Small Vessel Security Strategy

The tragic terror attack in Mumbai and its maritime nexus represents further cause for action on an effective international and domestic approach to small vessel security. The challenges this threat represents are clearly laid out in the U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security and Stewardship(January 2007).

"The emergence of transnational threats: Transnational criminals, pirates, and terrorists seek to exploit the complexity of the maritime domain and the vulnerabilities of the global supply system. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), contraband smuggling, and small vessel threats, such as water-borne improvised explosive devices (WBIEDs), represent the greatest risks from terrorism in the maritime domain. Today's trafficking of drugs, migrants, and contraband by criminals is becoming increasingly sophisticated and threatening as well."

"The vastness, anonymity, and limited governance of the global maritime domain: The maritime domain, by its nature, creates its own challenges. Legitimate uses and criminal threats are growing in a realm that spans the globe, has limited governance, and provides little transparency of activity (particularly for smaller vessels). This creates tension between recognized legal regimes and the emerging need for greater security and safety"

I recently wrote an article on the new approach needed to counter the small vessel threat consistent with our maritime security strategy. You can read it here: /Friendorfoe.pdf

There is no singular solution to the security threat presented by small vessels. The cooperative effort to reduce this threat, and mitigate potential impacts cuts across borders, jurisdictions and agencies. It requires a collaborative effort across government, the private sector and the international community.

Significant progress has been made to reduce the risks. Efforts have included technology, information sharing, improved operational capability, as well as legal regimes. Examples include:

• Improved international regulation through the IMO
• International cooperative efforts to enhance global MDA
• DHS Small Vessel Security Summits and Strategy
• NASBLA initiatives to improve registration requirements
• Self-propelled Semi-submersible legislation
• Development of advanced interdiction capability and capacity

We must continue to work to further overlap our layers of defense and close the current gaps in our maritime security strategy. Our solutions need to be risk-based to identify the potential illicit actors while ensuring the free-flow of legitimate commercial traffic and the freedom of movement American boaters have come to expect.