China Takes Another Step Forward in Space
UCS Backgrounder
China is preparing for its third launch of astronauts into space—and its first space walk—on September 25. With this space walk, it will pass another milestone on a path blazed by the Soviet Union and the United States more than 40 years ago. This achievement is another sign of a rapidly maturing Chinese space program—and is certain to generate renewed speculation in the West about Chinese motivations and intentions.
Recently published Chinese-language histories of China's space program provide new information on the motivations and political process that put China on its path to space, and the pivotal role the United States played in Chinese deliberations.
This newly available material indicates that 25 years ago Chinese scientists began to fear that China might be left behind in a world of accelerating technological progress. They argued that bold action was necessary to improve China's technical infrastructure and enhance its international stature, and that one way to do so was to establish a space program with the goal of a building a Chinese space station. Chinese leaders ultimately agreed and established the space program in 1992 to demonstrate their country's ability to access and maintain a presence in space, as well as its mastery of technologies appropriate to an advanced nation, despite its relatively underdeveloped social and economic conditions.
China's launch of its Shenzhou 5 space capsule on October 15, 2003, made it the third country to launch humans into space. The launch of Shenzhou 6 on October 12, 2005, placed China's second and third astronauts in orbit for nearly five days. Next week's launch of the Shenzhou 7 will carry three astronauts into space for three days.
President Reagan's Role
China's first attempt to start a human space flight program was abandoned by China's leader, Deng Xiaoping, in August 1978 in response to a grim progress report from space program directors. Deng concluded that China "should not participate in the space race" and instead "focus our energies on urgently needed practical satellite applications."
President Ronald Reagan's March 23, 1983, "Star Wars" speech set China on a different course. Some Chinese scientists argued that missile defense "is not just a military program but a far-reaching political striving to preserve American superiority" and that the U.S.program's "real objective" was "to push forward new advanced technologies and national economic development."
Reagan's speech triggered an intense debate between two camps of experts in the upper levels of the Chinese bureaucracy. The camp that eventually won the debate argued that in an era of rapidly advancing technology, China must respond with a high-tech initiative if it wanted to build its overall technology base. This was not a response to specific American capabilities, but to China's perceptions of the broader motivations behind a U.S.missile defense program. The other camp argued that China should maintain the status quo, continue to focus on modest projects that would yield more immediate results, and hold off on making large investments in cutting-edge technologies until its economy was stronger. In the absence of a consensus, the status quo held, but the debate continued.
Three years later, on March 3, 1986, four senior Chinese scientists made an end run around the bureaucracy. Wang Daheng, Chen Fangyun, Wang Ganchang and Yang Jiachi, veterans of China's nuclear weapons program, drafted a formal proposal, "Recommendations Concerning Research to Keep Pace with Foreign Strategic High Technology Development" and delivered it directly to Deng Xiaoping through a mutual friend. The scientists called on China's leaders to develop a set of high-tech initiatives that would allow China to "claim a seat at the table of the international club."
Deng immediately directed the State Council to organize meetings to discuss their proposal. On March 8 the State Council ordered the head of China's State Science Commission, Song Jian, and the head of China's Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), Ding Henggao, to engage the relevant civilian and military departments in developing a plan to enact the scientists' recommendations.
Six months later the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party approved the scientists' proposal, now called "Outline for a National Advanced Technology Development Plan" and allocated funds to implement it. The proposal became known as "Plan 863," a reference to the date they drafted it.
Plan 863 was not confined to aerospace, which was only one of seven fields where China would try to "follow international developments, decrease the gap between China and more advanced nations, and look for advantages where China could make a breakthrough." In February 1987 a special committee was established to develop a detailed plan for the space sector (Plan 863-2). It decided its main objective would be to build and operate a Chinese space station in low Earth orbit.
Shenzhou Program Faced Significan Internal Opposition
Serious differences of opinion held up Plan 863-2 until 1992. Advocates said the program would spur technological development, increase national power, raise China's international standing, and inspire national pride. Opponents said the large sums of money needed to insure success were better spent elsewhere in a country where the basic needs of many Chinese were still unmet. Opponents also argued that repeating something the United Statesand Russiahad accomplished decades ago would be politically meaningless both at home and abroad.
Eventually, senior Chinese scientists once again circumvented the bureaucracy with a back-door appeal to Deng Xiaoping, who was no longer part of the Chinese government but remained very influential. In January 1991 Liu Jiyuan, a rocket designer trained in the Soviet Union in the 1950s, drafted a proposal to develop the technology for a piloted space program and secretly delivered it to Deng Xiaoping's brother-in-law.
Six weeks later, Premier Li Peng asked Liu's boss, Ren Xinmin, for a briefing on the space program. Reflecting the controversy over the best use of resources and the importance of building up China's technology base, Li reportedly told Ren: "It can't be said that going ahead with a human space flight program is a wise decision, but it is a decision that must be made." Deng appears to have cajoled China's leaders into going forward with the program.
The Politburo finally gave the go-ahead for the space station plan in January 1992. The plan became known as Project 921 in commemoration of the date, and it has remained the space program's primary goal.
Opponents continued to pressure the political leadership to cancel the project until it finally became public in 1998. In private, some leading Chinese figures closely associated with the program continue to question its value.
Implications for U.S. Space Policy Vis-à-Vis China
The history of China's Shenzhou program shows that:
- China's space program grew out of a general interest in developing China's technical base so that it did not fall behind other advanced countries.
- Chinese leaders believe the capability to access space and use it for the same purposes as other spacefaring nations is essential to China's overall development. They decided that a Chinese space station was important to insure that other countries would recognize and respect Chinese interests in space.
- Chinese space policy has been reactive, not proactive. China has taken its lead from other spacefaring nations, primarily the United States. This extends not only to human space flight but to commercial and military space capabilities, including Earth observation, communication and data relay, remote sensing, global positioning, and antisatellite weapons.
- U.S.actions can have a significant influence on Chinese strategic planning. As noted above, China's space program was a response to President Reagan's missile defense program. Chinese writings show that China pays close attention to U.S.programs, plans and rhetoric on space. Any U.S. statements or actions that suggest the United States is pursuing "space dominance" are likely to trigger a Chinese response to counter such U.S. efforts.
This history also sheds some light on the current tension between China and the United States over the future of space.
For example, China is one of only three nations to send humans into space, yet despite this accomplishment the United States continues to exclude China from participation in the International Space Station. The U.S. concern is that cooperation with China could lead to a sharing of technology and expertise that could improve Chinese space and missile capabilities, which also could have military utility. China acknowledges those concerns, but believes U.S. restrictions on cooperation with China in space, especially excluding it from the Space Station, are excessive. It believes the ultimate U.S. aim is to slow the pace of China's overall economic and technical progress. Moreover, some in China see it as an attempt to deny China a "seat at the table"—one of the concerns that led to China's decision to invest in the Shenzhou program.
China and the United States appear to be locked in a confrontation in which the United States sees Chinese progress in space as potentially threatening, and China sees U.S.security concerns as part of a conspiracy to blunt Chinese progress and justify U.S. steps toward space dominance.
