ease the burden on these small overdrafters of engaging in the self-assessment process and to ease the burden on the Federal Reserve of administering caps, the Board allows institutions that meet reasonable safety and soundness standards to incur de minimis amounts of daylight overdrafts without performing a self-assessment. An institution may incur daylight overdrafts of up to 40 percent of its capital measure if the institution submits a board-of-directors resolution.
An institution with a de minimis cap must submit to its Reserve Bank at least once in each 12-month period a copy of its board-of-directors resolution (or a resolution by its holding company's board) approving the institution's use of daylight credit up to the de minimis level. The Reserve Banks will review the status of a de minimis cap institution that exceeds its cap during a two-week reserve-maintenance period and will decide if the de minimis cap should be maintained or if the institution will be required to perform a self-assessment for a higher cap.
c. Exempt-from-filing. Institutions that only rarely incur daylight overdrafts in their Federal Reserve accounts that exceed the lesser of $10 million or 20 percent of their capital measure are excused from performing self-assessments and filing board-of-directors resolutions with their Reserve Banks. This dual test of dollar amount and percent of capital measure is designed to limit the filing exemption to institutions that create only low-dollar risks to the Reserve Banks and that incur small overdrafts relative to their capital measure.
The Reserve Banks will review the status of an exempt institution that incurs overdrafts in its Federal Reserve account in excess of $10 million or 20 percent of its capital measure on more than two days in any two consecutive two-week reserve-maintenance periods. The Reserve Bank will decide if the exemption should be maintained or if the institution will be required to file for a cap. Granting of the exempt-from-filing net debit cap is at the discretion of the Reserve Bank.
d. Zero. Some financially healthy institutions that could obtain positive net debit caps choose to have zero caps. Often these institutions have very conservative internal policies regarding the use of Federal Reserve daylight credit or simply do not want to incur daylight overdrafts and any associated daylight overdraft fees. If an institution that has adopted a zero cap incurs a daylight overdraft, the Reserve Bank counsels the institution and may monitor the institution's activity in real time and reject or delay certain transactions that would cause an overdraft. If the institution qualifies for a positive cap, the Reserve Bank may suggest that the institution adopt an exempt-from-filing cap or file for a higher cap if the institution believes that it will continue to incur daylight overdrafts.
In addition, a Reserve Bank may assign an institution a zero net debit cap. Institutions that may pose special risks to the Reserve Banks, such as those without regular access to the discount window, those incurring daylight overdrafts in violation of this policy, or those in weak financial condition, are generally assigned a zero cap (see section II.E.5., "Problem institutions"). Recently chartered institutions may also be assigned a zero net debit cap.
As described above, an institution's cap category and capital measure determine the size of its net debit cap. The capital measure used in calculating an institution's net debit cap depends upon its chartering authority and home-country supervisor.
a. U.S.-chartered institutions. For institutions chartered in the United States, net debit caps are multiples of "qualifying" or similar capital measures that consist of those capital instruments that can be used to satisfy risk-based capital standards, as set forth in the capital adequacy guidelines of the federal financial regulatory agencies. All of the federal financial regulatory agencies collect, as part of their required reports, data on the amount of capital that can be used for risk-based purposes--"risk-based" capital for commercial banks, savings banks, and savings associations and total regulatory reserves for credit unions. Other U.S.-chartered entities that incur daylight overdrafts in their Federal Reserve accounts should provide similar data to their Reserve Banks.
b. U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks. For U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks, net debit caps on daylight overdrafts in Federal Reserve accounts are calculated by applying the cap multiples for each cap category to the FBO's U.S. capital equivalency measure.60 U.S. capital equivalency is equal to the following:
An FBO that is a FHC or has a SOSA rating of 1 may be eligible for a streamlined procedure (see section II.D.) for obtaining additional collateralized intraday credit under the maximum daylight overdraft capacity provision.
Granting a net debit cap, or any extension of intraday credit, to an institution is at the discretion of the Reserve Bank. In the event a Reserve Bank grants a net debit cap or extends intraday credit to a financially healthy SOSA 3-ranked FBO, the Reserve Bank may require such credit to be fully collateralized, given the heightened supervisory concerns with SOSA 3-ranked FBOs.
[Effective March 26, 2009] For purposes of calculating the deductible for daylight overdraft pricing, eligible FBOs will be granted a capital measure of 100 percent of capital. Eligible FBOs must have requested and been approved for a streamlined max cap and have unencumbered collateral pledged at all times to their Reserve Bank equal to or greater than the amount of the deductible.63,64
The Board recognizes that while net debit caps provide sufficient liquidity to most institutions, some institutions may still experience liquidity pressures. The Board believes it is important to provide an environment in which payment systems may function effectively and efficiently and to remove barriers, as appropriate, to foster risk-reducing payment system initiatives. Consequently, certain institutions with self-assessed net debit caps may pledge collateral to their administrative Reserve Banks to secure daylight overdraft capacity in excess of their net debit caps, subject to Reserve Bank approval.65,66 This policy is intended to provide extra liquidity through the use of unencumbered collateral by the few institutions that might otherwise be constrained from participating in risk-reducing payment system initiatives.67 The Board believes that providing extra liquidity to these few institutions should help reduce liquidity-related market disruptions.
An institution with a self-assessed net debit cap that wishes to expand its daylight overdraft capacity by pledging collateral should consult with its administrative Reserve Bank. Institutions that request daylight overdraft capacity beyond the net debit cap must have already explored other alternatives to address their increased liquidity needs.68 The Reserve Banks will work with an institution that requests additional daylight overdraft capacity to determine the appropriate maximum daylight overdraft capacity level. In considering the institution's request, the Reserve Bank will evaluate the institution's rationale for requesting additional daylight overdraft capacity as well as its financial and supervisory information. The financial and supervisory information considered may include, but is not limited to, capital and liquidity ratios, the composition of balance sheet assets, CAMELS or other supervisory ratings and assessments, and SOSA rankings (for U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks). An institution approved for a maximum daylight overdraft capacity level must submit at least once in each twelve-month period a board of directors resolution indicating its board's approval of that level.
If the Reserve Bank approves an institution's request, the Reserve Bank approves a maximum daylight overdraft capacity level. The maximum daylight overdraft capacity is defined as follows:
maximum daylight overdraft capacity =
net debit cap +
collateralized capacity69
The Reserve Banks will review the status of any institution that exceeds its maximum daylight overdraft capacity limit during a two-week reserve-maintenance period and will decide if the maximum daylight overdraft capacity should be maintained or if additional action should be taken (see section II.F., "Monitoring").
Institutions with exempt-from-filing and de minimis net debit caps may not obtain additional daylight overdraft capacity by pledging additional collateral without first obtaining a self-assessed net debit cap. Likewise, institutions that have voluntarily adopted zero net debit caps may not obtain additional daylight overdraft capacity without first obtaining a self-assessed net debit cap. Institutions that have been assigned a zero net debit cap by their administrative Reserve Bank are not eligible to apply for any daylight overdraft capacity.
An FBO that is a FHC or has a SOSA rating of 1 and has a self-assessed net debit cap may request from its Reserve Bank a streamlined procedure to obtain a maximum daylight overdraft capacity. These FBOs are not required to provide documentation of the business need or obtain the board of directors' resolution for collateralized capacity in an amount that exceeds its current net debit cap (which is based on up to 35 percent worldwide capital times its cap multiple), as long as the requested total capacity is 100 percent or less of worldwide capital times a self-assessed cap multiple.70 In order to ensure that intraday liquidity risk is managed appropriately and that the FBO will be able to repay daylight overdrafts, eligible FBOs under the streamlined procedure will be subject to initial and periodic reviews of liquidity plans that are analogous to the liquidity reviews undergone by U.S. institutions. 71 If an eligible FBO requests capacity in excess of 100 percent of worldwide capital times the self-assessed cap multiple, it would be subject to the general procedure.
Under the Board's policy, certain institutions warrant special treatment primarily because of their charter types. As mentioned previously, an institution must have regular access to the discount window and be in sound financial condition in order to adopt a net debit cap greater than zero. Institutions that do not have regular access to the discount window include Edge and agreement corporations, bankers' banks that are not subject to reserve requirements, limited-purpose trust companies, government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), and certain international organizations.72 Institutions that have been assigned a zero cap by their Reserve Banks are also subject to special considerations under this policy based on the risks they pose. In developing its policy for these institutions, the Board has sought to balance the goal of reducing and managing risk in the payment system, including risk to the Federal Reserve, with that of minimizing the adverse effects on the payment operations of these institutions.
Regular access to the Federal Reserve discount window generally is available to institutions that are subject to reserve requirements. If an institution that is not subject to reserve requirements and thus does not have regular discount-window access were to incur a daylight overdraft, the Federal Reserve might end up extending overnight credit to that institution if the daylight overdraft were not covered by the end of the business day. Such a credit extension would be contrary to the quid pro quo of reserves for regular discount-window access as reflected in the Federal Reserve Act and in Board regulations. Thus, institutions that do not have regular access to the discount window should not incur daylight overdrafts in their Federal Reserve accounts.
Certain institutions are subject to a daylight-overdraft penalty fee levied against the average daily daylight overdraft incurred by the institution. These include Edge and agreement corporations, bankers' banks that are not subject to reserve requirements, and limited-purpose trust companies. The annual rate used to determine the daylight-overdraft penalty fee is equal to the annual rate applicable to the daylight overdrafts of other institutions (36 basis points) plus 100 basis points multiplied by the fraction of a 24-hour day during which Fedwire is scheduled to operate (currently 21.5/24). The daily daylight-overdraft penalty rate is calculated by dividing the annual penalty rate by 360.73 The daylight-overdraft penalty rate applies to the institution's average daily daylight overdraft in its Federal Reserve account. The daylight-overdraft penalty rate is charged in lieu of, not in addition to, the rate used to calculate daylight overdraft fees for institutions described in section II.B. Institutions that are subject to the daylight-overdraft penalty fee do not benefit from a deductible and are subject to a minimum fee of $25 on any daylight overdrafts incurred in their Federal Reserve accounts.74
Edge and agreement corporations should refrain from incurring daylight overdrafts in their Federal Reserve accounts. In the event that any daylight overdrafts occur, the Edge or agreement corporation must post collateral to cover the overdrafts. In addition to posting collateral, the Edge or agreement corporation would be subject to the daylight-overdraft penalty rate levied against the average daily daylight overdrafts incurred by the institution, as described above.
This policy reflects the Board's concerns that these institutions lack regular access to the discount window and that the parent company may be unable or unwilling to cover its subsidiary's overdraft on a timely basis. The Board notes that the parent of an Edge or agreement corporation could fund its subsidiary during the day over Fedwire or the parent could substitute itself for its subsidiary on private systems. Such an approach by the parent could both reduce systemic risk exposure and permit the Edge or agreement corporation to continue to service its customers. Edge and agreement corporation subsidiaries of foreign banking organizations are treated in the same manner as their domestically owned counterparts.
Bankers' banks are exempt from reserve requirements and do not have regular access to the discount window. They do, however, have access to Federal Reserve payment services. Bankers' banks should refrain from incurring daylight overdrafts and must post collateral to cover any overdrafts they do incur. In addition to posting collateral, a bankers' bank would be subject to the daylight-overdraft penalty fee levied against the average daily daylight overdrafts incurred by the institution, as described above.
The Board's policy for bankers' banks reflects the Reserve Banks' need to protect themselves from potential losses resulting from daylight overdrafts incurred by bankers' banks. The policy also considers the fact that some bankers' banks do not incur the costs of maintaining reserves as do some other institutions and do not have regular access to the discount window.
Bankers' banks may voluntarily waive their exemption from reserve requirements, thus gaining access to the discount window. Such bankers' banks are free to establish net debit caps and would be subject to the same policy as other institutions. The policy set out in this section applies only to those bankers' banks that have not waived their exemption from reserve requirements.
The Federal Reserve Act permits the Board to grant Federal Reserve membership to limited-purpose trust companies subject to conditions the Board may prescribe pursuant to the Act. As a general matter, member limited-purpose trust companies do not accept reservable deposits and do not have regular discount-window access. Limited-purpose trust companies should refrain from incurring daylight overdrafts and must post collateral to cover any overdrafts they do incur. In addition to posting collateral, limited-purpose trust companies would be subject to the same daylight-overdraft penalty rate as other institutions that do not have regular access to the discount window.
The Reserve Banks act as fiscal agents for certain GSEs and international organizations in accordance with federal statutes. These institutions generally have Federal Reserve accounts and issue securities over the Fedwire Securities Service. The securities of these institutions are not obligations of, or fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by, the United States. Furthermore, these institutions are not subject to reserve requirements and do not have regular access to the discount window. GSEs and international organizations should refrain from incurring daylight overdrafts and must post collateral to cover any daylight overdrafts they do incur. In addition to posting collateral, these institutions would be subject to the same daylight-overdraft penalty rate as other institutions that do not have regular access to the discount window.
For institutions that are in weak financial condition, the Reserve Banks will impose a zero cap. The Reserve Bank will also monitor the institution's activity in real time and reject or delay certain transactions that would create an overdraft. Problem institutions should refrain from incurring daylight overdrafts and must post collateral to cover any daylight overdrafts they do incur.
Under the Federal Reserve's ex post monitoring procedures, an institution with a daylight overdraft in excess of its maximum daylight overdraft capacity or net debit cap may be contacted by its Reserve Bank. The Reserve Bank may counsel the institution, discussing ways to reduce its excessive use of intraday credit. Each Reserve Bank retains the right to protect its risk exposure from individual institutions by unilaterally reducing net debit caps, imposing collateralization or clearing-balance requirements, rejecting or delaying certain transactions as described below, or, in extreme cases, taking the institution off line or prohibiting it from using Fedwire.
A Reserve Bank will, through the Account Balance Monitoring System, apply real-time monitoring to an individual institution's position when the Reserve Bank believes that it faces excessive risk exposure, for example, from problem banks or institutions with chronic overdrafts in excess of what the Reserve Bank determines is prudent. In such a case, the Reserve Bank will control its risk exposure by monitoring the institution's position in real-time, rejecting or delaying certain transactions that would exceed the institution's maximum daylight overdraft capacity or net debit cap, and taking other prudential actions, including requiring collateral.78
Institutions, such as those maintaining merger-transition accounts and U.S. branches and agencies of a foreign bank, that access Fedwire through accounts in more than one Federal Reserve District are expected to manage their accounts so that the total daylight overdraft position across all accounts does not exceed their net debit caps. One Reserve Bank will act as the administrative Reserve Bank and will have overall risk-management responsibilities for institutions maintaining accounts in more than one Federal Reserve District. For domestic institutions that have branches in multiple Federal Reserve Districts, the administrative Reserve Bank generally will be the Reserve Bank where the head office of the bank is located.
In the case of families of U.S. branches and agencies of the same foreign banking organization, the administrative Reserve Bank generally is the Reserve Bank that exercises the Federal Reserve's oversight responsibilities under the International Banking Act.79 The administrative Reserve Bank, in consultation with the management of the foreign bank's U.S. operations and with Reserve Banks in whose territory other U.S. agencies or branches of the same foreign bank are located, may determine that these agencies and branches will not be permitted to incur overdrafts in Federal Reserve accounts. Alternatively, the administrative Reserve Bank, after similar consultation, may allocate all or part of the foreign family's net debit cap to the Federal Reserve accounts of agencies or branches that are located outside of the administrative Reserve Bank's District; in this case, the Reserve Bank in whose Districts those agencies or branches are located will be responsible for administering all or part of the collateral requirement.80
Secondary-market book-entry securities transfers on Fedwire are limited to a transfer size of $50 million par value. This limit is intended to encourage partial deliveries of large trades in order to reduce position building by dealers, a major cause of book-entry securities overdrafts before the introduction of the transfer-size limit and daylight overdraft fees. This limitation does not apply to either of the following:
Thus, requests to strip or reconstitute Treasury securities or to convert bearer or registered securities to or from book-entry form are exempt from this limitation. Also exempt are pledges of securities to a Reserve Bank as principal (for example, discount-window collateral) or as agent (for example, Treasury Tax and Loan collateral).
1. Effective March 26, 2009, the Federal Reserve Policy on Payment System Risk is amended to change all references to payments systems or payments system to payment systems or payment system and make other conforming changes. Return to text.
2. For the Board's long-standing objectives in the payment system, see "The Federal Reserve in the Payments System," September 2001, FRRS 9-1550, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/pricing/frpaysys.htm. Return to text.
3. To assist depository institutions in implementing this part of the Board's payment system risk policy, the Federal Reserve has prepared two documents, the Overview of the Federal Reserve's Payment System Risk Policy and the Guide to the Federal Reserve's Payment System Risk Policy, which are available on line at www.ferderalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/PSR or from any Reserve Bank. The Overview of the Federal Reserve's Payment System Risk Policy summarizes the Board's policy on the provision of daylight credit, including net debit caps and daylight overdraft fees. The overview is intended for use by institutions that incur only small and infrequent daylight overdrafts. The Guide to the Federal Reserve's Payment System Risk Policy explains in detail how these policies apply to different institutions and includes procedures for completing a self-assessment and filing a cap resolution, as well as information on other aspects of the policy. Return to text.
4. The term "depository institution," as used in this policy, refers not only to institutions defined as depository institutions" in 12 U.S.C. 461(b)(1)(A), but also to U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banking organizations, Edge and agreement corporations, trust companies, and bankers' banks, unless the context indicates a different reading. Return to text.
5. These definitions of credit risk, liquidity risk, and legal risk are based upon those presented in the Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems (Core Principles) and the Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems (Recommendations for SSS). The definition of operational risk is based on the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision's "Sound Practices for the Management and Supervision of Operational Risk," available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs96.htm. Each of these definitions is largely consistent with those included in the Recommendations for Central Counterparties (Recommendations for CCP). Return to text.
6. The term "financial institution," as used in this policy, includes a broad array of types of organizations that engage in financial activity, including depository institutions and securities dealers. Return to text.
7. Several existing regulatory and bank supervision guidelines and policies also are directed at institutions' management of the risks posed by interbank payment and settlement activity. For example, Federal Reserve Regulation F (12 CFR 206) directs insured depository institutions to establish policies and procedures to avoid excessive exposures to any other depository institutions, including exposures that may be generated through the clearing and settlement of payments. Return to text.
8. 12 U.S.C. 1861 et seq. Return to text.
9. Payment and settlement systems within the scope of this policy may be subject to oversight or supervision by multiple public authorities, as a result of the legal framework or the system's operating structure (e.g., multi-currency or cross-border systems). As such, the Federal Reserve, other central banks, securities regulators, or other financial system authorities may need to find practical ways to cooperate in order to discharge fully their own responsibilities. In some cases, multiple authorities may have responsibility for a multi-currency, cross-border, or other arrangement. In these situations, financial authorities need to be sensitive to the potential for duplicative or conflicting requirements, oversight gaps, or unnecessary costs and burdens imposed on the system. The "Principles for Cooperative Central Bank Oversight and Multi-currency Netting and Settlement Schemes," published in 1990, are set out in the "Report of the Committee on Interbank Netting Schemes of the Central Banks of the Group of Ten Countries" (Lamfalussy Minimum Standards). The CPSS report, "Central Bank Oversight of Payment and Settlement Systems" (Oversight Report), Part B, "Principles for international cooperative oversight," published in 2005, provides further information on the practical application of the Lamfalussy Cooperative Oversight Principles. The Lamfalussy Minimum Standards and the Oversight Report are available at http://www.bis.org/cpss/cpsspubl.htm. Return to text.
10. The $5 billion threshold was designed to apply to cash markets and may not be a useful benchmark for settlement systems, such as central counterparties, operating in derivatives markets. The appropriate financial system authorities in derivatives markets may therefore have different benchmarks and standards relevant to such systems. Return to text.
11. The 'next' twelve-month period is determined by reference to the date a determination is being made as to whether the policy applies to a particular system. Aggregate gross value of U.S dollar-denominated transactions refers to the total dollar value of individual U.S. dollar transactions settled in the system, which also represents the sum of total U.S. dollar debits (or credits) to all participants prior to or in absence of any netting of transactions. Return to text.
12. A system includes all of the governance, management, legal, and operational arrangements used to effect settlement as well as the relevant parties to such arrangements, such as the system operator, system participants, and system owners. Return to text.
13. The types of systems that may fall within the scope of this policy include, but are not limited to, large-value funds transfer systems, automated clearinghouse (ACH) systems, check clearinghouses, and credit and debit card settlement systems, as well as central counterparties, clearing corporations, and central securities depositories. For purposes of this policy, the system operator manages or directs the operations of the system. Return to text.
14. For the purposes of this policy, a "settlement system" includes a payment-versus-payment settlement system for foreign exchange transactions, a securities settlement system, and a system operating as a central counterparty. The CPSS defines "payment-versus-payment" as "…a foreign exchange settlement system which ensures that a final transfer of one currency occurs if and only if a final transfer of the other currency or currencies takes place." The CPSS and the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) define a "securities settlement system" as the full set of institutional arrangements for confirmation, clearance, and settlement of securities trades and safekeeping of securities and a "central counterparty" as an entity that interposes itself between counterparties to contracts traded in one or more financial markets, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. Return to text.
15. The daily gross value threshold will be calculated on a U.S. dollar equivalent basis. Return to text.
16. Where systems have inter-relationships with or dependencies on other systems (e.g., cross-guarantees, cross-collateralization, cross-margining, common operating platforms), system operators should also analyze whether and to what extent any cross-system risks exist and who bears them. Return to text.
17. The risk management and internal audit functions should also be independent of those responsible for day-to-day functions. Return to text.
18. Examples of key features that might be specified in a system's rules and procedures are controls to limit participant-based risks, such as membership criteria based on participants' financial and operational health, limits on settlement exposures, and the procedures and resources to hedge, margin, or collateralize settlement exposures. Other examples of key features might be business continuity requirements and loss allocation procedures. Return to text.
19. To facilitate analysis of settlement disruptions, systems may need to develop the capability to simulate credit and liquidity effects on participants and on the system resulting from one or more participant defaults, or other possible sources of settlement disruption. Such simulations may need to include, if appropriate, the effects of changes in market prices, volatilities, or other factors. Return to text.
20. The Core Principles were developed by the CPSS; references to "principles" in this policy are to the Core Principles. The Core Principles draw extensively on the previous work of the CPSS, most importantly the Lamfalussy Minimum Standards. The Core Principles extend the Lamfalussy Minimum Standards by adding several principles and broadening the coverage to include systemically important payment systems of all types, including gross settlement systems, net settlement systems, and hybrid systems, operated by either the public or private sector. The Core Principles also address the responsibilities of central banks in applying the Core Principles. Return to text.
21. The CPSS and IOSCO developed the CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations as minimum standards and are referred to as such in this policy. The full reports on the Core Principles and the CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations are available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss43.htm, http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss46.htm, and http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss64.htm. Return to text.
22. Systemically important payment systems are expected to meet the principles listed in Section C.1. Securities settlement systems of systemic importance are expected to meet the minimum standards listed in Section C.2.a., and systemically important central counterparties are expected to meet the minimum standards listed in C.2.b. For a system not subject to its authority, the Board encourages the system and its appropriate financial system authority to consider these principles and minimum standards when designing, operating, monitoring, and assessing the system, as appropriate and applicable. Return to text.
23. The Board will inform a system subject to its authority if it considers it systemically important and therefore expected to meet the principles or minimum standards in this policy. The Board will also inform such systems if they are expected to exceed any of the principles or minimum standards. The appropriate financial system authorities responsible for supervising or regulating central counterparties are encouraged to inform the central counterparties as to whether they are expected to meet the Recommendations for CCP. Return to text.
24. Important financial markets include, but are not limited to, critical markets as defined in the "Interagency Paper on Sound Practices to Strengthen the Resilience of the U.S. Financial System" as the markets for federal funds, foreign exchange, and commercial paper; U.S. government and agency securities; and corporate debt and equity securities. 68 FR 17809 (April 11, 2003). Return to text.
25. The Board considers self-assessments as only one resource for users and other persons to consider when evaluating any risks associated with a particular system. In order to effectively identify and manage risks, a user or other interested person may need to consider other relevant documentation such as the system's rules, operating procedures, or organizational documents. These materials may be publicly available or may need to be requested from the system directly. Return to text.
26. While the Board expects self-assessments to be robust, it does not expect payment and settlement systems to disclose publicly sensitive information that would expose system vulnerabilities or otherwise put the system at risk (e.g., specific business continuity plans). Return to text.
27. The Core Principles include implementation guidelines and an implementation summary for each principle. The guidelines provide both detailed explanations of each principle and general examples of ways to interpret and implement them. Return to text.
28. In November 2002, CPSS-IOSCO published an Assessment Methodology for the Recommendations for SSS, which is available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss51.htm. In November 2004, CPSS-IOSCO published the CCP Recommendations and an Assessment Methodology, which are available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss64.htm. These assessment methodologies for the CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations include key questions to assist an assessor in determining to what extent a system meets a particular minimum standard. Return to text.
29. Any review of an assessment by the Federal Reserve should not be viewed as an approval or guarantee of the accuracy of a system's self-assessment. Furthermore, the contents of a review of a self-assessment would be subject to the Board's rules regarding disclosure of confidential supervisory information. Therefore, without the express approval of the Board, a system would not be allowed to state publicly that its self-assessment has been reviewed, endorsed, approved, or otherwise not objected to by the Federal Reserve. Return to text.
30. If the Federal Reserve materially disagrees with the content of a system's self-assessment, it will communicate its concerns to the system's senior management and possibly to its board of directors, as appropriate. The Federal Reserve may also discuss its concerns with other relevant financial system authorities, as appropriate. Return to text.
31. Available at www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/PSR. Return to text.
32. This schedule of posting rules does not affect the overdraft restrictions and overdraft-measurement provisions for nonbank banks established by the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 and the Board's Regulation Y (12 CFR § 225.52). Return to text.
33. Funds transfers that the Reserve Banks function for certain international organizations using internal systems other than payment processing systems such as Fedwire will be posted throughout the business day for purposes of measuring daylight overdrafts. Return to text.
34. The GSEs include Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), entities of the Federal Home Loan Bank System (FHLBS), the Farm Credit System, the Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (Farmer Mac), the Student Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae), the Financing Corporation, and the Resolution Funding Corporation. The international organizations include the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the African Development Bank. The Student Loan Marketing Association Reorganization Act of 1996 requires Sallie Mae to be completely privatized by 2008; however, Sallie Mae completed privatization at the end of 2004. The Reserve Banks no longer act as fiscal agents for new issues of Sallie Mae securities, and Sallie Mae is not considered a GSE. Return to text.
35. The term "interest and redemption payments" refers to payments of principal, interest, and redemption on securities maintained on the Fedwire Securities Service. Return to text.
36. The Reserve Banks will post these transactions, as directed by the issuer, provided that the issuer's Federal Reserve account contains funds equal to or in excess of the amount of the interest and redemption payments to be made. In the normal course, if a Reserve Bank does not receive funding from an issuer for the issuer's interest and redemption payments by the established cut-off hour of 4:00 p.m. Eastern Time on the Fedwire Securities Service, the issuer's payments will not be processed on that day. Return to text.
37. Electronic payments for credits on these securities will post according to the posting rules for the mechanism through which they are processed, as outlined in this policy. However, the majority of these payments are made by check and will be posted according to the established check posting rules as set forth in this policy. Return to text.
38. Institutions that are monitored in real time must fund the total amount of their commercial ACH credit originations in order for the transactions to be processed. If the Federal Reserve receives commercial ACH credit transactions from institutions monitored in real time after the scheduled close of the Fedwire Funds Service, these transactions will be processed at 12:30 a.m. the next business day, or by the ACH deposit deadline, whichever is earlier. The Account Balance Monitoring System provides intraday account information to the Reserve Banks and institutions and is used primarily to give authorized Reserve Bank personnel a mechanism to control and monitor account activity for selected institutions. For more information on ACH transaction processing, refer to the ACH Settlement Day Finality Guide available through the Federal Reserve Financial Services website at http://www.frbservices.org. Return to text.
39. The Reserve Banks will identify and notify institutions with Treasury-authorized penalties on Thursdays. In the event that Thursday is a holiday, the Reserve Banks will identify and notify institutions with Treasury-authorized penalties on the following business day. Penalties will then be posted on the business day following notification. Return to text.
40. On rare occasions, the Treasury may announce withdrawals in advance that are based on institutions' closing balances on the withdrawal date. The Federal Reserve will post these withdrawals after the close of Fedwire. Return to text.
41. For purposes of this policy, government agencies are those entities (other than the U.S. Treasury) for which the Reserve Banks act as fiscal agents and whose securities are obligations of, or fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by, the United States. Return to text.
42. Electronic payments for credits on these securities will post by 9:15 a.m. Eastern Time; however, the majority of these payments are made by check and will be posted according to the established check posting rules as set forth in this policy. Return to text.
43. Original issues of government agency, government-sponsored enterprise, or international organization securities are delivered as book-entry securities transfers and will be posted when the securities are delivered to the purchasing institutions. Return to text.
44. This does not include electronic check presentments, which are posted at 1:00 p.m. local time and hourly thereafter. Paper check presentments are posted on the hour at least one hour after presentment. Paper checks presented before 10:01 a.m. Eastern Time will be posted at 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time. Presentment times will be based on surveys of endpoints' scheduled courier deliveries and so will occur at the same time each day for a particular institution. Return to text.
45. Institutions must choose one of two check-credit posting options: (1) all credits posted at a single, float-weighted posting time, or (2) fractional credits posted throughout the day. The first option allows an institution to receive all of its check credits at a single time for each type of cash letter. This time may not necessarily fall on the clock hour. The second option lets the institution receive a portion of its available check credits on the clock hours between 11:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. Eastern Time. The option selected applies to all check deposits posted to an institution's account. Reserve Banks will calculate crediting fractions and float-weighted posting times for each time zone based on surveys. Credits for mixed cash letters and other Fed cash letters are posted using the crediting fractions or the float-weighted posting times for the time zone of the Reserve Bank servicing the depositing institution. For separately sorted deposits, credits are posted using the posting times for the time zone of the Reserve Bank servicing the payor institution. Return to text.
46. Corrections are account entries made to correct discrepancies detected by a Reserve Bank during the initial processing of checks. Return to text.
47. Adjustments are account entries made to correct discrepancies detected by an institution after entries have posted to its account and are made at the request of the institution. Return to text.
48. The Federal Reserve Banks will post debits to institutions' accounts for electronic check presentments made before 12:00 p.m. local time at 1:00 p.m. local time. The Reserve Banks will post presentments made after 12:00 p.m. local time on the next clock hour that is at least one hour after presentment takes place but no later than 3:00 p.m. local time. Return to text.
49. The Federal Reserve Banks will process and post Treasury-authorized penalty abatements on Thursdays. In the event that Thursday is a holiday, the Federal Reserve Banks will process and post Treasury-authorized penalty abatements on the following business day. Return to text.
50. A change in the length of the scheduled Fedwire operating day should not significantly change the amount of fees charged because the effective daily rate is applied to average daylight overdrafts, whose calculation would also reflect the change in the operating day. Return to text.
51. Under the current 21.5-hour Fedwire operating day, the effective daily daylight-overdraft rate is truncated to 0.0000089. Return to text.
52. Under the current 21.5-hour Fedwire operating day, the effective daily deductible rate is rounded to 0.0000042. Return to text.
53. The net debit cap for the exempt-from-filing category is equal to the lesser of $10 million or 0.20 multiplied by a capital measure. Return to text.
54. The two-week period is the two-week reserve-maintenance period. The number of days used in calculating the average daylight overdraft over this period is the number of business days the institution's Reserve Bank is open during the reserve-maintenance period. Return to text.
55. This assessment should be done on an individual-institution basis, treating as separate entities each commercial bank, each Edge corporation (and its branches), each thrift institution, and so on. An exception is made in the case of U.S. branches and agencies of FBOs. Because these entities have no existence separate from the FBO, all the U.S. offices of FBOs (excluding U.S.-chartered bank subsidiaries and U.S.-chartered Edge subsidiaries) should be treated as a consolidated family relying on the FBO's capital. Return to text.
56. An insured depository institution is (1) "well capitalized" if it significantly exceeds the required minimum level for each relevant capital measure, (2) "adequately capitalized" if it meets the required minimum level for each relevant capital measure, (3) "undercapitalized" if it fails to meet the required minimum level for any relevant capital measure, (4) "significantly undercapitalized" if it is significantly below the required minimum level for any relevant capital measure, or (5) "critically undercapitalized" if it fails to meet any leverage limit (the ratio of tangible equity to total assets) specified by the appropriate federal banking agency, in consultation with the FDIC, or any other relevant capital measure established by the agency to determine when an institution is critically undercapitalized (12 U.S.C. 1831o). Return to text.
57. An FBO should undergo the same self-assessment process as a domestic bank in determining a net debit cap for its U.S. branches and agencies. Many FBOs, however, do not have the same management structure as U.S. institutions, and adjustments should be made as appropriate. If an FBO's board of directors has a more limited role to play in the bank's management than a U.S. board has, the self-assessment and cap category should be reviewed by senior management at the FBO's head office that exercises authority over the FBO equivalent to the authority exercised by a board of directors over a U.S. institution. In cases in which the board of directors exercises authority equivalent to that of a U.S. board, cap determination should be made by the board of directors. Return to text.
58. In addition, for FBOs, the file that is made available for examiner review by the U.S. offices of an FBO should contain the report on the self-assessment that the management of U.S. operations made to the FBO's senior management and a record of the appropriate senior management's response or the minutes of the meeting of the FBO's board of directors or other appropriate management group, at which the self-assessment was discussed. Return to text.
59. Between examinations, examiners or Reserve Bank staff may contact an institution about its cap if there is other relevant information, such as statistical or supervisory reports, that suggests there may have been a change in the institution's financial condition. Return to text.
60. The term "U.S. capital equivalency" is used in this context to refer to the particular capital measure used to calculate net debit caps and does not necessarily represent an appropriate capital measure for supervisory or other purposes. Return to text.
61. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act defines a financial holding company as a bank holding company that meets certain eligibility requirements. In order for a bank holding company to become a financial holding company and be eligible to engage in the new activities authorized under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the Act requires that all depository institutions controlled by the bank holding company be well capitalized and well managed (12 U.S.C. 1841(p)). With regard to a foreign bank that operates a branch or agency or owns or controls a commercial lending company in the United States, the Act requires the Board to apply comparable capital and management standards that give due regard to the principle of national treatment and equality of competitive opportunity (12 U.S.C. 1843(l)). Return to text.
62. The SOSA ranking is composed of four factors, including the FBO's financial condition and prospects, the system of supervision in the FBO's home country, the record of the home country's government in support of the banking system or other sources of support for the FBO; and transfer risk concerns. Transfer risk relates to the FBO's ability to access and transmit U.S. dollars, which is an essential factor in determining whether an FBO can support its U.S. operations. The SOSA ranking is based on a scale of 1 through 3, with 1 representing the lowest level of supervisory concern. Return to text.
63. If an FBO meets the criteria for the streamlined procedure for max caps but was granted a max cap before implementation of the streamlined procedure (effective March 26, 2009) or is approved for a max cap under the general procedure because the limit being requested is greater than 100 percent of worldwide capital, the FBO would still qualify for the higher deductible if it also met the collateralization requirement. Return to text.
64. Under some circumstances, rules for determining whether collateral is available may differ for PSR and discount window purposes. All collateral must be acceptable to the Reserve Banks. Return to text.
65. The administrative Reserve Bank is responsible for the administration of Federal Reserve credit, reserves, and risk management policies for a given institution or other legal entity. Return to text.
66. All collateral must be acceptable to the Reserve Banks. The Reserve Banks may accept securities in transit on the Fedwire book-entry securities system as collateral to support the maximum daylight overdraft capacity level. Securities in transit refer to book-entry securities transferred over the Fedwire Securities Service that have been purchased by an institution but not yet paid for and owned by the institution's customers. Collateral eligibility and margins are the same for PSR policy purposes as for the discount window. See http://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/ for information. Return to text.
67. Institutions may consider applying for a maximum daylight overdraft capacity level for daylight overdrafts resulting from Fedwire funds transfers, Fedwire book-entry securities transfers, National Settlement Service entries, and ACH credit originations. Institutions incurring daylight overdrafts as a result of other payment activity may be eligible for administrative counseling flexibility (59 FR 54915-18, Nov. 2, 1994). Return to text.
68. Some potential alternatives available to an institution to address increased intraday credit needs include shifting funding patterns, delaying the origination of funds transfers, or transferring some payment processing business to a correspondent bank. Return to text.
69. Collateralized capacity, on any given day, equals the amount of collateral pledged to the Reserve Bank, not to exceed the difference between the institution's maximum daylight overdraft capacity level and its net debit cap. Return to text.
70. For example, a financial holding company is eligible for uncollateralized capacity of 35 percent of worldwide capital times the cap multiple. The streamlined max cap procedure would provide such an institution with additional collateralized capacity of 65 percent of worldwide capital times the cap multiple. Return to text.
71. The liquidity reviews will be conducted by the administrative Reserve Bank, in consultation with each FBO's home-country supervisor. Return to text.
72. See footnote 34. Return to text.
73. Under the current 21.5-hour Fedwire operating day, the effective daily daylight-overdraft penalty rate is truncated to 0.0000338. Return to text.
74. While daylight overdraft fees are calculated differently for these institutions than for institutions that have regular access to the discount window, overnight overdrafts at Edge and agreement corporations, bankers' banks that are not subject to reserve requirements, limited-purpose trust companies, GSEs, and international organizations are priced the same as overnight overdrafts at institutions that have regular access to the discount window. Return to text.
75. These institutions are organized under section 25A of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 611--631) or have an agreement or undertaking with the Board under section 25 of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 601--604(a)). Return to text.
76. For the purposes of this policy, a bankers' bank is a depository institution that is not required to maintain reserves under the Board's Regulation D (12 CFR 204) because it is organized solely to do business with other financial institutions, is owned primarily by the financial institutions with which it does business, and does not do business with the general public. Such bankers' banks also generally are not eligible for Federal Reserve Bank credit under the Board's Regulation A (12 CFR § 201.2(c)(2)). Return to text.
77. For the purposes of this policy, a limited-purpose trust company is a trust company that is a member of the Federal Reserve System but that does not meet the definition of "depository institution" in section 19(b)(1)(A) of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 461(b)(1)(A)). Return to text.
78. Institutions that are monitored in real time must fund the total amount of their ACH credit originations in order for the transactions to be processed by the Federal Reserve, even if those transactions are processed one or two days before settlement. Return to text.
79. 12 U.S.C. 3101--3108. Return to text.
80. As in the case of Edge and agreement corporations and their branches, with the approval of the designated administrative Reserve Bank, a second Reserve Bank may assume the responsibility of managing and monitoring the net debit cap of particular foreign branch and agency families. This would often be the case when the payment activity and national administrative office of the foreign branch and agency family is located in one District, while the oversight responsibility under the International Banking Act is in another District. If a second Reserve Bank assumes management responsibility, monitoring data will be forwarded to the designated administrator for use in the supervisory process. Return to text.