Produced by the North Pacific Fishery Management Council - NOAA Coop. Agreement #97-NA77FC006
North Pacific Fishery Management Council Report to Congress
RUSSIAN FAR EAST
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
Clarence G. Pautzke, Ph.D.
Executive Director
North Pacific Fishery Management Council
605 West 4th Avenue, Suite 306
Anchorage, Alaska 99501
(907) 271-2809
September 30, 1997
Table of Contents
1.1 Nature of the Problem
1.2 Magnuson-Stevens Act Tasking
1.3 Caveat
1.4 Emerging Salmon Issues
Chapter 2. National Fisheries Overview
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Basic Jurisdictions
2.3 Far East Jurisdictions
2.4 Social and Political Change in Russia
2.5 Fisheries Resource Development
2.6 Summary
Chapter 3. Administration of Fisheries
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Federal Fisheries Committee
3.3 Far Eastern Scientific-Industrial Council
3.4 Territorial Fishing Industry Committees
3.5 Centralized Decision-making
3.6 Summar
Chapter 4. Stock Assessment and Harvest Levels
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Scientific Institutions
4.3 Development of Bering Sea Harvest Limits for Pollock
4.4 Pollock Harvest Limits
4.5 Transboundary Concerns
4.6 Summary
Chapter 5. Allocations of Pollock Quotas
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Types of Fishing Quotas
5.3 Quota Decision Process and Use
5.4 Main Recipients of Pollock Quota
5.5 Foreign Allocations
5.6 Summary
Chapter 6. Enforcement and Monitoring
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Glavrybvod
6.3 Federal Border Service
6.4 Northeast Border District
6.5 Special Marine Inspection Service
6.6 Enforcement and Monitoring Practices
6.7 Putina Enforcement Operations
6.8 Synopsis of Fisheries Regulations
6.9 Summary
7.1 Preface
7.2 Management
7.3 Research
7.4 Enforcement
The North Pacific Fishery Management Council wishes to thank several individuals for their help in developing this report. We had extraordinary cooperation from the U.S. Coast Guard Seventeenth District. RADM Ray Riutta, CAPT Vince O’Shea, and LCDR Kim Sullivan provided information on the Federal Border Service and enthusiastically supported our efforts in meeting with personnel in Russian Far East enforcement and management institutions. Stephen Meyer and Dave Flannagan of the NMFS Alaska Enforcement Division provided information on the functions and structure of Glavrybvod and the Special Marine Inspection Service. Vidar Wespestad, at the NMFS Alaska Fisheries Science Center in Seattle, provided much of the information on the biology of the pollock stocks and the setting of harvest levels. Steve Cowper and John Tichotsky, in the Office of the Secretariat of the Northern Forum in Anchorage, Alaska, and Shawneen Conover, North Pacific Fisheries Program Manager of the Alaska Center for International Business (now within the State of Alaska Department of Commerce and Economic Development, Division of Trade and Development), University of Alaska Anchorage, provided background information on quota allocation processes and the fishing industry. Shawneen Conover’s contribution requires special mention because of her editorial leadership on the Pacific Rim Fisheries Update series of translated news articles from Russia. That series provided the basis for much of our understanding of their fishing industry and the Far East Scientific-Industrial Council. Also, her guidance and advice were invaluable in the beginning stages of this research. Finally, we wish to thank Linda Roberts on our staff for developing the graphics and efficiently compiling the document into a readable whole.
1. The North Pacific Fishery Management Council (Council) is authorized by the Magnuson-Stevens Act to manage the groundfish complex of the Bering Sea and Aleutians. This is done under the authority of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Groundfish Fishery Management Plan, implemented through federal regulations beginning in 1981. The western boundary of the fishery management plan in the northern Bering Sea is the U.S. - Russian Convention Line of 1867.
2. Walleye pollock of U.S. origin migrate westward from the eastern Bering Sea, across the Convention Line and intermingle with Russian pollock stocks. Concerns have been raised that Russian fishing vessels, and Russia-licensed vessels from third countries, may be harvesting pollock of U.S. origin. Of concern is a Russian and third party fishery concentrated in the northern Bering Sea just to the west of the Convention Line that targets pollock stocks straddling the boundary line. Of equal concern is the Russian fishery off Cape Navarin that may be harvesting juvenile pollock from the eastern Bering Sea.
3. This transboundary issue must not be confused with a similar situation concerning pollock stocks in the international waters of the central Bering Sea, the so-called “Donut Hole.” The Donut Hole transboundary issue has been resolved through an international convention. Unlike the Donut Hole issue, transboundary pollock stocks to the north inhabit waters completely within the national jurisdictions of two countries, the U.S. and Russia.
4. Effort has grown rapidly on the Russian side due to several factors. There has been increasing emphasis on fishing in the Russian Exclusive Economic Zone as high seas fisheries opportunities were reduced elsewhere. Rapid fleet rebuilding is occurring in the Far East, requiring substantial hard currencies. National and regional initiatives have been approved recently calling for increased fisheries production. Fishing rights have been granted to foreign fishermen to keep them from fishing in the Peanut Hole, the international waters of the central Sea of Okhotsk.
5. Little progress has been made in reaching a mutual understanding on long term management partially because we have had little knowledge of the fisheries management and enforcement structures in the Russian Far East.
6. Therefore, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council was tasked by Congress in reauthorizing the Magnuson-Stevens Act in 1996, to submit a report by September 30, 1997, describing the institutional structures in Russia pertaining to stock assessment, management, and enforcement for fishery harvests in the Bering Sea, and recommendations for improving coordination between the United States and Russia.
7. This report responds to that direction from Congress, but should be viewed as just a first tentative step in understanding the Russian system of fisheries management. Verification of the information will be needed as information becomes more available, hopefully through improved communications between Russian and United States fisheries managers, scientists, and enforcement personnel. Additionally, institutional structures for fisheries management and enforcement are changing, and this will necessitate periodic revisions in the descriptions provided herein.
8. Russia is now working its way out of major structural changes that occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Reform toward profit-based operations has caused greathardships on the fishing fleets as they rebuild and replace their aging Soviet era fishing fleet. The introduction of new, technologically advanced fishing platforms is putting ever increasing pressures on the fish stocks of the North Pacific, particularly the pollock stock which dominates the species complex.
9. New national and regional goals have been established to increase harvests of the fisheries resources. These initiatives, combined with the race for fish already underway, will place considerable pressure on fisheries resources. There seems to be inadequate funding necessary to field comprehensive enforcement and monitoring programs.
10. There are three levels of fisheries administration in the Russian Federation. Overall authority for management decisions flows from the Federal Fisheries Committee, in Moscow, within the Ministry of Agriculture and Food. The Federal Fisheries Committee manages, monitors, and enforces the fisheries, and conducts research, through several different branches and regional offices.
11. The second level of administration is the Far Eastern Scientific-Industrial Council, which represents the oblasts, krais, and okrugs along the Pacific Coast, and recommends fishing quotas and regulations at the regional level. The Federal Fisheries Committee in Moscow retains final approval authority. The Far Eastern Scientific-Industrial Council is the closest counterpart to the North Pacific Fishery Management Council though it does not appear to have the same authorities.
12. Stock assessment of Bering Sea pollock is carried out mainly by TINRO-Center and KamchatNIRO. Scientists from these two institutions do not always agree on the status of the stocks, and VNIRO in Moscow has performed independent assessments. The Federal Fisheries Committee must approve the harvest levels.
13. Russian scientists have exchanged information with fisheries scientists from the NMFS Alaska Fisheries Science Center in Seattle. These exchanges need to be encouraged, as does access to the Russian zone by U.S. fisheries research vessels such as the R/V Miller Freeman. Only through continued cooperative research will the fisheries managers be able to determine how best to manage the pollock resource for the long term.
14. Once the annual total allowable catches (TAC) for pollock are established by the Federal Fisheries Committee in October, the harvest is allocated out to the various users in the Far East. Significant quotas are held back by the Federal Fisheries Committee to use to raise funds to run the agency. Most of the hold-back is sold to foreign operations for hard currency.
15. The Far Eastern Scientific-Industrial Council plays a central role in gathering quota requests from the oblasts, krais, and okrugs. It also oversees quota distributions after the harvest levels have been determined.
16. There are many companies from the Far East region that participate in the pollock fisheries in the western Bering Sea, but it is likely that those receiving the most quota will be most influential in management decisions and quotas for pollock. From Primorye, the major players appear to include VBTRF and Dalmoreproduct from Vladivostok, and NBAMR from Nakhodka. Major companies fromKamchatka include AKROS and UTRF, both in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy. From Sakhalin, the Nevelsk Base of Trawling Fleet may be important. Chukotka Autonomous Okrug may be of emerging importance as it has an increased pollock quota of 60,000 mt for four years starting in 1996, most coming from the western Bering Sea.
17. The sale of quota to foreign fleets by the Federal Fisheries Committee has long been a flashpoint in Moscow-Far East relations, particularly when foreign fleets continue fishing after domestic fishermen have exhausted their quotas. The Federal Fisheries Committee continues this practice to generate hard currency and keep foreign countries from returning to the Peanut Hole.
18. Three agencies have major enforcement responsibilities for fisheries in the Far East: the Glavrybvod, Federal Border Service, and Special Marine Inspection Service. U.S. fisheries managers and enforcement personnel have had considerable interaction with personnel from the Kamchatrybvod. That branch office of Glavrybvod appears to dominate enforcement and monitoring of fisheries in the western Bering Sea.
19. The Federal Border Service is the Russian counterpart of the U.S. Coast Guard, and the two agencies have relatively good communications with each other.
20. The Special Marine Inspection Service concentrates more on pollution control and is under a completely different administration than the rybvod system. The Service provides inspectors to the fishing fleet, and must coordinate with, and complement, the inspection and enforcement personnel from the rybvod. There has been less contact with the Special Marine Inspection Service.
21. The enforcement agencies are underfunded and understaffed. As activity in Russian fisheries in the Far East increase, these enforcement and monitoring agencies will be under increased pressure to spread their personnel and technical resources further.
22. Management Recommendations:
• Continue to increase knowledge of Russian Far East Fisheries management and enforcement structures and processes.
• Promote working relationships between appropriate management institutions, including the North Pacific Fishery Management Council and corresponding institutions in Russia, for long-term sustainability of fisheries of mutual concern.
• Support Russian efforts to continue and make permanent, the moratorium on fishing in the Peanut Hole in the central Sea of Okhotsk
• Pursue opportunities for U.S. visits to major ports in the Russian Far East to improve understanding of Russian fisheries.
23. Research Recommendations:
• Promote exchange of data and development of a central repository for Bering Sea fisheries and ecosystem data.
• Calibrate and standardize research methodology and instrumentation on Bering Sea pollock fisheries.
• Encourage U.S.-Russian collaboration on scientific fisheries and ecological research
24. Enforcement Recommendations:
• Establish a U.S.-Russia multi-agency committee for enforcement. U.S. agencies would include 17th Coast Guard District, and NMFS AK Region Enforcement; Russia would include appropriate Russian enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Border Service, Rybvod, and Special Marine Inspection Service. This would provide information regarding regulations, procedures, and enforcement techniques.
• Encourage the 17th Coast Guard District Commander to continue initiatives to expand cooperation with North Coast Region FBS in areas like:
- Exchange of officers for professional information sharing.
- Hosting Russian officials at the Coast Guard Fisheries Training Center.
- Promote reciprocal visits to U.S. and Russian ports to improve understanding of U.S. and Russian fishing fleet composition, characteristics, and operational patterns.
- Joint fisheries patrols to improve communication procedures between U.S.-Russia enforcement assets.
• Develop a more responsive mechanism to deal with Russian and other foreign flag fishing vessels which violate the U.S. EEZ, but are not apprehended by the U.S. Coast Guard.
1.1 Nature of the Problem
The North Pacific Fishery Management Council (Council) is authorized by the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act) to recommend management measures to the U.S. Secretary of Commerce for fisheries in the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) from 3 to 200 miles. The Council manages the groundfish complex of the Bering Sea and Aleutians under the authority of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Groundfish Fishery Management Plan, implemented through federal regulations beginning in 1981 (50 CFR Part 675). The plan allows for setting of harvest limits and measures to manage the participating fishing sectors and gears. The geographic jurisdiction of the fishery management plan ranges westward, from 170ø West longitude on the south side of the Aleutians and from outside state waters on the north side of the Alaska Peninsula, to the U.S. - Russian Convention Line of 1867, from the Bering Straits southward to 200 miles south of the Aleutians.
Walleye pollock (Theragra chalcogramma) of U.S. origin range westward beyond the U.S. EEZ into waters under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. Concerns have been raised that Russian fishing vessels, and Russia-licensed vessels from third countries, may be harvesting pollock of eastern Bering Sea origin. This happens because pollock migrate from the eastern Bering Sea under U.S. jurisdiction, across the U.S.-Russia Convention Line of 1867 to areas off Cape Navarin in the western Bering Sea where they co-mingle with Russian pollock stocks before returning to U.S. waters (Wespestad 1996). There also is a Russian and third party fishery concentrated in the northern Bering Sea just to the west of the Convention Line that targets pollock stocks straddling the boundary line (Fig.1).
Figure 1. North Pacific Region.
This transboundary issue is not to be confused with a similar situation concerning pollock stocks in the international waters of the central Bering Sea, the so-called “Donut Hole.” There, a problem arose in the mid-1980s as foreign vessels from Japan, South Korea, Poland and China moved into the Donut Hole to fish pollock because they were displaced from U.S. waters by growth of U.S. domestic fisheries. Pollock catch increasedrapidly in the Donut Hole and then declined more rapidly. The moratorium on fishing since 1993 has been observed by all countries including the U.S. and Russia, and there exists a formula approach for future operations should renewed stock abundance allow such fisheries. This is embodied in the Convention on the Conservation and Management of the Pollock Resources in the central Bering Sea, signed on June 16, 1994, by representatives of the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the U.S. Japan and the Republic of Poland signed the Convention on August 4, and August 25, 1994, respectively (Colson 1994).
Unlike the Donut Hole issue, sharing of pollock stocks north of the Donut Hole jurisdictionally involves just two nations, the United States and Russia. Effort has grown rapidly on both sides of the Convention Line. On the U.S. side, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council has developed a license limitation program to help control growth in catching capacity, but still the fishing fleet is significantly overcapitalized. The pollock resource has been allocated between inshore processors and the offshore sector since 1992 and fishing seasons have shortened considerably in the past five years. U.S. vessels fish the pollock resource over a broad range from the southeastern Bering Sea to north of the Pribilofs along the east side of the Convention Line.
Effort has grown rapidly on the Russian side of the Convention Line also. This growth is being driven by several factors. First, with extension of national fisheries jurisdictions worldwide in the 1970s, Soviet fishing vessels became more confined to resources within their own EEZ, thus increasing pressure on local fish stocks. These conditions hold today as opportunities on the high seas and in other EEZs are relatively limited. Second, Soviet fishing fleets were heavily subsidized, were not expected to make a profit, and were rewarded for exceeding their planned catch quotas. Most of that fleet is obsolete and not competitive in today’s fisheries. The Far Eastern industry is pursuing a major overhaul of their fleet through new vessel purchases and leases, and through refitting of their older, but still useable vessels. This requires major sources of hard currency, and much of that comes from sale of quotas. Third, there are additional burdens being placed on the fishing industry to provide support for improvements in living conditions, services, and community infrastructures whose general conditions have deteriorated over many years of Soviet rule. Fourth, quotas are being granted to foreign fishing vessels in the Russian EEZ in return for not fishing in the Peanut Hole, that portion of the central Sea of Okhotsk outside Russian jurisdiction. Fifth, and last, there are several national initiatives to boost fisheries production over the next five to thirteen years.
These factors have combined to place excessive pressure on pollock and other fisheries resources in the Bering Sea. It is clear that there needs to be a better basin-wide understanding of stock dynamics and effects of fishing. A major challenge confronting the U.S. and Russia is how to work together to sustain the magnificent pollock resource. There is no particular management structure, similar to that established for Donut Hole management, established to communicate concerns and resolve differences in fisheries conservation and management practices between the U.S. and Russia. Without some mechanism for coordinated, verifiable, and sustainable management and conservation of Bering Sea transboundary pollock stocks, their long term outlook could be threatened.
1.2 Magnuson-Stevens Act Tasking
Little progress has been made in reaching a mutual understanding on long term management partially because we have had little knowledge of the fisheries management and enforcement structures in the Russian Far East. There no longer is relative constancy in the management regime as there was for many years under the former Soviet Ministry of Fisheries. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union have come vast changes in the fisheries management structure. The management infrastructure and the fishing industry continue to evolve rapidly. Our understanding has been limited further by the lack of openness of information in Soviet/Russian society.
As a response to the paucity of information describing the systems of fisheries management and enforcement in the Russian Far East, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council was tasked by Congress when it reauthorized the Magnuson-Stevens Act in 1996, to do the following :
“No later than September 30, 1997, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council, in consultation with the North Pacific and Bering Sea Advisory Body, shall submit to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate and the Committee on Resources of the House of Representatives a report describing the institutional structures in Russia pertaining to stock assessment, management, and enforcement for fishery harvests in the Bering Sea, and recommendations for improving coordination between the United States and Russia for managing and conserving Bering Sea fishery resources of mutual concern.” (P.L. 104-297, sec. 108(g)[uncodified])
This report responds to the Congressional charge and represents our most current understanding of Russian Far East fisheries management, conservation, and enforcement. This report begins by describing the basic political jurisdictions of Russia, particularly in the Far East. It discusses the importance of Far Eastern regions in natural resource development and some of the social changes that serve as backdrop for the examination of fisheries administration. Fisheries resource development in the Soviet Union and Russia is examined next. The federal administration of fisheries is then described beginning with the Federal Fisheries Committee and ending with the functions of the regional fishing administrations.
Next described is the institutional structure for stock assessments and setting of harvest limits for pollock. This is followed by a description of the process by which the harvest limits are allocated to Russian fishing companies and licensed foreign operations. The regulatory regime is then summarized, and finally, enforcement and monitoring are examined. The paper ends with suggestions on further cooperative efforts with Russia.
1.3 Caveat
This report should be viewed as a first step in understanding Russian fisheries management. Information contained herein was gathered from as many open sources as possible, including translations of Russian news articles, western news reports, academic reports, and some published reports. Also, it is based to a large extent on personal contacts with U.S. travelers to Russia, and with Russian personnel involved in fisheries management, enforcement, and industry.
We have attempted to verify much of the information using contacts in Russia as available. A special effort was made by the Council to verify perceptions of management and enforcement by funding Northern Forum representatives to travel to Vladisvostok in the spring of 1997 to talk with government and industry leaders. It should be cautioned, however, that just as various individuals within the U.S. likely would provide divergent, and possibly even conflicting, views on U.S. fisheries management operations, depending on their perspective, experience and knowledge base, Russians may also. They will have differing views on how their system runs, particularly given the rapid changes that have occurred in fisheries management structures since the fall of the Soviet Union. Though Russia has progressed significantly in the openness of information in the past five years, there is relatively little information available on stock status and enforcement, particularly when judged against U.S. standards. Indeed, with the high state of flux, information as little as a few months old may be out of date. Our understanding of Russian Far East fisheries will continue to evolve. The Council will keep Congress informed of any major changes in our understanding of the Russia Federation system of fisheries management.
1.4 Emerging Salmon Issues
Though not treated further in this report, a second transboundary fishery concern has been raised, the issue of salmon interceptions. The 1997 run of sockeye salmon into Bristol Bay was significantly below expected returns. The forecast return was about 34 million fish, allowing for an anticipated harvest of 25 million fish. The harvest ended up at about 12.3 million fish. This is the single largest salmon fishery in North America and the basis for the livelihoods of fishermen from Alaska and throughout the Pacific Northwest. It is unclear what happened to the salmon that were expected to return to Bristol Bay. A possibility is that they were intercepted on the western side of the U.S.-Russia Convention Line.
There is a long history of salmon fisheries in Russian waters and of the Japanese participating in them under intergovernmental agreements or by reflagging. An offshore salmon driftnet fishery still exists within the Russian Exclusive Economic Zone east of the Kuril Islands and in the western Bering Sea (NMFS OE 1997). The vessels are land-based driftnetters in the 30 meter class. Each vessel deploys approximately 16,000 meters of net in four sets. The annual quota for the fisheries is reported to be approximately 20,000 metric tons. Primary species are sockeye and coho salmon. The fishery is reported to have a high bycatch of sea birds and marine mammals. Other information indicates that 10,000 - 16,500 metric tons of sockeye salmon have been taken annually from 1990 to 1994.
News accounts from Japan indicate that a total of 29 Russian driftnet vessels intended to participate in the 1997 fishery, compared to 20 vessels in 1996, and 10 vessels in 1995, the first year that driftnet fisheries were allowed. Fourteen of the 29 vessels belong to Russian companies in Sakhalin. Apparently they have research quotas for 6,800 metric tons. The remaining 15 vessels hail from Kamchatka and claim to have research quotas for 7,800 metric tons. The majority of the vessels are former Japanese tuna boats and all have either Panamanian or Greek registry. Their operations range along the Kamchatka coast south to the Kuriles. They offload directly to transport vessels headed for Japan.
These fisheries are taking place under research permits. In 1992, the U.S. and Russia signed a bilateral agreement calling for a ban on directed salmon fishing in the U.S. and Russian exclusive economic zones. The agreement allows for directed fishing within 25 nautical miles of the baseline from which the 200 mile zone is measured. Research fishing is permitted outside 25 nautical miles. Vessels conducting surveys under national and international scientific research programs, or vessels flying either the U.S. or the Russian flag, may also conduct salmon scouting operations in the U.S. and Russian EEZs. Fisheries under research permits may be fishing new areas where U.S. and Asian salmon stocks intermingle.
There are no data available now to determine the impacts of “research” fisheries in the Russian EEZ on Bristol Bay sockeye stocks. Biological information required to determine the origin of the salmon caught in Russian waters and the potential impacts on U.S. stocks needs to be obtained through all possible channels, including the North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission. The North Pacific Fishery Management Council intends to monitor this matter very closely. Though this issue is not addressed further in this report on transboundary pollock stocks and Russian fisheries management, the Council will keep Congress informed of their concerns regarding transboundary salmon, particularly as they relate to sockeye originating out of the Bristol Bay region.
Chapter 2. National Fisheries Overview
2.1 Introduction
The basic jurisdictional composition of the Russian Federation is unfamiliar to most U.S. fisheries managers. The following sections describe the basic jurisdictions of Russia, particularly those along the Pacific Coast in the Far Eastern region. This description will provide background information to better understand how fisheries decisions are made and the importance of the Far East in contributing to the nation’s fisheries. There also has been very significant social and structural changes since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. These are recounted here and then related to the development of fisheries in Russia and the Far East.
2.2 Basic Jurisdictions
The Russian Federation today consists of twenty-one republics, six krais (territories), forty-nine oblasts (provinces), one autonomous oblast, and ten autonomous okrugs (ethnic districts). Russia’s republics, krais, and oblasts are similar to states in the U.S. in terms of their political and administrative structures and their role in the federation. Russia’s other jurisdictions, however, are different, if not unique, from American states, counties, cities and townships (Oleynik 1993).
Republics. These are the most politically developed and active jurisdictions of Russia. Their boundaries were drawn in the 1920s to give political recognition to important ethnic minority groups. Governmental structures in the republics include legislative and executive branches, represented by a parliament and executive government. Parliaments have the right to adopt their own economic regulations which may be different from regulations adopted at the federal level. There are no republics on the Russian Far East Pacific Coast.
Oblasts (provinces). Oblasts are primarily administrative subdivisions. Each oblast has a council of representatives and an executive administration of elected and appointed officials. Oblast representatives are much less politically active on the federal level than representatives of the republics. Oblast governments are preoccupied more with local economic problems and less with federal ones. Oblasts continue to be mostly administrative subdivisions of the federation and most contain no significant nationality groups other than ethnic Russians. Oblasts on the Pacific Coast include Kamchatka, Magadan, and Sakhalin.
Krais (territories). Krais are unique administrative entities which are a combination of republic and oblast. Boundaries for krais were drawn up arbitrarily, mostly for administrative purposes. Initially, the main difference between krais and oblasts was in the presence of one or more political subdivisions based on nationality groups in the form of autonomous oblasts, autonomous okrugs or both, which were located within the territory of krais. Krais on the Pacific Coast include Primorsky and Khabarovsk.
Autonomous Oblasts and Okrugs (districts). Autonomous oblasts and okrugs were created to give political recognition to relatively small ethnic groups. All autonomous okrugs are assigned to large areas of sparse population in Siberia, the Far East, and the northern regions of Russia. Because of their small populations, the role of autonomous oblasts and okrugs at the federal level is rather limited. Nevertheless, representatives from these jurisdictions continue to strive for more independence from the federal government in solving their economic problems, especially in the use of natural resources concentrated in their territories. Autonomous okrugs on the Pacific Coast include Koryak and Chukotka.
2.3 Far East Jurisdictions
The Far East region is comprised of seven administrative regions of varying political importance: the Primorsky and Khabarovsk krais; the Kamchatka, Magadan, and Sakhalin oblasts; and the Koryak and Chukotka autonomous okrugs (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Far East Administrative Regions.
Their administrative centers, population (1993), and number of representatives to the Congress of People’s Deputies (CPD), and Supreme Soviet (Parliament or Duma), are as follows:
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The legislative branch of the Russian Federation consists of two levels: the Supreme Soviet (Parliament or Duma) and the Congress of People’s Deputies. The Duma has 247 members chosen from the membership of the Congress and plays the most important role in the legislative process in Russia (Oleynik 1993). It is the body that is authorized to ratify international treaties of the Russian Federation. The Congress of People’s Deputies has 1,052 members, elected for 5-year terms in 1990, from every jurisdiction (i.e. krais, oblasts, republics, etc.). There is one representative for approximately every 150,000 citizens.
Primorsky Krai. Also called Primorye, this is the most developed of the seven regions, and long has had the infrastructure to support most of the fishing industry in Far East Russia. With its high population and representation in the Congress of People’s Deputies, it is very influential nationally, particularly on fisheries issues. Many of the industry leaders from Dalryba and other large associations in Vladivostok and Nakhodka appear to have direct access to the leaders of government and even to national leaders such as Vice President Chernomyrdin. In a bid to increase its self rule, Primorsky Krai adopted on July 8, 1993, a declaration that it should be given status as a republic within the Russian Federation, and sent an appeal to President Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet (Pacific Rim Fisheries Update, 8/1993). Primorsky today still remains a krai, though a very powerful one.
Conover (1997) lists twenty fishing companies, centered mainly in the Vladivostok and Nakhodka areas, which are identified with fishing pollock in the western Bering Sea. Main headquarters for most large fishing associations, foreign consulates, foreign industry representatives, enforcement, and research are also there. Six of the major pollock quota users in the Far East come out of Primorsky. Primorsky fishermen were allocated over 1 million metric tons or 50% of the total pollock for all areas for 1996 (preliminary estimated pollock quota for 1997 is 1,338,000 metric tons for Primorsky fishermen). In the western Bering Sea, Primorsky fishermen received 277,500 metric tons or 63% of the pollock quota in 1996. The fishing industry of Vladivostok was reported to contribute 80% of that city’s total production in 1996, underscoring the importance of the industry to that major Far East city (Pacific Rim Fisheries Update: 4/1997).
Khabarovsk Krai. Conover (1997) lists ten fishing companies in this krai directly identified with pollock harvest in the Bering Sea, but only 4,000 metric tons of pollock were allocated to Khabarovsk Krai fishermen in the western Bering Sea in 1996. Khabarovsk received 7% (146,200 metric tons) of the Far East pollock quota, but less than 1% of the western Bering Sea pollock quota.
Kamchatka Oblast. This oblast appears to be the next most important area, after Primorye, in terms of pollock activities in the western Bering Sea. Conover (1997) lists eleven fishing organizations at minimum that are identified with pollock fishing in the Bering Sea. Three of those companies are among the top ten pollock users in the Russian Far East. Kamchatka fishermen received 23% of the region-wide pollock quota in 1996 (and for 1997 will receive about the same tonnage, 516,000 metric tons pollock), and 22% (96,000 metric tons) of the western Bering Sea quota. The main fishing center is Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy.
Koryak Autonomous Okrug. Very little information is available on this area. As noted above, it has a very low population level. It is administered out of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy. Though the okrug has considerable coastline along the Bering Sea, no companies are specifically identified with Bering Sea pollock (Conover 1997). Koryak was allocated 4,000 metric tons of pollock in the western Bering Sea in 1996, and 3,400 metric tons in the North Okhotsk Sea. These tonnages may have been sold to companies from other regions for fees.
Magadan Oblast. Magadan Oblast received only 1,000 metric tons of pollock in the western Bering Sea in 1996, and 53,600 metric tons in the North Okhotsk Sea. No companies are specifically identified with the western Bering Sea (Conover 1997). Magadan used to control all of the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, but in 1994, the Okrug was taken out from under Magadan administration.
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug. As noted above, this okrug was once administered by Magadan, much like the Koryak Autonomus Okrug is still administered by Kamchatka. Chukotka broke away in 1994, and seems to be an anomaly in the Russian Far East. It could be important because it is located across the Bering Straits from Alaska, and encompasses Cape Navarin. Large pollock schools concentrate off Cape Navarin, providing the basis of a large fishery. Because pollock from the western and eastern Bering Sea shelfs intermingle there, fisheries off Cape Navarin may be impacting the pollock stock within the U.S. EEZ. Chukotka has about 85,000 ethnic Russians, and about 13,000 Eskimo and Chukchi Natives, many of whom herd reindeer and have some communication with whaling families from the North Slope Borough. The area is said to be very closed, and hard to access. Recent developments include additional tonnages of pollock allocated to Chukotka to help indigenous groups. Though 100,000 metric tons was requested, the Federal Fisheries Committee only granted 60,000 metric tons, including 40,000 metric tons pollock and the remainder in other species.
Sakhalin Oblast. Somewhere around forty fishing companies are identified by Conover (1997) as involved with pollock fisheries, though none specifically with western Bering Sea pollock. They come mainly from the cities of Nevelsk, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, and Kholmsk, on the southern tip of the island. Sakhalin Oblast fishermen received 304,270 metric tons of pollock region-wide in 1996 (15%) ( and 382,000 metric tons in 1997), making it the third largest user behind Primorsky and Kamchatka. It also was the third largest user of western Bering Sea pollock, receiving 46,000 metric tons or 10% of the 1996 quota.
2.4 Social and Political Change in Russia
Russia became an independent state at the end of 1991 with the break-up of the Soviet Union. The Russian Federation was left with 76.6 percent of the total area of the former USSR, and the largest and richest state in natural resources of the Newly Independent States (Oleynik 1993). The political leadership of the new Russia, President Boris Yeltsin and his ministers, committed itself to democratic and free market reforms and began extensive economic and political changes after President Yeltsin was freely elected in June 1991. A coup attempt in Moscow in August 1991 had failed. In 1993, a major political crisis took place in Russia. On September 21, 1993, Yeltsin dissolved the Parliament and the Congress of People’s Deputies and called for early parliamentary elections in December. The Russian Parliament, headed by Chairman Khasbulatov, continued to resist Yeltsin’s reforms, and members of Parliament barricaded themselves in the Parliament Building in early October 1993. Vice President Alexander Rutskoi, who had been suspended by Yeltsin, declared himself Acting President and was sworn in by the Parliament. Violence erupted on October 3 outside the Parliament Building when anti-Yeltsin demonstrators overtook police and stormed the nearby office of the Mayor of Moscow. The next day government troops bombarded the Parliament Building, leading to the surrender of Khasbulatov and Rutskoi.
While this action ostensibly settled, albeit temporarily, the question of future direction of the country down the path of reform, the next presidential election in the year 2000 may provide a clearer gauge of direction for reforms. It may or may not ease the tension between the Duma and reform-oriented leaders in the executive branch that has had spillover effects on recent efforts to resolve the maritime boundary dispute in the Bering Sea. This tension may need to be resolved before any long term agreement can be reached on the maritime boundary, or for that matter on other fisheries issues involving transboundary stocks of importance to the United States.
Political upheaval that occurred in Russia in 1991-1993 provided a catalyst for changes in the relationships between the regions and Moscow and the control over natural resources, particularly fisheries. Not only were the upper levels of government grappling with conflict between reformers and anti-reformers at the national level, but considerable changes were taking place in the structure of government during the two to three years after Yeltsin came to power. Additionally, many of the regions and outlying areas were seeking more autonomy in their relationship to Moscow. On the one hand, the central government was trying to keep the federation from disintegrating further, and on the other, the outlying regions wanted more say in the development of their naturalresources, and the distribution of the wealth generated from those resources, particularly since central government funds and materials were no longer forthcoming to Far East fishermen.
All this was taking place while the country was moving from a controlled economy, wherein fuel and repairs in the fishing fleet were provided regularly by the central government, to a free market economy wherein the fishing fleet had to fend for itself, buy its own fuel and generate funds from its fisheries to sustain its fleet. This hit the Far East particularly hard as will be described below. In the 1990s, the Russian Far East became an important nexus for international transactions rather than being simply a military staging area and resource storehouse. Very quickly, the region became a gateway to Pacific Rim economies including Japan, Korea and the western United States. With the extensive resource wealth, the region began to exert more control over their resources though they still remain under the authority of Moscow for many, if not most, of their natural resource decisions (Cowper et al. 1997).
2.5 Fisheries Resource Development
Russia showed little interest in marine fisheries until after the end of World War I and the Revolution of 1917, though there did exist a significant coastal salmon fishery for salmon. In February 1920, Lenin signed a decree that established the organization and administration of the commercial fishing industry, and expansion and mechanization of the fishing fleet commenced (OES 1965). Development accelerated in 1925 with establishment of cooperatives (the kolkhoz system) and State run fisheries, and the introduction of fixed prices for fish and fish products (Atkinson 1987). Trawler fleet construction began during the first Five-Year Plan, 1928-1932, in the Barents Sea and Far East. The first large trawlers began operations in the Far East in 1929 and totaled twenty vessels by 1932 (Haskell 1963). As shown below, Zilanov (1996) characterizes the pre-revolution period as based on a market economy under the czarist regime, and the post revolutionary period as one based on the planned distribution system.
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After a stand-down during World War II, termed the Great Patriotic War by Russians, efforts were renewed to develop Soviet fisheries. During the fourth Five-Year Plan (1946-1950), fishery development was given priority and standardized vessel construction was increased (Haskell 1963). A new economic growth program was adopted for 1959-1965, and Soviet shipyards were expanded. Because the Soviet shipyards had limited capacity, contracts for shipbuilding were let to East Germans, Polish, Finnish, Danish, Japanese, and English shipyards. By 1963, the Soviet Union’s fishing fleet totaled more than two million gross registered tons, and with its support ships and whaling flotillas, had become the largest and most modern in the world. It had tripled in size since the mid-1950s, and total Soviet fisheries catches had risen from 1.65 million metric tons in 1950 to 4.7 million metric tons in 1963 (OES 1965). This expansion was driven in part by the need for foodstuffs, especially protein, for a burgeoning population faced with the failure of Soviet agriculture. It also supported the political aims of the Soviet Union to be a dominant player on the Cold War stage throughout the world. By 1964, nearly 200 factory trawlers were in operation and more were being added almost daily to the Soviet fleet.
Zilanov (1996) describes 1951-1956 as a period for exploiting near-USSR seas, and 1957-1975 as one of exploiting the high seas. Catch tripled to 6.2 million metric tons in the latter period. This was also the period when exploratory fleets began to range across the Bering Sea and Gulf of Alaska. The Far East region extended over 3.6 million square miles, an area as large as the U.S., was strategically exposed, and only had five million people (OES 1965). The Soviet Government devoted large sums of capital to build the economy. Annual investments in the Far East fishing industry increased steeply in the 1959-1965 Seven-Year Plan and represented about 1% of all Soviet industrial investments. During 1960-63, the Soviet Government added to the Far East fleet more than 200 modern fishing, fish-processing, whaling, and support vessels with an estimated gross tonnage of 500,000 tons. The trend in Soviet Far East fisheries was toward building of more processing and support vessels vital to successful distant water fisheries.
In 1963, the Far East produced over 1.5 million metric tons in fish landings, or about one-third of total Soviet landings. The principal beneficiary of government investments in the Far East was the Primorsky Krai whose yearly allocations increased eightfold in ten years. A major influx of vessels to the Far East occurred in 1964 reportedly due to the failure of the Barents Sea herring fishery in 1963-1964. As many as 60 SRT trawlers transferred to the Far East in 1964. Additional vessels were being built in Far East and Baltic shipyards. Fish handling facilities in Vladivostok and Nakhodka were rebuilt and reported to be the largest in the USSR, exceeding even Murmansk (OES 1965). By 1964 fishing was the most important economic activity in the Far East: its annual output, valued at $1.1 billion, represented about one-third of the total industrial production in the region. The Main Far Eastern Fish Industry Administration (Upravleniye Dalryba) was reported to export fish and fish products of Soviet fisheries to 32 countries.
As the Soviet Union’s fishing fleet fanned out across the world’s oceans in the 1960s and 1970s, annual harvests rose to nearly 10 million metric tons, peaking in 1976 and 1977 upon extension of national jurisdictions (FAO 1994)(Figure 3). Marine catches declined to about 9 million metric tons in 1978 and then increased to a peak of 10.3 million metric tons in 1988. Zilanov (1996) credits this growth to vigorous development of the Soviet fishing fleets under the planned distribution system, and the goal to contribute significantly to the food security of the country, ensuring annually 20-25% of the animal proteins. Soviet catches declined to 9.4 million metric tons by 1990 and then rapidly fell off to less than 7 million metric tons in 1991 under the Russian Federation.
This decline in Soviet fisheries followed a long, relatively stable period of planned distribution under the Soviet Ministry of Fisheries. The planned distribution system came under serious scrutiny after Gorbachev ascended to leadership in March 1985. He urged that natural resources development and utilization be placed on a profit and loss basis rather than on some set of production goals established by the bureaucracy. By 1987, laws had been enacted reducing central control over enterprises and authorizing permits for private shops and joint ventures with western partners (Yergin and Gustafson 1995). By 988, the Soviet Ministry of Fisheries had ordered theregional fisheries boards to disband, including Dalryba in the Far East (FNI: 3/1990). They still were allowed to manage the fishing fleets, but could no longer hold assets. For a brief period of about a year, Basin Production Organizations (BPOs) replaced the established regional fishing-industrial complexes. The BPO for each basin had a reefer fleet, large wholesale and retail trading company, several fishing fleets, repair shipyards, fish prospecting company, and a number of research institutions. The Ministry of Fisheries was left with only four research institutions directly under its control, whereas a year earlier, it had fifteen.
Figure 3. Marine Waters Catch.
Late in 1989, with perestroika (restructuring) well underway in the Soviet Union, every planned management structure of fisheries was changed and foreign-Russian joint ventures began, more under the control of the cooperatives and business enterprises in the regions (FNI: 2/1990). The intent of the reorganization was to allow fisheries interests in the regions to take over day-to-day economic management of the fleet. Under the new system, land-based businesses and fishing fleets could come or go freely from an association such as Dalryba.
The first calls for the use of fees to generate hard currency to repair the fleet came in the spring of 1990 (FNI: 7/1990). It was argued that the Federal Fisheries Committee should set target production goals at 70-80% of what the industry normally would take, and allow the remainder to be sold for hard currency fees. In December 1990, it was reported that the State still owned almost all the fishing assets and continued to send down tight production plans. There were plans to create joint stock companies and to sell fishing enterprises, but the industry was still heavily subsidized in 1990 (FNI: 12/1990).
By October 1991, after the failed August coup, the Ministry of Fisheries was no longer able to supply the fuel needs or money for repair of the fishing fleet. Two options were proposed: industry could provide 90% of their catch to meet state-placed orders at a fixed price and 10% could be sold on the free market, and the government would still continue to provide hard currency support; or 60% of the catch could go to the state and 40% to the fleet and industry for currency support, thus responding to perestroika (FNI: 10/1991). Fishermen were at poverty levels and catches had fallen by over 31% in 1991 compared to the previous year (FAO 1994). This spurred major restructuring of the fishing industry and the launching of many joint ventures, partnerships, and other arrangements to obtain hard currency (FNI: 1/1992). By July 1991, there were fifty-three registered joint ventures, fifteen with the Japanese (FNI: 7/1991). The fishing industry argued with government leaders that the fleet was obsolete and needed repairs, and that it should be able to keep hard currency. Following the coup, hard currency funding had fallen by 80%. There were shortages of fuel, packaging and cans. Vessels were deteriorating and few new vessels were on the way.
Fish prices were freed up in January 1992. From 1991 to 1992, landings continued to decline another 19% to about 5.2 million metric tons (FAO 1994). In December 1992, President Yeltsin signed a decree allowing fishermen to keep up to ninety percent of hard currency earned from the export of product. Ten percent still had to be sold on internal markets (FNI: 2/1993). Nonetheless, money was in short supply, the ruble had been devalued, and ship orders from foreign shipyards were down or could not be paid for (Globefish Report, cited in FNI: 8/1993). By 1993, total marine catches were down another 21% to about 4.2 million metric tons (FAO 1995).
Far East catches were down to 2.7 million metric tons in 1993, compared to 4.6 million metric tons in 1990. Many fishing companies were bankrupt and salary payments to workers were in arrears (FNI: 12/1994). New and restructured companies emerging from the financial chaos of the fisheries sector were beginning to acquire new fishing vessels through leases and purchase. Many new factory trawlers and crabbers were ordered for the fleet. Catch in the first six months of 1995 rebounded 16.6% over the same period in 1994 (FNI: 11/1995). The largest catches were in the Far East. Still the marine catches for the entire Russian Federation remained between 3.5 and 4.2 million metric tons in 1994 and 1995, a period characterized by Zilanov (1996) as a dissolution of the planned distribution system and transition to market relations. Catch increased to about 4.5 million metric tons in 1996 (Rodin 1997).
Kaczynski (1995) reported the following important allocation patterns in the Russian Far East for 1994:
1. Absolute priority was given to large companies with governmental participation.
2. Largest companies were located in Primorsky Krai where coastal waters had few fish resources.
3. Russia recognized the ethnic rights to the resources.
4. Local governments in Kamchatka and Sakhalin received larger allocations.
5. International obligations of the Russian Government were respected by setting aside resources for foreign fishing fleets, however, the Federal Committee had to approve all allocations and joint ventures.
The fishing fleet is being modernized very rapidly. A governmental fisheries development program approved in October 1995, called “Ryba,” proposed major scrapping of vessels and replacement of the fleet with new factory trawlers. By the year 2001, 77% of the Russian fishing and 60% of the support fleet that was in service in 1992 is to be scrapped or completely rebuilt. These vessels are being replaced by new factory trawlers from Norway, Germany, and Spain. Kaczynski estimated that the total cost of the renewal of the Russian fleet in domestic shipyards would be on the order of $1 billion, and maintenance and repairs of existing vessels would cost $2.8 billion until those vessels could be scrapped. Financing would be secured by government guarantees of foreign commercial credits.
These national programs are placing tremendous pressure on Russian companies to obtain foreign currency and increase their quota share. The situation is ripe for overrunning quotas and underreporting catches, as long as the hard currency keeps flowing in. The goal of Ryba is to maintain a catch level of 4.2 million metric tons by the year 2000, with 71-76% of the total catch coming from the Russian Exclusive Economic Zone (Zilanov 1996; Pacific Rim Fisheries Update: 2/1996). An even more ambitious program was announced by the Federal Fisheries Committee in January 1997. It aims to raise fish catches by 50% to 6 million metric tons by the year 2010 (Shuster 1997). The program will entail major investments by fishing companies and foreign investors to overhaul old and build new catcher and factory trawler vessels and to modernize shore processing plants.
The above history recounts the dynamic changes that have occurred in Russian fisheries since the late 1980s, particularly in the Far East. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the entire fishing industry was in shambles.Now in 1997, just six years from the time of the coup, and less than five years from a period of extreme hardships in 1992 and 1993, the Russian fishing industry is resurging. It has invested in rebuilding and purchasing new vessels from Norway, Spain and other countries including the U.S. These debts need to be paid off with hard currency. Also, many of the social amenities and support structures in Russia are in disrepair. These all need to be improved, and to a great extent those improvements will be directly dependent on the fishing industry. Adding to this situation are energetic national programs to develop fisheries further by 2000 or 2010 to gain revenues for the government.
The national plan to develop fisheries in Russia rests on individual regional plans. The Far East plan was prepared by Far Eastern fisheries scientists and fishing companies. The Far East region has long been, and remains, the mainstay of Russian fisheries, now contributing over 70% of the nation’s fisheries output (Conover 1997). The average catch exceeds 3 million metric tons. The Sea of Okhotsk provides 50-60% of the catch, mainly pollock, but the next most important region is the broad shelf area from the western Bering Sea to the east of Kamchatka which provides about 20% of the Far Eastern catch. Pollock provides about 70% of the basin’s catch. The goal of the Far East fisheries plan is to achieve harvests of 3.5 million metric tons annually by the year 2010 (Pacific Rim Fisheries Update: 4/1997).
2.6 Summary
There are several conditions in place today in the Russian Far East that will put increased pressure on fish stocks. First, there is an ongoing effort to modernize the fishing industry. The fleet remaining from the Soviet period was heavily subsidized and in bad repair. Throughout the Far East there is active rebuilding of fishing capacity through purchase, lease, and vessel refitting This requires hard currency, the type that is generated from the sale of fish and fish products abroad. Additionally, the fishing sector contributes significantly to the social and economic well being of the regions and the ports from which they originate. There is a drive to improve those conditions after many years under the Soviet regime. On top of these industry initiatives to catch more fish and generate more funds, are ambitious regional and national governmental programs to increase Russian fish harvests over the next thirteen years. Federal fisheries managers will be under pressure to attain these goals in their regions. These conditions easily could lead to a great tendency to fish fast and hard. This furious race for fish, conducted under reduced monitoring and enforcement due to funding shortfalls, could provide the conditions conducive to overfishing pollock, the largest contributor to the fisheries complex.
Chapter 3. Administration of Fisheries
3.1 Introduction
Russian fisheries in all regions appear to be strongly managed from Moscow. This is in keeping with the deeply entrenched Soviet practice of centralized planning and decision-making. While there have been movements to delegate some economic decisions to the regions, and several regional institutions and committees have been formed in the past five years to handle this authority, Moscow still is generally believed to have the final sign-off on harvest levels and allocations, all major management decisions, and those involving international relations.
Federal authority for fisheries management is vested in the Committee of Fishing of the Russia Federation in Moscow (Figure 4). In news accounts this committee goes by several other names, e.g., Federal Fisheries Committee, Committee on Fishing Industry, Roskomrybolovstvo, etc. Here it will be referred to as the Federal Fisheries Committee. In the Far East region, the Far Eastern Scientific-Industrial Council was established in 1992 or 1993 to consolidate fishing quota requests and monitor industry performance. In each of the krais and oblasts are territorial fishing committees or administrations. Federal authorities play a significant role in most regional decisions.
3.2 Federal Fisheries Committee
The Federal Fisheries Committee, headquartered in Moscow, is the counterpart to the U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service. It plays a very strong role in fisheries management in the Russian Federation, and has endured several reorganizations and placements within the executive branch of government since reforms began in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s.
Under the Soviet regime, fisheries were at a ministry level and the Ministry of Fisheries dominated command-based governance of a multi-layered, detailed production plan system, marked by a high level of centralization (Stokke 1995). After Gorbachev rose to leadership in 1985, there was movement toward making natural resource development, including fisheries, more profit oriented, rather than solely based on detailed production plans and planned consumption by the Soviet people. In March 1987, during the initial period of glasnost and perestroika, Nikolai Kotlyar was announced as the new Minister of Fisheries, replacing Vladimir Kamantsov who had left to be the Deputy Premier of Russia in September 1986 (FNI: 3/1987).
In 1989 new emphasis was placed on earning hard currency from fisheries resources and other natural resources so that the departments that managed them, and the industries that relied on them, would not be so dependent on subsidies from the government. The industry was to move to a profit and loss basis beginning in January 1990 (FNI: 9-10/1989). Beginning on December 1, 1989, sweeping changes were made in the Ministry of Fisheries and its organizational structure (FNI: 2/1990). A two-year plan was envisioned to change over to enterprise cooperatives and to create joint stock companies (FNI: 12/1990).
During the coup in Moscow in August 1991, it was reported that Kotlyar made the mistake of instructing the fishing fleet to obey the coup leaders (FNI: 1/1992). After the coup failed, he was replaced by Deputy Minister V. M. Luzhnikov who was on vacation the day of the coup. The decision of the Ministry to back the failed coupmembers did not rest well with the leadership of Russia. Sweeping reforms were made in the Ministry, its command structure and its hard currency source. Hard currency funding for the Ministry and the fishing fleet had been reduced by 80%, and the Ministry was unable to supply the needs of the fishing complex. There was little fuel for the fleet and little money for repairs. The central planning system in Moscow was swept away, the responsibility of the Ministry was reduced, and the fishing fleets, cooperatives and joint ventures were encouraged to assume day-to-day operations. The Soviet Ministry became the Russian Ministry of Fisheries and its staff was reduced by one half to 300 (FNI: 10/1991). It had been expected that with the failure of the coup and the dissolution of the Soviet Union that the new Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources would acquire a central position in fisheries management (Stokke 1995), and apparently the Fisheries Ministry was subordinate for a brief time in 1990 or 1991 to the other ministry. It eventually ended up completely within the Ministry of Agriculture and Food (Akaha 1993). In March 1992, Vladimir Korelsky was announced as the youngest fisheries minister ever to be appointed (FNI: 3/1992). He would also hold the position of the First Vice Minister of Agriculture.
The Federal Fisheries Committee reacquired independent status by a Presidential Decree of 30 September 1992 (Stokke 1995). It remained independent until 1997, despite considerable restructuring of the government and a bid by the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources to take over fisheries and the committee. Alexander V. Rodin was appointed chair of the committee on January 20, 1997, by decree of the government, thus replacing Korelsky. On March 17, 1997, President Yeltsin signed into force a decree that restructured the federal bodies of the executive branch. It included the elimination of the State Committee for Fishing, transferring its functions to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food. As of September 1997, the Federal Fisheries Committee was operating as the Department of Fisheries within the Ministry of Agriculture and Food, but very much like it had in the past, as an independent agency. Apparently the enforcement functions (the primary emphasis of Glavrybvod, described in Section 6.2) of the committee were tasked to the State Committee for Protection of the Environment, but that situation appears to be unsettled. Mikhail Dementiev has been appointed head of the committee and Rodin has the title of First Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Food.
The functions of the Federal Fisheries Committee have changed over time. Decree #208 of March 6, 1993, which established the rights of the committee when it was newly separated from the Ministry of Agriculture and Food, apparently was hastily written and many important provisions were omitted. It did not specifically authorize it to coordinate and control commercial fishing activities, and no one else regulated their activities, particularly with regard to navigation safety and licensing. Decree #208 was superseded by Decree #467 which cleared up any questions about the Federal Committee’s authority. Decree #467 was signed in Moscow by Prime Minister Chernomyrdin on May 15, 1995. It specifically authorized the committee to coordinate, ratify, and monitor regional programs of the fishing industry, and to issue fishing licenses. Prominent was the right of the committee to keep a list of all fishing enterprises, regardless of type of ownership. This enabled it to control the distribution of benefits granted to fishing enterprises. It stated further that the Federal Fisheries Committee would determine overall fishing quotas and their distribution. Regional administrations were required to report the number of quotas allocated, to whom they were given, and for which area. Apparently, before the new decree, the new market entities that emerged after the fall of the Soviet Union were operating however they wished. And finally, the new decree authorized the Federal Fisheries Committee, in case of disputes among regions, enterprises, organizations and agencies, to make the final decision which then could be appealed in court.
A more recent decree, Decree #967, dated September 26, 1995, authorized the committee to issue and monitor fishing licenses and their transfers. Foreign permits for fishing in the Russian EEZ are governed by rules issued under Ordinance No. 86 (May 30, 1994) by the Federal Fisheries Committee. That ordinance covers all foreign legal entities, individuals and Russian companies with foreign investment.
In summary, the Federal Fisheries Committee has authority over the entire Russian fishing industry, and its rights include:
1. Formulate, implement and monitor policy and regulations concerning the fishing industry;
2. Analyze, coordinate and oversee the socioeconomic, scientific and technical development of the fishing industry; develop short and long-term forecasts for its development;
3. Coordinate scientific research on stock populations, acceptable harvest levels, enhancement, etc;
4. Supervise fishing port administrations;
5. Monitor safety of marine vessels and protect human life on vessels;
6. Grant licenses to fishing fleets and hatcheries;
7. Confirm final quotas based on recommendations by the Far East Scientific-Industrial Council with consideration given for intergovernmental and other governmental agreements and regional distribution orders, monitor use; and
8. Determine opening and closing dates of seasons, zones, and fishing grounds (Conover 1997).
The Federal Fisheries Committee has several departments to conduct science and research, and the setting of harvest quotas and allocations. These include the Russian Federal Research Institute of Fisheries and Oceanography (VNIRO), a field research department, TINRO, and the enforcement and monitoring department whose formal name is the National Administration of Fishery Enforcement, Resources Restoration and Regulation of Fishing (Glavrybvod). The committee works closely with and through the Far East Scientific-Industrial Council whose membership and major functions are explained next.
3.3 Far Eastern Scientific-Industrial Council
Fisheries administration in the Soviet Union/Russian Federation has always been organized around a basin principle based on four to five large regional industrial administrative complexes (FNI: 6/1987). In 1983 Dalryba, along the Pacific Coast, was reported to be the most important. Zapryba, representing the ports of Kalingrad, Leningrad, and the Baltic States was next in importance. Its fleets operated in the Baltic Sea and Atlantic. Third was Sevryba representing Murmansk and Arkhangelsk oblasti, and the Republic of Karelia (Stokke 1995) with fisheries in the northeast Atlantic and Barents Sea. Fourth was Azcharryba in the Atlantic but also the Azov and Black Sea, with main ports at Sebastopol, Kerah, and Novorosiisk. Fifth was Kaspryba with inland waters and the Caspian Sea.
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there remained only four large territorial-industrial complexes (FNI: 8/1991). Sevryba in the Northern European part of Russia grew in importance because it had more political stability, even though Dalryba on the Pacific Coast produced more fish. Of note is that Korelsky, Zilanov, and Rodin all hail from Murmansk or a background in Sevryba. Kotlyar hailed from Dalryba and earlier was a delegate to the Supreme Soviet from the Kurile Peninsula (FNI: 3/1987). Changes that swept the Ministry of Fisheries in the late 1980s also affected the regional basin authorities. The Ministry of Fisheries ordered the regional fisheries boards, including Dalryba, to disband. (FNI: 3/1990). They could give commands to the fishing fleet but could not hold assets. The intent of the reorganization was to use economics to control fisheries in a basin, not just administrative levers. This led to the development of Basin Production Organizations (BPOs) for each basin that had a reefer fleet, large wholesale and retail trading company, several fishing fleets, repair shipyards, a fish prospecting company, and a number of research institutes. The Ministry of Fisheries was left with only four research institutions and one design institution to directly control, whereas just 12 months earlier, there were fifteen such organizations. The “BPO” structure lasted only a year due to tensions among companies and the belief of fishermen and processors that the new organization was still too inflexible.
In 1992, a system of scientific-industrial councils was established to assume decisions at the regional level and many of the functions of the earlier basin production organizations and Dalryba. One was operating in Murmansk by early 1993 (Stokke 1995). The Far East Scientific-Industrial Council (FESIC) appears to have been established by Order N15 of April 11, 1992 of the Federal Fisheries Committee (Pacific Rim Fisheries Update: 2/1993). The translated news article stated that the Deputy Chairman of the Federal Fisheries Committee was nominated to chair the council. His deputies were to be the head of TINRO and the Deputy Director General of Dalryba. There were to be some 23-30 members on the council representing the main territories and fishing organizations of the Far East. Accounts of the numbers of members on the FESIC has varied over the years. A news report of a council meeting held in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy on October 10-13, 1995, said there were 38 permanent members, 80 experts and specialists, and about 80 invited guests (Pacific Rim Fisheries Update: 12/1995).
It is difficult to determine when the FESIC first met. There are reports of a meeting in Moscow in April 1993 (Pacific Rim Fisheries Update: 6/1993). In any case, the regional councils were up and operating in 1993 at the latest. Stokke (1995) reported that the quota setting process was vested in the Northern Scientific-Industrial Council. It had responsibility for aggregating the demands and proposals of various fisheries groups in the region, as well as regional authorities, and preparing for the Federal Fisheries Committee, recommendations on total allowable catches (TACs) and their division between the counties, republics, krais, and okrugs. The council was composed of representatives from central fisheries and environmental bureaucracies, regional authorities, fishing industry organizations, and research institutions. It was chaired by the First Deputy Chairman of the Federal Fisheries Committee.
A 1996 translation of Model Bylaws for Basin Fisheries Councils (bylaws undated), indicates that regional councils were established for each basin for better coordination in the decision -making process. Their activities are directed by legislation of the Russian Federation, decrees and ordinances of the federal government, and the Federal Fisheries Committee. They include representatives of the Federal Fisheries Committee, Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (Minpriroda), scientific and research organizations, basin fish enforcement agencies, territorial councils, fishing industry, and the regional administrations. Membership must be approved by the Federal Fisheries Committee. The council is headed by the Deputies of the Chairman of the Federal Fisheries Committee or other officers of the committee. Specialists from fishing enterprises, scientific and research organizations, fisheries enforcement agencies, enforcement agencies, and the regional administration, who are not members, may participate in council meetings as experts. All council recommendations require formal approval of the Federal Fisheries Committee.
According to the Model Bylaws, the regional councils are assigned the following duties:
1. Cooperation with regional fishery councils and fishery management bodies.
2. Evaluate proposed changes to fishing regulations as well as other proposed changes to fishery and resource related regulations in the basin.
3. Establish as required, working commissions to manage area regulations such as boundaries for restricted areas, seasonal closures, etc.)
4. Evaluate research programs developed by scientific and research institutions and their departments.
5. Develop special regulations for allocations for scientific research, experimental harvest of species prohibited from commercial fisheries, and conducting expeditions for specific purposes in restricted areas.
6. Preparation and dissemination of materials and proposals of fishery councils and administrations for allocating basin fish quotas.
7. Evaluating proposals for quotas to address needs of indigenous people.
8. Preparing for approval of the Federal Fisheries Committee, recommended allocations of fish quotas to various industry users, developed within the overall harvest limits set by the committee and Minpriroda(Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources), according to established procedures of allocations, and rules established by regional fisheries councils.
9. Develop recommendations for improving regulations and practices on allocating fish by users.
10. Evaluate proposals and develop recommendations to protect fish stocks, improve conditions for natural reproduction, and improve biotechnology for artificial reproduction.
11. Evaluate proposals to prevent, or if that is not possible, compensate for, fishing industry impacts on the marine environment.
12. Develop recommendations to improve processing of roe fish and to better manage the fisheries.
13. Collect and process information to monitor development of the fisheries.
14. Analyze cases of gross violation of fishing and roe extraction and use.
15. Develop information and recommendations for reallocations of fish between users if some users are unable to fully harvest their quotas.
16. Evaluate reliability and regularity of catch reports and industry catch reports and develop recommendations to improve operational and statistical data.
Council meetings are held as needed. A meeting may be called by the chairman, the Federal Fisheries Committee chairman, by Minpriroda, by demand of one of the territorial fisheries councils, or by joint demand of the majority of representatives of the research institutions and fish protection agencies. A meeting quorum requires two-thirds of the voting members. While considering issues of fish conservation and regulations, at least half of the members of research institutions, enforcement agencies and natural resource protection must be present. Decisions are made by majority vote. If a majority of members cannot agree on an issue, the chairman must attempt to find a compromise solution. If no compromise is forthcoming, the chairman should make the decision. Any member who disagrees with a decision may send a copy of the decision and their minority opinion to all organizations that participated in the decision, and to the Federal Fisheries Committee. Expenses of members and working group activities will be covered by the organizations they represent. The Far Eastern Scientific-Industrial Council has the elected governors from the seven major administrative areas, though the vice governors normally attend:
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Some members of Glavrybvod also are on the council. It meets three to four times a year just ahead of the individual seasons for pollock, herring, salmon, and crab. They rotate their meetings among five cities, Magadan, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, and Sakhalin. They also meet in Moscow. The pollock meeting is in November each year and takes about five days.
3.4 Territorial Fishing Industry Committees
Within the basic regional jurisdictions is a more local committee, the territorial fishing industry committee. These were established so that an oblast or krai could coordinate the allocations and their usage within their own areas and industry. Stokke (1995) notes that while the territorial councils have made attempts to take more control overallocation decisions, that authority still rests mainly with the regional scientific-industrial councils and the Federal Fisheries Committee.
In the Far East, there are fisheries administrations in each oblast and krai. Conover (1997) notes that the administration fishing departments are responsible for meeting plans for fish products delivered to the federal fund, meeting territorial quotas, registering fish companies, and other duties assigned by the Federal Fisheries Committee and local administration. Each region has its own fishing industrial council/committee whose membership is made up of representatives of the local administration, scientists and chairmen of fishing associations. The regional councils work in close cooperation with the Far East Scientific-Industrial Council and carry out the same duties, on a more local level. Conover lists regional fishing administrations for Kamchatka, Khabarovsk, Magadan, Primorye and Sakhalin.
News reports of the establishment of Primorye council in late 1993 said that it was headed by the Deputy Governor. Its members included fishing companies, state authorities on fresh and marine waters, and first deputies of cities and districts. Their main objective was to prepare proposals for local administration of quota allocations and give technical assistance to fish farms and fish control and protection organizations (Pacific Rim Fisheries Update: 12/1993).
The bylaws for the Magadan Regional Fisheries Council (Appendix to Magadan Regional Administrative Order N. 149p, November 5, 1993) have the following provisions:
1. The Regional Fisheries Council is established by the regional government as a joint organization of the Federal Fisheries Committee and the regional government to better coordinate marine fisheries activities.
2. The council includes representatives of the regional rybvod and special marine protection, TINRO, the fishing industry, and local government.
3. The council develops recommendations to the regional administration on:
a. allocating regional fish quotas to local industry sectors including those with foreign interests;
b. research and development of underutilized or poorly known resources;
c. reproduction of fisheries resources;
d. fisheries regulations;
e. harvest allocations by area;
f. licensing of construction, purchase and refitting of fishing vessels;
g. regional funding and support to develop regional fishing industry interests, fisheries enforcement agencies, and scientific research organizations; and
h. licensing of fishing activities.
4. Recommendations on allocations of fish among industry components must be developed in accordance with the Decree on Allocating Quotas of Fish, while considering the needs of the federal government and regional governments, including fisheries exports.
5. The council will conduct its business in accordance with its bylaws, as approved by the regional administration in coordination with the Federal Fisheries Committee.
6. Representatives from the industry, scientific institutions, local rybvod, special marine inspection, district administrations, and the Magadan City administration, who are not members, may participate in the meetings as experts.
7. All recommendations of the council must be approved by the head of the regional administration before enactment.
8. The council will establish a working group chaired by the vice chairman of the council to prepare meeting materials, collect and distribute information, arrange for expert consultations, and carry out the decisions of the council.
9. Meetings will be held as needed, and may be called by order of the head of the regional administration, the council chairman, or by the majority of voting members on the council.
10. A meeting quorum is at least one half of the voting members. All decisions are made by majority vote.
3.5 Centralized Decision-making
There has been some question of whether the true authority for decisions on harvest levels and allocations is vested in the regions or in Moscow. Decree #436, on the Protection of Natural Resources of Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf and Economic Zone of the Russian Federation, signed by President Yeltsin on May 5, 1992, specifically stated that it was unacceptable and unauthorized for republics, territories, regions, autonomous districts and local authorities and the territories of the Russian Federation to manage natural resources of territorial waters, continental shelf and the EEZ. He specifically vested management authority in the Russian Federation government.
The regions did not readily accept this centralized authority. In 1993, for example, the Kamchatka government and fishermen applied to the Federal Fisheries Committee to have more authority over their own resources and participate more in the decisions on allocations, particularly since there was a heavy influence of Primorye fishermen on the allocations process. They forced the Federal Fisheries Committee to give them a greater hand in allocating resources between fishing groups and to give the Kamchatka government 8-10% of the quota to sell to foreign companies and joint ventures to generate funds the local government could use for developing its economy.
On July 8, 1993, Primorsky Krai adopted a declaration that it should be upgraded in status to a republic. They sent an appeal to the President of Russia and the Supreme Soviet explaining their need to be changed to a republic (Pacific Rim Fisheries Update: 8/1993). In October 1993, the Far East Scientific-Industrial Council met in Khabarovsk and condemned the Federal Fisheries Committee for setting baseless, high fishing quotas in Far Eastern Seas. They unanimously declared their irrevocable right to manage the resources and quotas within their own zones. Even the Special Marine Inspection Service (then within the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources) criticized the Federal Fisheries Committee for the high quotas for 1994 for the Sea of Okhotsk, Bering Sea, and the Sea of Japan. They also stated that the Federal Fisheries Committee should be denied the right to independently sell the sea resources in Far Eastern seas. (Pacific Rim Fisheries Update: 12/1993)
The Japanese also took note of the struggle between Moscow and the regions. Atkinson (1993) reported that during the Japan-Russia negotiations for 1993 fisheries, the Japanese noted a subtle change in the negotiations. In 1992, the Russian delegation was led by a representative of Dalryba, but in 1993, the delegation was led by the Deputy Director of the Federal Fisheries Committee, and the Dalryba representative was the assistant leader. In addition, the fishing fees for 1993 were to be paid to the Federal Fisheries Committee, rather than going to Dalryba as occurred in 1992. These somewhat subtle changes indicated that the Russian central government was reasserting control over fisheries matters after the organizational problems following the failed coup in 1991. During the meetings, the representatives from the Federal Fisheries Committee stressed that all joint venture and industry-to-industry agreements had to have Moscow’s approval, ostensibly to weed out improper joint venture arrangements. In 1992, the Japan Fisheries Association conducted negotiations with Dalryba. In 1993, the Japanese were advised that final approval would come from the Federal Fisheries Committee.
Quota usage by the Federal Fisheries Committee, particularly its practice of holding back quotas in the Far East for sale to foreign fishermen, is at the center of many battles between the regions and Moscow. An interesting article translated for Pacific Rim Fisheries Update (2/1996) is headed: “Fight for Quotas Goes On!” The article states that Primorye representatives won another round in the continuing quota battle with Moscow officials. Apparently, the Federal Fisheries Committee had attempted to reduce the pollock quota by 300,000 mt and useit to feed the Army. The quota for 1996 would have then been much lower than for 1995. The delegations from Khabarovsk and Primorye refused to sign the final quota documents because they considered Moscow’s justification for the cut to be groundless. Primorye fishermen, at least, won a raise in the quota levels to be more comparable to 1995. They returned from Moscow with 100,000 mt additional pollock, supposedly released from the Federal Fisheries Committee reserved quotas.
Another cause for dispute between local fishermen and the Federal Fisheries Committee is closing of a fishery for Russians while foreign vessels are still operating. For example, in 1996, the Federal Fisheries Committee ordered 37 Russian fishing vessels to stop fishing in the Bering Sea because their pollock quotas had expired. At the same time, about 40 fishing vessels from China, Japan, Poland and South Korea continued to fish. This provoked many angry cables and appeals from Russian fishermen to the Federal Fisheries Committee, the Russian Government and the mass media. The Russian companies had used up their permitted quotas for the season. The foreign fisheries were operating under intergovernmental agreements. The Russian fishermen ended up moving on to the Sea of Okhotsk where about 200,000 mt remained available (Pacific Rim Fisheries Update: 12/1996)
Quota usage will be described in more detail in Chapter 5, but it is clear from many, many news articles and examples, that Moscow holds a tight reign over quotas and their usage. Though there were efforts in the early 1990s, especially when the Ministry of Fisheries was in disarray after the August 1991 failed coup, to divest the newly formed Federal Fisheries Committee of its lock on quotas, no major inroads appear to have been made. The decisions are still made in Moscow, though regional fishing industries have been successful in changing quotas by bringing pressure to bear on those in central positions of authority. The fishermen from Primorye and Kamchatka seem to have been the most successful in doing that. Also, it is clear that the Far East, particularly Kamchatka, should have greater influence on the Federal Fisheries Committee now that Dementiev, former administrator of the Kamchatka fishing department, is the head of the committee.
3.6 Summary
There are three levels of fisheries administration in the Russian Federation. Overall authority for management decisions flows from the Federal Fisheries Committee, in Moscow, within the Ministry of Agriculture and Food. At the ministerial level is Alexander Rodin, but the Federal Fisheries Committee is directed by Mikhail Dementiev, a recent arrival from the Kamchatka Fishing Administration. The Federal Fisheries Committee manages, monitors, enforces, and conducts research through several different branches including the rybvods and TINRO. A member of the committee also is seated, and normally chairs, the Far Eastern Scientific-Industrial Council which represents the oblasts, krais, and okrugs along the Pacific Coast. The council is in the position to recommend fishing quotas and regulations, but the committee is in the position of approving those recommendations. As Oleynik (1993) notes, Russia retains a much more centralized decision-making process than the United States. This is abundantly clear in the many translations of news articles that cover Far East fisheries. This has also been made clear in discussions directly with participants in the fishing industry.
On the surface, it would seem that the closest counterpart to the North Pacific Fishery Management Council is the Far Eastern Scientific-Industrial Council. Both represent regional jurisdictions. Both have federal and regional representatives. But a distinct difference between the two is that the NPFMC is established to make many different management and allocational decisions for the fisheries, while the FESIC seems to be more involved with just quota setting. This view may change as more information is developed on the actual practices of the FESIC. The other difference is that the Federal Fisheries Committee in Moscow plays a much more dominant role in regional fisheries decisions than does the NMFS headquarters office in Washington, D.C. The Soviet style of centralized decision-making is being tested by the regions, but so far it is intact within the Russian Federation.
Chapter 4. Stock Assessment and Harvest Levels
4.1 Introduction
Scientific assessments are performed on the Far East region groundfish stocks by TINRO-Center in Vladivostok and KamchatNIRO in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy. VNIRO in Moscow often will perform an independent assessment, particularly if there is disagreements among regional scientists. It is the scientists from the regional institutions that exchange information with U.S. scientists from the NMFS Alaska Fisheries Science Center. The institutional structure for fisheries science, the development of pollock harvest limits, and concerns with the transboundary nature of pollock stocks are described below.
4.2 Scientific Institutions
The Federal Fisheries Committee’s main department for biological assessment is the Russian Institute of Fisheries and Oceanography, known as VNIRO, after its old acronym, the All-Union Scientific Institute of Fisheries and Oceanography. In the Russian Far East is TINRO (Pacific Research Institute of Fisheries and Oceanography) in Vladivostok. Apparently TINRO was reorganized by decree of the Federal Committee on January 13, 1995, and is referred to as TINRO-Center. TINRO has two branch offices which now are quasi-independent legal organizations: SakhNIRO (Sakhalin Scientific Research Institute of Fisheries and Oceanography in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk), and KamchatNIRO (Kamchatka Scientific Research Institute of Fisheries and Oceanography in Petropavlosk-Kamchatskiy). TINRO-Center was given the responsibility for coordinating the two centers (Pacific Rim Fisheries Update: 4/1995).
TINRO also has four organizations that it controls directly: its Khabarovsk subsidiary (KhFTINRO), Magadan subsidiary (MFTINRO), Chukotka subsidiary (ChFTINRO), and its scientific research fleet in Vladivostok. The base for the scientific research fleet was created in 1995 after the Pacific Department of Fisheries Survey and Scientific Research of the Fleet (TURNIF), transferred ten scientific vessels to TINRO when TURNIF became a privatized joint stock company (Cowper et al. 1997).
The main objective of the research institutes is to develop recommendations for exploration, conservation, and optimum utilization of living marine resources. Their activities include:
1. Assessment and monitoring of fisheries resources and ecological situations of fishing areas;
2. Development of annual and long-term forecasts of allowable harvest levels of living marine resources; and
3. Development of methodologies and engineering for the rehabilitation and improvement of aquatic habitats and the quality of their living resources (Conover 1997).
The exact relation of TINRO with VNIRO is unclear, but apparently TINRO is directly responsible to the Federal Fisheries Committee, not VNIRO (Cowper et al. 1997). It has been stressed that TINRO works with VNIRO, not for it. SakhNIRO and KamchatNIRO are now separate, but coordinate with TINRO.
4.3 Development of Bering Sea Harvest Limits for Pollock
The condition of pollock within the western Bering Sea is assessed by TINRO-Center and KamchatNIRO scientists (V. Wespestad, pers. comm., 1996). The TINRO assessment is based on survey data and theKamchatNIRO assessment is based on age-structured analysis of fishery data. The Director of KamchatNIRO is said to be in charge of the pollock program in the Bering Sea. ChFTINRO also is involved to some extent, as apparently it has the Western Bering Sea as its prime area of research. VNIRO reportedly receives catch and stock data from the field divisions, and may develop its own independent assessments (Wespestad 1996).
Local TINRO divisions collect pollock data from fishery research vessels that work the entire Far East area. Surveys are directed mainly by TINRO Center which has an overall long term sampling program, but local TINRO divisions in the different areas also must approve the sampling plan. Local scientists monitor catch and survey information and may recommend increasing the total allowable catch (TAC) limit, as happened in 1995 for the Sea of Okhotsk, but Moscow still has to approve any changes. There most likely is considerable give and take between the field offices and Moscow on scientific data and results, but still it appears that Moscow has a strong upper hand when in comes to setting harvest levels.
The overall pollock TAC for the Far East is developed by scientists at TINRO who must recommend a maximum and optimum catch. These recommendations are sent to Moscow for review and approval. This is done each year in October, Moscow sends its TAC recommendation back to the Far East in late October or early November. By the beginning of the new year, the quotas must be allocated by region. The recommendation that comes out of Moscow is an overall TAC for each of two broad areas, the Sea of Okhotsk and the Bering Sea. Additional recommendations are included on allocating those TACs by regional users.
Inseason monitoring may cause TINRO scientists to recommend changes in catch levels, but Moscow has to approve such changes. In the spring of 1995, for example, there was a quota of 650,000 mt of pollock for the northern Sea of Okhotsk. TINRO-Center scientists monitored the catch and surveys and decided that the population was very healthy and larger than previously estimated. They recommended increasing the TAC from 650,000 mt to 800,000 mt and Moscow approved.
4.4 Pollock Harvest Limits
Wespestad (1996) reported on pollock catches in North Pacific waters. He notes that the total catch in the Russian EEZ in 1995 was 2.471 million mt. Of that catch approximately 405,600 mt comes from the Bering Sea. More major contributions are made from the North Sea of Okhotsk (914,000 mt) and the West Kamchatka (902,000 mt) regions (Figures 5 and 6).
Figure 5. Russian Far East Regulatory Regions.
Figure 6. Distribution of pollock catches for 1995.
The 1996 quota set for the Bering Sea is 510,000 mt. He notes that western Bering Sea pollock have experienced poor recruitment since 1986 when the last strong year-class occurred, but that the condition of pollockwithin the western Bering Sea is difficult to determine because of differences in survey approaches. Russian scientists anticipate a continued decline or stability at current levels for most stocks in the Russian EEZ through the end of the century. These recent catches in the western Bering Sea are down from the mean of 797,000 mt from 1981 through 1997 (catch quota used for 1997), and well below the maximum harvest of 1.327 million mt of 1988 (Figures 7 and 8).
Figure 7. Western Bering Sea pollock harvests (Cowper et al. 1997).
Figure 8. Comparison of Bering Sea pollock catches (Wespestad 1996).
For comparison purposes, the average catch in the eastern Bering Sea (including the Aleutian Islands) was 1.204 million metric tons for the period 1981-1997 (catch quota used for 1997), with a high of 1.534 million mt in 1990 (Wespestad 1996). Over the long term, pollock has been the keystone of U.S. commercial fisheries off Alaska which annually provide over half of the U.S. marine catch (NMFS 1995). Pollock alone contributed 1.27 mmt or roughly 62% of the total harvest of the combined groundfish complex of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands (BSAI) and the Gulf of Alaska (GOA) in 1996. It was the most important species in quantity and fifth in value for 1996, accounting for 27 percent of the commercial landings in the U.S. (NMFS 1997). The ex-vessel value of pollock was $234 million, or just over 43% of the value of the ground fish complex, which is the largest of five major fisheries off Alaska: $538.4 million for groundfish, $346.5 million for salmon, $175.2 million for shellfish, $74.2 million for halibut, and $44.8 million for herring (Kinoshita, et al. 1997).
A U.S. commercial fleet of approximately 200 trawl catcher and catcher-processor vessels depends on pollock. These vessels deliver shoreside or offshore and the allocation between the two sectors is the subject of much contention, particularly as the North Pacific Fishery Management Council begins to consider whether to change the current allocation formula which is scheduledto expire on December 31, 1998. In addition, pollock is the major basis for an innovative community development program that is providing for the economic well being of residents in Western Alaska along the Bering Sea coast. And last, pollock is a major component of the North Pacific marine food web, supporting a host of other species and upper tropic level species such as seabirds and marine mammals. Of particular concern is the Steller sea lion whose populations have declined by over 80% in large regions off Alaska, and whose condition has been listed as endangered under the Marine Mammal Protection Act.
Clearly, pollock is of critical importance to both U.S. and Russian interests. Russian fishing industries rely heavily on pollock from the western Bering Sea and even more so on pollock from the Sea of Okhotsk. Sixty-six percent of Russia’s worldwide catch in 1993 came from the northwest Pacific Ocean, and pollock contributed 77% of that regional fishery. The Bering Sea is important to Russian fisheries, but not of the same significance it has to U.S. fisheries. The Bering Sea provides 91% of the U.S. pollock harvest, but only 32% of the Russian pollock harvest (FAO 1995).
4.5 Transboundary Concerns
The transboundary nature of pollock and thus their availability to exploitation to the west of the U.S.-Russia Convention line have been described briefly in Chapter 1. Pollock distributional data from surveys performed in 1994 by the Miller Freeman indicate there is a contiguous distribution of pollock from Bristol Bay to south of Cape Navarin, and in 1996, continuous distribution to the U.S.-Russia Convention Line (NPFMC 1996) (Figure 9). Wespestad (1996) believes that pollock drift from the southeastern Bering Sea along the continental shelf to the north Bering Sea. They stay in the northwestern Bering Sea until maturity, at about age 4, and then move to the southeastern Bering Sea under U.S. jurisdiction. He notes that potentially large catches and discarding of juvenile pollock in the Russian EEZ may reduce eastern Bering Sea stocks below levels that have supported historic harvests. This could require U.S. managers to reduce significantly the TACs set for U.S. waters.
Figure 9. Transboundary migration of pollock (Balykin 1996).
Western Bering Sea pollock is currently at a low level of abundance (NPFMC 1996). Biomass estimates are not available for the northern Bering Sea stock, but catch shows a declining trend. With the decrease in western Bering Sea pollock abundance, Russian and joint venture fishing efforts may increase in the Russian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the northern area. If significant harvests of juvenile pollock that will recruit to the eastern Bering Sea exploitable population occur in the Russian EEZ, then there may be a reduction in the exploitable biomass and yield in the U.S. EEZ. The historic level of fishing within the Navarin area does not appear to have had an adverse impact on the eastern Bering Sea stock, however, eastern Bering Sea stocks have been at high levels and then decreased to lower levels in recent years. It is a possibility that the eastern Bering Sea stock could be impacted at lower stock levels by current fishing practices in the Russian EEZ.
There are, of course, differing opinions on whether the pollock stocks off Cape Navarin have any fish of U.S. origin. An opinion expressed by regional Russian scientists is that a significant contribution to pollock in area 01 (western Bering Sea) comes from the eastern Bering Sea (Fedeyev 1990; Shuntov et al. 1993). However, Russian scientists believe that the target exploitation rate of 30% will prevent overfishing of the eastern Bering Sea stock. They further believe that eastern Bering Sea pollock move to the southeast Bering Sea upon reaching maturity and that the majority of large pollock harvested in the northern Bering Sea (along the Convention Line) are of western Bering Sea origin. Wespestad (personal communication, 1996) does not believe these assumptions are supportable. Aging techniques have been inadequate and there is a lack of clear distinction in year-class structure within the Bering Sea. B. Kotenev, Deputy Director of VNIRO in Moscow, has stated on two occasions that he believes there are no eastern Bering Sea pollock stocks intermingling with Russian stocks off Cape Navarin (pers. comm., 1997; and at August 12-13, 1997, U.S.-Russian Bering Sea negotiating session in Washington, D.C.)
4.6 Summary
The transboundary nature of the pollock resource in the Bering Sea increases the stock’s vulnerability to overfishing. Stock assessment of Bering Sea pollock is carried out mainly by TINRO-Center and KamchatNIRO. Scientists from these two institutions do not always agree on the status of the stocks, and VNIRO in Moscow has performed independent assessments. Nor do they always agree on the presence in or contribution of eastern Bering Sea pollock stocks to those in the western Bering Sea. To answer these questions, exchanges of information must be encouraged, as well as access of U.S. fisheries research vessels like the R/V Miller Freeman to the Russian EEZ. Only through continued cooperative research will the fisheries managers be able to determine how best to manage the pollock resource for the long term. Pollock is the main fisheries resource base in North Pacific waters for both Russia and the U.S. Decisions made on poor knowledge of the stocks could be catastrophic for both countries’ industries.
Chapter 5. Allocations of Pollock Quotas
5.1 Introduction
Once the annual total allowable catches (TAC) for pollock are established by the Federal Fisheries Committee in October, based on recommendations from TINRO, KamchatNIRO, and VNIRO, the harvest is allocated to the various users in the Far East. Significant quotas are held back by the Federal Fisheries Committee to use to raise funds to run the agency. Most of the hold-back is sold to foreign operations for hard currency, as will be described below. The Far Eastern Scientific-Industrial Council plays a central role in gathering quota requests from the oblasts, krais, and okrugs. It also oversees quota distributions after the harvest levels have been determined. The various companies and other user groups that fish for Bering Sea pollock are described below, and the chapter ends with a review of foreign allocations of pollock in the Russian Far East.
5.2 Types of Fishing Quotas
There are four types of quotas issued by the Federal Fisheries Committee once the harvest levels are established: domestic quotas, quotas determined by intergovernmental agreement, commercial contract quotas, and a small reserve quota for unexpected events.
Domestic Quota. These are the quotas of pollock (or any other species) that are allocated to various sectors of the industry. Requests for quotas, generally brokered through the Far East Scientific-Industrial Council, are made by companies, scientific institutions such as TINRO, institutions of education that relate to fishing, the regional government, groups and individuals. The regional fisheries committee in each of the krais and oblasts plays a role in consolidating the quota requests for their industries and other quota users. There is considerable lobbying to influence the quota allocations, and favoritism. In general, large companies are favored over small companies. Companies that pay taxes and contribute to social benefits such as schools, hospitals etc., are favored. Dalmoreproduct, VBTRF, and Primorrybprom request, and usually receive, large quotas. Because the quota need not be caught by the applicant, but can be sold to generate funds, institutions such as a college like Dalryinst may request quota to support themselves though they have no fishing vessels. There can be a lively trade in reselling of these quotas. TINRO receives a research quota, but the rybvods do not.
Quotas Determined by Intergovernmental Agreement. Japan, South Korea, China, North Korea, and Poland have intergovernmental agreements with the Russian government that allow them to fish in Russian waters. China and Poland receive quotas in exchange for not fishing in the Peanut Hole in the international waters of the Sea of Okhotsk. These intergovernmental quotas are directly issued by the Federal Fisheries Committee.
Commercial Contract Quotas. Additional quotas are sold to domestic and foreign companies by the Federal Fisheries Committee for a negotiated price (recently about $300-500 per mt for pollock). US-Russia joint ventures receive quotas from the commercial contract quota. This has been the case for the last five years. The quota arrangements are made in Moscow, but the licenses are issued by the rybvods. It is reported that Japan received 9,000 mt of pollock on a fee basis for 1997, in addition to its intergovernmental quota. Russian fishing companies that have used their normal quota can also apply for contract quota. Foreign operations often can fish their quotas into December even though the Russian fleet has ended in November. This is a source of great friction with Russian fishermen.
Reserve Quotas. The Committee may withhold a small percentage of the allowable quota for special purposes and unexpected events. There are few details available on this quota.
5.3 Quota Decision Process and Use
Once TINRO scientists recommend a maximum allowable harvest, it must be approved by the Federal Fisheries Committee. The Federal Fisheries Committee then establishes a general quota, called by its acronym, ODU (Obshchi Dopustimy Ulov). Next, the commercial quota is generated (Cowper et al. 1997) based in large part on requests submitted from the regions. The various fishing sectors and quota users of a region submit their requests for quota to the regional fisheries committee for the krai or oblast (Figure 10). These committees in turn consolidate the quota requests for their region and submit the consolidated request to the Far East Scientific-Industrial Council (FESIC) for review and approval. All requests must be in by September 30. There are no exceptions. The FESIC decisions on allocations are very contentious and are taken by majority vote. Once the FESIC develops its recommendations, they are forwarded as a Far Eastern regional request to the Federal Fisheries Committee for final approval. A regional government may appeal to the Federal Fisheries Committee to overturn a decision made by the FESIC. The Federal Fisheries Committee forwards the approved TACs for the Sea of Okhotsk and the western Bering Sea in late October or early November to the Far Eastern Region, specifically to the FESIC which must make the allocations by the beginning of the year.
Figure 10. Fishing Quota Allocational Process.
News articles indicate that until recently, once a company had a quota, it had the whole season to use it up, and if its vessel broke down, it could sell the quota to some other company. Many times quotas were not fully used. In 1994, Kamchatka’s fishing committee decided that if a company had not fished its quota by October 1, the quota could be used by other companies that already had exhausted their quota or had received no quota in the first place. They also said that quota usage would affect the next year’s allocation to that company. This became known as the “olympic” system of quota usage (Pacific Rim Fisheries Update: 7/1995).
Primorye fishermen operated under the olympic system in the Sea of Okhotsk in the first half of 1995 and greatly improved their performance (Pacific Rim Fisheries Update: 12/1995). Catches of pollock in the Sea of Okhotsk under the Olympic system were 1.68 million mt of a 2 million mt quota, 300,000 mt above the same period for the previous year (FNI: 11/1995). The Primorye Committee then petitioned the Federal Fisheries Committee to allow the Olympic system to be used in other areas. The new system was aimed at benefitting stronger and better organized fishermen. Obviously, it benefitted the large fishing fleets from Primorye. Sakhalin adopted the olympic system in February 1996 (Pacific Rim Fisheries Update: 5/1996).
5.4 Main Recipients of Pollock Quota
Primorye has the largest fleet, more than half the entire Far East fleet, and normally receive the largest quotas. Those fishermen do not have much fish off their own coast, so they must be allocated quota in other regions. Vladivostok is the traditional major seat of power for fisheries in the Far East, though Kamchatka fishermen are becoming very influential also. For pollock quotas (in mt) region-wide and in the western Bering Sea, fishermenfrom Primorsky Krai are first, followed by those from Kamchatka and Sakhalin, as shown in the example below for 1996 (Cowper et al. 1997):
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The regonal administration fishing committees and departments are responsible for brokering the region’s quotas among their fishing sectors and ensuring that fish products are delivered to the Federal Fund, meeting territorial quotas, and registering fishing companies. One of the most common scenarios is for a company to receive an allocation, and that company will have a fishing vessel but no processing vessel. The company will then contract with a foreign processor to buy the fish, thus generating hard currency, while providing jobs for the fishermen.
Once a specific region such as Kamchatka or Primorye has negotiated its quota, apparently that region must allocate 90% to fishermen from that region, and it can sell 10% to foreign interests to generate hard currency. The one anomaly in allocations arrangements seems to be the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug. It has obtained permission from Moscow to use its entire quota to generate fees from foreign fishermen. In 1995, Chukotka only received a pollock quota of 10,000 mt. But for 1996-1999, it was granted an annual quota of 60,000 mt, including 40,000 mt pollock. Kaczynski (1995) reported the following major pollock users for 1994 in the western Bering Sea:
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Each of the major companies is described below based mainly on news accounts.
VBTRF. The Vladivostok Base of Trawling and Refrigerator Fleet became a joint-stock company in 1993 following other large fishing companies such as Dalryba and Primorrybprom. The company adopted a development program in May 1994, and since then has proceeded to purchase many new factory trawlers from Spain, each 345 ft long and capable of catching up to 300 mt per day. Thirteen new factory trawlers have been purchased from Spain, making VBTRF one of the largest companies of its kind in the Far East. By June 1995, it was reported that the company had invested $36 million in purchasing new and refurbishing older vessels. A new super-trawler, the Vladimir Starginsky, built in Spain, joined the VBTRF fleet in June 1995, and was sent to the Bering Sea. It is said to have the largest fishing fleet in the Russian Far East with about 50 ships in its fishing fleet and 16 ships in its transport fleet. They also have completed construction of a cold storage facility at Vladivostok. VBTRF also fishes hake off Canada. It is VBTRF that is involved with Resource Group International that took over management of the Ocean Trawl vessels. In 1996, VBTRF’s total catch of 471,000 mt exceeded the combined total catch of Dalmoreproduct and Nakhodka BAMR. Their quotas for Bering Sea pollock in 1997 were only one third of their available processing capacity (Pacific Rim Fisheries Update: 8/1997).
Dalmoreproduct. This is the largest fishing association in the Russian Far East, though VBTRF apparently has a larger fishing fleet. In 1995, Dalmoreproduct sold $520 million worth of fish, processed 650,000 metric tons of seafood, and generated 300,000 metric tons of processed products. Some 40% of the catch came from their own vessels. It was reported in 1994 that the Dalmoreproduct Association is second only to the automobile giant KAMAZ in all of Russia and is the most successful organization in the Far East. In 1995, the company’s processors received 240,000 metric tons pollock from Primorsky, Khabarovsk, and Kamchatka fishermen and 140,000 metric tons from Dalmoreproduct’s own vessels. It has purchased new factory trawlers and been rewarded with additional quota from the Federal Fisheries Committee. The company has 11,000 crew members and a total of 16,000 employees. It describes itself as a public joint-stock company with over 22,000 share holders. Its assets include 61 vessels, of which there are 15 floating processors, 37 catcher vessels, and a transport and tanker fleet. The company has 12 subsidiaries and owns seven dependent organizations. It has established business contacts with 50 companies from 15 countries and foreign companies hold 36% of the capital stock of the company. It catches, processes and transports fish products and runs hotels and provides medical services. Included among the foreign owners of Dalmoreproduct are Nippon Suisan, Mitsui, Eurobank, and All-Alaska Seafoods. In 1994, All-Alaska entered into a 10-year lease and management partnership with Dalmoreproduct. This included 10 American catcher boats and a processing barge. The barge and catchers have Russian registry, but they still retain their American ownership and can move back and forth between Russian and American waters. If the sale is completed after 10 years, then they will be fully Russian and cannot come back (Alaska Fishermens Journal, August 1996). In July 1997 at the annual general meeting in Vladivostok, the company announced it had 16,219 shareholders and that it ranked as the 44th largest company in Russia and the first among food production and fishing companies. In 1996, it produced 284,712 metric tons of processed product and it plans to increase its catch in 1997 by 50% to 438,000 metric tons.
Preobrazhenie BTF. Preobrazhenie Base of Trawling Fleet joint-stock company in Primorsky Krai is considered one of the best fishing industry organizations, next to Dalmoreproduct. The company has purchased Sterkoder factory trawlers. It has over 25 fishing vessels and was allocated 130,000 metric tons pollock in 1996. It was reported in January 1997 that Dalmoreproduct intended to buy controlling interest in PBTF for about $2 million.
NBAMR. The Nakhodka Base of Active Sea Fishing (NBAMR or BAMR) was established in 1951 and was one of the largest enterprises in the former USSR. With changes to a market economy in Russia, NBAMR transformed into a joint-stock company in which 20% of its stocks are publicly traded. NBAMR has 70 trawlers, some of which are obsolete, over 15 years old. NBAMR is claimed to have one of the best infrastructures, including repair facilities, moorages, storages, and railroad accesses. The NBAMR fleet is acquiring newSterkoder factory trawlers, each costing about $12 million. The company had 55 large catcher processors as of April 1996. NBAMR was given the largest Alaska pollock quota for 1996, 182,000 mt.
TURNIF. This company has a long history as the major supplier of research vessels for the Far East. It was established in 1970 and its main specialty was scientific programs and research. In October 1993, it was reorganized into a joint-stock company, and it continued to conduct research at the direction of the Federal Fisheries Committee. At one time it had 54 vessels, ranging from 145 to 5,000 tons that could operate anywhere in the Pacific from the Arctic to the Antarctic. Due to a shortage of scientific funding, research became extremely limited and it was reported in early 1995 that eleven of TURNIF’s specialized vessels were idle, another 22 were leased out, and 18 were under repair. Because of these changes in Russia and the shortage of fuel and research funds, TURNIF changed over to a commercial fishing operation. Debts piled up and TURNIF almost went bankrupt. In early 1995, controlling interest in TURNIF was acquired by a well known Primorye investment company, Pacific Securities, and one of their first actions was to transfer ten research vessels to TINRO. Many of the other TURNIF vessels are being refitted to process surimi from pollock. The company operates about 10 vessels which are used in the Alaska pollock fishery. TURNIF’s pollock allocation in the Bering Sea more than doubled from 1995 to 1996, from 18,000 to 45,000 mt.
Primorrybprom. This is a joint-stock company. It was reported to have about 21 enterprises in 1993. It was reported in late 1994 to be facing financial crises though it was once prosperous. Apparently it was reported in January 1997 that Primorrybprom had gone legally bankrupt. At the company’s autumn 1996 shareholders meeting, it was reported that the company ended 1995 with losses of 17 billion rubles (US$ 3.4 million) and overall debt amounting to 87 billion rubles. In May 1997, part of its assets were placed on auction but they failed to raise much money because of the high asking price. The Federal Fisheries Committee had withdrawn the company’s fishing license due to the significant indebtedness of the company to the federal budget, and the catching fleet had stopped fishing.
MCRI. This company out of Washington State has been in business in Russia for 16 years and is one of the largest suppliers of processed cod, pollock, flounder and crab to the U.S. market.
Khabarovsk Kolkhozes. No additional information.
Magadanrybprom. It was reported in early 1993 that this was established as a powerful joint venture with Taiyo and Morikawa. In late 1994, it was reported that a scandal was brewing within the company and fishermen were picketing the offices. They claimed that the leadership of the company was corrupt and on the brink of bankruptcy. Fishermen had not received salaries in six months. A commission, established by regional authorities, discovered tens of thousands of tons of fish and millions of dollars transferred illegally abroad through various shady intermediaries. It was reported in November 1994 that company officials were fleeing the city and the region.
Dalryba. Dalryba was formerly the chief administrator for all state-controlled processing companies and fishing organizations of the Far East. Initially, Dalryba was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Fisheries of the USSR, but when it collapsed, Dalryba reported to the Federal Fisheries Committee. Dalryba then separated from the state and was reorganized as a joint-stock company. The controlling interest in the shares is held by Dalryba staff and there are no large outside shareholders. Dalryba was reported in late 1995 to have six fishing vessels. It has four SRTM type trawlers, one BMRT freezer trawler, and one transportation ship. Dalryba maintains an influence disproportionate to its size because of its history as a large state-owned association.
Sakhalin Administration. The oblast is granted quotas to obtain hard currency. It has distributed quotas to various associations to purchase corn and grain for feed production, to the Agricultural Department to purchaseplanting machines, and to a state enterprise to purchase mechanical tools and snow blowers. A portion of the oblast budget also depends on the quota revenues. The companies that might fish for the oblast’s pollock were unspecified but there are several large ones in Sakhalin including the Nevelsk Base of Trawling Fleet, Korsakov Base of Ocean Fishing, Kirov Fishing Kolkhoz, Sakhalin Union of Kolkhozes, and Sakhmoreproduct. Nevelsk Base Trawl Fleet (BTF) receives 60,000 metric tons of Alaska pollock quota and probably catches most of it in the Sea of Okhotsk or near the Kuriles.
Kamchatka Administration. The three main fishing companies in Kamchatka are AKROS, Baza Rybholodflota, and Kamchatka UTRF. They are among the largest pollock quota users in the Far East, outranked only by industry from Primorsky Krai.
AKROS Joint-stock Company. In 1992, the Department of the Industrial Fleet of the Kamchatka Intercollective Farms Industrial Union was transformed into the AKROS Joint-stock Company. In 1992, the company obtained six vessels for trawling from Norway (bare-boat charters). AKROS sells most of its product to Japan. The company held a quota for 123,000 metric tons Alaska pollock in the Bering Sea in 1996 and operated 19 vessels.
Department of the Trawl and Refrigerator Fleet (UTRF). This company has over 40 vessels and is allocated a pollock quota of 119,000 metric tons. It is reported that UTRF has arranged a venture with Iceland Seafoods International to provide pollock over a four-year period (FNI: 3/1996).
Kamchatka Base of the Refrigerator Fleet (Baza Rybholdflota). In January 1997, this company was to sell 6 of its 22 vessels to a newly established company to avoid bankruptcy. In July 1997, it was reported that the general director had been fired and was under criminal investigation for claiming deliberate bankruptcy of the company. Apparently he sold or transferred vessels without shareholder consent. The company is trying to recover the vessels. More than 1,000 employees have not been paid for six months.
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug. This has been described earlier, and the pollock is usually allocated to foreigners for fees because the Okrug does not have its own fishing industry. Apparently, Chukotka requested 100,000 metric tons of fish in the Bering Sea and Sea of Okhotsk combined for 1996 but only received 60,000 metric tons of pollock, 53,000 metric tons in the Bering Sea and 7,000 metric tons in the Sea of Okhotsk. This increase over previous years, when the pollock quota was estimated at 10,000 to 22,000 metric tons, is specifically earmarked for development of the rural and native communities. They originally sought 80,000 metric tons pollock and 20,000 metric tons crab but were given 60, 000 metric tons pollock and 1,000 metric tons king crab, plus an assortment of other species including 20,000 metric tons salmon. The pollock quota of 60,000 metric tons is for four years, 1996-1999. Of that, 40,000 metric tons has been contracted to Arctic Storm for 1997. Last year, the Alaska Ocean fished on the Chukotka quota. By order of the Russian Federation on December 27, 1996, the 1997 pollock quota to Chukotka was 51,600 metric tons in the western Bering Sea, with 3,600 metric tons west of 174-176ø East longitude and 48,000 metric tons to the east of 174-176ø East longitude. Additional pollock tonnages making up the 60,000 metric tons total for 1997 were allocated in east Kamchatka and the Sea of Okhotsk.
Koryak Okrug. No Information available.
5.5 Foreign Allocations
Though fisheries jurisdiction was extended to 200 miles in 1977, the Soviet Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) was not formally established until the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet signed a decree on February 28, 1984 (Akaha 1993). In December 1984, the Soviet Union and Japan concluded a bilateral agreement that replaced two provisional agreements which had governed Japanese and Soviet fishing within each other’s 200-mile zones since1977. The accord required each side to permit the other to fish in its 200-mile zone with each side’s catch quota to be determined through consultation at the annual meetings of the Japan-Soviet Fisheries Commission. Japan has had large tonnages in Russian waters. For the 1991 fishing season, for example, Japan was given a quota of 182,000 metric tons within the Soviet EEZ in return for a Soviet quota of 182,000 metric tons in Japanese waters. The Japanese then paid 1.1 billion yen in fishing fees for an additional quota of 35,000 metric tons within the Soviet EEZ.
Akaha (1993) indicates that in the early 1990s, Russia became quite anxious to generate hard currency by readily accepting Japanese requests for large catch quotas in the Russian EEZ. In 1992, Russia agreed to sell 150,000 metric tons of pollock in the Sea of Okhotsk, an increase of 65,000 metric tons over 1991. Russia also permitted Japanese trawlers to fish in their zone for the first time since 1977. In 1992, the Japanese salmon quota in the Russian EEZ was increased by about 800 metric tons over 1991, to 17,819 metric tons, in exchange for 444 million yen in ‘cooperation fees’.
When the Donut Hole fishery was ended by the moratorium in 1993, the foreign fleets dispersed to other areas, namely the Peanut Hole in the central Sea of Okhotsk. There had already been harvests of 297,000 metric tons in 1991, increasing to 698,000 metric tons in 1992 as the pollock catches in the Donut Hole rapidly declined (Wespestad 1996). Japan responded to the downturn in the Donut Hole fisheries by selling most of their factory trawlers to foreign joint venture partners or transferring their vessels to fisheries in the south Atlantic and Pacific oceans, according to a study of world fishing fleets by the NMFS Office of International Affairs (cited in Pacific Rim Fisheries Update: 6/1994). The Republic of Korea, China, and Poland concentrated their efforts in the Peanut Hole. South Korea transferred 18-23 of its 41-vessel North Pacific trawling fleet to the Peanut Hole, and 4-5 Chinese operated there.
Under pressure from the Russian industry, the Federation adopted a decree in April 1993 to temporarily prohibit fishing by Russian and foreign vessels in the Peanut Hole, effective June 15, 1993. Though South Korea and China protested this unilateral action, they started moving their fleets out of the area in June, but Poland kept on fishing. At a multilateral meeting in late May 1993, South Korea and China pledged to reduce their 1993 catch by 25%. Japan reaffirmed its commitment not to fish in the Peanut Hole, but Poland would not commit to any reductions. Wespestad (1996) provides catch data showing that the pollock harvest in the Peanut Hole decreased to 264,000 metric tons in 1993.
At a conference on the Peanut Hole moratorium in Moscow on June 15, 1993, the Federal Fisheries Committee proposed a requirement that Dalryba allow those countries that withdrew their fishing vessels from the Peanut Hole to have the right to fish in the Russian EEZ (Pacific Rim Fisheries Update: 12/1993). Dalryba directors objected strongly, saying that foreigners should compensate Russian fishermen for the damage they had caused by their uncontrolled fishing in the Sea of Okhotsk. The Federal Fisheries Committee met again in late 1993 and discussed selling pollock quota for 1994 in the Russian EEZ to countries with intergovernmental agreements with Russia. Again, regional interests protested selling of quotas in the Far East. Nevertheless, it was reported in December 1993 that in 1994, South Korean fishermen would deliver 22,000 metric tons of fish to Russian processors in exchange for direct quotas in the Russian EEZ, and 55,000 metric tons of pollock would be harvested by South Korean fishing vessels in the Bering Sea, North Kuriles, and the northern Sea of Okhotsk in exchange for not fishing in the Peanut Hole (Pacific Rim Fisheries Update: 12/1993). It was reported that Japan received 22,000 metric tons of pollock in the Russian EEZ by mutual access agreement in 1994 and 7,100 metric tons by fee. A further report in March 1994 indicated that Japan would receive 118,000 metric tons, South Korea 77,000 metric tons and North Korea 40,000 metric tons in the Russian EEZ (Pacific Rim Fisheries Update: 3/1994). Russian fishermen strongly opposed these decisions by the Federal Fisheries Committee, protesting that the foreign fishermen would take much more than 500,000 metric tons and cost the industry jobs as well as lower the price of pollock.
Then in 1994, Primorye’s administration received permission from the Federal Fisheries Committee to sell about 20,000 metric tons of pollock for hard currency, supposedly to use the money to buy equipment for coal mines to allow higher production to overcome the energy crisis. Primorye was granted additional pollock over its 1993 quota to have quota to sell in 1994. It was reported that Khabarovsk had sold some pollock quota for similar purposes in November 1993.
On May 30, 1994, the Federal Fisheries Committee issued Ordinance No. 86 which contained regulations for issuing permits to foreign interests for operations in the Russian EEZ. In December 1994, the federal government took formal action to authorize the Federal Fisheries Committee to sell quotas for fees to foreign interests. Government Decree No. 1443, dated December 12, 1994, required that any funds generated through sale of fishing quotas would have to be used to finance scientific research, fish protection and fish farming, rescue fleets, and international activities of the Federal Fisheries Committee (Pacific Rim Fisheries Update: 4/1995). Apparently, by the end of July, the Poles had withdrawn from the Peanut Hole in return for a 75,000 metric tons pollock quota in the Russian EEZ. The Chinese had negotiated a 50,000 metric tons quota in Russian waters (Pacific Rim Fisheries Update: 10/1995). The harvests of pollock in the Peanut Hole decreased to 124,000 metric tons (Wespestad 1996).
As foreign countries moved their vessels from the Peanut Hole to the Russian EEZ, particularly the Sea of Okhotsk, Russian fishermen began to protest loudly. In the Sea of Okhotsk , the total pollock quota was set at about 2 million metric tons in 1995. Of that, 1.67 million metric tons was allocated to Russian fishermen, and 388,000 metric tons went to foreign fishermen (Pacific Rim Fisheries Update: 12/1995). Reserves for the summer season in North Okhotsk were 158,000 metric tons and it was specifically allocated to foreign fishermen in accordance with intergovernmental agreements and for Russian fishermen during the November and December period. The Chinese were given 57,000 metric tons in the Russian EEZ, good to December 31, 1995, to stop fishing in the Peanut Hole. Poles were reported to have been allocated 300,000 metric tons annually in the Sea of Okhotsk over ten years, starting in 1995. However, it was reported that they were granted 111,000 metric tons pollock in 1997, 65,000 metric tons in the Sea of Okhotsk, and 46,000 metric tons in the Bering Sea (Pacific Rim Fisheries Update: 2/1997). In addition, the Poles will receive raw pollock in joint venture operations using four processing vessels and Russian catchers. A more recent report indicates that Japan received 100,000 metric tons of pollock and Poland 150,000 metric tons for 1997 (Cowper et al. 1997). In 1997, a U.S. vessel, the Arctic Storm, is also fishing in Russian waters on pollock quotas allocated to the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug.
This clearly demonstrates that Russia chose to solve the Peanut Hole fishery by allocating pollock quotas in the Sea of Okhotsk and the Bering Sea. This initiative, which generates very significant fees for the Federal Fisheries Committee, has been protested by Far East fishermen, particularly those from Kamchatka (Pacific Rim Fisheries Update: 10/1995). The problem becomes particularly acute when Russian fishermen must end their fisheries upon taking their quotas, but foreign vessels can continue to fish. In announcing the new head of the Kamchatka Fishing Administration, it was noted that Eugeniy Kabanov’s main goal will be “russification” of the fisheries because there are too many foreign vessels harvesting the fish of the Far East (Kamchatka Fisherman article, June 6, 1997).
5.6 Summary
There are many companies from the Far East region that participate in the pollock fisheries in the western Bering Sea, but it is likely that those receiving the most quota will be most influential in management decisions and quotas for pollock. From Primorye, the major players appear to include VBTRF and Dalmoreproduct from Vladivostok, and NBAMR from Nakhodka. Major companies from Kamchatka include AKROS and UTRF, both in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy. From Nevelsk, Sakhalin, the Nevelsk Base of Trawling Fleet may or may not be important. In 1994, it was reported to fish pollock in the western Bering Sea, but more recent informationindicates that its current quotas are in the Sea of Okhotsk and near the Kuriles. Chukotka Autonomous Okrug may be of emerging importance. It has an increased pollock quota of 60,000 metric tons for four years starting in 1997, and 53,000 metric tons of it is taken in the western Bering Sea. Cape Navarin is within Chukotka’s jurisdiction. Chukotka does not have its own fleet and sells its quota for fees.
The sale of quota to foreign fleets by the Federal Fisheries Committee has long been a flashpoint in Moscow-Far East relations, particularly when foreign fleets continue fishing after domestic fishermen have exhausted their quotas. The Federal Fisheries Committee has withstood these protests from the regions and seems undeterred in its selling of quotas for hard currency. The allocation of pollock to foreign fleets to keep them from fishing in the Peanut Hole also is of concern because much of that effort has been redirected to the western Bering Sea. Without some international agreement to keep foreign vessels out of the Peanut Hole, this practice likely will continue, thus putting pressure on the resources. It is plausible that at some future time, the Russian domestic industry will have grown in capacity and influence to a point where foreign opportunities will be removed. It is clear, though, that the Federal Fisheries Committee retains the authority and the clout to continue the foreign fee fisheries for the time being.
Chapter 6. Enforcement and Monitoring
6.1 Introduction
Fisheries enforcement and monitoring are accomplished mainly by three agencies: Glavrybvod, Federal Border Service, and the Special Marine Inspection Service. The Glavrybvod has a major focus on enforcement but appears to have additional duties as well. The Federal Border Service is the Russian counterpart of the U.S. Coast Guard. The Special Marine Inspection Service concentrates more on pollution control and is under a completely different administration than the rybvod system. The following sections describe these agencies and their functions. Then the prevailing enforcement and monitoring practices are summarized, as well as special enforcement operations called “Putina”. The chapter ends with a synopsis of fishing regulations for the western Bering Sea.
6.2 Glavrybvod
Glavrybvod is the Russian acronym for the National Administration of Fishery Enforcement, Resources Restoration and Regulation of Fishing (Glavrybvod, undated). This state agency is part of the Federal Fisheries Committee and regulates the industrial harvesting of fish, other marine animals and plants, their preservation and restocking in internal waters of the Russian Federation, on the continental shelf, economic zone, areas controlled by international conventions and fishing agreements, and in open areas of the world oceans. It has branch offices throughout Russia, all coordinated and administered through Glavrybvod. Apparently it was reestablished as a separate agency sometime after November 1993.
The branch offices of Glavrybvod are the closest Russian counterpart to the U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service’s enforcement branches, though they do have some duties similar to the NMFS Regional Administrators. Glavrybvod’s responsibilities include both marine and fresh water fisheries, commercial and sport. It has control and monitoring responsibilities for marine mammals. Management responsibilities include issuance of fishing permits, receipt and monitoring of reported catch data, and management of a fisheries observer and inspection program. (NMFS OE, 1997)
There are twenty-six main regional offices of Glavrybvod, five located in the Russian Far East:
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Sakhalinrybvod has responsibility for the Gulf of Tartary, the western Sea of Okhotsk and the southern portion of the Sea of Okhotsk south of the Kamchatka Peninsula including the Kurile Islands.
Primorrybvod has responsibility for the Sea of Japan south of Sakhalin Island. It does not have direct jurisdiction over the Bering Sea but does provide technical support in terms of patrol boats which may or may not have a helicopter. Primorrybvod is the lead agency for collecting and reporting information from all rybvods operating in the Russia Far East to Moscow (Cowper et al. 1997).
Amurrybvod may have been either merged into one of the other regions, shifted to an inland region, or disbanded. Little is known about its status or responsibilities.
Okhotskrybvod has responsibility for the northwestern Sea of Okhotsk and the western half of the Shelekhova Gulf. It additionally has responsibility for the northwestern Bering Sea north of 61 N latitude which encompasses the Cape Navarin Basin, though with the limited resources available to that rybvod, much of the enforcement in that area is deferred to the Kamchatrybvod. It has been speculated that administrative authority for the northwestern Bering Sea may move to the Glavrybvod with regional administration to be carried out by Kamchatrybvod.
Kamchatrybvod is responsible for the eastern half of the Shelekhova Gulf, the eastern half of the Sea of Okhotsk to the southern end of the Kamchatka Peninsula including the international waters, or Peanut Hole, within the Sea of Okhotsk. Kamchatrybvod is also responsible for those waters of the North Pacific north of the southern end of the Kamchatka Peninsula and those waters of the Bering Sea including the Donut Hole north of 61 N latitude. Kamchatrybvod has 150 shoreside inspectors and 60 marine inspectors. It also employs about 30 observers. The difference between inspectors and observers is that the latter cannot take enforcement actions and do not conduct enforcement boardings of vessels. Kamchatrybvod has four ocean going patrol vessels operating independently of the Federal Border Service. They are based in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy. The region also recently acquired helicopters and expects to acquire fixed wing aircraft for surveillance. Additional vessels are provided by the Primorrybvod in Vladivostok. These may be transferred to the region in the future. Though fuel is in short supply, rybvod vessels receive sufficient quantities to carry out their mission.
There is also a Chukotrybvod in Anadyr that provides inspectors in the fishing fleet in the western Bering Sea. Its resources are very limited and they must depend to a large extent on those provided by Kamchatrybvod. Their catch reports are sent to either the Kamchatrybvod or Okhotskrybvod for consolidation and forwarding to Primorrybvod, and then on to Moscow.
6.3 Federal Border Service
The Federal Border Service (FBS) has been subordinate to the ministries of Defense and Security, but is now an independent ministry (USCG 1997). The FBS was formally separated from the Russian military by decree in October 1994, though it remains very military in nature. FBS personnel are trained at military academies and the rank structure is much like the military. Primary FBS missions include maritime law enforcement, illegal immigration interdiction, customs law enforcement and smuggling interdiction; defense readiness; counterintelligence; and counterterrorism. Search and rescue are not a primary mission.
The FBS headquarters are near the Kremlin and there are six Border Districts with district headquarters as follows:
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Assets of FBS include about 200,000 personnel, 22,000 of which are in the maritime forces. Major assets include large frigates over 200 ft LOA, icebreakers, patrol craft and hydrofoils. FBS also has numerous smallerharbor/river craft as well as a fleet of support vessels. Air assets include fixed wing aircraft and helicopters, some deployed on the frigates.
6.4 Northeast Border District
Headquarters for the Northeast Border District (NEBD) are in Petropavlosk-Kamchatskiy. The NEBD maritime area of responsibility extends from the Chukchi Sea to the northern Kurile Islands. It thus includes the western Bering Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk and the northwest Pacific Ocean, and landward, the Kamchatka and Magadan Oblasts and the Koryak and Chukotka Okrugs. The NEBD supports all FBS missions as well as search and rescue. Assets include over 25 ships and perhaps 40 aircraft situated mainly around Petropavlosk, Provedeniya and Magadan (USCG 1997).
Patrol ships normally carry an inspector from Rybvod, the enforcement arm of Russia’s Federal Committee, and 50 to 100 boardings will be completed during each patrol. NEBD vessels and aircraft actively patrol the US/Russia Convention Line if fuel is available. In the Russian EEZ, NEBD patrol vessels have authority to stop and inspect any non-military vessel for enforcement purposes. Minor infractions receive a warning and typically the rybvod inspector onboard will determine the amount of penalty on the spot. For catch and vessel seizures, the vessel is escorted to port. The illegal catch that is confiscated annually is estimated at hundreds of thousands of dollars and billions of rubles. All money from confiscated illegal catches goes to the Federal Fisheries Committee, and a very small percentage eventually is remitted to the FBS. The NEBD is responsible for enforcing all fisheries regulations in the Russian EEZ. Unlike in the US EEZ where the State of Alaska regulates some species.
NEBD boarding procedures are similar to those used by the USCG. A vessel is hailed on channel 16, and if necessary, one of the ship’s two 6-man boarding teams will board the fishing vessel. The rybvod inspector, and sometimes a customs officer, will accompany the boarding team. Logs, records, fishing gear, catch and cargo are inspected, as well as vessel and crew documentation. Foreign vessels are inspected for compliance with pollution regulations. A typical boarding takes about three hours if no violations are detected.
6.5 Special Marine Inspection Service
The spetsmorinspektsiya or Specialized Marine Inspection Service (SMIS) is a relative newcomer. It has enforcement responsibilities but no management responsibilities. SMIS primarily enforces any action of fishing and processors that may harm the environment (Cowper et al. 1997). SMIS has only a few small vessels and must depend on the equipment of the rybvods or the fishing fleet itself. The SMIS works with the Federal Border Service and the Rybvods on special enforcement operations called “putina” (see below).
SMIS is part of the Federal Committee for the Environment. There are offices of the SMIS for every region of the Russian Far East. The regional offices are all responsible directly to Moscow, although overall coordination is carried out from Vladivostok. The Kamchatka, Koryak and Chukotka offices of SMIS have direct enforcement powers over the Bering Sea, from the shore to the limits of the EEZ. In addition to pollution and effluent regulations, inspectors from SMIS can enforce any of the federal fishing laws. The most serious infractions the SMIS reportedly encounters are catching undersized fish, fishing in a closed area, fishing without a license, not having proper documentation, and incorrect processing of fish waste, particularly with the production of fish meal.
6.6 Enforcement and Monitoring Practices
Rybvod inspectors are uniformed employees of the federal government (NMFS OE 1997). They appear to have a great deal of authority in dealing with violations including vessel and catch seizures, permit revocation, and the ability to order a vessel to move from an area or return to port. Additionally, the Russian system presumes guilt until proven otherwise, and therefore enforcement actions are in force until overturned in court. Fines were generally low in the past but recent information indicates that fines are being increased under a new law passed by the Duma in November 1996 which increased the maximum for fines on vessel captains to $500,000 and 5 years imprisonment. It was recently reported that Kamchatrybvod imposed huge fines on the Vladisvostok Trawler Fleet Base for fishing in an area closed due to high herring and juvenile bycatch. The fine was five billion rubles (about $865,000). A second company was fined 6.5 billion rubles (about $1.1 million) for catching 34 metric tons of crabs during a ban and without a permit (Rybak Kamchatki 1997)
The rybvods routinely share information with the FBS and rybvod personnel routinely accompany FBS vessels. Both agencies derive a portion of their operating income from allocations of fish, which is fished at the end of the regular season. The allocations are sold to industry concerns.
Foreign vessels are fined by the local rybvods, but pay directly, in foreign or hard currency, into a special bank account of the Federal Fisheries Committee. Fines for infractions by Russian vessels are collected by the local rybvod and are paid in rubles. As of 1997, no U.S. vessels had been fined, but fines were collected from Japanese, South Korean, and Chinese vessels (Cowper et al. 1997). Fines collected from fisheries violations can be, with permission of the Russian government, remitted back into the agency that makes the case. For example, in April 1995, rybvod captured eight Japanese trawlers fishing in closed waters off the coast of Kamchatka (NMFS OE 1997). The violation resulted in penalties of $10.5 million, paid in $600,000 installments over three years. Rybvod received a permit to use this money for enforcement, though it is unclear whether all the money goes to just the Kamchatrybvod or to the agency in general. The FBS has asserted that it should receive some of the money.
Inspectors and observers must accompany all foreign fishing vessels, but few of the Russian fishing vessels carry an observer/inspector due to lack of personnel. Often in a Russian fishing expedition, the inspector/observer will be stationed on the largest processor, accompanying the chief of the expedition. Captains of vessels report in daily and most data reports, particularly for the western Bering Sea, are aggregated and processed in Kamchatrybvod. Inspectors determine volume of catch using basket samples, and they also measure bycatch. A vessel’s catch may be confiscated if bycatch of juvenile pollock exceeds 8%. If vessels are found in closed areas, their licenses may be removed, and the fine will be very large. The vessel captain may seek judicial review of his case.
Kamchatrybvod is in the process of initiating a computerized fisheries reporting system to replace the paper submission now used. Data from the system are transmitted to patrol vessels for use in inspection and verification of reported catch. In 1997 the crab fleet fishing near Kamchatka will be required to use the onboard computer to input catch and effort data with an electronic link to the rybvod fisheries reporting system. Position of the vessels will also be reported automatically based on GPS technology (NMFS OE 1997).
6.7 Putina Enforcement Operations
Putinas (which means “fishing season” in Russian) are major enforcement operations staged by the rybvod, SMIS, and the FBS. They are meant to crack down on Russian and foreign operations that may be poaching fish and taking it out of the Russian EEZ to avoid fees and customs taxes (Pacific Rim Fisheries Update: 6/1994). All catcher vessels and processors in a particular area will have inspectors present during a Putina.
Putina 94. The first one was Putina 94 which was directed mainly at the Japanese in the southern reaches of the Sea of Okhotsk, off Kamchatka, and in the Kurils. The Russian Navy, Minister of Interior, Customs, Federal Security Services, Tax Inspectorate, and others were involved. The operation started on April 20 and there were 663 vessels registered to fish in the EEZ, including 207 foreign vessels (Pacific Rim Fisheries Update: 9/1994). Over 100 vessels were searched, and 19 vessels, including four foreign vessels were fined for violating fishing rules and smuggling. The first stage ended on May 10. The second stage began on June 22 and had dedicated vessels and aircraft from the FBS. It ended sometime in late July or early August. The third stage ran from August 20 to September 30, 1994. The major results from the operation were that there were far more Russian violators than foreign ones. One report said that of 668 inspections of foreign vessels, 63 had violations. Of 841 inspections of Russian vessels, there were 447 violations. Fines were levied on 41 foreign vessels and 157 Russian vessels in Putina 94 (Pacific Rim Fisheries Update: 4/1995)
Apparently, Putina 94 was run by the Main Economic Crime Office and the Main Organized Crime Office of the Russian Ministry of the Interior to cover a vast area from the Volga region to the Far East (FNI: 4/1995). The goal in the Far East was to protect the marine resources in the western Pacific and crackdown on illegal fishing in the Sea of Okhotsk and Sea of Japan and to put an end to illegal fish trafficking to foreign markets. Despite the success of the operation, police expressed deep concern about the high degree of crime and corruption in the industry. In the Russian Far East in particular, law enforcement bodies had to deal with international Mafia-style operations linked to interests abroad. Certain foreign firms were claimed to have established criminally shaded relations with Russian fishing companies to pump huge amounts of illegal fish on export markets. It is alleged that it had become an established practice for Russian vessels to obtain a one-time experimental fishing permit, only to continue the so-called research and commercial fishing for several years by reporting a failure to harvest the resources allocated. Total value of unrecorded fish disclosed in 1994 during inspections exceeded $2 million.
Putina 95. This operation began on March 10, 1995 and continued through October 30 in two stages (Pacific Rim Fisheries Update: 4/1995). The first stage ended on July 10. Fines totaling 15 million rubles were given to 123 Russian vessels. Only two foreign vessels were cited and fined $40,000 (Pacific Rim Fisheries Update: 10/1995).
Putina 96. This operation started on March 30 with involvement by the Department of Interior, Primorrybvod and the Special Marine Inspection Service. It lasted to July 10. The Border Guards commenced their operations on April 20. Putina 96 was conducted in 18 regions of Russia (Pacific Rim Fisheries Update: 9/1996). A total of 2,195 violations including 2,152 poaching cases were registered. Nearly 3400 people had been named in these cases with penalties imposed exceeding 2 billion rubles. The operation confiscated 425 vessels involved in poaching activities. Enforcement agents discovered that a lot of fish was being smuggled abroad through fictitious joint ventures.
Putina 97. For the first half of 1997, Putina operations generated 294 cases of violations with penalties and fines issued amounting to 7 billion rubles, and 6.8 billion rubles worth of fish and sea products confiscated. This is higher than 1996. The second stage of the operation started July 15 and will last until October 30 (Pacific Rim Fisheries Update: 8/1997).
6.8 Synopsis of Fisheries Regulations
One of the primary pieces of regulations relating to fishing in the Russian Far East is Ordinance No. 458, titled Fishing Regulations in the Far East dated November 17, 1989. It is not clear if Ordinance no. 458 applies to foreign vessels. English translation of these regulations was provided by a Russian fishing company, and is not an official translation of the Russian government. As of February 1997, these regulations were still in effect, but are in the process of being rewritten (NMFS OE 1997). Highlights of the regulations follow:
ORDINANCE NO. 458 (Appendix 3)
November 17, 1989
Title: Fishing Regulations in the Far East
Authority: Minister of Fisheries of the U.S.S.R.
Applicability: Fishing regulations in the Economic Zone, Territorial Waters and the Continental Shelf of the U.S.S.R. of the Pacific and Arctic Oceans.
Purpose: Control of catching of fish and other live resources by individuals and legal entities, as well as research, exploration, storage, processing, transportation, loading/unloading and support operations connected with such fishing.
Regulations do not apply to marine mammal fishing (see The Regulations of Mammal Fishing, ordinance No. 349 dated 06/29/86)
Other Applicable Regulations: Decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet U.S.S.R.
1. The Administrative Responsibility for the Violation of the Legislation of the Protection and Utilization of the Live Resources, dated 08/14/85.
2. The Economic Zone of the U.S.S.R., dated 02/28.
3. Continental Shelf of the U.S.S.R., dated 92/06/68.
General Provisions (Sections 4 -6):
1. Requires permits for all fishing activities including research and fish farming.
2. Requires establishment of a TAC by TINRO and the Ministry of Fisheries, for each species and bycatch limits based on scientific data. Identifies TINRO and the Ministry of Fisheries as the agencies.
3. Authorizes the Ministry of Fisheries to impose additional restrictions on fishing based on scientific data.
General Requirements of Industry (Section 7):
1. Requires fishing industry to not exceed the TAC.
2. Requires fishing industry to maintain catch records and report catch to the rybvod on a biweekly basis.
3. Requires identifying markings on all set gear.
4. Requires that herring, salmon, sole, halibut, cod and shelf species be used for human consumption only.
5. Requires industry to allow access to all vessels, landing sites, storage facilities and processing facilities and provide travel and accommodations to inspectors. Further requires industry to allow inspectors access to meeting an conferences related to fishing and allow access to communications.
6. Requires industry to pay reimbursement for discards.
General Requirements of Vessel Captains (Sections 8/9):
1. Requires vessel captains to allow access to all vessel quarters and specific vessel documents/records and sets time requirements for maintaining records on board.
2. Requires the captains to report any foreign fishing vessel detected in the territorial waters and economic zone.
Rybvod Authority (Section 10):
1. Authorizes the rybvod in conjunction with TINRO to impose partial or total closures to protect salmon spawning areas and to reschedule opening and closing dates (within a 15-day time frame). Further allows salmon catch in excess of allocations in the event of overcrowding of spawning areas.
2. Issue and extend permits in accordance with procedures set by Glavrybvod.
3. Have free access to the national parks and reserves, vessels, hydro-electric power plans, and other enterprises who dump sewage and waste product to the economic zone or waters adjacent to the zone.
4. Take measures to limit or entirely stop the fishing by a vessel or group of vessels in case they violate these regulations.
Prohibitions (Section 11):
1. Contains prohibitions similar to U.S. regulations that prohibit misreporting of catch.
2. Prohibits the possession of working gear in areas closed to that gear type; use of gear of new design; use of explosives, toxic or narcotic substances, spears or firearms without specific permission; introduction of new species; entry of a fishing vessel into closed areas unless granted transit permission.
3. Prohibits dumping of fill in spawning & breeding areas.
4. Prohibits geological survey work without permission of rybvod.
5. Prohibits dumping of sewage or garbage from any vessel.
6. Prohibits the changing or concealing of a vessel's registration number or name.
Restrictions on Fishing Gear and Fishing Methods (Section 12):
1. Prohibits hook and line fishing for salmon.
2. Limits crab fishery to pots only.
3. Prohibits any trawl fishery in waters less than 20 meters.
4. Also contains section that indicates all bottom trawling is prohibited for pollock, however, other sections indicate bottom trawling for pollock is allowed in some instances.
Fishing Restrictions (Section 13):
1. Lists multiple herring closures and other species-specific area closures.
Prohibited Areas, Periods of Fishing and Fishing Gear (Section 14):
1. Lists multiple trawl and pollock trawl closures throughout the Far East. Most closures are based on water depth ranging from waters less than 100 meters to 400 meters.
2. Prohibits fishing during salmon run (May to October) near the rivers' estuaries flowing into the seas and bays closer than 2 miles from Kamchatka, Primorje and rivers flowing into the northern part of the Tartar Straight, Amurskih Liman and the Bay of Sakhalin and closer than 1 mile for all other areas.
Restrictions on the Size of Fish (Section 15): Minimum size of fish: (partial list)
| herring pollock cod flat fish halibut black halibut sole Atka mackerel Kamchatka king crab blue king crab Tanner crab hair crab |
19-25 cm depending on area 30 cm 40 cm 21 cm 62 cm 40 cm 18 cm 22 cm 15 cm 13 cm 20 cm 8 cm |
Unless otherwise stated on the permit, bycatch is limited to 8% of other species. When fishing with trawl and other gear, bycatch of crab is limited to 2%. During specialized (directed) crab fishery a bycatch of young and female crab per day is 0.2%.
Violations of bycatch are applicable to the second trawl or seine in any particular area. If illegal bycatch is encountered in a trawl then the vessel is required to move at least 5 miles from the previous position.
Size of Mesh of the Fishing Gear (Section 16):
Reference to technical documentation should be used (not contained within these regulations).
Responsibility for the Violation of the Regulations (Section 17):
1. For violations of these regulations the administrative procedures provided by the legislation shall be implemented against the guilty party. The fish protection agencies may also revoke the Fishing ticket (permit) for fishing.
2. Applicable administrative regulations:
17.1 Violations within the territorial sea - The Administrative Responsibility for the Violation of the Legislation of the Protection and Utilization of the Live Resources, dated 08/14/85.
17.2 Violations within the economic zone - The Economic Zone of the U.S.S.R., dated 02/26/84/
17.3 Violations within the continental shelf - The Continental Shelf of the U.S.S.R.
3. Implementation of administrative penalty does not relieve violators from paying reimbursement for damages. Procedures for imposing penalties for caused damages are found in The Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., No. 831, dated 10/25/78 and No. 315 dated 03/10/86.
4. Officials who gave instruction which led to a violation or acted in a way that led to the violation or who failed to take prudent measures ro prevent the violation shall be held liable.
5. Cost for retrieval of fishing gear, transportation of detained fishing gear, vessels and catches to the place of storage must either be carried out by the violator or at the violator's expense.
6. Species caught in violation shall be confiscated and sold. Regulations seem to be contradictory but indicate that such catch is deducted from the organization's allocation but not the overall allocation.
6.9 Summary
Three agencies have major enforcement responsibilities for fisheries in the Far East: the Glavrybvod, Federal Border Service, and Special Marine Inspection Service. U.S. fisheries managers and enforcement personnel have had considerable interaction with personnel from the Kamchatrybvod. That branch office of Glavrybvod appears to dominate enforcement and monitoring of fisheries in the western Bering Sea. Their personnel have visited NMFS Enforcement in Juneau and the North Pacific Fishery Management Council, and normally are represented at U.S.-Russia negotiating sessions involving the maritime boundary dispute. The Federal Border Service has interacted with U.S. Coast Guard personnel. There have been training opportunities and exchanges of personnel. There has been less contact with the Special Marine Inspection Service. That agency is more oriented toward environmental monitoring and pollution controls. The service does provide inspectors to the fishing fleet, and must coordinate with, and complement, the inspection and enforcement personnel from the rybvod. Each of these agencies is under funded and under staffed. As activity in Russian fisheries in the Far East increases, these enforcement and monitoring agencies will be under increased pressure to spread their personnel and technical resources further in order to do an adequate job in controlling fisheries in the western Bering Sea.
7.1 Preface
The following recommendations were developed by the North Pacific Fishery Management Council in response to congressional direction in revising the Magnuson-Stevens Conservation and Management Act. Council representatives have not had an opportunity to meet with their Russian counterparts to discuss these recommendations. The Council intends to provide Congress with further recommendations as may be warranted by future improvements in understanding of Russian Far East fisheries management and enforcement.
7.2 Management
7.3 Research
7.4 Enforcement
• Establish a U.S.-Russia multi-agency committee for enforcement. U.S. agencies would include 17th Coast Guard District, and NMFS AK Region Enforcement; Russia would include appropriate Russian enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Border Service, Rybvod, and Special Marine Inspection Service. This would provide information regarding regulations, procedures, and enforcement techniques.
• Encourage the 17th Coast Guard District Commander to continue initiatives to expand cooperation with North Coast Region FBS in areas like:
-Exchange of officers for professional information sharing.
-Hosting Russian officials at the Coast Guard Fisheries Training Center.
-Promote reciprocal visits to U.S. and Russian ports to improve understanding of U.S. and Russian fishing fleet composition, characteristics, and operational patterns.
-Joint fisheries patrols to improve communication procedures between U.S.-Russia enforcement assets.
• Develop a more responsive mechanism to deal with Russian and other foreign flag fishing vessels which violate the U.S. EEZ, but are not apprehended by the U.S. Coast Guard.
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