



Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report

Weekly

April 13, 2007 / Vol. 56 / No. 14

Severe Methicillin-Resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* Community-Acquired Pneumonia Associated with Influenza — Louisiana and Georgia, December 2006–January 2007

Staphylococcus aureus infection has been reported infrequently as a cause of community-acquired pneumonia (CAP) and typically has been associated with influenza virus infection or influenza-like illness (ILI).* During the 2003-04 influenza season, methicillin-resistant S. aureus (MRSA) gained attention as a cause of 15 cases of influenza-associated CAP † (1). No formal surveillance has been conducted, and few additional cases of MRSA CAP were reported to CDC during the 2004-05 and 2005-06 influenza seasons. However, in January 2007, CDC received reports of 10 cases of severe MRSA CAP, including six deaths, among previously healthy children and adults in Louisiana and Georgia during December 2006-January 2007. These were the first reported cases of severe MRSA CAP during the 2006–07 influenza season in the two states, and 10 was a higher number than expected for the 2-month period. A case of severe MRSA CAP was defined as pneumonia requiring hospitalization or resulting in the death of a patient from whom a specimen (i.e., sterile site or sputum sample) yielded MRSA when collected <48 hours after hospitalization or arrival at an emergency department (ED). Association with influenza was determined by either a positive result on a laboratory test or a diagnosis of ILI. This report describes three of the MRSA CAP cases as examples and summarizes all 10 of the reported cases. These cases underscore the need for health-care providers to be vigilant, especially during the influenza season, for severe cases of CAP that might be caused by MRSA.

Case Reports

Louisiana case 1. A previously healthy boy aged 10 years (Table) became ill with fever, cough, sore throat, and bilateral earache on December 6, 2006, and was treated with acetaminophen at home. The next day, his symptoms worsened and he was taken to a local ED in respiratory distress with a fever of 104°F (40°C). A chest radiograph was performed and revealed mutlilobar pneumonia. The patient was transferred to another hospital and admitted to the pediatric intensive care unit (PICU), where he required endotracheal intubation and mechanical ventilation. He was treated initially on December 7 with intravenous (IV) ceftriaxone; vancomycin was started the next day. On December 8, a rapid immunochromatographic assay for the qualitative detection of influenza A or B was performed on nasopharyngeal secretions and was positive for influenza A. A sputum culture obtained the same day grew MRSA; blood cultures were negative. The patient had leukopenia and worsening hypotension

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^{*} Defined as a temperature of ≥100.0°F (≥37.8°C), oral or equivalent, with cough and/or sore throat, in the absence of a known cause other than influenza.

[†]Defined as pneumonia occurring during the 2003–04 influenza season in a person with either laboratory-confirmed influenza virus infection, clinician-determined ILI (e.g., fever plus sore throat or cough), or both, from whom a specimen (i.e., blood, sputum, or pleural fluid) that was collected within 48 hours after hospitalization yielded *S. aureus*.

The MMWR series of publications is published by the Coordinating Center for Health Information and Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Atlanta, GA 30333.

Suggested Citation: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. [Article title]. MMWR 2007;56:[inclusive page numbers].

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and hypoxia. He died on December 9, approximately 42 hours after admission to the PICU. The cause of death was reported as bilateral pneumonia. The patient had no documented history of MRSA; no documentation of influenza vaccination was present in either his medical record or the statewide immunization database, Louisiana Immunization Network for Kids Statewide (LINKS).

Louisiana case 2. An adolescent boy aged 14 years (Table) had ILI symptoms on December 26, 2006, and was taken to a local ED, where he was treated with clarithromycin and penicillin for atypical pneumonia and pharyngitis. A rapid test for group A streptococcus was negative. The following day, the patient was taken to his primary-care provider with worsening symptoms and was prescribed oseltamivir for suspected influenza. On December 28, the youth returned to the ED in respiratory distress and was noted to have bloody, frothy sputum; a fever of 104°F (40°C); and hypoxia. In the ED, the patient was intubated, placed on mechanical ventilation, and administered IV ceftriaxone and vancomycin. A chest radiograph revealed diffuse bilateral infiltrates, and a computed tomography scan of his chest revealed extensive bilateral lung consolidation and small anterior mediastinal and posterior pneumothoraces. A rapid immunochromatographic assay performed on nasopharyngeal secretions was positive for influenza A, and a blood culture grew MRSA. The patient died on December 28, approximately 6 hours after arrival in the ED; cause of death was recorded as pneumonia, sepsis, and disseminated intravascular coagulation. At autopsy, the lungs displayed necrotizing pneumonia. Immunohistochemical assay in the lung revealed evidence of *S. aureus* (positive antigens using monoclonal and polyclonal anti-S. aureus antibodies) in the areas of pneumonia; however, the tissues did not indicate evidence of influenza A or B by immunohistochemistry. MRSA was recovered from a tonsillar swab and lung specimen. Influenza vaccination had not been documented in the patient's medical record or in LINKS. His medical history was unremarkable except for a culture-confirmed axillary MRSA abscess that was diagnosed on October 9, 2006, and treated with trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole for 7 days.

Georgia case 1. A previously healthy girl aged 8 years (Table) was taken to her primary-care provider on December 17, 2006, after 3 days of fever (maximum: 103.0°F [39.4°C]), cough, and posttussive emesis. She was treated in the provider's office with azithromycin, dexamethasone, and aerosolized albuterol. Her condition worsened, and she was transported to a local ED, where she received IV ceftriaxone and nebulized albuterol. A chest radiograph revealed a right lower lobe pneumonia. She was transported to a referral hospital, where she was noted to be hypotensive and hypoxemic. She was intubated on arrival and placed on extracorporeal membrane

TABLE. Demographic and clinical characteristics of patients with severe methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* (MRSA) community-acquired pneumonia associated with influenza or influenza-like illness* — Louisiana and Georgia, December 2006–January 2007

State and case no.	Age	Sex	Comor- bidities	Previous MRSA skin disease (self or contact)	Sites of positive MRSA cultures	Respiratory symptom onset to collection of MRSA sample (days)	•	Laboratory influenza test	Influenza vaccination documented by medical record or immunization registry	Empiric antimicrobials before S. aureus culture	Outcome (cause of death)	Respiratory symptom onset to death (days)
Louis	iana			•							•	
1	10 yrs	М	None	Unknown	Sputum	2	Multiple lobar infiltrate	Rapid test positive	No	Ceftriaxone	Died (bilateral pneumonia)	3
2	14 yrs	М	None	Yes (self)	Blood, sputum, tonsillar swab	2	Multiple lobar infiltrate	Rapid test positive	No	Ceftriaxone	Died (sepsis, pneumonia, DIC [†])	2
3	43 yrs	М	Hepatitis C, hypertension	Yes (self)	Blood, sputum	3	Multiple lobar infiltrate	Test not performed	No	Vancomycin, gentamicin	Survived	Not applicable
4	26 yrs	М	None	Yes (self)	Sputum	5	Multiple lobar infiltrate	Rapid test negative§	No	Trimethoprim- sulfamethoxazole	Survived	Not applicable
5	21 yrs	М	None	Yes (contact)	Blood, sputum	6	Multiple lobar infiltrate	Rapid test positive	No	Ceftriaxone	Survived	Not applicable
6	4 mos	F	None	No	Pleural rind	3	Single lobar infiltrate, pleural effusion	Test not performed	No	Ceftriaxone	Survived	Not applicable
Georg	gia											
1	8 yrs	F	None	None known in last year	Sputum	3	Single lobar infiltrate	Viral culture positive	No No	Azithromycin, ceftriaxone, vancomycin	Died (hypoxia, pneumonia, respiratory distress, MRSA sepsis)	25
2	48 yrs	F	Current smoker	None known in last year	Sputum, blood, nares	3	Multiple lobar infiltrate	Rapid test negative§	No	Ceftriaxone, azithromycin, levofloxacin, pipericillin/ tazobactam	Died (MRSA sepsis)	4
3	27 yrs	F	Current smoker	None known	Sputum, blood	2	Single lobar infiltrate	Rapid test positive	No	Ceftriaxone, azithromycin	Died (necrotizing pneumonia)	19
4	11 yrs	F	None	None known	Blood	2	Multiple lobar infiltrate	Rapid test positive	No	Ceftriaxone, vancomycin	Died (MRSA pneumonia)	2

^{*} Defined as a temperature of ≥100.0°F (≥37.8°C), oral or equivalent, with cough and/or sore throat, in the absence of a known cause other than influenza. c Disseminated intravascular coagulation.

oxygenation. During intubation, she had cardiac arrest and was resuscitated. Also on December 17, viral and sputum cultures were collected that tested positive for influenza A and MRSA, respectively; blood cultures were negative for MRSA. After a long hospital course complicated by renal and hepatic failure and a subpulmonic abscess, the patient died on January 7, 2007, a total of 25 days after onset of symptoms. Cause of death was listed as hypoxia, pneumonia, respiratory distress, and MRSA sepsis. Influenza vaccination was not

documented in the medical record or in the Georgia Registry of Immunization Transactions and Services.

Summary of 10 Cases

Ten cases of severe MRSA CAP were reported during December 2006–January 2007 from Louisiana and Georgia (Table). Median age of the 10 patients was 17.5 years (range: 4 months to 48 years), and eight were aged <30 years. Five of the patients were female. One patient had a history of chronic

[§] Patient had influenza-like illness, and influenza test was conducted outside the 4-day reliability window from respiratory symptom onset to test.

hepatitis C and hypertension, and two were current smokers; none of the other patients had any relevant medical history. Four patients had documentation of either recent MRSA skin and soft tissue infection (SSTI) or living with someone with a history of MRSA SSTI. In all 10 cases, clinicians diagnosed ILI either preceding or concurrent with CAP. Six patients had laboratory-confirmed influenza. Influenza vaccination status for the 2006-07 influenza season was available for six of the patients; none had documentation of vaccination. Radiologic information on the initial evaluation was available for all patients; three had unilobar infiltrates, and seven had multilobar infiltrates. In three patients, MRSA was isolated only from sputum. Respiratory symptoms for the 10 patients began a median of 3 days (range: 2-6 days) before collection of specimens that grew MRSA. Of the six (60%) patients who died, the median period from respiratory symptom onset to death was 3.5 days (range: 2-25 days).

Laboratory Findings

Among the 10 cases, MRSA isolates from five of the six Louisiana cases were available for microbiologic characterization by CDC. All isolates were resistant to beta-lactams and erythromycin, two had inducible resistance to clindamycin, and two were not susceptible to levofloxacin. All isolates were positive for Panton-Valentine leukocidin (PVL) toxin genes by polymerase chain reaction and carried the staphylococcal cassette chromosome *mec* (SCC*mec*) type IVa resistance gene cassette. Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis analysis revealed that the five isolates had indistinguishable patterns and were designated USA 300-0114.

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Editorial Note: As demonstrated by the cases in this report, secondary *S. aureus* pneumonia is a potentially catastrophic complication of influenza. *S. aureus* respiratory coinfections often develop into severe, necrotizing pneumonia with a relatively high case-fatality rate (33% during the influenza epidemic of 1968–1969) and rapid clinical progression (e.g.,

death within 24 hours after admission) (2). S. aureus pneumonia has been complicated further by the emergence of MRSA as a cause of infection among persons in the community without traditionally recognized MRSA risk factors (3). During the 2003–04 influenza season, 15 cases of influenza associated CAP caused by MRSA and four deaths (fatality rate: 26.7%) were reported to CDC, generally in persons with no medical problems (1,4).

Reports of pediatric mortality associated with bacterial coinfections with influenza virus infection have been uncommon. During the 2003–04 influenza season, 153 influenza-associated pediatric deaths were reported through state health departments to CDC; 102 of these had bacterial cultures obtained, and 11 were positive for *S. aureus*, primarily CAP infections (5). Pediatric influenza deaths were made nationally notifiable in 2004. During October 1, 2004–January 19, 2007, a total of 99 pediatric deaths associated with influenza were reported to CDC. Of these, 13 were tested for concomitant invasive bacterial infections, and only four had invasive *S. aureus* coinfection; two of those four deaths are reported here.

Particularly notable in the 10 cases described in this report is the short period between any respiratory symptom onset and either death or recovery of MRSA from the patient. Respiratory symptoms began a median of 3 days before recovery of MRSA, and four (67%) of six patients who died did so within 4 days of respiratory symptom onset. These short durations suggest that, in these cases, the influenza virus and MRSA infections likely occurred concomitantly rather than in the more classically described biphasic clinical course of CAP symptoms after influenza illness (6).

In the United States, the majority of community-associated MRSA infections have been SSTIs caused by a single pulsed-field type, termed USA300. USA300 isolates typically are resistant only to beta-lactam and macrolide antimicrobial agents and contain genes for the PVL toxin, which lyses white blood cells; these genes typically are not present in strains of health-care—associated MRSA (7). A recent study with an acute pneumonia animal model determined that PVL was associated with the development of necrotizing pneumonia (8).

In general, diagnostic testing for CAP is encouraged if the results might affect clinical decisions (e.g., antimicrobial management). In 30% of the cases in this report, MRSA was recovered only from sputum. The recently released Infectious Disease Society of America/American Thoracic Society CAP guidelines for adults recommend sputum cultures along with blood cultures and other diagnostic tests for certain patients (e.g., those with severe disease). Other indications for sputum culture include pleural effusion, cavitary infiltrates, and

failure of outpatient therapy; all of these indications were observed among the MRSA patients described in this report. The guidelines also note that sputum Gram stain is useful for quickly identifying pathogens such as *S. aureus* that are not the most common causes of CAP and might not be covered by routine empiric therapy (9). Beginning optimal therapy quickly can reduce mortality (9).

Four patients in this report had a documented history of MRSA skin infection in themselves or in a close contact before contracting pneumonia. The presence of preceding staphylococcal skin disease among persons with staphylococcal pneumonia has been described previously during an influenza pandemic (10). The index of suspicion for MRSA CAP, therefore, should be increased in patients with a history of MRSA infection or close contact with an MRSA-infected person or in communities where MRSA infections have been identified. If MRSA CAP is suspected, clinicians should add vancomycin or linezolid to the empiric regimen (9).

These cases serve to remind health-care providers that CAP can be caused by MRSA. Although uncommon, MRSA CAP has few obvious characteristics that differentiate it from other bacterial infections or from influenza virus infection alone; MRSA CAP often affects young, otherwise healthy persons and can be rapidly fatal. MRSA should be suspected in persons with severe pneumonia, especially during the influenza season, in those with cavitary infiltrates, and in those with a history of MRSA infection. Fatal cases of MRSA CAP or cases requiring hospitalization or ICU admission should be reported through state health departments to CDC's Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion by telephone (800-893-0485) or e-mail (search@cdc.gov).

Acknowledgments

This report is based, in part, on contributions by C Jones-Nazar, MD, D Robertson, J Eavey, MPH, Louisiana Office of Public Health; L Kravet, Louisiana State Public Health Laboratory; F Brian, MD, Rapides Parish Coroner's Office; LJ Mayeux, MD, Avoyelles Parish Coroner's Office; and C Trant, MD, Lafayette Parish Coroner's Office, Louisiana.

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Nail-Gun Injuries Treated in Emergency Departments — United States, 2001–2005

Speed, ease of use, and ready availability have made pneumatic nail guns a common tool used in work settings such as residential construction and wood-product fabrication. In addition, the tools are now readily available to consumers, extending to the public what had been primarily a potential work-related hazard. To characterize nail-gun injuries in work and nonwork settings, patients with nail-gun injuries treated in U.S. hospital emergency departments (EDs) were studied by using the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission's (CPSC's) National Electronic Injury Surveillance System (NEISS) and the NEISS occupational injury supplement (NEISS-Work) maintained by CDC's National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). This report describes the results of that analysis, which indicated that during the 5-year period 2001–2005, an average of approximately 37,000 patients with injuries* related to nail-gun use were treated annually in EDs, with 40% of injuries (14,800) occurring among consumers. † In addition, data on ED-treated injuries indicated that, in 2005, nail-gun injuries among consumers were approximately three times higher than in 1991

^{*} For this report, all cases are referred to as injuries; however, ED-treated illnesses and disorders are included in the national estimates. Among the NEISS-Work cases, 90%–95% of the cases are injuries. Although NEISS programs collect information on injuries and illnesses (e.g., infection of a nail-gun wound or repetitive motion disorder), they are not categorized separately in the available data.

[†] All references to consumers and consumer-product injuries are nonwork related.

(4,200). Additional measures are needed to prevent nail-gun injuries among both workers and consumers.


Nail-gun injury estimates for consumers were obtained from CPSC's online NEISS data (1); NEISS data are derived from a national stratified probability sample of 101 U.S. hospital EDs (2). Estimates for work-related nail-gun injuries were taken from NEISS-Work, an adjunct occupational injury and illness surveillance program with a 67-hospital sample (3). An injury was identified as work related if the ED chart indicated that the injury occurred while working for pay or other compensation, while volunteering for an organized group, or during agricultural production-related activities.

Consumer nail-gun injuries were defined as ED-treated injuries that involved "nail guns or stud drivers" (CPSC product code 0882), excluding heavy-duty staplers (CPSC product code 0834) (1). The CPSC online NEISS data system produced the national estimates with variances (used to calculate 95% confidence intervals [CIs]) (1); individual consumer case records were not reviewed. Cases were weighted on the basis of the size (i.e., annual number of ED visits) of the hospital in which treatment was received. The number of injuries was the sum of the case weights, and variances were calculated using the classic formula for the variance of a total from a stratified sample.

Work-related nail-gun injuries were identified from NIOSH NEISS-Work data as those involving pneumatic nail guns and excluding heavy-duty staplers, rivet drivers, and electric or powder-actuated tools. Nail-gun injuries were identified based on CPSC product code 0882, the Occupational Injury and Illness Classification System injury and illness source/ secondary source code 7291 (nail guns — powered) (4), and key words (e.g., nail gun, nailer, shot, or gun) from case narratives. Injuries included being shot by a nail from a gun, being struck by the nail gun or the hose from a compressor, and reporting either a musculoskeletal injury or an eye injury associated with use of the nail gun. Work-related injury estimates and variances were calculated by the same methods used by CPSC for consumer-product-related injuries (1). Consumer-product-related injuries and work-related nail-gun injuries were mutually exclusive.

During 2001–2005, annual consumer nail-gun injuries ranged from 13,400 to 16,200, with an annual average of 14,800 ED-treated injuries (Figure). During the same period, work-related nail-gun injuries ranged from 19,300 to 28,600,

FIGURE. Number of consumer* (1991–2005) and worker (1998–2005) nail-gun injuries treated in hospital emergency departments — United States



 $^{^{\}star}_{1}$ Consumer injuries are non-work related $^{\dagger}_{95\%}$ confidence interval.

with an annual average of 22,200. A steady increase in injuries among consumers occurred during the 1990s. Similar data for workers were not available before 1998.

In 2005, approximately 12,800 (96%) of 13,400 consumers injured by nails guns and 28,000 (98%) of 28,600 workers injured by nail guns were men. Injured workers had a median age of 27 years, and consumers had a median age of 35 years. For both consumers and workers, the diagnosis associated with 87% of the nail-gun injuries was either wound with a foreign body (i.e., open wound with retained nail or other object) or puncture wound (i.e., open wound, excluding those with retained foreign body) (Table). Certain puncture wounds resulted from a nail going through construction material into a person; in others, a nail was shot completely through a body part, or a person removed the nail before seeking treatment. Approximately 4% of nail-gun injuries among workers resulted in fractured bones. Injuries to upper extremities, primarily hands and fingers, accounted for 75% of all consumer nail-gun injuries and 66% of all worker nailgun injuries. Lower extremities also were injured frequently, accounting for 17% of consumer injuries and 24% of worker injuries. Examples of other nail-gun injuries among either workers or consumers included eye injuries from foreign

[§] The NEISS-Work sample for occupational injuries uses 67 of the 101 NEISS hospitals used by CPSC for consumer-product—related injuries. The 67-hospital sample is distributed proportionately across the strata similar to the larger CPSC sample and statistically weighted to appropriately account for the smaller sample size. Because of hospital closures and other nonparticipation and nonresponse factors, the number of reporting hospitals can vary monthly and yearly.

Number of fractures did not meet minimum NEISS reporting requirements because the national estimate was too small, the coefficient of variation exceeded 33%, or both. Percentages are provided for information purposes only and might be unstable.

TABLE. Number and percentage of nail-gun injuries treated in hospital emergency departments, by nature of injury and body part — United States, 2005

	Consumers			Workers	
No.*	(95% CI) [†]	(%)	No.	(95% CI)	(%)§
13,400	(10,400–16,400)	(100)	28,600 (16,600–40,600)	(100)
4,400	(3,100-5,700)	(33)	9,600	(5,000-14,100)	(34)
7,200	(5,400-9,000)	(54)	15,100	(8,300-21,900)	(53)
1,800	(900-2,700)	(13)	3,900	(1,900-5,900)	(14)
10,000	(7,600-12,500)	(75)	18,800 (10,500–27,100)	(66)
8,900	(6,800-11,000)	(66)	16,600	(8,900-24,300)	(58)
2,300	(1,500-3,000)	(17)	6,900	(4,000-9,900)	(24)
¶			2,800	(1,300-4,400)	(10)
	13,400 4,400 7,200 1,800 10,000 8,900 2,300	No.* (95% CI)† 13,400 (10,400–16,400) 4,400 (3,100–5,700) 7,200 (5,400–9,000) 1,800 (900–2,700) 10,000 (7,600–12,500) 8,900 (6,800–11,000) 2,300 (1,500–3,000)	No.* (95% CI)† (%) 13,400 (10,400–16,400) (100) 4,400 (3,100–5,700) (33) 7,200 (5,400–9,000) (54) 1,800 (900–2,700) (13) 10,000 (7,600–12,500) (75) 8,900 (6,800–11,000) (66) 2,300 (1,500–3,000) (17)	No.* (95% CI)† (%) No. 13,400 (10,400-16,400) (100) 28,600 (4,400 (3,100-5,700) (33) 9,600 7,200 (5,400-9,000) (54) 15,100 1,800 (900-2,700) (13) 3,900 10,000 (7,600-12,500) (75) 18,800 (8,900 (6,800-11,000) (66) 16,600 2,300 (1,500-3,000) (17) 6,900	No.* (95% CI)† (%) No. (95% CI) 13,400 (10,400–16,400) (100) 28,600 (16,600–40,600) 4,400 (3,100–5,700) (33) 9,600 (5,000–14,100) 7,200 (5,400–9,000) (54) 15,100 (8,300–21,900) 1,800 (900–2,700) (13) 3,900 (1,900–5,900) 10,000 (7,600–12,500) (75) 18,800 (10,500–27,100) 8,900 (6,800–11,000) (66) 16,600 (8,900–24,300) 2,300 (1,500–3,000) (17) 6,900 (4,000–9,900)

- * Numbers of injuries for consumers were rounded to the nearest 100 injuries and might not match values published by the Consumer Product Safety Commission.
- † Confidence interval.
- § Percentage might not add to 100 because of rounding.
- ¶ Open wound with retained nail or other object.
- ** Open wound, excluding those with retained foreign body.
- th Upper extremity includes lower and upper arm, elbow, hand, fingers, and wrist (excludes shoulder).
- §§ Lower extremity includes ankle, foot, knee, lower and upper leg, and toes.
- Does not meet minimum National Electronic Injury Surveillance System (NEISS) reporting requirements.

bodies and corneal abrasions; dental injuries; musculoskeletal injuries such as sprains, strains, tendonitis, nerve damage from tool use, and finger dislocation from reaching and lifting a tool; lacerations; electrical burns; and noise-induced hearing difficulty.** Among 1,500 workers hospitalized for nail-gun injuries in 2005 (CI = 700–2,200), approximately 60% had foreign-body injuries and 35% had puncture wounds,†† whereas overall, more persons had puncture wounds than foreign-body injuries (Table). Wounds requiring hospitalization included embedded nails in the trunk, head, joints, or bones; fractures from nail penetration; and infected puncture wounds. Most persons with nail-gun injuries were not hospitalized; 12,600 (94%) consumers and 26,900 (94%) workers were treated and released from EDs in 2005.

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Editorial Note: Since 1991, annual consumer nail-gun injuries have increased approximately 200%. This increase likely corresponds to an increase in availability during the 1990s of inexpensive pneumatic nail guns and air compressors (used to

power the nail guns) in home hardware stores; however, no sales data are available for confirmation. The number of worker nail-gun injuries has remained stable since 1998 (when data comparable to those for consumers became available), with the exception of 2005. In 2005, the estimated number of nailgun injuries among workers increased 39% from 2004. This increase was distributed uniformly throughout the year, and the reason for the increase is unclear. Although the increase is not statistically significant (p>0.05) compared with estimates for the preceding years, the change indicates a need for close monitoring.

Nail guns in the consumer and commercial markets differ, but similar models are available in both markets. The

current national standard for pneumatic fastener driving tools (American National Standards Institute [ANSI] SNT-101-2002) applies to products in both markets (5). According to the ANSI standard, actuation (firing) mechanisms on nail guns have two critical components to prevent unintentional firing: a manual trigger and a contact element in the nose of the gun. The most common type of firing mechanism is the dual-action contact-trip trigger, which requires that the manual trigger and nose contact element both be depressed for a nail to be discharged. When users depress the manual trigger, they can rapidly fire a nail (i.e., "bounce nail") each time the nailgun nose contacts the work material, speeding up production. Trigger locks and other user modifications that keep the trigger constantly depressed or that disable the nose contact switch have been used to make rapid nailing easier, but this counteracts the safety features of the dual-action contact-trip mechanism.

Another type of firing mechanism, the alternative sequential-trip trigger, requires the nose contact to be depressed before the manual trigger, rather than simultaneously with the trigger, to discharge a nail, making unintentional discharge of nails less likely. Injury surveillance in the residential construction industry has indicated that approximately 65%–69% of injuries from contact-trip tools likely could be prevented through use of a sequential-trip trigger (6–8). The International Staple, Nail, and Tool Association adopted a voluntary ANSI standard recommending that manufacturers install sequential-trip triggers on certain types of nail guns before distribution, beginning in May 2003 (5); however,

^{**} National estimates did not meet minimum NEISS reporting requirements because the national estimate was too small, the coefficient of variation exceeded 33%, or both.

^{††} Number of persons hospitalized as a result of foreign-body or puncture wounds did not meet minimum NEISS reporting requirements because the national estimate was too small, the coefficient of variation exceeded 33%, or both. Percentages are provided for information purposes only and might be unstable.

under the standard, contact-trip triggers can continue to be sold with nail guns or as an option.

The findings in this report are subject to at least four limitations. First, the total number of injuries from nail guns is underrepresented by NEISS because the system only counts injuries treated in EDs; however, EDs are likely to treat a high proportion of nail-gun puncture wounds and embedded nails. In addition, only the most severe injury at the time of treatment is recorded for an individual person; a single incident might have resulted in multiple injuries or more severe sequelae. Second, the identification of cases and their specific characteristics is limited by the availability of appropriate information in the ED records and subsequent reporting by the hospital records abstractors. Thus, misclassification might have occurred in describing the person who was injured (consumer versus worker), the type of fastener tool, and the injury diagnosis (foreign-body versus puncture wound). Third, the small hospital sample size resulted in large standard errors (10%–20%) that might have obscured significant differences among years. CIs for work-related injury estimates are larger than for consumer injuries because of the smaller hospital sample used for data collection. Finally, NEISS ED surveillance does not provide information about the population at risk, the amount of exposure (e.g., hours of tool use), or tool characteristics (e.g., type of nail gun or trigger mechanism). Although consumers had fewer injuries than workers during 2001-2005, if consumers had substantially fewer hours of exposure (i.e., tool use) than workers, consumer nail-gun injury rates might have been higher than those of workers.

NEISS consumer injury estimates and NEISS-Work occupational injury estimates provide a national perspective on the injuries received from nail guns and indicate how injuries from tools used in work and nonwork settings can overlap (9). Although training regarding safe work practices might reduce nail-gun injuries, use of sequential-trip triggers is likely to be more effective (6–8), particularly among consumers, who do not usually receive training in tool use. The voluntary ANSI standard only addresses availability of the sequential-trip triggers and does not address the continued use of contact-trip triggers. The ANSI standard revision is likely to decrease injuries over time as older tools with contact-trip triggers are no longer being sold or used, but perceived lack of future availability might result in the contact-trip trigger tools being retained in work settings. In addition, consumers might be unaware of the need to replace older contact-trip triggers with sequential-trip triggers. Therefore, distribution of new nail guns with sequential-trip triggers and availability in home hardware centers of kits to convert contact-trip triggers to sequential-trip triggers might help reduce the use of the more hazardous tools. Moreover, additional training material on nailgun safety to supplement product information included with the tools should be provided at the point of sale or rental to further influence safe nail-gun use among consumers and workers.

Acknowledgments

This report is based, in part, on data contributed by T Schroeder, CPSC Division of Hazards and Injury Data Systems; and NEISS hospital ED record abstractors.

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Update to CDC's Sexually Transmitted Diseases Treatment Guidelines, 2006: Fluoroquinolones No Longer Recommended for Treatment of Gonococcal Infections


In the United States, gonorrhea is the second most commonly reported notifiable disease, with 339,593 cases documented in 2005 (1). Since 1993, fluoroquinolones (i.e.,

ciprofloxacin, ofloxacin, or levofloxacin) have been used frequently in the treatment of gonorrhea because of their high efficacy, ready availability, and convenience as a single-dose, oral therapy. However, prevalence of fluoroquinolone resistance in Neisseria gonorrhoeae has been increasing and is becoming widespread in the United States, necessitating changes in treatment regimens. Beginning in 2000, fluoroquinolones were no longer recommended for gonorrhea treatment in persons who acquired their infections in Asia or the Pacific Islands (including Hawaii); in 2002, this recommendation was extended to California (2). In 2004, CDC recommended that fluoroquinolones not be used in the United States to treat gonorrhea in men who have sex with men (MSM) (3). This report, based on data from the Gonococcal Isolate Surveillance Project (GISP), summarizes data on fluoroquinolone-resistant N. gonorrhoeae (QRNG) in heterosexual males and in MSM throughout the United States. This report also updates CDC's Sexually Transmitted Diseases Treatment Guidelines, 2006 (4) regarding the treatment of infections caused by N. gonorrhoeae. On the basis of the most recent evidence, CDC no longer recommends the use of fluoroquinolones for the treatment of gonococcal infections and associated conditions such as pelvic inflammatory disease (PID). Consequently, only one class of drugs, the cephalosporins, is still recommended and available for the treatment of gonorrhea.

GISP is a CDC-sponsored sentinel surveillance system that has been monitoring antimicrobial susceptibilities of N. gonorrhoeae in the United States since 1986. Annually, GISP collects approximately 6,000 urethral gonococcal isolates from males attending 26 to 30 sexually transmitted disease (STD) clinics throughout the country and provides national data to guide treatment. QRNG isolates demonstrate ciprofloxacin minimum inhibitory concentrations (MICs) of $\geq 1.0 \,\mu\text{g/mL}$; isolates with intermediate resistance to fluoroquinolones demonstrate ciprofloxacin MICs of 0.125–0.500 µg/mL.

GISP began susceptibility testing for ciprofloxacin in 1990. Overall, QRNG prevalence remained <1% during 1990–2001 but increased to 2.2% in 2002, to 4.1% in 2003, and to 6.8% in 2004. In 2005, of 6,199 isolates collected by GISP, 9.4% were resistant to ciprofloxacin, and during January–June 2006, 13.3% of 3,005 isolates collected were resistant (Figure) (5). Excluding isolates from Hawaii and California (areas that discontinued fluoroquinolone treatment in 2000 and 2002, respectively), 6.1% and 8.6% of isolates were QRNG in 2005 and 2006, respectively. Intermediate resistance to ciprofloxacin has remained stable, ranging from 0.4% to 1.1% from 1990 to 2006 (5).

FIGURE. Percentage of Neisseria gonorrhoeae isolates with intermediate resistance or resistance to ciprofloxacin, by year -Gonococcal Isolate Surveillance Project, United States,



* Data for 2006 are preliminary (January–June only).
† Demonstrating ciprofloxacin minimum inhibitory concentrations (MICs) of $0.125-0.500 \mu g/mL$

§ Demonstrating ciprofloxacin MICs of \geq 1.0 μ g/mL.

In addition, since 2001, GISP has observed QRNG increases among isolates from MSM, and more recently, from heterosexual males. In 2001, QRNG prevalence was 1.6% and 0.6% among MSM and heterosexual males, respectively. The QRNG prevalence among isolates from MSM increased to 7.2% in 2002, to 15% in 2003, to 23.8% in 2004, and to 29% in 2005 (5). Among heterosexual males, the prevalence increased more slowly, from 0.9% in 2002 to 1.5% in 2003, to 2.9% in 2004, and to 3.8% in 2005 (5). Preliminary data from January-June 2006 indicate that QRNG prevalence increased to 38.3% among MSM and 6.7% among heterosexual males. For isolates from sites outside of California and Hawaii, QRNG prevalence was 24.3% in MSM and 2.7% in heterosexual males in 2005; in the first 6 months of 2006, it was 30.7% and 5.1%, respectively.

Available data from GISP for 2005 and preliminary data from 2006 have demonstrated that QRNG has continued to increase among heterosexual males and is present in all regions of the country (Table) (5). Several cities outside California and Hawaii have seen substantial increases in QRNG prevalence among heterosexual males from 2004 to 2006; for example, in Philadelphia, QRNG prevalence increased from 1.2% in 2004 to 9.9% in 2005 and to 26.6% in 2006, and in Miami, prevalence increased from 2.1% in 2004 to 4.5% in 2005 and to 15.3% in 2006.

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TABLE. Prevalence of ciprofloxacin-resistant* *Neisseria* gonorrhoeae among heterosexual males with gonococcal urethritis, by U.S. Census region — Gonococcal Isolate Surveillance Project (GISP), United States, 2004–2006[†]

	2004	2005	2006
Region	%	%	%
West	·		
Albuquerque	_	_	5.5
Denver	4.0	3.1	1.8
Honolulu	11.3	19.4	25.0
Las Vegas	0.8	2.7	4.2
Long Beach	12.7	16.0	22.2
Los Angeles	9.5	4.0	10.0
Orange County	20.5	26.2	25.0
Phoenix	2.7	4.5	1.0
Portland	8.9	11.5	10.7
San Diego	13.9	15.6	25.0
San Francisco	10.3	8.2	22.5
Seattle	4.6	4.7	19.2
Tripler [§] (Honolulu)	16.7 [¶]	_1	¶
Midwest			
Chicago	_	1.4	1.6
Cincinnati	_	_	_
Cleveland	_	1.1	1.4
Detroit	_	0.3	_
Minneapolis	2.9	0.5	1.1
Northeast			
Philadelphia	1.2	9.9	26.6
South			
Atlanta	1.0	2.9	5.7
Baltimore	0.7	1.8	2.9
Birmingham	_	1.1	1.8
Dallas	1.5	0.4	4.6
Greensboro	_	0.7	1.7
Miami	2.1	4.5	15.3
New Orleans	1.7	7.1**	**
Oklahoma City	1.1	1.8	3.5

^{*} Demonstrating ciprofloxacin minimum inhibitory concentrations of ≥1.0 µg/mL.

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Editorial Note: GISP is the only national, sentinel surveillance system that monitors emerging resistance in *N. gonorrhoeae* in the United States; with the decreasing use of culture to diagnose gonorrhea, GISP has become an increasingly important source of information on *N. gonorrhoeae* that are resistant to antimicrobials. Findings from GISP, which is conducted in publicly funded clinics and includes only male urethral isolates, might not be representative of the entire U.S. population infected with gonorrhea.

During January–June 2006, QRNG was identified in 25 out of 26 GISP sites, and increases in the prevalence of QRNG were observed among isolates from heterosexual males and MSM in most regions of the country. As a result, CDC no longer recommends fluoroquinolones for treatment of gonorrhea in the United States; similarly, CDC no longer recommends fluoroquinolones for treatment of other conditions that might be caused by *N. gonorrhoeae*, such as PID.

CDC has recommended single-dose fluoroquinolone regimens for the treatment of gonococcal infections since 1993. Although QRNG was identified as a problem in Asia in 1991 and was first identified in Hawaii in the same year, only sporadic occurrences were noted in the continental United States during the 1990s. However, since 1999, increasing resistance of N. gonorrhoeae to the fluoroquinolones has been observed, first in Hawaii, then in California and other Western states, then among MSM, and now in other populations and regions. CDC has changed treatment recommendations when QRNG prevalence has reached >5% in defined groups and locations, with consideration given to other factors such as the prevalence of gonorrhea, the availability of antimicrobial susceptibility data, and the costs of diagnostic and treatment options (4,6). This >5% threshold has been used by CDC and the World Health Organization so that all recommended treatments for gonorrhea can be expected to cure ≥95% of infections.

Because fluoroquinolones are no longer recommended, the options for treating gonococcal infections in the United States are limited (4) (Box). For the treatment of uncomplicated urogenital and anorectal gonorrhea, CDC now recommends a single intramuscular dose of ceftriaxone 125 mg or a single oral dose of cefixime 400 mg. However, 400-mg tablets of cefixime are not available; cefixime is only available in a suspension formulation. Some evidence suggests that a single oral dose of cefpodoxime 400 mg or cefuroxime axetil 1 g might be additional oral alternatives for the treatment of urogenital and anorectal gonorrhea (4).

Alternative parenteral single-dose regimens for urogenital and anorectal gonorrhea include ceftizoxime 500 mg, cefoxitin 2 g with probenecid 1 g orally, or cefotaxime 500 mg. However, these cephalosporin regimens do not offer any advantage over ceftriaxone. For persons with penicillin or cephalosporin allergies, a single intramuscular dose of spectinomycin 2 g is a recommended alternative. However spectinomycin is not available in the United States. Updated information from CDC regarding the availability of cefixime and spectinomycin will be available at http://www.cdc.gov/std/gonorrhea/arg.

[†] Data for 2006 are preliminary (January-June only).

[§] Tripler Army Medical Center.

[¶] Fewer than 10 isolates were collected.

^{**} Because of Hurricane Katrina, isolates were collected during January— May 2005 only. GISP was restarted in October 2006.

BOX. Updated recommended treatment regimens for gonococcal infections and associated conditions — United States, April 2007

Uncomplicated Gonococcal Infections of the Cervix, Urethra, and Rectum*

Recommended Regimens

Ceftriaxone 125 mg in a single intramuscular (IM) dose

OR

Cefixime[†] 400 mg in a single oral dose

PLUS

TREATMENT FOR CHLAMYDIA IF CHLAMYDIAL INFECTION IS NOT RULED OUT

Alternative Regimens

Spectinomycin[†] 2 g in a single IM dose

OR

Cephalosporin single-dose regimens§

Uncomplicated Gonococcal Infections of the Pharynx*

Recommended Regimens

Ceftriaxone 125 mg in a single IM dose

PLUS

TREATMENT FOR CHLAMYDIA IF CHLAMYDIAL INFECTION IS NOT RULED OUT

Disseminated Gonococcal Infection

Updated treatment regimens available at http://www.cdc.gov/std/treatment.

Pelvic Inflammatory Disease

Updated treatment regimens available at http://www.cdc.gov/std/treatment.

Epididymitis

Updated treatment regimens available at http://www.cdc.gov/std/treatment.

For pharyngeal gonorrhea, CDC now recommends a single intramuscular dose of ceftriaxone 125 mg (Box); pharyngeal gonococcal infections often are asymptomatic and more difficult to eradicate than urogenital and anorectal infections (4). Spectinomycin, cefixime, cefpodoxime, and cefuroxime axetil do not appear adequate for treating pharyngeal gonococcal infections.

A single oral dose of azithromycin 2 g is effective against uncomplicated gonococcal infections, but CDC does not recommend widespread use of azithromycin because of concerns regarding rapid emergence of resistance, as evidenced by the increase in azithromycin MICs documented since 1999 in the United States and internationally (4,5,7-9). However, azithromycin might be an option for treatment of uncomplicated gonococcal infections from any site (i.e., urogenital, anorectal, and pharyngeal) in persons with documented severe allergic reactions to penicillins or cephalosporins.

Persons in whom gonococcal infection is diagnosed should be treated for possible coinfection with *Chlamydia trachomatis* with a single dose of azithromycin 1 g by mouth or with doxycycline 100 mg twice a day, by mouth for 7 days, if chlamydial infection has not been ruled out (4).

Test of cure is not recommended routinely for patients with uncomplicated gonorrhea who have been treated with recommended or alternative regimens. Persons with persistent symptoms of gonococcal infection or whose symptoms recur shortly after treatment with a recommended or alternative regimen should be reevaluated by culture for *N. gonorrhoeae*; positive isolates should undergo antimicrobial-susceptibility testing. Clinicians and laboratories should report treatment failures or resistant gonococcal isolates to CDC at 404-639-8373 through state and local public health authorities.

With fluoroquinolones no longer recommended for the treatment of gonococcal infections, only one class of drug, cephalosporins, is still recommended and available. Therefore, state and local health departments must remain vigilant for the emergence of cephalosporin resistance.

With use of nonculture tests to diagnose *N. gonorrhoeae* increasing and with local data on antimicrobial susceptibility less available, CDC strongly recommends that all state and local health department laboratories maintain or develop the capacity to perform culture (10). CDC also encourages all state and local health department laboratories to maintain the capacity to perform antimicrobial-susceptibility testing or form partnerships with experienced laboratories that can perform such testing. At a minimum, antimicrobial-susceptibility testing should be performed for ceftriaxone, spectinomycin, azithromycin, and any other regimens that are used locally for gonorrhea treatment.

^{*}For all adult and adolescent patients, regardless of travel history or sexual behavior. Information regarding management of these infections in patients with documented severe allergic reactions to penicillins or cephalosporins is available at http://www.cdc.gov/std/treatment.

Not available in the United States.

[§] Other single-dose cephalosporin regimens that are considered alternative treatment regimens against uncomplicated urogenital and anorectal gonococcal infections include ceftizoxime 500 mg IM; or cefoxitin 2 g IM, administered with probenecid 1 g orally; or cefotaxime 500 mg IM. Some evidence indicates that cefpodoxime 400 mg and cefuroxime axetil 1 g might be oral alternatives.

Acknowledgments

This report is based, in part, on contributions by J Thomas, T Sullivan, Emory Univ, Atlanta, Georgia; LJ Doyle, The Cleveland Clinic Foundation, Cleveland, Ohio; CJ Lenderman, P Dixon, Univ of Alabama at Birmingham, Birmingham, Alabama; K Winterscheid, Univ of Washington, Seattle, Washington; JM Ehret, Univ of Colorado Health Sciences Center, Denver, Colorado; and M Grabenstein, S Bowers, K Pettus, M Parekh, J Knapp, Laboratory Reference and Research Br, Div of Sexually Transmitted Diseases Prevention, National Center for HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention, CDC.

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Preliminary FoodNet Data on the Incidence of Infection with Pathogens Transmitted Commonly Through Food — 10 States, 2006

Foodborne illnesses are a substantial health burden in the United States (1). The Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network (FoodNet) of CDC's Emerging Infections Program

collects data from 10 U.S. states* regarding diseases caused by enteric pathogens transmitted commonly through food. FoodNet quantifies and monitors the incidence of these infections by conducting active, population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed illnesses (1). This report describes preliminary surveillance data for 2006 and compares them with baseline data from the period 1996–1998. Incidence of infections caused by *Campylobacter*, *Listeria*, *Shigella*, and *Yersinia* has declined since the baseline period. Incidence of infections caused by Shiga toxin-producing *Escherichia coli* O157 (STEC O157) and *Salmonella*, however, did not decrease significantly, and *Vibrio* infections have increased, indicating that further measures are needed to prevent foodborne illness and achieve national health objectives.

In 1996, FoodNet began active, population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed cases of infection caused by *Campylobacter, Listeria, Salmonella*, STEC O157, *Shigella*, *Vibrio*, and *Yersinia*. FoodNet personnel ascertain cases through contact with all clinical laboratories serving their surveillance areas. FoodNet added surveillance for cases of *Cryptosporidium* and *Cyclospora* infection in 1997 and STEC non-O157 infection in 2000. In 2004, FoodNet began collecting data on which laboratory-confirmed infections were associated with outbreaks.

Hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS) surveillance, which began in 2000, is conducted in nine states through a network of pediatric nephrologists and infection-control practitioners and is validated with a review of hospital discharge data. Because of the length of time required for review of hospital records, this report contains preliminary HUS data for 2005.

During 1996–2006, the FoodNet surveillance population increased from 14.2 million persons (5% of the U.S. population) in five states to 44.9 million persons (15% of the U.S. population) in 10 states. Preliminary incidence for 2006 was calculated by dividing the number of laboratory-confirmed infections by 2005 population estimates. Final incidence for 2006 will be reported when 2006 population estimates are available from the U.S. Census Bureau. In previous reports, the final incidence has been similar to the preliminary incidence.

Surveillance

In 2006, a total of 17,252 laboratory-confirmed cases of infections in FoodNet surveillance areas were identified:

^{*} Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, Minnesota, New Mexico, Oregon, Tennessee, and selected counties in California, Colorado, and New York.

Salmonella (6,655 cases), Campylobacter (5,712), Shigella (2,736), Cryptosporidium (859), STEC O157 (590), STEC non-O157 (209), Yersinia (158), Vibrio (154), Listeria (138), and Cyclospora (41). The overall incidence per 100,000 population was 14.81 for Salmonella, 12.71 for Campylobacter, 6.09 for Shigella, 1.91 for Cryptosporidium, 1.31 for STEC O157, 0.46 for STEC non-O157, 0.35 for Yersinia, 0.34 for Vibrio, 0.31 for Listeria, and 0.09 for Cyclospora. Substantial variation occurred among surveillance sites (Table). In 2005, FoodNet identified 71 cases of HUS in children aged <18 years (rate: 0.68 per 100,000 children); 47 (66%) cases occurred in children aged <5 years (rate: 1.63).

Of the 5,957 (90%) Salmonella isolates serotyped, seven serotypes accounted for 64% of infections: Typhimurium, 1,157 (19%); Enteritidis, 1,109 (19%); Newport, 531 (9%); Javiana, 292 (5%); Montevideo, 250 (4%); Heidelberg, 239 (4%); and a monophasic serotype identified as Salmonella I 4,[5],12:i:-, 239 (4%). Among 147 (95%) Vibrio isolates for which the species was identified, 94 (64%) were V. parahaemolyticus, and 18 (12%) were V. vulnificus. FoodNet also collected data on 209 STEC non-O157 isolates that were tested for O antigen determination; 188 (90%) had an identifiable O antigen, including O26 (53 isolates [28%]), O103 (46 [24%]), and O111 (29 [15%]); for 21 (10%) isolates, no reaction occurred with the typing antisera used by CDC, or O antigen information was not available.

Comparison with Baseline Period

A main-effects, log-linear Poisson regression model (negative binomial) was used to estimate statistically significant changes in incidence. This model accounts for the increase in the number of FoodNet sites and surveillance population and for variations in incidence among sites (1). For laboratory-confirmed infections, the average annual incidence for 1996–1998 (1997–1998 for *Cryptosporidium*) was used as the baseline. For HUS surveillance, 2000–2001 was used as the baseline. Estimated changes in incidence (relative rate) between the baseline period and 2006 and 95% confidence intervals (CIs) were calculated. Partly because of concerns that changes in clinical laboratory practices affected incidence, a baseline has not been set for non-O157 STEC (2) or *Salmonella* I 4,[5],12:i:-.

The estimated annual incidence of several infections changed significantly from baseline to 2006 (Figure 1). The estimated incidence of infection with *Yersinia* decreased 50% (CI = 37%–60%), *Shigella* decreased 35% (CI = 8%–54%), *Listeria* decreased 34% (CI = 17%–47%), *Campylobacter* decreased 30% (CI = 24%–35%), and *Vibrio* increased 78% (CI = 34%–138%). The estimated incidence of *Cryptosporidium*, *Salmonella*, and STEC O157 did not change significantly compared with the baseline. Although *Salmonella* incidence did not decrease significantly overall, the incidence of *S*. Typhimurium decreased significantly (41% [CI = 34%–48%]). In contrast,

TABLE. Incidence* of bacterial and parasitic infection in 2006 and hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS) in 2005, by site and pathogen/condition, compared with national health objectives[†] — Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network,§ United States

Pathogen/ Condition	California	Colorado	Connecticut	Georgia	Maryland	Minnesota	New Mexico	New York	Oregon	Tennessee	Overall 2006	National health objective
Bacteria												
Campylobacter	26.82	18.52	15.16	6.27	7.61	17.51	18.77	12.07	17.14	7.40	12.71	12.30
Listeria	0.25	0.19	0.54	0.22	0.50	0.14	0.26	0.51	0.30	0.22	0.31	0.25
Salmonella	15.19	13.84	14.41	20.04	13.86	14.05	13.33	11.44	11.01	14.04	14.81	6.80
Shigella	7.55	6.96	1.91	15.01	2.18	4.99	8.71	1.11	2.58	3.30	6.09	NA¶
STEC** O157	1.31	1.35	1.20	0.45	0.70	2.86	1.04	1.23	2.28	1.48	1.31	1.00
STEC non-O157	0.22	0.62	0.94	0.20	0.61	0.86	1.19	0.42	0.25	0.12	0.46	NA
Vibrio	1.15	0.12	0.54	0.28	0.59	0.08	0.10	0.28	0.27	0.15	0.34	NA
Yersinia	0.31	0.23	0.48	0.35	0.18	0.39	0.26	0.32	0.41	0.49	0.35	NA
Parasites												
Cryptosporidium	1.50	1.43	1.08	2.98	0.32	4.66	1.76	1.23	2.06	0.79	1.91	NA
Cyclospora	0	0	0.26	0.21	0.04	0.08	0.05	0	0.05	0.07	0.09	NA
HUS ^{††}	3.26	2.02	0.95	0.72	0.52	2.08	_	2.96	2.66	1.80	1.63	0.90

^{*} Per 100,000 population.

[†] Healthy People 2010 objectives for incidence of Campylobacter, Salmonella, and Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli O157 infections for year 2010 and for incidence of Listeria infections for year 2005.


[§] Surveillance populations (in millions): California (3.21), Colorado (2.59), Connecticut (3.51), Georgia (9.07), Maryland (5.60), Minnesota (5.13), New Mexico (1.93), New York (4.31), Oregon (3.64), Tennessee (5.96), and overall (44.95).

[¶] Not applicable because no national health objective exists regarding infection with this pathogen.

^{**} Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli.

^{††} Incidence rate for HUS in children aged <5 years; rate calculation is based on surveillance population aged <5 years in the nine sites that conducted hospital discharge data review.

FIGURE 1. Relative rates compared with 1996–1998 baseline period of laboratory-diagnosed cases of infection with *Campylobacter*, STEC* O157, *Listeria*, *Salmonella*, and *Vibrio*, by year — Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network, United States, 1996–2006



^{*} Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli.


significant increases in incidence compared with baseline occurred for *S*. Enteritidis (28%, CI = 4%–57%), *S*. Newport (42%, CI = 7%–87%), and *S*. Javiana (92%, CI = 22%–202%). The estimated incidence of *S*. Heidelberg and *S*. Montevideo did not change significantly compared with baseline (Figure 2). The estimated incidence of HUS in children aged <5 years also did not change significantly.[†]

Outbreak-Associated Cases of Infection

Outbreak-associated cases of infection accounted for at least 88 (15%) of 590 STEC O157 cases in 2006, compared with 36 (9.0%) of 402 cases in 2004 and 107 (23%) of 473 cases in 2005. Three large, high-profile multistate outbreaks of STEC O157 infections associated with produce affected FoodNet sites in 2006. Of the 88 outbreak-associated STEC O157 cases ascertained in FoodNet in 2006, one outbreak associated with bagged fresh spinach (3) accounted for 32 (36%), and two outbreaks associated with lettuce in two fast-food chains accounted for 14 (16%).

Outbreak-associated cases accounted for at least 404 (6.1%) of 6,655 *Salmonella* cases ascertained in FoodNet in 2006, compared with 352 (5.4%) of 6,498 cases in 2004 and 296 (4.6%) of 6,505 cases in 2005. A multistate outbreak of *S.* Typhimurium infections associated with tomatoes accounted for 58 (14%) outbreak-associated *Salmonella* cases ascertained in FoodNet in 2006, and an outbreak of *S.* Newport infections associated with tomatoes accounted for 37 (9.2%).

FIGURE 2. Relative rates compared with 1996–1998 baseline period of laboratory-diagnosed cases of infection with the six most commonly isolated *Salmonella* serotypes, by year — Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network, United States, 1996–2006



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Editorial Note: In 2006, compared with the 1996–1998 baseline period, significant declines occurred in the estimated incidence of *Campylobacter*, *Listeria*, *Shigella*, and *Yersinia* infections. However, most of these declines occurred before 2006. Most of the decline in *Campylobacter* incidence occurred by 2001. In 2006, the incidence of *Listeria* infections remained higher than at its lowest point in 2002.

After substantial declines in 2003 and 2004, the incidence of STEC O157 infections increased in 2005 (4) and again in 2006. The earlier decline in incidence was temporally associated with measures by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection Service (USDA-FSIS) and the beefprocessing industry to reduce the contamination of ground beef. These measures were accompanied by a decline in the frequency of isolation of STEC O157 from ground beef in 2003 and 2004 (5). In 2005 and 2006, however, the frequency

[†] Additional information, including data on age-specific trends and trends of HUS, is available at http://www.cdc.gov/foodnet.

of isolation of STEC O157 in ground beef remained at the same level as 2004. Reasons for the increases in human STEC O157 infections in 2005 and 2006 are not known. However, STEC O157 outbreaks caused by contaminated spinach and lettuce in 2006 highlight the need to more effectively prevent contamination of produce that is consumed raw. In a measure to reduce the risk for illness attributed to fresh produce, the Food and Drug Administration recently published draft guidance advising processors on how to minimize microbial food-safety hazards common to the processing of most freshcut fruits and vegetables (6).

Of the six most common Salmonella serotypes in 2006, only Typhimurium has declined since the baseline, and its incidence since 2003 has been stable. Transmission of Salmonella to humans can occur via many vehicles, including produce, eggs, poultry and other meat, and direct contact with animals and their environments. The two outbreaks of salmonellosis associated with tomatoes in 2006 underscore the need to more effectively prevent contamination of produce that is consumed raw. Poultry is an important source of human Salmonella infections. USDA-FSIS reported an increase in the frequency of isolation of Salmonella, particularly S. Enteriditis, in chicken-broiler carcasses during 2000-2005 (7,8). The predominant S. Enteriditis phage type strains isolated from chickens matched those associated with eating chicken in a FoodNet case-control study (7,9), indicating that chicken is an important source of human S. Enteriditis infections. In early 2006, USDA-FSIS launched an initiative to reduce Salmonella in poultry and other meat (10). For the period 2001–2006, a USDA-FSIS testing program identified 2006 as the year with the lowest percentage of chickens that tested positive for

The incidence of *Vibrio* infections has increased to the highest level since FoodNet began conducting surveillance. These infections are most often associated with the consumption of raw seafood, particularly oysters. Additional measures to reduce contamination of seafood more effectively are warranted. Consumers, especially persons who are immunocompromised, should be informed they are at increased risk for *Vibrio* infections when they consume raw seafood.

Much remains to be done to reach the national health objectives for foodborne illnesses. Enhanced measures are needed to control pathogens in animals and plants; to reduce

or prevent contamination during growing, harvesting, and processing; and to educate consumers more effectively about risks and prevention measures. Such measures can be better focused when the source of human infections (i.e., animal reservoir species and transmission route) is known. In particular, further research is needed to understand how contamination of fresh produce occurs so that new measures to reduce such contamination can be developed and implemented.

Consumers can reduce their risk for foodborne illness by following safe food-handling recommendations and by avoiding consumption of unpasteurized milk, raw or undercooked oysters, raw or undercooked eggs, raw or undercooked ground beef, and undercooked poultry. The risk for foodborne illness also can be decreased by choosing in-shell pasteurized eggs, irradiated ground meat, and high-pressure—treated oysters. Additional information on food safety for consumers is available at http://www.foodsafety.gov.

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[§] Additional information is available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/science/ground_beef_e.coli_testing_results/index.asp.

Additional information is available at http://www.health.gov/healthypeople.

Progress Toward Poliomyelitis Eradication — Pakistan and Afghanistan, January 2006–February 2007

Of the four countries where wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission has never been interrupted, two are in the World Health Organization's (WHO) Eastern Mediterranean Region: Pakistan and Afghanistan (1).* During January 2006–February 2007, the number of reported WPV cases in both countries increased. In addition, an increase was observed in the number of affected districts; however, genetic diversity of the virus decreased, and regions of transmission remained limited. This report updates a previous report (2) and describes polio cases and eradication activities in Pakistan and Afghanistan during January 2006–February 2007. Critical to the success of polio eradication will be high vaccination coverage among children in areas of frequent conflict along the border between these two countries.

Immunization Activities

Routine coverage of infants with 3 doses of oral polio vaccine (OPV) remained low in 2006, at 69% and 64% in Afghanistan and Pakistan, respectively. Reported 3-dose OPV coverage, however, varied substantially among provinces within each country, ranging from 20% to 80% in Afghanistan, and from 42% to 90% in Pakistan. Coverage was higher in areas with good health infrastructure and management, easy access, and higher levels of literacy.

In 2006, Pakistan conducted 12 supplemental immunization activities (SIAs), sonsisting of six national immunization days (NIDs), two sub-NIDs (SNIDs), three large-scale SIAs in response to reported WPV cases, and one cross-border SIA in collaboration with Afghanistan. SNIDs in Pakistan were conducted primarily in districts at high risk for poliovirus circulation, including semiautonomous tribal areas of North-West Frontier Province; districts of Balochistan Province, bordering Afghanistan; and Sindh Province (including Karachi city).

*The other two countries are India and Nigeria.

During 2006, Afghanistan conducted five NIDs and five SNIDs, with most SNIDs covering the southern, southwestern, and eastern regions along the border with Pakistan. During the first 2 months of 2007, Pakistan conducted two SIAs (one NID and one SNID), and Afghanistan conducted two SNIDs.

SIAs in both countries continued to be effective, with vaccination rates estimated at >95% among children aged <5 years. However, evidence from post-SIA assessments, field observations, and reported vaccination histories of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) cases indicates that vaccination coverage remains suboptimal, particularly in the known high-risk, security-compromised, and remote areas along the border between the two countries. In Pakistan, these areas include parts of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, North-West Frontier Province, and Balochistan Province. In Afghanistan, the most serious security situation persists in the Southern Region (Kandahar, Helmand, Oruzgan, and Zabul provinces), but security also is compromised in large parts of the South Eastern Region and in parts of the Eastern Region. Because of the extensive cross-border movement and migration between Pakistan and Afghanistan, especially in the region stretching from central Pakistan through Balochistan into southern Afghanistan, SIAs in the two countries generally were synchronized to ensure simultaneous, comprehensive coverage of border areas and of children in transit.

In 2006, monovalent type 1 OPV (mOPV1), which is most effective against the outbreak serotype, WPV type 1 (WPV1) (3), was used in most high-transmission risk areas during four of the 12 SIAs conducted in Pakistan, and five of the 10 SIAs in Afghanistan. However, in Pakistan, since the November 2006 SIA, only trivalent OPV (tOPV) has been used in SIAs because of the persistent transmission of both WPV1 and WPV type 3 (WPV3). In 2007, the extent of mOPV1 use in SIAs in both countries will depend on the types of poliovirus circulation.

Acute Flaccid Paralysis (AFP) Surveillance

The Global Polio Eradication Initiative relies on an acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance system to identify cases of poliomyelitis. Through this system, AFP cases in all children aged <15 years and suspected polio in persons of any age are reported and investigated as possible poliomyelitis. AFP surveillance quality is monitored according to World Health

[†] Sources of coverage data are unpublished reports from the Ministry of Health on routine immunization coverage (Afghanistan) and an independent coverage evaluation conducted in May 2006 (Pakistan).

[§] Mass campaigns conducted during a brief period (days to weeks) in which 1 dose of OPV is administered to all children aged <5 years, regardless of vaccination history. The geographic extent of campaigns (national versus subnational) is determined by analysis of surveillance data. OPV can be administered at fixed sites, by mobile teams during house-to-house visits, by mobile teams at transit points (e.g., train stations or markets), or through a combination of strategies, depending on local circumstances.

[¶]mOPV1 contains polio vaccine against WPV1 only and does not provide protection against other WPV types. mOPV1 provides greater immunity to a specific WPV type than does the same number of doses of trivalent OPV.

Organization (WHO) operational targets.** The national nonpolio AFP rate (number of nonpolio AFP cases per 100,000 population aged <15 years) was 5.8 in Pakistan and 6.2 in Afghanistan, above the target rate of two cases; adequate stool specimens^{††} were collected from 89% (range: 82%–95% among provinces) and 91% (range: 64%–100% among provinces) of AFP cases in Pakistan and Afghanistan, respectively, above the target of 80% (Table).

The polio laboratory at the National Institutes of Health in Islamabad, Pakistan, which serves as a Regional Reference Laboratory in the global polio laboratory network, continues to provide laboratory support for AFP surveillance in both countries. The National Institutes of Health laboratory performs the initial virus isolation, intratypic differentiation, and genomic sequencing. Since July 2006, the laboratory has implemented a fast-processing algorithm, which shortens the interval between receiving the specimen and reporting the results to approximately 14 days (an approximate 50% reduction).

WPV Incidence

In Pakistan, the number of confirmed polio cases increased from 28 cases reported from 17 districts in 2005 to 40 cases reported from 20 districts in 2006. Of the 40 polio cases, 20 were caused by WPV1 and 20 by WPV3. The majority of WPV1 cases were reported from Sindh Province or from security-compromised areas in North-West Frontier Province (Figure). Approximately 73% of polio patients were aged <2 years, 13% had never received any OPV doses, and 18% had received 1 to 3 OPV doses. Additionally, 18% of patients were of Afghani origin, a group that accounts for approximately 2% of the total Pakistan population. The resurgence of WPV3 in Pakistan was reported in late 2006 in northern Sindh and North-West Frontier Province, caused by a virus strain that had circulated in southern Afghanistan in 2005 and early 2006 and was reintroduced into Pakistan through Balochistan Province. The virus spread most rapidly in Sindh, and by February 2007, a total of 10 WPV3 cases had been reported from eight districts. As of February 28, six cases (two WPV1 and four WPV3) had been confirmed.

In Afghanistan, 31 WPV cases were reported in 2006 (29 WPV1 and two WPV3), up from nine total cases in 2005 (2). After nearly 2 years without a report of WPV1 in the Southern Region, an importation of WPV1 from Pakistan in late 2005 resulted in an outbreak that peaked in June–July 2006 and ended in early September 2006. Apart from this regional outbreak, Afghanistan reported only two WPV1 cases (one

TABLE. Acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance indicators and reported wild poliovirus (WPV) cases, by quarter and type — Pakistan and Afghanistan, January 2006–February 2007

		FP reporti	ng (2006)			Report	ad WDV	cases (20	06)			
Country/ Province	No. AFP	Nonpolio AFP	% persons with AFP with adequate		Qu	arter	eu wr v	Total by WP	cases V type	Total	by type, (Februar	VPV cases, January 1– y 28, 2007)
or region	cases	rate*	specimens [†]	1	2	3	4	WPV1	WPV3	cases	WPV1	WPV3
Pakistan	4,410	5.8	89	2	10	13	15	20	20	40	2	4
NWFP§	965	8.2	86	1	3	7	5	11	5	16	1	1
Balochistan	226	6.3	83	1	5	2	2	4	6	10	_	1
Punjab	1,934	4.8	92	_	1	1	_	1	1	2	_	_
Sindh	1,207	7.0	87	_	1	3	8	4	8	12	1	2
Other areas¶	78	3.1	87	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_
Afghanistan	989	6.2	91	6	16	7	2	29	2	31	_	_
Southern	154	4.5	81	6	15	6	1	26	2	28	_	_
South Eastern	67	4.2	97	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_
Eastern	107	7.4	88	_	_	1	_	1	_	1	_	_
Western	151	5.8	92	_	1	_	_	1	_	1	_	_
Central	197	6.6	93	_	_			_	_	_	_	_
North Eastern	118	6.4	91	_	_	_	1	1	_	1	_	_
Northern	168	7.6	96	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_
Badakhshan	27	5.9	93	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_

^{*} Per 100,000 children aged <15 years.

^{**} Current WHO operational targets for countries at high risk for polio transmission are a nonpolio AFP rate of at least two cases per 100,000 population aged <15 years at each subnational level and adequate stool specimen collection for >80% of AFP cases (i.e., two specimens collected >24 hours apart, both within 14 days of paralysis onset, and shipped on ice or frozen ice packs to a WHO-accredited laboratory and arriving at the laboratory in good condition).


^{††} Two stool specimens collected 24 hours apart within 2 weeks of paralysis onset that arrive at the lab in good condition.

Two stool specimens that are collected at an interval of at least 24 hours within 14 days of paralysis onset and properly shipped to the laboratory.

[§] North-West Frontier Province.

Includes Azad, Jammu, Kashmir (AJK), the Federally Administered Northern Areas, and Islamabad.

FIGURE. Wild poliovirus (WPV) cases,* by district — Afghanistan and Pakistan, January 2006–February 2007†



* Excludes viruses detected from environmental surveillance and vaccine-derived polioviruses.

† Data reported to the World Health Organization as of February 28, 2007.

from Nangarhar Province, Eastern Region, and one from Baghlan Province, North Eastern Region). Neither of these cases led to extended virus transmission, and genetic data suggest that both cases were imported recently from the Southern Region outbreak area or from Pakistan. Both 2006 WPV3 cases were reported from the Southern Region. Twenty (65%) of 31 cases reported in 2006 were among children aged <2 years; six (19%) of those children had never received OPV, and 10 (32%) had received 1 to 3 doses of OPV. In 2007, no polio cases had been reported from Afghanistan as of February 28. However, the security-compromised, hard-toaccess area around Kandahar, Southern Region (adjacent to the Quetta area of Balochistan, Pakistan) remains the area at greatest risk for undetected poliovirus transmission. In previous outbreaks, circulating virus has been reported in Kandahar with subsequent spread to other provinces in western and central Afghanistan.

Genetic sequencing revealed that five clusters of genetic lineages of WPV1 and two clusters of WPV3 circulated in Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2006, a decrease in the number of lineages from seven WPV1 and three WPV3 in 2005. The genetic data also suggested strong links between viruses reported in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Reported by: WHO Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office Egypt, Cairo; WHO Pakistan, Islamabad; WHO Afghanistan, Kabul; Immunization, Vaccines, and Biologicals Dept, WHO, Geneva, Switzerland. Global Immunization Div, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, CDC.

Editorial Note: Although the number of confirmed polio cases increased during 2006 in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, some progress was made toward the eradication goal in both countries. WPV transmission in Pakistan in 2006 was confined to previously known areas of transmission: south and central North-West Frontier Province; the Quetta area of Balochistan, bordering the Southern Region of Afghanistan; and Karachi in Sindh. After the use of mOPV1 during several SIAs since 2005 (3), WPV1 transmission in Pakistan was lower in 2006 than in any previous year since poliovirus type has been measured, with only one WPV1 case each reported from Punjab Province and from northern Sindh. In Afghanistan, the WPV1 outbreak in the southern area of the country ended, with no further reports of WPV1 from

the area since early September 2006. Although WPV1 was imported into two other regions of Afghanistan, the virus did not spread. In addition, the genetic diversity of both types of WPV circulating in Afghanistan and Pakistan continued to decrease, and AFP surveillance remained sensitive in both countries.

Vaccinating children in areas of conflict remains one of the greatest challenges in both countries and will require continued engagement of civil administration and local communities, including support from tribal and religious leaders. Additional focus has been placed on the identification of and access to mobile populations in areas of high poliovirus transmission. Cross-border coordination of polio activities, including two joint SNIDs, indicates government commitment to the program in both countries. The two respective ministers of health conducted a meeting on polio and jointly inaugurated the cross-border mop-up vaccination campaign in December 2006. The number of permanent vaccination posts at the border also was increased from two to 15.

Interruption of WPV transmission in Pakistan and Afghanistan is a regional and global priority. Success will require overcoming one of the greatest challenges to polio eradication:

accessing and vaccinating children along the large, remote, and increasingly security-compromised border between the two countries. This area is now recognized as the principal remaining virus reservoir in the region and a primary source of poliovirus spread into other areas, facilitated by frequent border crossings. Achieving a high rate of vaccination coverage in this border area will require continued support from the international polio partnership, §§ commitment to high-quality SIAs from political and health leaders at all levels, and close coordination of polio eradication activities between the two countries.

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Notice to Readers

Availability of Provisional AIDS and HIV/AIDS Data in Table IV and Pediatric HIV Surveillance Data in Table I


CDC is upgrading the national human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) surveillance data management system. During this transition, CDC will not update AIDS or HIV/AIDS surveillance data in the quarterly *MMWR* Table IV. In addition, CDC will not provide monthly updates of HIV infection data for persons aged <13 years in Table I. A footnote that explains this situation will be included with Tables I and IV during the period when no updates are available.

Solio eradication efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan are supported by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation; the governments of Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom; the International Committee of the Red Cross; the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies; Rotary International; UNICEF; the United States Agency for International Development; WHO; and CDC.

QuickStats

FROM THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS

Distribution of Births, by Gestational Age — United States, 1990 and 2005



The distribution of births by gestational age changed between 1990 and 2005. The percentage of preterm births (<37 completed weeks of gestation) increased 20%, from 10.6% to 12.7%; the percentage of births at 37–39 weeks of gestation also increased, from 41.4% to 53.5%, a 29% increase. In contrast, the percentage of infants born at 40 weeks and especially 41 weeks of gestation declined (15% and 43%, respectively).

SOURCE: National Vital Statistics System. Births: preliminary data for 2005. Available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/pubs/pubd/hestats/prelimbirths05/prelimbirths05.htm.

TABLE I. Provisional cases of infrequently reported notifiable diseases (<1,000 cases reported during the preceding year) — United States, week ending April 7, 2007 (14th Week)*

	Current	Cum	5-year weekly	Total o	ases rep	orted for	r previou	s years	
Disease	week	2007	average [†]	2006	2005	2004	2003	2002	States reporting cases during current week (No.
Anthrax		_		1				2	
Botulism:									
foodborne	_	_	0	19	19	16	20	28	
infant	_	13	1	95	85	87	76	69	
other (wound & unspecified)	_	2	1	45	31	30	33	21	
Brucellosis	_	25	2	119	120	114	104	125	
Chancroid	_	1	1	34	17	30	54	67	
Cholera	_	_	0	7	8	5	2	2	
Cyclosporiasis§	2	14	2	135	543	171	75	156	FL (2)
Diphtheria	_	_	_	_	_	_	1	1	
Domestic arboviral diseases§.1:									
California serogroup	_	_	0	63	80	112	108	164	
eastern equine	_	_	_	7	21	6	14	10	
Powassan	_	_	_	1	1	1	44	1	
St. Louis	_	_	0	9	13	12	41	28	
western equine Ehrlichiosis§:	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	
human granulocytic		13	2	575	786	537	362	511	
human monocytic	1	29	1	500	506	338	321	216	CA (1)
human (other & unspecified)	,	10	0	230	112	59	44	23	OA (I)
Haemophilus influenzae,**	_	10	O	200	112	33		20	
invasive disease (age <5 yrs):									
serotype b	1	3	0	9	9	19	32	34	MN (1)
nonserotype b	i	12	3	103	135	135	117	144	NC (1)
unknown serotype	3	82	5	248	217	177	227	153	FL (1), TN (1), UT (1)
Hansen disease§	_	9	2	73	87	105	95	96	- ('), ('), (')
Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome§	_	2	0	38	26	24	26	19	
Hemolytic uremic syndrome, postdiarrheal§	4	25	2	272	221	200	178	216	NY (1), MO (2), TX (1)
Hepatitis C viral, acute	7	164	21	841	652	713	1,102	1,835	NY (1), MN (2), FL (1), OK (1), WA (1), OR (1)
HIV infection, pediatric (age <13 yrs) ^{††}	_	_	5	52	380	436	504	420	
Influenza-associated pediatric mortality §, §§	1	41	1	41	45	_	N	N	AK (1)
Listeriosis	11	121	10	816	896	753	696	665	NY (2), PA (1), GA (1), FL (2), TN (2), TX (1), CA (2)
Measles [¶]	3	5	1	52	66	37	56	44	NC (3)
Meningococcal disease, invasive***:									
A, C, Y, & W-135	2	54	6	233	297	_	_	_	WA (2)
serogroup B	3	24	3	145	156	_	_	_	OK (1), WA (2)
other serogroup	_	6	1	_25	_27	_	_	_	
unknown serogroup	12	187	20	716	765	_	_	_	OH (1), MN (1), FL (2), TN (1), AZ (1), WA (1),
									CA (5)
Mumps	4	222	88	6,541	314	258	231	270	OH (1), WA (2), CA (1)
Novel influenza A virus infections	_	_	_	N	N	N	N	N	
Plague	_	_	_	17	8	3	1	2	
Poliomyelitis, paralytic	_	_	_	 N	1	N	N		
Poliovirus infection, nonparalytic [§] Psittacosis [§]	_	3	0	20	N 16	12	12	N 18	
Q fever [§]	1	34	2	178	136	70	71	61	MD (1)
Rabies, human		J4	0	3	2	70	2	3	WID (1)
Rubella ^{†††}	_	9	0	8	11	10	7	18	
Rubella, congenital syndrome	_	_	0	1	'i	_	1	1	
SARS-CoV ^{§,§§§}	_	_	Ö			_	8	N	
Smallpox§	_	_	_	_	_	_	_		
Streptococcal toxic-shock syndrome§	_	17	5	101	129	132	161	118	
Syphilis, congenital (age <1 yr)	_	37	7	334	329	353	413	412	
Tetanus	_	3	0	33	27	34	20	25	
Toxic-shock syndrome (staphylococcal)§	2	19	2	96	90	95	133	109	VA (1), CO (1)
Trichinellosis	_	1	0	14	16	5	6	14	
Tularemia	_	2	0	89	154	134	129	90	
Typhoid fever	2	57	5	317	324	322	356	321	CA (2)
Vancomycin-intermediate Staphylococcus aure	eus§ —	2	0	4	2	_	N	N	
Vancomycin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus§	_	_	0	1	3	1	N	N	
Vibriosis (non-cholera Vibrio species infections) [§] 4	26	_	N	N	N	N	N	FL (3), CA (1)
Yellow fever	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	1	

-: No reported cases. N: Not notifiable.

No reported cases. N: Not notifiable. Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts.

Incidence data for reporting years 2006 and 2007 are provisional, whereas data for 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005 are finalized.

Calculated by summing the incidence counts for the current week, the 2 weeks preceding the current week, and the 2 weeks following the current week, for a total of 5 preceding years. Additional information is available at http://www.cdc.gov/epo/dphsi/phs/files/5yearweeklyaverage.pdf.

Not notifiable in all states. Data from states where the condition is not notifiable are excluded from this table, except in 2007 for the domestic arboviral diseases and influenza-associated pediatric mortality, and in 2003 for SARS-CoV. Reporting exceptions are available at http://www.cdc.gov/epo/dphsi/phs/infdis.htm.

Includes both neuroinvasive and non-neuroinvasive. Updated weekly from reports to the Division of Vector-Borne Infectious Diseases, National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and Enteric Diseases (ArboNET Surveillance). Data for West Nile virus are available in Table II.

Data for H. influenzae (all ages, all serotypes) are available in Table II.

Updated monthly from reports to the Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention, National Center for HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention. Implementation of HIV reporting influences the number of cases reported. Updates of pediatric HIV data have been temporarily suspended until upgrading of the national HIV/AIDS surveillance data management system is completed. Data for HIV/AIDS, when available, are displayed in Table IV, which appears quarterly.

Updated weekly from reports to the Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases. A total of 42 cases were reported for the 2006–07 fluences.

The three measles cases reported for the current week were indigenous.

Data for meningococcal disease (all serogroups) are available in Table II.

No rubella cases were reported for the current week.

Updated weekly from reports to the Division of Viral and Rickettsial Diseases, National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and Enteric Diseases.

TABLE II. Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending April 7, 2007, and April 8, 2006 (14th Week)*

			Chlamyd	lia [†]				ioidomy	cosis				otosporid	iosis	
	Current		vious veeks	Cum	Cum	Current		vious weeks	Cum	Cum	Current		vious veeks	Cum	Cum
Reporting area	week	Med	Max	2007	2006	week	Med	Max	2007	2006	week	Med	Max	2007	2006
United States	10,216	19,779	23,540	237,694	267,578	116	150	478	2,128	2,362	14	68	301	583	712
New England Connecticut Maine [§] Massachusetts New Hampshire Rhode Island [§] Vermont [§]	372 207 55 — 20 69 21	674 201 47 304 38 63 20	1,364 833 73 604 69 108 45	8,502 2,006 707 4,117 503 925 244	7,928 1,625 557 4,025 470 908 343		0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0	N — — — N	N — — — — N	1 - 1 - - -	3 0 0 0 0 0	22 7 6 14 5 5	27 7 8 — 6 —	73 38 8 20 5 —
Mid. Atlantic New Jersey New York (Upstate) New York City Pennsylvania	2,257 — 572 1,202 483	2,459 384 505 753 770	4,163 543 2,745 1,325 1,006	31,724 3,842 6,164 11,224 10,494	32,776 5,118 5,490 11,436 10,732	N N N N	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	N N N N	N N N N	3 3 —	11 0 3 2 4	33 3 13 12 18	71 — 23 13 35	115 8 22 30 55
E.N. Central Illinois Indiana Michigan Ohio Wisconsin	1,064 575 — 309 27 153	3,201 1,019 374 757 625 374	4,471 1,333 632 1,225 2,269 528	38,636 12,153 5,077 9,454 7,294 4,658	46,061 14,982 5,685 7,513 11,878 6,003		1 0 0 1 0	3 0 0 3 2 0	10 — 8 2 N	9 6 3 N	2 — — 2 —	15 2 1 2 5 4	110 22 18 9 33 53	121 3 10 29 48 31	159 22 9 30 57 41
W.N. Central lowa Kansas Minnesota Missouri Nebraska [§] North Dakota South Dakota	93 — — — — 33 60	1,186 155 147 245 447 99 30 50	1,445 225 270 314 628 180 64 84	13,820 2,064 1,861 2,396 5,220 1,260 351 668	16,962 2,373 2,267 3,585 6,133 1,395 530 679	1 N N - 1 N N N	0 0 0 0 0 0	54 0 0 54 1 0 0	3 N N 3 N N N	N N — N N N	4 — 2 2 — —	12 2 1 3 2 1 0	77 28 8 25 21 16 1	91 15 13 23 19 6 1	96 7 14 40 23 4 — 8
S. Atlantic Delaware District of Columbia Florida Georgia Maryland [§] North Carolina South Carolina [§] Virginia [§] West Virginia	2,399 41 92 — 509 645 609 503	3,706 68 65 960 708 342 624 384 461 57	6,115 111 161 1,187 3,022 951 1,772 2,105 685 96	39,069 965 1,331 3,300 6,520 5,167 8,301 6,415 6,518 552	51,227 1,008 755 12,561 8,682 4,685 10,310 5,853 6,636 737		0 0 0 0 0 0 0	1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0	1 N N N 1 N N N	2 N N N 2 N N N	3 2 1 	17 0 0 8 5 0 0 1 1	68 3 2 32 12 2 11 14 5	177 2 3 89 49 5 8 11 9	168
E.S. Central Alabama [§] Kentucky Mississippi Tennessee [§]	630 70 68 — 492	1,470 421 131 401 528	2,093 577 691 958 709	20,505 4,915 1,541 6,033 8,016	20,691 6,977 2,557 4,330 6,827	N N N N	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	N N N N	N N N N	1 - - 1	3 0 1 0	14 11 3 3 5	28 12 9 3 4	20 8 6 1 5
W.S. Central Arkansas [§] Louisiana Oklahoma Texas [§]	1,370 184 60 129 997	2,203 157 303 263 1,451	3,026 337 610 473 1,908	28,717 2,223 3,662 3,699 19,133	29,498 2,206 4,588 2,714 19,990		0 0 0 0	1 0 1 0	N - N N	N - N N	_ _ _ _	5 0 1 1 2	45 2 9 4 36	22 2 5 10 5	35 4 — 9 22
Mountain Arizona Colorado Idaho [§] Montana [§] Nevada [§] New Mexico [§] Utah Wyoming [§]	278 72 — 23 3 174 — 6	1,270 431 317 54 51 107 183 97 28	2,018 993 416 253 144 397 321 201 54	12,167 2,854 1,781 1,004 662 2,234 2,159 1,132 341	17,034 5,041 4,172 915 598 1,811 2,762 1,341 394	80 80 N N N	102 102 0 0 0 1 0	201 199 0 0 0 3 3 4 0	1,455 1,432 N N N 7 5	1,802 1,756 N N N 21 4 19	_ _ _ _ _ _	3 0 1 0 0 0 0	39 3 7 5 26 1 5 3	30 7 11 1 2 — 6 1	26 3 5 3 5 3 5 3 2 5
Pacific Alaska California Hawaii Oregon [§] Washington	1,753 79 1,183 — 153 338	3,377 85 2,670 107 161 352	4,075 157 3,198 133 394 548	44,554 1,090 34,807 1,289 2,591 4,777	45,401 1,113 35,053 1,603 2,621 5,011	35 N 35 N N	53 0 53 0 0	299 0 299 0 0	659 N 659 N N	549 N 549 N N	_ _ _ _ _	1 0 0 0 1	5 1 0 1 4	16 — — — 16 —	20 — — 20 —
American Samoa C.N.M.I. Guam Puerto Rico U.S. Virgin Islands	U - - U	0 — 111 4	46 — — 236 9	U U — 1,994 U	U U — 1,238 U	U U N U	0 - 0 0	0 - 0 0	U N U	U U N U	U U N U	0 — 0 0	0 — 0 0	U 	U U N U

C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
U: Unavailable. —: No reported cases. N: Not notifiable. Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts. Med: Median. Max: Maximum.

* Incidence data for reporting years 2006 and 2007 are provisional. Data for HIV/AIDS, AIDS, and TB, when available, are displayed in Table IV, which appears quarterly. Chlamydia refers to genital infections caused by *Chlamydia trachomatis*.

Scontains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).

TABLE II. (Continued) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending April 7, 2007, and April 8, 2006 (14th Week)*

(14th Week)*			Giardiasi	s			G	onorrhe	а		Hae		s influen.	zae, invas	ive
		Prev		3				evious	ш				vious	otypes	
Reporting area	Current week	52 w		Cum 2007	Cum 2006	Current week		weeks Max	Cum 2007	Cum 2006	Current week		veeks Max	Cum 2007	Cum 2006
United States	155	309	530	3,172	3,914	3,052	6,792	8,674	76,649	91,545	43	43	137	612	636
New England Connecticut Maine§	4 _ 2	18 5 4	44 25 14	118 48 39	264 45 18	64 55 1	111 42 2	259 203 8	1,343 433 20	1,312 419 38	=	2 0 0	12 7 4	23 15 5	31 8 5
Massachusetts New Hampshire Rhode Island§	_ _ _	0 0 0	18 9 17	_ 1 _	137 8 12	2 6	48 3 10	96 9 19	697 40 139	651 61 128	=	0 0 0	7 2 3		15 — 1
Vermont [§] Mid. Atlantic	2 27	3 64	12 120	30 586	44 811	— 505	1 633	5 1,521	14 8,428	15 8,897	10	0 10	2 25	138	2 141
New Jersey New York (Upstate) New York City	 17 3	7 25 17	16 101 33	36 219 182	125 227 263	124 199	103 122 175	158 1,035 376	1,229 1,596 2,502	1,468 1,508 2,808	8	1 3 2	4 14 6	8 38 35	22 30 33
Pennsylvania	7	14	35	149	196	182	224	336	3,101	3,113	2	3 5	10	57	56
E.N. Central Illinois Indiana Michigan	13 — N 2	39 8 0 13	96 27 0 38	420 29 N 151	683 157 N 194	391 157 — 178	1,283 363 154 306	2,227 488 289 880	15,497 4,231 2,062 4,279	18,459 5,640 2,491 2,870	1 - -	1 1 0	14 5 10 5	55 3 7 8	92 27 14 13
Ohio Wisconsin	11	15 15 9	32 24	188 52	204 128	8 48	310 133	1,165 181	3,244 1,681	5,449 2,009	1	2	6 3	37 —	24 14
W.N. Central lowa	7	23 5	117 16	222 46	340 60	11 —	384 37	518 63	4,444 475	5,132 490	_2	3 0	22 1	35 —	28 —
Kansas Minnesota Missouri	 5	3 0 9	11 87 28	29 7 109	41 77 114	=	43 65 195	90 87 269	564 668 2,354	641 840 2,701	2	0 1 0	2 17 5	4 12 15	3 10 12
Nebraska [§] North Dakota South Dakota	1	2 0 1	9 4 6	20 1 10	22 5 21	 2 9	24 2 6	48 6 15	290 16 77	338 31 91	=	0 0 0	2 2 0	3	3
S. Atlantic Delaware	36	52 1	97 4	631 7	571 7	870 18	1,599 28	2,696 44	15,301 379	22,275 401	16	11 0	28 3	176 5	162
District of Columbia Florida	23	1 23	7 44	15 288	16 240	41 —	35 446	63 549	586 1,564	498 5,777	7	0	2 9	2 56	
Georgia Maryland [§] North Carolina	4 2 —	12 4 0	26 11 0	154 49 —	118 49 —	134 270	349 119 314	1,539 230 608	2,706 1,642 4,080	3,933 1,798 5,216	4 2 2	2 2 0	6 5 8	50 30 15	41 21 15
South Carolina [§] Virginia [§] West Virginia	1 6 —	2 9 0	8 28 21	15 96 7	22 114 5	278 129 —	166 119 19	1,026 238 44	2,590 1,595 159	2,675 1,785 192	_	1 1 0	3 7 6	12 1 5	13 16 9
E.S. Central Alabama [§] Kentucky	1 1 N	8 4 0	34 22 0	91 46 N	100 49 N	198 8 20	584 193 50	878 271 268	7,314 2,017 499	8,211 3,195 895	2	2 0 0	9 3 1	33 7 1	46 10 4
Mississippi Tennessee§	N —	0 4	0 12	N 45	N 51	— 170	154 194	434 240	2,106 2,692	1,625 2,496		0	1 6		3 29
W.S. Central Arkansas [§]	5 3	7 3	21 13	74 35	38 18	556 111	960 80	1,483 142	11,929 1,072	12,353 1,231	5	1 0	26 2	35 2	23
Louisiana Oklahoma Texas [§]	2 N	1 2 0	6 11 0	12 27 N	20 N	83 40 322	184 107 587	366 238 931	2,302 1,566 6,989	2,668 926 7,528	5	0 1 0	3 24 2	3 28 2	1 19 1
Mountain Arizona	10 1	29 3	69 11	313 49	357 40	62 19	269 106	455 220	2,360 626	3,680 1,217	4 2	4 2	14 9	86 42	84 34
Colorado Idaho [§] Montana [§]	5 1 —	10 3 2	26 12 11	116 25 16	119 38 18	4	71 2 3	93 20 20	524 64 26	973 58 32	1 	1 0 0	4 1 0	20 3 —	23 2 —
Nevada [§] New Mexico [§]	_	1	9	19 18	29 17	39	31 30	135 65	534 395	627 473	_	0	2 2	3 8	6 10
Utah Wyoming [§]	3	7 1	25 4	62 8	91 5	_	16 2	28 5	173 18	250 50	1	0	3 1	10	9
Pacific Alaska	52 2	60 1	147 17	717 16	750 8	395 11	787 11	971 27	10,033 118	11,226 148	3	2	8 2	31 4	29
California Hawaii Oregon [§]	30 - 7	43 1 8	71 4 14	512 15 101	570 17 102	324 — 8	649 15 26	833 30 46	8,524 146 285	9,284 286 372	 3	0 0 1	6 1 6	1 26	9 4 12
Washington American Samoa	13 U	8	68 0	73 U	53 U	52 U	76 0	131 2	960 U	1,136 U	U U	0	2	U	1 U
C.N.M.I. Guam	<u>U</u>	_	_	U 	U 	<u>U</u>	_	_	U 	U 	<u>U</u>	_	_	<u>U</u>	<u>U</u>
Puerto Rico U.S. Virgin Islands	U	5 0	19 0	42 U	22 U	U	6 0	16 3	97 U	94 U	U	0	2 0	U	U

C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
U: Unavailable. —: No reported cases. N: Not notifiable. Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts. Med: Med: * Incidence data for reporting years 2006 and 2007 are provisional.
Data for *H. influenzae* (age <5 yrs for serotype b, nonserotype b, and unknown serotype) are available in Table I. Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS). Max: Maximum.

TABLE II. (*Continued*) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending April 7, 2007, and April 8, 2006 (14th Week)*

				tis (viral, a	cute), by t	/pe [†]		В				14	egionellos	sis	
		Previ	A ous				Prev	ious					vious	513	
Reporting area	Current week	52 we		Cum 2007	Cum 2006	Current week		reeks Max	Cum 2007	Cum 2006	Current week		veeks Max	Cum 2007	Cum 2006
United States	42	58	116	610	1,035	37	80	287	861	1,075	9	49	109	336	341
New England	_	2	20	6	72	_	2	4	16	40	_	1	12	3	16
Connecticut Maine§	_	1 0	3	4	9 3	_	0	4	8	18	_	0	9	2	3
Massachusetts	_	0	2 4	_	42	_	0	2 1	1	4 12	_	0	2 4	_	2
New Hampshire	_	0	16	2	13	_	0	1	2	4	_	0	0	_	1
Rhode Island [§] Vermont [§]	_	0 0	2 2	_	1 4	_	0	4 1	4 1	1 1	_	0	6 2	1	1
Mid. Atlantic	2	7	19	72	88	5	8	19	93	136	2	15	53	89	100
New Jersey	_	1	4	8	30	_	2	5	17	43	_	2	11	11	14
New York (Upstate) New York City	2	2 2	12 11	19 31	14 29	3	1 2	14 6	18 14	16 30	2	5 2	30 20	29 11	32 17
Pennsylvania	_	1	4	14	15	2	3	7	44	47	_	5	19	38	37
E.N. Central	_	6	13	67	85	7	8	19	101	126	_	10	30	68	66
Illinois Indiana	_	1 0	4 7	17 5	19 5	_	2	5 17	12 5	45 7	_	1 1	11 5	<u> </u>	11
Michigan	_	2	8	25	32	_	2	8	35	43	_	3	10	26	14
Ohio Wisconsin	_	1 0	4 4	20	21 8	7	2	10 3	44 5	29 2	_	4 0	19 3	37 1	27 11
W.N. Central	17	2	8	32	35	2	3	13	38	41	_	1	15	11	9
owa	_	0	1	5	3	_	0	3	7	6	_	0	3	1	1
Kansas Minnesota	 17	0 0	1 7	— 18	15 1		0	2 12	3 4	4 1	_	0 0	2 11		_
Missouri	_	1	3	5	8	_	1	4	19	27	_	0	2	6	-5
Nebraska [§]	_	0	2	2	3	_	0	3	3	2	_	0	2	1	2
North Dakota South Dakota	_	0 0	0 3	_	 5	_	0	0 1	_	_ 1	_	0	0 1	1	1
S. Atlantic	12	8	27	113	156	12	23	55	257	300	3	10	25	92	85
Delaware	_	0	2	_	4	_	0	4	3	12	_	0	2	1	1
District of Columbia Florida	4	0 3	5 13	9 46	1 57		0 7	2 16	1 86	4 112	3	0 3	5 10	<u> </u>	38
Georgia	3	1	5	15	9	2	3	8	36	36	_	1	5	11	2
∕Iaryland [§] North Carolina	3	1 0	7 11	13 6	23 38	2 1	2 1	7 16	22 49	49 49	_	2 0	8 5	20 9	20 11
South Carolina§	_	0	3	3	7	_	2	5	21	18	_	0	2	4	2
Virginia§ West Virginia	2	1 0	4 3	21	16 1	2	2	5 23	32 7	9 11	_	1 0	5 4	3 3	7
E.S. Central		2	7	 22	32	1	6	20	62	90		2	9	14	12
Alabama§	_	0	2	2	2		1	10	19	26	_	0	2	1	3
Kentucky	_	0	4 5	4	14 1	_	1 0	5 7	1 7	21	_	1 0	6	7	3
Mississippi Tennessee§	_	1	5 5	5 11	15	1	3	7	35	10 33	_	1	2 7	6	-6
W.S. Central	_	6	20	36	95	_	18	128	105	156	_	1	12	12	6
Arkansas§	_	0	5	3	24	_	1	4	7	16	_	0	1	1	1
Louisiana Oklahoma	_	0	4 3	4	2 3	_	1	5 14	15 9	5 1	_	0	2 6	1	_
Texas§	_	5	15	29	66	_	14	108	74	134	_	1	12	10	4
Mountain	3	5	16	82	99	2	3	9	31	52	1	2	8	25	16
Arizona Colorado	3	3 1	13 3	71 6	59 15	_	0	2 4	7	19 10	1	1 0	4 2	8 5	3
daho§	_	0	2	1	4	_	0	2	3	4	_	0	3	1	2
Montana [§] Nevada [§]	_	0	3 2		1 5	_	0 1	0 5	10	 11	_	0	1 2	_	- 3
New Mexico§	_	0	2	1	6	_	0	2	3	5	_	0	2	2	_
Utah Wyoming [§]	_	0	2 1	_	8 1	2	0	5 1	8	3	_	0	6 1	5 2	_4
Pacific	8	15	52	180	373	8	12	38	158	134	3	1	11	22	31
Alaska	_	0	1	1	1	_	0	3	2	134	_	0	1		_
California	8	13	48	164	347	8	8	26	121	100	1	1	11	17	31
Hawaii Oregon§	_	0 1	2	2 8	6 11	_	2	1 5	 26	2 23	_	0 0	0 0	_	_
Washington	_	1	4	5	8	_	1	12	9	8	2	0	2	5	_
American Samoa	U	0	0	U	U	U	0	0	U	U	U	0	0	U	Ļ
C.N.M.I. Guam	<u>U</u>	_	_	U —	<u>U</u>	<u>U</u>		_	<u>U</u>	<u>U</u>	<u>U</u>	_		<u>U</u>	L
Puerto Rico	_	1	10	13	12	_	1	9	11	4	_	0	1	_	_
U.S. Virgin Islands	U	0	0	U	U	U	0	0	U	U	U	0	0	U	U

C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
U: Unavailable. —: No reported cases. N: Not notifiable. Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts.

* Incidence data for reporting years 2006 and 2007 are provisional.

* Data for acute hepatitis C, viral are available in Table I.

* Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS). Med: Median. Max: Maximum.

TABLE II. (Continued) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending April 7, 2007, and April 8, 2006 (14th Week)*

			yme disea	ase				Malaria			Men		cal disea serogrou	se, invasi ups	ve [†]
			ious		_			/ious		_			vious		
Reporting area	Current week	Med Med	eeks Max	Cum 2007	Cum 2006	Current week	Med Med	reeks Max	Cum 2007	Cum 2006	Current week	Med Med	veeks Max	Cum 2007	Cum 2006
United States	53	250	1,019	1,419	1,569	6	25	50	165	295	17	19	40	271	403
New England	2	20	260	81	99	_	0	6	2	9	_	1	3	6	14
Connecticut Maine§	_	9 2	227 39	20 31	41 17	_	0	3 1	_	1 1	_	0	2 3	2 1	3
Massachusetts	_	0	3	_	19	_	0	3	_	5	_	0	2	_	7
New Hampshire Rhode Island [§]	1	3 0	95 93	24	17 1	_	0	3 1	_	1	_	0	2 1	_ 1	
Vermont§	1	1	15	6	4	_	0	Ó	_	1	_	0	i	2	_
Mid. Atlantic	19	153	571	690	1,101	1	5	18	39	79	_	2	11	27	58
New Jersey New York (Upstate)	— 16	26 54	187 392	102 196	262 464	_ 1	1 1	7 7	10	22 6	_	0 1	2 4	7	8
New York City	_	2	24	5	16	_	3	9	23	41	_	1	4	5	22
Pennsylvania	3	45	237	387	359	_	1	4	6	10	_	0	4	15	22
E.N. Central Illinois	_	12 0	158 1	18 1	75 —	2	3 1	10 6	25 6	38 12	1	2	7 2	29 3	55 15
Indiana	_	0	3	_	2	_	0	2	1	5	_	Ö	4	7	8
Michigan Ohio	_	1 0	5 5	6 2	3 9		0	2	6 7	5 11	_ 1	0 1	3 4	8 11	9 15
Wisconsin	_	11	154	9	61	_	0	3	5	5		Ö	2		8
W.N. Central	1	5	169	20	34	_	1	13	12	5	1	1	5	26	18
Iowa Kansas	_	1 0	8 2	3 1	4	_	0	1 2	2	1	_	0	3 1	6 1	4
Minnesota	_	2	167	15	29		0	12	7	2	1	0	3	7	2
Missouri	1	0	2	1	_	_	0	1	1	1	_	0	3 1	9	8
Nebraska [§] North Dakota	_	0	2 0	_	1	_	0	1 1	2	_	_	0 0	1	1 1	_4
South Dakota	_	0	1	_	_	_	0	0	_	1	_	0	1	1	_
S. Atlantic	26	42	134	551	227	3	5	15	44	82	2	3	10	39	70
Delaware District of Columbia	4	7 0	28 7	97 2	76 5	_	0	1 2	1 1	2	_	0	1 1	_	
Florida	3	1	5	11	6	2	1	4	12	9	2	1	7	13	26
Georgia Maryland§	 15	0 20	1 104	362	1 129		1	6 4	4 13	23 22	_	0	3 2	6 10	6
North Carolina	1	0	4	6	8		0	4	4	9	_	0	6	4	13
South Carolina [§] Virginia [§]	3	0 6	2 36	3 70	1 1	_	0 1	2 4	9	3 13	_	0	2 2	4 2	10
West Virginia	_	0	14	_		_	Ö	1	_	1	_	0	2	_	1
E.S. Central	_	0	4	6	1	_	0	3	7	7	1	1	3	13	15
Alabama [§]	_	0	3 2	1	1	_	0	2 1	1 1	3 1	_	0	2 1	3	3
Kentucky Mississippi	_	0	1	_	_	_	0	1	1	1	_	0	3	3	3
Tennessee§	_	0	2	5	_	_	0	2	4	2	1	0	2	7	6
W.S. Central	_	1	6	6	2	_	1	7	3	9	1	1	9	32	25
Arkansas [§] Louisiana	_	0 0	0 1	_	_	_	0	2 1	_ 1	_ 1	_	0	2 4	5 8	4
Oklahoma	_	0	0	_	_	_	0	2	1	1	1	0	3	7	5
Texas [§]	_	1	6	6	2	_	1	6	1	7	_	0	9	12	12
Mountain Arizona	_	0 0	4 2	2	3 3	_	1 0	6 3	10 4	17 2	1 1	1 0	5 2	27 6	32 12
Colorado	_	0	1	_	_	_	0	2	4	6	_	0	2	8	10
Idaho [§] Montana [§]	_	0	2 1	_ 1	_	_	0	1 1		 1	_	0	1	2 1	_1
Nevada§	_	0	1	i	_	_	0	1		_	_	0	1	3	3
New Mexico [§] Utah	_	0 0	1	_	_	_	0	1 2		1 7	_	0	1 2	1 6	1
Wyoming [§]	_	Ö	1	_	_	_	Ö	0	<u>.</u>	<u>'</u>	_	Ö	2	_	2
Pacific	5	3	17	45	27	_	4	14	23	49	10	4	9	72	116
Alaska California	 5	0 2	1 14	2 38	 27	_	0 2	4 6	2 17	4 38	 5	0 3	1 8	1 48	2 75
Hawaii	N	0	0	N	N	_	0	2	_	_	_	0	2	2	4
Oregon [§] Washington	_	0	2	5	_	_	0	3 11	3 1	4 3	 5	0	3 5	9 12	18 17
American Samoa	U	0	0	U	U	U	0	0	ı U	J U	o U	0	0	12	
C.N.M.I.	Ü	_	_	Ü	Ü	Ü	_	_	Ü	Ü	Ü	_	_	_	
Guam Puerto Rico	N			N	N	_		_ 1	_ 1	_	_		_ 1	_ 3	_
U.S. Virgin Islands	U	0	0	U	U	U	0	0	Ú	U	U	0	0	_	_

C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
U: Unavailable. —: No reported cases. N: Not notifiable. Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts. Med: Median. Max: Maximum.

* Incidence data for reporting years 2006 and 2007 are provisional.

* Data for meningococcal disease, invasive caused by serogroups A, C, Y, & W-135; serogroup B; other serogroup; and unknown serogroup are available in Table I.

* Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).

TABLE II. (*Continued*) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending April 7, 2007, and April 8, 2006 (14th Week)*

(14th Week)*			Rab	ies, anim	nal		Ro	cky Mo	untain sp	otted feve	er				
			ious					/ious	•				vious	0	
Reporting area	Current week	Med	eeks Max	Cum 2007	Cum 2006	Current week	Med	veeks Max	Cum 2007	Cum 2006	Current week	Med	veeks Max	Cum 2007	Cum 2006
United States	53	246	898	1,666	3,784	74	105	173	840	1,326	7	29	118	107	283
New England	_	18	53 9	62 15	402 21	7	12	26	108	141	_	0	8	_	_
Connecticut Maine†	_	2 2	15	25	22	_	4 2	14 8	38 22	32 20	N	0	0	N	N
Massachusetts New Hampshire	_	0 2	22 27		309 6	_	0 1	17 5	 8	64 5	_	0	1 1	_	_
Rhode Island† Vermont†	_	0 1	30 14	 15	11 33	1 6	0 2	3 5	9 31	4 16	_	0	8	_	_
Mid. Atlantic	8	34	156	324	33 482	1	16	5 57	115	193	_	2	6	10	11
New Jersey	_	3	11	9	105		0	0	_	_	_	0	2	_	2
New York (Upstate) New York City	4	20 0	150 8	220 —	144 23	1	0 1	0 5	18	1	_	0 0	2 3	3	
Pennsylvania	4	9	22	95	210	_	16	56	97	192	_	1	4	7	
E.N. Central Illinois	7	39 9	79 23	387 49	599 146	_	2	18 7	5	4 1	_	1 0	6 4	1	3 1
Indiana Michigan	_ 1	3 10	37 39	3 94	50 123	_	0 1	2 5	4		_	0	1 1		_
Ohio	6	12	56	223	196	_	0	9	1	1	_	0	4	_	2
Wisconsin W.N. Central	_ 2	3 18	9 96	18 119	84 420	_ 1	0 6	0 20	35	— 50	_ 2	0 3	1 14	— 16	4
Iowa	_	4	16	34	121		1	7	4	7	_	0	1	_	_
Kansas Minnesota	_	4 0	13 80	47 —	109	_	2 0	5 6	20 3	19 4	_	0 0	1 2	_	_
Missouri Nebraska [†]	2	4 1	10 4	20 4	123 57	_	1 0	6 0	2	4	2	2	12 5	16	4
North Dakota	_	0 0	9	1	4	1	0	7	6	2	_	0	0	_	_
South Dakota S. Atlantic	19	17	4 164	13 247	6 276	— 52	37	4 62	— 471	14 637	4	10	68	— 62	 249
Delaware	_	0	1	1	1	_	0	0	_	_	_	0	3	3	3
District of Columbia Florida	5	0 4	2 20	2 86	3 68	_	0 0	0 10	33	176	_	0	1 5	3	6
Georgia Maryland†	_ 1	0 2	3 6	 37	7 56	_	4 6	16 12	36 62	60 103	_	1 1	5 7	2 8	3 13
North Carolina	10	0	111	69	52	19	9	22	121	84	4	4	61	36	219
South Carolina† Virginia†	3	2	11 19	24 25	43 42	2 31	3 11	11 27	33 163	33 159	_	1 2	5 13	4 6	3 2
West Virginia	_	0	19	3	4	_	2	8	23	22	_	0	2		_
E.S. Central Alabama†	2	6 1	24 17	57 17	72 18	_	4 1	13 8	27 —	48 16	1	5 1	27 9	17 5	12 4
Kentucky Mississippi	_	0	5 6	<u> </u>	12 9	_	0	4 2	6	4 2	_	0	1 1	_	_
Tennessee [†]	2	3	11	34	33	_	2	7	21	26	1	4	22	12	8
W.S. Central Arkansas†	_	17 1	147 13	86 2	159 10	2 1	2	34 5	17 7	184 4	_	1 0	28 10	_	4
Louisiana	_	0	2	5	3	_	0	0	_	_	_	0	1	_	_
Oklahoma Texas [†]	_	0 14	9 134	— 79	2 144	<u>1</u>	0 0	9 29	10	11 169	_	0 0	18 6	_	1
Mountain	10	38	87	320	945	3	3	28	16	30	_	0	5	1	_
Arizona Colorado	4	6 8	28 26 7	61 96	189 360	3	2	10 0	15 —	29 —	_	0 0	2 1	_	_
Idaho† Montana†	1	1 1	7 8	11 10	25 32	_	0	24 2	_	_	_	0	3 2	1	_
Nevada [†]	_	0	9	3	15	_	0	1	_	_	_	0	1	_	_
New Mexico [†] Utah	5	2 12	8 39	12 116	25 284	_	0 0	2 1	1	1	_	0 0	2 2	_	_
Wyoming [†]	_	1	8	11	15	_	0	2	_	_	_	0	1	_	_
Pacific Alaska	5 —	33 1	229 8	64 8	429 27	8 2	4 0	12 6	46 22	39 7	N	0 0	1 0	N	N
California Hawaii	_	22 1	226 7	<u> </u>	242 38	6 N	3	11 0	24 N	32 N	N	0	1 0	_ N	 N
Oregon [†]	<u> </u>	1	6	18	48	_	0	4	_	_	_	0	1	_	- N
Washington American Samoa	5 U	4 0	46 0	32 U	74 U	_ U	0	0	— U	— U	N U	0	0	N U	N U
C.N.M.I.	Ü	_	_	Ü	Ü	Ü	_	_	Ü	Ü	Ū	_	_	Ü	U
Guam Puerto Rico	_	0	1	_	_	_	1	6	 15	 28	N N	0	0	N N	N N
U.S. Virgin Islands	U	0	0	U	U	U	0	0	U	U	U	0	0	U	U

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U: Unavailable. —: No reported cases. N: Not notifiable. Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts. Med: Median. Max: Maximum.

* Incidence data for reporting years 2006 and 2007 are provisional.

* Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).

TABLE II. (Continued) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending April 7, 2007, and April 8, 2006 (14th Week)*

		s	almonello	sis		Shiga to	oxin-pro	ducing E	. coli (ST	EC)†		5	Shigellos	is	
	Current		rious eeks	Cum	Cum	Current		rious reeks	Cum	Cum	Current		vious veeks	Cum	Cum
Reporting area	week	Med	Max	2007	2006	week	Med	Max	Cum 2007	2006	week	Med	Max	2007	2006
United States	338	821	1,336	6,536	7,344	20	75	178	398	517	155	258	521	2,455	2,489
New England Connecticut Maine§	5 — 2	18 0 2	82 68 14	142 68 26	778 503 17	$\frac{1}{1}$	2 0 0	16 5 8	17 5 8	104 84 2	5 -4	2 0 0	14 8 5	18 8 8	120 67 —
Massachusetts New Hampshire Rhode Island [§] Vermont [§]	1 2 —	0 3 1 1	53 25 15 6	17 21 10	222 22 10 4	_ _ _	0 0 0	9 3 2 4	3 - 1	13 2 1 2	_ _ 1 _	0 0 0	11 2 3 2	1 1	45 4 3 1
Mid. Atlantic New Jersey New York (Upstate) New York City Pennsylvania	36 — 22 — 14	90 16 27 24 30	191 49 93 50 67	884 49 276 226 333	849 164 165 233 287	5 -2 - 3	8 1 3 0 3	62 16 14 4 47	49 1 21 4 23	48 13 13 7 15	4 - 4 -	14 3 3 5 1	47 35 43 14 6	107 6 28 57 16	230 73 67 63 27
E.N. Central Illinois Indiana Michigan Ohio Wisconsin	30 — 3 27 —	103 27 15 18 22 16	198 61 55 35 56 27	680 56 110 143 236 135	1,030 295 110 182 265 178		9 1 1 1 3 2	59 7 8 6 18 39	48 2 1 10 30 5	86 13 10 19 21 23	7 — 7 —	23 10 2 2 3 3	68 50 17 5 14 10	131 17 14 9 63 28	252 89 32 59 46 26
W.N. Central lowa Kansas Minnesota Missouri Nebraska [§] North Dakota South Dakota	29 — 24 5 —	48 8 7 11 15 3 0	109 26 16 60 35 9 5	517 75 75 121 171 30 8 37	444 77 67 96 130 45 4 25	5 — 5 — —	11 2 0 3 2 1 0	45 38 4 26 13 11 0 5	52 6 4 23 12 7 —	67 12 1 27 21 5 —	38 — 7 30 1 —	41 2 2 4 12 1 0 6	77 14 11 24 69 14 18 24	508 16 8 73 390 5 4	217 8 21 20 122 25 2 19
S. Atlantic Delaware District of Columbia Florida Georgia Maryland [§] North Carolina South Carolina [§] Virginia [§] West Virginia	112 — 82 12 8 — 4 6	224 2 1 95 34 13 29 19 20 1	395 10 4 176 66 33 130 55 58 31	2,136 17 8 910 386 146 335 146 167 21	1,721 18 19 757 225 118 333 88 145 18	7 — 3 1 2 1 —	11 0 0 2 1 2 2 0 3	32 3 1 9 7 9 11 3 11 5	114 4 	83 1 — 13 14 15 19 2 19	64 — 41 18 2 1 1	70 0 0 33 24 1 1 0 2	143 2 5 76 54 10 14 10 9	947 3 3 584 294 18 16 12 17	594 — 3 243 206 33 62 35 12
E.S. Central Alabama [§] Kentucky Mississippi Tennessee [§]	11 3 4 — 4	53 9 9 12 17	138 70 23 42 32	385 102 90 36 157	368 131 77 60 100	_ _ _ _	4 0 1 0 2	21 5 12 0 9	20 3 7 — 10	37 3 10 — 24	8 5 — — 3	12 4 2 1 3	75 66 15 25 14	168 64 21 25 58	163 34 82 24 23
W.S. Central Arkansas [§] Louisiana Oklahoma Texas [§]	16 10 — 6 —	84 14 17 8 46	186 45 42 40 107	254 77 73 68 36	591 218 49 48 276	_ _ _ _	3 0 0 0 2	52 7 1 17 48	15 4 — 4 7	21 2 — 1 18	15 4 — 1 10	37 2 3 2 30	187 10 24 9 174	176 21 40 13 102	284 20 8 20 236
Mountain Arizona Colorado Idaho [§] Montana [§] Nevada [§] New Mexico [§] Utah Wyoming [§]	22 10 8 2 — — 2 —	52 19 12 3 2 4 5 4	88 45 30 9 10 20 15 15	502 192 130 27 18 36 44 41	519 173 132 32 26 38 45 58	2 1 - 1 - - -	7 2 1 2 0 0 1 1	36 13 8 8 0 5 5 14 3	47 17 9 4 — 4 8 5	47 13 12 5 — 9 4 3 1	4 3 1 — — — —	26 11 3 0 0 1 2 1	87 35 15 3 13 20 15 6	168 82 27 3 4 11 25 5	193 99 25 5 1 23 28 11
Pacific Alaska California Hawaii Oregon [§] Washington	77 1 60 — 2 14	116 1 89 4 7 11	306 5 218 16 17 83	1,036 20 806 51 59 100	1,044 27 803 51 90 73	N — —	5 0 0 0 1 2	24 0 5 3 9 22	36 N 21 2 5	24 N N 3 15 6	10 -7 - - 3	32 0 28 1 1 2	94 2 81 3 6 13	232 5 192 7 10 18	436 3 330 10 56 37
American Samoa C.N.M.I. Guam Puerto Rico U.S. Virgin Islands	U <u>U</u> 3 U	0 — 14 0	0 — 65 0	U U — 93 U	U U — 59 U	U N — U	0 - 0 0	0 — 0 0	U N 	U N U	U U — U	0 — 0 0	0 — 6 0	U U 5 U	U U 2 U

C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
U: Unavailable. —: No reported cases. N: Not notifiable. Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts. Med: Me

* Incidence data for reporting years 2006 and 2007 are provisional.
Includes *E. coli* O157:H7; Shiga toxin-positive, serogroup non-O157; and Shiga toxin-positive, not serogrouped.

* Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS). Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts. Med: Median.

TABLE II. (*Continued*) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending April 7, 2007, and April 8, 2006 (14th Week)*

(14th Week)*	Stre	ptococcal	disease,	invasive, g	roup A	Streptococcus pneumoniae, invasive disease† Age <5 years					
Dan antina a anna	Current	52 w	ious eeks	Cum	Cum	Current	52 w	rious reeks	Cum	Cum	
Reporting area	week	Med	Max	2007	2006	week	Med	Max	2007	2006	
United States	85	88	212	1,363	1,845	15	24	88	403	402	
New England Connecticut	_	2 0	15 0	19 —	69 —	_	1 0	4 0	9	21 —	
Maine [§]	_	0	2	5	8	_	0	2	_		
Massachusetts New Hampshire	_	0 0	5 9	4	46 10	_	0 0	4 4	 5	17 4	
Rhode Island§	_	0	6	_	3	_	0	3	3	_	
/ermont [§]	_	0	2	10	2	_	0	1	1	_	
Mid. Atlantic New Jersey	15 —	17 2	39 8	263 23	365 69	<u>1</u>	3 0	17 4	34	69 20	
New York (Upstate)	9	5	26	93	106	1	2	14	34	44	
New York City	_	3	8	52	66		0	2		5	
Pennsylvania	6	6	11	95	124	N	0	0	N O4	N	
E.N. Central Illinois	16 —	14 4	31 11	221 33	418 135	<u>2</u>	6 1	14 6	64 9	119 32	
Indiana	_	2	12	32	44	_	0	10	6	17	
Michigan Ohio	2 14	3 4	10 14	63 93	93 98		1 1	5 7	25 23	28 23	
Wisconsin	— —	1	6	93	98 48	_	0	2	23 1	19	
W.N. Central	3	5	32	114	126	_	2	10	35	28	
Iowa	_	0	0	_	_	_	0	0	_	_	
Kansas Minnesota	_	0 0	3 29	15 48	30 52	_	0 1	3 6	3 19	7 10	
Missouri	1	2	5	36	24	_	0	2	10	6	
Nebraska [§]	_	0	2	4	13	_	0	2	2	4	
North Dakota South Dakota	2	0 0	2 2	8 3	4 3	_	0 0	1 0	1	1 —	
S. Atlantic	31	20	45	350	394	4	2	11	85	22	
Delaware	_	0	2	_	3	_	0	0	_	_	
District of Columbia Florida	9	0 5	2 16	4 78	4 88	_ 1	0	1 5	— 19	_	
Georgia	7	5	11	87	91	1	0	5	30	_	
Maryland [§]	4	3	10	58	83	2	1	5	25	17	
North Carolina South Carolina§	5 3	0 1	26 5	45 23	55 25	_	0	0 2	 8	_	
Virginia§	3	2	10	49	37	_	0	1	2	_	
West Virginia	_	0	6	6	8	_	0	3	1	5	
E.S. Central	3	4	11	60	81 N		0	6	23	5	
Alabama [§] Kentucky	N —	0 0	0 4	N 14	N 24	<u>N</u>	0	0 0	N —	N —	
Mississippi	N	0	0	N	N	_	0	2	2	5	
Tennessee§	3	3	7	46	57	_	0	6	21	_	
W.S. Central Arkansas [§]	5 1	6 0	61 5	89 10	134 6	5 1	4 0	39 2	70 7	60 9	
Louisiana		0	2	3	1	_	0	4	12	2	
Oklahoma Tayaas	1	2 3	5	35	45	2	1	12	20	13	
Texas [§]	3		56	41	82	2	1	24	31	36	
Mountain Arizona	12 2	11 5	42 34	214 82	230 129	3 1	4 2	11 7	72 42	76 49	
Colorado	6	3	9	63	42	2	1	4	19	18	
Idaho§ Montana§	 N	0 0	1 0	5 N	3 N	N	0	1 0	 N	1 N	
Nevada§	_	0	1	1	1	_	0	0	_	_	
New Mexico§	_	1	4	17	29	_	0	4	11	8	
Utah Wyoming [§]	4	1 0	7 1	44 2	24 2	_	0 0	0 0	_	_	
Pacific	_	3	9	33	28	_	0	4	11	2	
Alaska	-	0	2	7	N		0	2	9	_	
California Hawaii	N —	0 2	0 9	N 26	N 28	<u>N</u>	0	0 2	N 2	N 2	
Oregon§	N	0	0	N	N N	N	0	0	N	N	
Washington	N	0	0	N	N	N	0	0	N	N	
American Samoa	U	0	0	U	U	U	0	0	U	U	
C.N.M.I. Guam	<u>U</u>	_	_	<u>U</u>	<u>U</u>	U N	_	_	U N	U N	
Puerto Rico	_	0	0	_	_	N	0	0	N	N	
U.S. Virgin Islands	U	0	0	U	U	U	0	0	U	U	

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* Incidence data for reporting years 2006 and 2007 are provisional.

† Includes cases of invasive pneumococcal disease, in children aged <5 years, caused by *S. pneumoniae*, which is susceptible or for which susceptibility testing is not available (NNDSS event code 11717).

* Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).

TABLE II. (Continued) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending April 7, 2007, and April 8, 2006 (14th Week)*

		Str	eptococo All ages		<i>oniae</i> , inva	sive diseas									
				e <5 year	s	Syphilis, primary and secondary									
		Prev		_	_			vious	_	_			vious	_	_
Reporting area	Current week	Med Med	eeks Max	Cum 2007	Cum 2006	Current week	Med	veeks Max	Cum 2007	Cum 2006	Current week	Med Med	veeks Max	Cum 2007	Cum 2006
United States	48	43	115	800	896	7	7	16	117	121	91	181	260	2,024	2,337
New England	1	0	7	18	10	_	0	1	_	2	1	4	13	42	58
Connecticut		0	0	_	_	_	0	0	_	_	1	0	10	6	12
Maine [§] Massachusetts	_	0	2 0	3	2	_	0	0	_	1	_	0 2	1 7	 28	3 32
New Hampshire		0	0				0	0			_	0	2	4	5
Rhode Island§	1	0	4	7	3	_	0	1	_	_	_	0	3	3	4
Vermont§	_	0	2	8	5	_	0	1	_	1	_	0	1	1	2
Mid. Atlantic New Jersey	1	3 0	8	49 —	44	_	0	5 0	11	6	23	24 3	44 8	419 48	281 45
New York (Upstate)	1	1	5	18	13	_	0	4	6	1	1	3	14	31	35
New York City Pennsylvania	_	0 2	0 6	— 31	— 31	_	0	0 2	 5	 5	21 1	13 4	35 12	283 57	135 66
E.N. Central	11	10	40	203	202	_	1	7	23	36	4	14	32	142	245
Illinois		0	2	3	8	_	0	1	23 1	3	2	6	13	27	139
Indiana	_	2	30	34	43	_	0	5	3	9	_	1	5	11	22
Michigan Ohio	11	0 5	3 38	— 166	8 143	_	0 1	1 5	 19	1 23	1	2 4	10 9	33 57	21 50
Wisconsin	N	0	0	N	N	_	Ö	0	_	_	1	1	4	14	13
W.N. Central	_	1	51	30	16	_	0	10	4	1	_	5	14	47	61
lowa	_	0	0	_	_	_	0	0	_	_	_	0	3	1	5
Kansas Minnesota	_	0	1 50	3	_	_	0	0 10	_	_	_	0 1	3 5	5 20	8 15
Missouri	_	1	5	25	16	_	0	2	3	1	_	3	9	21	31
Nebraska§ North Dakota	_	0 0	1 0	1	_	_	0	0	_		_	0	2 1	_	2
South Dakota	_	0	3	1	_	_	0	1	1	_	_	0	3	_	_
S. Atlantic	33	21	54	391	500	7	3	8	60	45	20	42	136	380	517
Delaware	_	0	1	1		_	0	1	1	_	_	0	3	2	8
District of Columbia Florida	26	0 12	3 29	4 223	15 223	7	0 2	0 8	<u> </u>	2 42	1	2 14	11 23	44 68	34 193
Georgia	6	7	17	147	223	_	0	1	_	1	_	6	105	13	43
Maryland [§] North Carolina	_	0	0	_	_	_	0	0	_	_	4 7	5 5	14 23	74 98	89 88
South Carolina§		0	0				0	0			4	1	5	23	20
Virginia [§]	N	0	0	N	N	_	0	0	_	_	4	4	17	57	41
West Virginia	1	1	17	16	39	_	0	1	5	_	_	0	2	1	1
E.S. Central Alabama§	1 N	2 0	7 0	49 N	77 N	_	0	3 0	9	13	7 3	14 5	29 17	191 64	148 76
Kentucky	_	0	2	10	19	_	0	1	1	3	1	1	9	24	11
Mississippi Tennessee [§]	_ 1	0 2	0 7	— 39	— 58	_	0	0 3	 8	10	3	1 6	8 12	30 73	17 44
W.S. Central	1	1	5	43	8	_	0	2	4	3	25	29	58	388	367
Arkansas§		0	3	1	4	_	0	0	_	2	1	1	7	29	25
Louisiana	_	0	2	13	4	_	0	1	1	1	10	5	30	77	46
Oklahoma Texas§	1	0	5 0	29 —	_	_	0	2	3	_	2 12	1 21	5 31	25 257	21 275
Mountain	_	1	7	17	39	_	0	5	6	15	_	8	27	58	120
Arizona	_	0	Ó		_	_	Ō	Ō	_	_	_	2	16	11	52
Colorado Idaho§		0	0			_	0	0	_	_	_	1 0	5	3 1	22
Montana [§]	N	0	0	N —	N	_	0	0	_	_	_	0	1 1	1	1
Nevada [§]	_	0	3	11	8	_	0	2	3	_	_	1	12	19	28
New Mexico [§] Utah	_	0	0 7	4	— 18	_	0	0 4	_	10	_	1 0	5 2	19 3	15 2
Wyoming [§]	_	ő	3	2	13	_	ő	2	1	5	_	ő	1	1	_
Pacific	_	0	0	_	_	_	0	0	_	_	11	37	52	357	540
Alaska California	N	0	0	N	N	_	0	0	_	_	_	0 34	2 45	3 316	5 462
California Hawaii	N	0	0			_	0	0	_	_	_	0	45 1	316	462 8
Oregon§	N	0	0	N	N	_	0	0	_	_	_	0	6	4	5
Washington	N 	0	0	N	N 	_	0	0	_	_	11	2	11	33	60
American Samoa C.N.M.I.	U U	0	0	U	U U	U U	0	0	U U	U U	U U	0	0	U	U
Guam	N	_	_	N	N	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_
Puerto Rico	N	0	0	N	N		0	0	_ U	_ U	_ U	2	11	27	38 U
U.S. Virgin Islands	U	0	0	U	U	U	0	0	U	U	U	0	0	U	U

C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
U: Unavailable. —: No reported cases. N: Not notifiable. Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts. Med: Median. Max: Max * Incidence data for reporting years 2006 and 2007 are provisional.
Includes cases of invasive pneumococcal disease caused by drug-resistant *S. pneumoniae* (DRSP) (NNDSS event code 11720). Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS). Med: Median. Max: Maximum.

TABLE II. (Continued) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending April 7, 2007, and April 8, 2006 (14th Week)*

			West Nile virus disease Neuroinvasive					Non-neuroinvasive [§]							
		Prev	rious				Prev	ious					vious		
Reporting area	Current week	52 w Med	eeks Max	Cum 2007	Cum 2006	Current week	Med	eeks Max	Cum 2007	Cum 2006	Current week	52 v Med	veeks Max	Cum 2007	Cum 2006
United States	557	826	1,435	11,931	14,941		1	178		3		1	399		1
New England	10	21	72	154	522	_	0	3	_	_	_	0	2	_	_
Connecticut	_	0	0	_	_	_	0	3	_	_	_	0	1	_	_
Maine ¹ Massachusetts	_	2	17 1	_	101 92	_	0	0 1	_	_	_	0	0 1	_	_
New Hampshire	2	5	47	59	120	_	0	0	_	_	_	0	0	_	_
Rhode Island ¹ Vermont ¹	 8	0 11	0 66	— 95	209	_	0 0	0	_	_	_	0	0	_	_
Mid. Atlantic	60	103	193	1,597	1,848	_	0	11	_	_	_	0	4	_	_
New Jersey	N	0	0	N	N	_	0	2	_	_	_	0	1	_	_
New York (Upstate) New York City	N	0	0	N —	N	_	0 0	5 4	_	_	_	0	1 2	_	_
Pennsylvania	60	103	193	1,597	1,848	_	ő	2	_	_	_	ő	1	_	_
E.N. Central	125	234	587	3,618	5,843	_	0	43	_	_	_	0	33	_	_
Illinois Indiana	1	1 0	9	50	29	_	0	23 7	_	_	_	0	23 12	_	_
Michigan	41	94	258	1,445	1,710	_	0	11	_	_	_	0	2	_	_
Ohio Wisconsin	83	128 12	449 64	1,895 228	3,623 481	_	0 0	11 2	_	_	_	0	3 2	_	_
W.N. Central	14	30	131	640	758		0	36	_			0	79		_
lowa	N	0	0	N	756 N	_	0	3	_	_	_	0	4	_	_
Kansas	_	7 0	52	276	132	_	0	3	_	_	_	0	3	_	_
Minnesota Missouri	14	16	0 82	 255	 593	_	0	6 14	_	_	_	0	7 2	_	_
Nebraska [¶]	N	0	0	N	N	_	0	9	_	_	_	0	38	_	_
North Dakota South Dakota	_	0 1	60 15	84 25	13 20	_	0 0	5 7	_	_	_	0	28 22	_	_
S. Atlantic	53	96	176	1,494	1,569	_	0	2	_	_	_	0	7	_	_
Delaware	_	1	6	8	34	_	0	0	_	_	_	0	0	_	_
District of Columbia Florida	 21	0	5 42	389	11 N	_	0 0	0 1	_	_	_	0	1 0	_	_
Georgia	N	0	0	N	N	_	0	1	_	_	_	0	4	_	_
Maryland ¹ North Carolina	N	0	0	N	N	_	0 0	2 1	_	_	_	0	2	_	_
South Carolina ¹	19	22	72	452	389	_	0	i		_	_	0	0	_	
Virginia [¶]	2	28 25	142 56	220 425	516 619	_	0	0 1	_	_	_	0	2	_	_
West Virginia E.S. Central	11 2	25 5	43		019	_	0	15	_	_	_	0		_	_
Alabama [¶]	2	5	43	102 100	_	_	0	2	_	3	_	0	16 0	_	_
Kentucky	N	0	0	N	N	_	0	2	_	_	_	0	1	_	_
Mississippi Tennessee ¹	N	0	2 0	2 N	N	_	0 0	10 4	_	3	_	0	16 2	_	_
W.S. Central	266	200	966	3,351	3,237	_	0	58	_	_	_	0	26	_	1
Arkansas ¹	5	11	92	169	225	_	0	4	_	_	_	0	2	_	_
Louisiana Oklahoma	_	2 0	11 0	39	16	_	0	13 6	_	_	_	0	9 4	_	1
Texas ¹	261	172	873	3,143	2,996	_	Ö	38	_	_	_	Ö	16	_	_
Mountain	26	57	102	955	1,164	_	0	61	_	_	_	1	228	_	_
Arizona Colorado	— 13	0 23	0 51	370	— 621	_	0	9 10	_	_	_	0	15 51	_	_
Idaho [¶]	N	0	0	N	N	_	0	30	_	_	_	0	157	_	_
Montana ¹ Nevada ¹	2	0	26 3	109	N 1	_	0 0	3 9	_	_	_	0	8 16	_	_
New Mexico ¹	3	4	18	105	218	_	0	1		_	_	0	1	_	
Utah	8	19 0	65 11	367 4	314 10	_	0	8 7	_	_	_	0	17 10	_	_
Wyoming ¹	_		9			_			_	_				_	_
Pacific Alaska	1 1	0 0	9	20 20	N	_	0 0	15 0	_	_	_	0 0	51 0	_	_
California	_	0	0	_	N	_	0	15	_	_	_	0	37	_	_
Hawaii Oregon ¹	N	0 0	0 0	N	N	_	0 0	0 2	_	_	_	0 0	0 14	_	_
Washington	N	0	0	N	N	_	0	0	_	_	_	Ō	2	_	_
American Samoa	U	0	0	U	U	U	0	0	U	U	U	0	0	U	U
C.N.M.I. Guam	U —	_	_	<u>U</u>	<u>U</u>	U —	_	_	<u>U</u>	<u>U</u>	<u>U</u>	_	_	<u>U</u>	U —
Puerto Rico	1	12	30	144	145		0	0	_	_		0	0	_	_
U.S. Virgin Islands	U	0	0 una lelando	U	U	U	0	0	U	U	U	0	0	U	U

C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
U: Unavailable. —: No reported cases. N: Not notifiable. Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts. Med: Median. Max: Maximum.

Incidence data for reporting years 2006 and 2007 are provisional.
Updated weekly from reports to the Division of Vector-Borne Infectious Diseases, National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and Enteric Diseases (ArboNET Surveillance). Data for California serogroup, eastern equine, Powassan, St. Louis, and western equine diseases are available in Table I.

Not notifiable in all states. Data from states where the condition is not notifiable are excluded from this table, except in 2007 for the domestic arboviral diseases and influenzanassociated pediatric mortality, and in 2003 for SARS-CoV. Reporting exceptions are available at http://www.cdc.gov/epo/dphsi/phs/infdis.htm.

Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).

Reporting Arawa Age 265 46-40 254 1.24 61 70tal Reporting Arawa Age 265 265-40 1.24 20 20 20 20 20 20 20	TABLE III. Deaths i	n 122 U.				•	2007	(14th We	eek)							
Reporting Area Age 365 45-64 25-44 12-4 12-14			All c	causes, b	y age (ye	ears)					All	causes, b	y age (ye	ears)		
Boston, MA	Reporting Area		≥65	45-64	25-44	1-24	<1		Reporting Area		≥65	45-64	25-44	1-24	<1	
Bridgeport, CT 36 28 7 - 1 - 5	-								1							
Cambridge, MA 14 12 2 Fall River, MA 24 18 4 2 Fall River, MA 24 18 4 2 Fall River, MA 25 18 4 2 Fall River, MA 26 18 4 2 Fall River, MA 27 1 Fall River, MA 28 18 4 2 Fall River, MA 29 7 1 - Fall River, MA 29 7 1 - Fall River, MA 20 10 10 10 Fall River, MA 20 10 10 10 Fall River, MA 20 10 10 Fall River, MA 21 10 10 Fall River, MA 22 10 10 Fall River, MA 23 10 10 Fall River, MA 24 10 10 Fall River, MA 25 10 10 Fall River, MA 26 10 10 Fall River, MA 27 10 10 Fall River, MA 28 10 10 Fall River, MA 29 10 10 Fall River, MA 20 10 10 Fall River, MA 21 10 Fall River, MA 22 10 Fall River, MA 23 10 10 Fall River, MA 24 10 Fall River, MA 25 10 Fall River, MA 26 10 Fall River, MA 27 14 7 2 1 Fall River, MA 28 10 10 Fall River, MA 29 10 Fall River, MA 20 10 Fall Rive	,															
Fall River, MA 44 48 49 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40														_		
Lovell, MA		24	18						Jacksonville, FL						2	8
Lynn, MA 9 7 1 1 1 — — — — Shichmond, WA 41 26 12 1 1 1 1 3 New Bedford, MA 22 12 7 2 — 1 — Swamanh, GA 75 47 19 2 5 2 5 2 5 New Home, CT 23 13 9 3 — 2 3 6 1																
New Bedriord, MA																
New Haven, CT					-											
Somerville, MA					_		3	6	St. Petersburg, FL	58	43	6		2	3	5
Springfield, MA																
Waterbury, CT 20 18 2 — — 2 4 Borney Corester, Mark 64 46 14 2 — 2 4 Mid. Atlantic 2.389 1,689 494 120 44 39 116 Chattanoga, TN 54 41 7 2 2 2 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 1 2 2 2 3 1 3 3 8 2 1 2 4 1 2 4 1 2 4 1 2 4 1 2 4 1 2 4 1 2 4 1 2 3 3 8 4 1 3 3 4 4 2 2 4 4 3 3 3 6 4 8 <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>, · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>									, · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·							
Wordenser, MA Mid. Atlantic 2.388 1.689 4.94 1.69 4.95 1.69					_		_		I					0.4		64
Mid. Atlantic 2,389 1,689 494 120 44 39 116 Albary, NY 43 29 9 3 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 Albary, NY 43 29 9 3 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 3 1 2 3 Albary, NY 43 29 9 3 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 3 1 2 3 Albary, NY 43 29 9 3 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 3 1 2 3 Albary, NY 43 29 19 3 1 1 2 2 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3	Worcester, MA	64	46	14	2	_	2	4								
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Buffalo, NY																
Camben, NJ 18 7 6 2 1 1 2 — Elizabeth, NJ 8 5 3 6 12 4 1 1 — 3 Bright, NJ 8 5 3 36 12 4 1 1 — 3 Nashville, TN 134 83 33 8 6 4 9 New York City, NY 1 102 733 199 54 17 16 43 New York City, NY 1,022 733 199 54 17 16 43 New York City, NY 15 3 2 11 1 — 3 — 4 New York City, NY 15 3 2 11 1 — 3 — 4 Philadelphia, PA 39 25 12 — 4 1 1 1 5 — 2 Philadelphia, PA 39 25 12 — 1 1 1 5 — 2 Philadelphia, PA 39 25 12 2 — 1 1 1 5 — 2 Rochester, NY 152 122 23 3 3 2 2 7 7 Philadelphia, PA 29 18 8 2 2 1 — 1 1 5 5 Schenectady, NY 21 1 16 4 — 1 — 1 — 1 Syracuse, NY 108 82 22 4 4 — 15 Schenectady, NY 10 11 1 1 1 — 2 — 15 Schenectady, NY 16 1 15 1 1 1 — 2 — 15 Schenectady, NY 16 1 15 1 1 1 — 2 — 1 Ulica, NY 16 1 15 1 1 1 1 — 2 — 1 Ulica, NY 16 1 15 1 1 1 1 1 — 2 — 1 Ulica, NY 16 1 15 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	,															
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Jersey City, N. 1.02	,															
New York City, NY 1,022 733 199 54 17 16 43 Newark, NJ 52 32 111 1 3 5 4 Paterson, NJ 16 12 4					-				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·							
Newark, N.									1							
Patrison, NJ 16 12 4 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —	Newark, NJ				1	3										
Pittsburgh, PA# 39																
Reading PA																
Houston, TX 321 181 89 31 8 12 15	0 ,								1							
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Terling Normal											-					
Street					1										4	
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Akron, OH									1							
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Cincinati, OH 95 51 28 8 6 6 2 15 Las Vegas, NV 247 162 48 23 9 5 14 Cleveland, OH 199 143 40 8 5 3 13 Clas Vegas, NV 247 162 48 23 9 5 14 Cas Vegas, NV 0qden, UT 28 21 3 3 3 1 — 2 Clumbus, OH 106 73 23 7 2 1 8 Phoenix, AZ 203 126 50 16 5 6 15 Dayton, OH 106 73 23 7 2 1 8 Phoenix, AZ 203 126 50 16 5 6 15 Phoenix, AZ 203 126 50 16 5 6 15 Phoenix, AZ 203 126 50 16 5 6 15 Phoenix, AZ 203 126 50 16 5 6 15 Phoenix, AZ 203 126 50 16 5 6 15 Phoenix, AZ 203 126 50 16 5 6 15 Phoenix, AZ 203 126 50 16 5 7 Chapter A 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1																
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Gary, IN 6 3 35 17 4 4 4 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1																
Grand Rapids, MI					4											
Indianapolis, IN 179 99 53 17 5 5 11 Fresno, CA U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U																
Milwaukee, WI 75 44 19 7 2 3 4 Honolulu, HI 80 59 12 3 3 3 3 9 Peoria, IL 38 23 12 1 — 2 4 Long Beach, CA 63 40 17 4 2 — 7 Rockford, IL 46 31 11 2 1 1 1 1 Long Angeles, CA U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U																
Peoria, IL 38 23 12 1 2 4 Long Beach, CA 63 40 17 4 2 7						_	_									
Rockford, IL 46 31 11 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 6 11 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 3 2 1 2 1 3																
South Bend, IN 43 29 13 — 1 — 1 — 1 Pasadena, CA 31 20 9 — — 2 4 Toledo, OH 92 67 14 5 1 5 11 5 11 Portland, OR 120 76 32 4 2 6 11 Youngstown, OH 55 44 8 1 — 2 1 Sacramento, CA 191 123 50 11 7 — 14 W.N. Central 598 387 141 42 12 13 52 Sacramento, CA 191 123 50 11 7 — 14 Des Moines, IA 74 56 13 2 1 2 15 San Diego, CA 184 128 41 8 4 3 11 Kansas City, KS 32 19 12 — 1 — 6																
Youngstown, OH 55 44 8 1 — 2 1 Sacramento, CA 191 123 50 11 7 — 14 W.N. Central 598 387 141 42 12 13 52 San Diego, CA 184 128 41 8 4 3 11 Des Moines, IA Duluth, MN 21 15 5 1 — — 3 15 52 16 53n Diego, CA 129 89 30 6 1 3 16 Mansas City, KS 32 19 12 — 1 — 6 San Francisco, CA 129 89 30 6 1 3 16 53n Diego, CA 1245 177 43 18 5 2 16 53n Diego, CA 245 177 43 18 5 2 16 53n Diego, CA 245 177 43 18 5 2 16 53n Diego, CA	South Bend, IN	43	29	13	_	1	_	1	Pasadena, CA		20	9		_	2	4
W.N. Central 598 387 141 42 12 13 52 San Diego, CA 184 128 41 8 4 3 11 Des Moines, IA 74 56 13 2 1 2 15 5 1 — — 3 16 129 89 30 6 1 3 16 16 11 3 16 13 2 1 — — 3 16 San Joego, CA 129 89 30 6 1 3 16 San Joego, CA 129 89 30 6 1 3 16 San Joego, CA 129 89 30 6 1 3 16 San Joego, CA 245 177 43 18 5 2 16 San Joego, CA 245 177 43 18 5 2 16 San Joego, CA 245 177 43 18 5 2 16 San J							5									
Des Moines, IA 74 56 13 2 1 2 15 Duluth, MN 21 15 5 1 — 3 3 16 San Jose, CA 245 177 43 18 5 2 16 San Jose, CA 31 25 1 3 2 — 1 San Francisco, CA 31 25 1 3 2 — 1 San Francisco, CA 31 25 1 3 2 — 1 San Jose, CA 31 25 1 3 3 2 — 1 San Jose, CA 31 25 1 3 3 2 — 1 San Jose, CA 31 25 1 3 3 2 — 1 San Jose, CA 31 25 1 3 3 2 — 1 San Jose, CA 31 25 1 3 3 2 — 1 San Jose, CA 31 25 1 3 3 2 — 1 San Jose, CA 31 25 1 3 3 2 — 1 San Jose, CA 31 25 1 3 3 2 — 1 San Jose, CA 31 25 1 3 3 2 — 1 San Jose, CA 31 25 3 1 3 3 2 — 1 San Jose, CA 31 25 3 3 2 — 1 San Jose, CA 31 25 3 3 2 — 1 San Jose, CA 31 25 3 3 2 — 1 San																
Duluth, MN 21 15 5 1 — — 3 San Jose, CA 245 177 43 18 5 2 16 San Jose, CK 32 19 12 — 1 — 6 San Jose, CA 31 25 1 3 2 — 1 San Jose, CK Sa									San Francisco, CA						3	16
Kansas City, NO 78 43 16 11 3 3 1 1																
Ransas City, MO	Kansas City, KS											-				
Minneapolis, MN 48 35 8 3 1 1 5 7 Total 11,162** 7,397 2,523 716 268 250 771 St. Louis, MO 83 39 34 7 2 — 3 St. Paul, MN 48 36 10 1 1 1 — 5													2	_		4
Omaha, NE 101 67 20 8 1 5 7 Total 11,162** 7,397 2,523 716 268 250 771 St. Louis, MO 83 39 34 7 2 — 3 St. Paul, MN 48 36 10 1 1 — 5									Tacoma, WA	131	98	24	7	2	_	5
St. Paul, MN 48 36 10 1 1 — 5	Omaha, NE	101	67	20	8	1	5	7	Total	11,162**	7,397	2,523	716	268	250	771

U: Unavailable. —:No reported cases.

* Mortality data in this table are voluntarily reported from 122 cities in the United States, most of which have populations of ≥100,000. A death is reported by the place of its occurrence and by the week that the death certificate was filed. Fetal deaths are not included.

† Pneumonia and influenza.

§ Because of changes in reporting methods in this Pennsylvania city, these numbers are partial counts for the current week. Complete counts will be available in 4 to 6 weeks.

¶ Because of Hurricane Katrina, weekly reporting of deaths has been temporarily disrupted.


** Total includes unknown ages.

TABLE IV. Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases,* United States, quarter ending March 31, 2007 (13th Week)

States, quarter endir	ig warch 31		berculosis				
	Previous						
Reporting area	Current quarter	4 qu	arters Max	Cum 2007	Cum 2006		
United States	1,595	1,595	3,294	1,595	2,666		
New England Connecticut Maine Massachusetts New Hampshire Rhode Island Vermont	35 22 3 — 3 5 2	35 22 2 0 2 5	94 26 5 58 8 9	35 22 3 — 3 5 2	62 19 3 31 2 4 3		
Mid. Atlantic New Jersey New York (Upstate) New York City Pennsylvania	377 65 44 222 46	377 65 44 222 46	617 139 108 275 98	377 65 44 222 46	463 96 50 233 84		
E.N. Central Illinois Indiana Michigan Ohio Wisconsin	234 121 7 38 53 15	234 120 7 38 53 14	327 158 38 93 68 21	234 121 7 38 53 15	219 91 28 30 54 16		
W.N. Central lowa Kansas Minnesota Missouri Nebraska North Dakota South Dakota	97 5 18 46 26 — —	97 5 18 46 25 0 0	148 14 29 65 31 11 9	97 5 18 46 26 — 2	96 9 30 34 15 3 — 5		
S. Atlantic Delaware District of Columbia Florida Georgia Maryland North Carolina South Carolina Virginia West Virginia	323 — 10 141 32 26 62 12 37 3	323 0 10 141 32 26 62 7 37 3	793 16 18 313 140 48 144 45 137 6	323 — 10 141 32 26 62 12 37 3	600 3 18 221 160 79 57 8 49 5		
E.S. Central Alabama Kentucky Mississippi Tennessee	78 30 9 23 16	78 30 9 23 16	207 51 26 36 95	78 30 9 23 16	149 52 12 27 58		
W.S. Central Arkansas Louisiana Oklahoma Texas	54 23 — 31	54 21 0 27 0	459 37 0 31 403	54 23 — 31	480 19 — 55 406		
Mountain Arizona Colorado Idaho Montana Nevada New Mexico Utah Wyoming	58 23 12 — — 9 14	58 23 12 0 0 0 8	176 138 34 0 0 0 13 14	58 23 12 — — 9 14	72 25 30 — — 10 6		
Pacific Alaska California Hawaii Oregon Washington	339 8 234 32 — 65	339 8 234 22 0 65	767 24 641 43 0 84	339 8 234 32 — 65	525 19 433 18 10 45		
American Samoa C.N.M.I. Guam Puerto Rico U.S. Virgin Islands	U 	0 0 0	0 — 48 0	U — — —	U U 17 —		

C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
U: Unavailable. —: No reported cases. N: Not notifiable.
Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum.
* AIDS and HIV/AIDS data are not updated for this quarter because of upgrading of the national HIV/AIDS surveillance data management system.

FIGURE I. Selected notifiable disease reports, United States, comparison of provisional 4-week totals April 7, 2007, with historical data



^{*} Ratio of current 4-week total to mean of 15 4-week totals (from previous, comparable, and subsequent 4-week periods for the past 5 years). The point where the hatched area begins is based on the mean and two standard deviations of these 4-week totals.

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☆U.S. Government Printing Office: 2007-623-038/41018 Region IV ISSN: 0149-2195