WPCS 2BBcR Z33|["m^36Gff%==\o3=33ffffffffff33oooQzKfzztzp=o=o\%ffQi\=bp:6m:p\ifQUGpbbbX=o=o=3============i:fffffQ\\\\K:K:K:K:p\\\\ppppbfi\\b\zifffQQQQi\\\\bbbbbbppK:K:K:K:fmz:z:z:z:z:pppp\\QQQtUtUtUtUzGzGzGppppppbpXpXpXiz:pQtUzGbbi\pNo3o\6QNNfff=7f=f=%GGf//\\pp%G=ooee3o<;o;rfolWSGrfffZAeAe8.888888888888f>fffff]````J>J>J>J>rffffrrrrxffoffxffofff]]]]o````ffffffrrJ>J>J>J>lox;x;x;x;x;rrrrffWWWoSoSoSoSxGxGxGrrrrrrxfoZoZoZox;rWoSxGxfxfofrNe.}S1SSS```==`9}}`9(PPS88SSrr(P9ee\\w.e77\\\wwweeeCe.wR)EreewwwwIeenR\\\wwwxio\eEfRfIfRxe|W87y\r\rxWlRx\\]\ceIfIs`Wx\rriIe77\``rigewiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiIIIIIIIeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee777777777777\\\\\\\````````````rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrxfx8xs8s\"m^*,:SS}z22K[*2**SSSSSSSSSS**[[[Collluldu}=Sudzudul_dzljj\2[2[KSSCVK2Q\/,Y/\KVSCE:\QuQQH2[2[2*222222222222V/lSlSlSlSlSwlClKlKlKlK=/=/=/=/z\uKuKuKuKz\z\z\z\jQlSuVuKuKjQuKdVlSlSlSlClClClCuVlKlKlKlKuQuQuQuQuQuQ}\}\=/=/=/=/SuYd/d/d/d/d/z\z\z\z\uKuK}lClClC_E_E_E_Ed:d:d:z\z\z\z\z\z\ujQ\H\H\HuVd/z\lC_Ed:jQjQuVuKz\N[*[K,C@@SSS2-}}S2ooS}2::S''KK\\:2[[RRk*[11RRRkskk[ZZ<[){kJ%>gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR2K#c= c"m^*2gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR"m^)+9RRzx11IY)1))RRRRRRRRRR))YYYAljjjrjbrz>RRR1,zzR1llRz199R&&IIZZ91YYQQi)Y00QQQiqiiYXX;Y(yiH$<euXXqiiii@yqqqXXaHQQQiiij]bQXgn|g|n|SR{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS"X^HJS<aa}FSFFFF}oaa}<a]XX}kaaSFSS*SSSSSSSSSS]o]o]o]o]o]o]o]o]XXXXX}}}}kkkX}kNF}J}}}\\VV<xx}SS}}<xVF*RRdE|>gn|g|n|SR{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS27 c}#&- c(4"m^36Gff%==\o3=33ffffffffff33oooQzKfzztzp=o=o\%jjjrjbrzgn|g|n|SR}{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS"X^?S}}SSS}?S?F}}}}}}}}}}SS}a}SFS}S}ooS}FSF}oaS}}}oc7cS?SS*SSSSSSSSSSF}}}}}oooooaFaFaFaF}}}}}}}}}}}}}oooooooo}}}}}}aFaFaFaF}FFFFF}}oooaaaaSSS}oooFoaS}}}NX?}S}}}}}}KS}K}KF}}}SS}}S}KF*RRdE|>gn|g|n|SR{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS"m^3=Iff%==\o3=3offffffffff33oooQzKpzzz~~z=o=o\%ifQpQ=bp=:f=p\ifQQAp_\\U=o=o=3============f=iiiiiQQQQQK=K=K=K=p\\\\pppp~\ip\\~\\ziiiiQQQQpQQQQbbbbbbppK=K=K=K=pfz=z=z=z=z=pppp\\QQQzQzQzQzQ~A~A~Apppppp~\zUzUzUpz=pQzQ~A~\~\p\pNo3w\=QNNfffMDf=f=3GG\==\\pp%G=ooee3o<cC"m^!+==\Z%%7C%==========CCC1QOOOVOIV\-=VIhZVIVOEIZOlMMC%C%C7==1?7%;C#!A#bC7?=13+C;V;;5%C%C%%%n%%%%%%%%%%?#O=O=O=O=O=nXO1O7O7O7O7-#-#-#-#ZCV7V7V7V7ZCZCZCZCM;O=V?V7V7M;V7I?O=O=O=O1O1O1O1V?O7O7O7O7V;V;V;V;V;V;\C\C-#-#-#-#=VAI#I#I#I#I#ZCZCZCZCV7V7n\O1O1O1E3E3E3E3I+I+I+ZCZCZCZCZCZClVM;C5C5C5V?I#ZCO1E3I+M;M;V?V7ZCNCC7!1//===%!\\=%QQ=\%++=n77nCCn+n%CC<HYYY66^E@@@@(JEEE66;,1N11@@@A9<16%7,7(7,A6C/A1>1P7A/:,A1E12156(7(>4E/A1H>E>9(6144>986@9999999999999999999(((((((666666666666666666661111111444444444444>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>A7AA>E>1&)o=3no P['C&P &%e8.|e P['CP&8SF> P['CPd:SHvX pTCd'l80lX pTCDS?3s\  PCPDS??皝4  p(AC&u![2*d[ P['CP u![2*P[e xzCX&r!Y1)LY P['CP )o=3no P['C&P )o=3PRoe xzC&X&UC%D4C P['CJP&F66 P['CP&[G' ԦGG P['C^PKTKE0B$$<??KEDBN"m^ #-AAa_'':G ' AAAAAAAAAA GGG4VTTT[TN[a/A[Nn_[N[TJN_TrRRG'G'G:AA4C:'?G%#E%hG:CA46-G?[??8'G'G' ''u''''''''''C%TATATATATAu]T4T:T:T:T:/%/%/%/%_G[:[:[:[:_G_G_G_GR?TA[C[:[:R?[:NCTATATAT4T4T4T4[CT:T:T:T:[?[?[?[?[?[?aGaG/%/%/%/%A[EN%N%N%N%N%_G_G_G_G[:[:uaT4T4T4J6J6J6J6N-N-N-_G_G_G_G_G_Gr[R?G8G8G8[CN%_GT4J6N-R?R?[C[:_GNG G:#422AAA'#aaA'VVAa'--Au::uGGu-u'GG@@S G&&@@@SZSSGssFFz/G `S:0P]sssFFzZSSSS3`ZZZFFM:@e@@SSSTJN@F0G:G3G:TFV='&T@P@hGT=K:T@Z@A@EF3G3QCY=T@]PZPJ3F&&@CCPJHFSJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ3333333FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF&&&&&&&&&&&&@@@@@@@CCCCCCCCCCCCPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPTGT'TQZ'Q@2PoxGHH/K PFTNFormats for each footnote,  X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8: (Goldberg, J., concurring); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 277 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring). As one of the 19th century English judges put it, the rule was that [t]he innkeeper is not to select his guests[;] [h]e has no right to say to one, you shall come into my inn, and to another you shall not, as every one coming and conducting himself in a proper manner has a right to be received; and for this purpose innkeepers are a sort of  J public servants. Rex v. Ivens, 7 Car. & P. 213, 219, 173 Eng. Rep. 94, 96 (N.P. 1835); M. Konvitz & T. Leskes, A Century of Civil Rights 160 (1961).  After the Civil War, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts was the first State to codify this principle to ensure access to public accommodations regardless of race. See Act Forbidding Unjust Discrimination on Account of Color or Race, 1865 Mass. Acts, ch. 277 (May  J 16, 1865); Konvitz & Leskes, supra, at 155!56; L.G. Lerman & A. Sanderson, Discrimination in Access to Public Places: A Survey of State and Federal Public Accommodations Laws, 7 N. Y. U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 215, 238 (1978); F. Fox, Discrimination and "   Antidiscrimination in Massachusetts Law, 44 B. U. L. Rev. 30, 58 (1964). In prohibiting discrimination in any licensed inn, in any public place of amusement, public conveyance or public meeting, 1865 Mass. Acts, ch. 277, 1, the original statute already expanded upon the common law, which had not conferred any right of access to places of public amusement, Lerman & Ander J son, supra, at 248. As with many public accommodations statutes across the Nation, the legislature continued to broaden the scope of legislation, to the point that the law today prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religious creed, national origin, sex, sexual orientation ..., deafness, blindness or any physical or mental disability or ancestry in the admission of any person to, or treatment in any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement. Mass. Gen. Laws 272:98. Provisions like these are well within the State's usual power to enact when a legislature has reason to believe that a given group is the target of discrimination, and they do not, as a general matter, violate the First or  J Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g., New York State Club  J Assn., Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 11!16  J (1988); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,  Jh 624!626 (1984); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United  J@ States, 379 U.S. 241, 258!262 (1964). Nor is this statute unusual in any obvious way, since it does not, on its face, target speech or discriminate on the basis of its content, the focal point of its prohibition being rather on the act of discriminating against individuals in the provision of publicly available goods, privileges, and services on the proscribed grounds.  ;H2 d d8C؃  d2  In the case before us, however, the Massachusetts law has been applied in a peculiar way. Its enforcement does not address any dispute about the participation of openly gay, lesbian, or bisexual individuals in various"   units admitted to the parade. The petitioners disclaim any intent to exclude homosexuals as such, and no individual member of GLIB claims to have been excluded from parading as a member of any group that the Council has approved to march. Instead, the disagreement goes to the admission of GLIB as its own parade unit carrying its own banner. See App. to Pet. for Cert. B26!B27, and n. 28. Since every participating unit affects the message conveyed by the private organizers, the state courts' application of the statute produced an order essentially requiring petitioners to alter the expressive content of their parade. Although the state courts spoke of the parade as a place of public accommo J dation, see, e.g., 418 Mass., at 247!248, 636 N.E.2d, at 1297!1298, once the expressive character of both the parade and the marching GLIB contingent is understood, it becomes apparent that the state courts' application of the statute had the effect of declaring the sponsors' speech itself to be the public accommodation. Under this approach any contingent of protected individuals with a message would have the right to participate in petitioners' speech, so that the communication produced by the private organizers would be shaped by all those protected by the law who wished to join in with some expressive demonstration of their own. But this use of the State's power violates the fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.  Jx   Since all speech inherently involves choices of what  JP to say and what to leave unsaid, Pacific Gas & Electric  J( Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986) (plurality opinion) (emphasis in original), one important manifestation of the principle of free speech is that one who chooses to speak may also decide what  J not to say, id., at 16. Although the State may at times prescribe what shall be orthodox in commercial adver`"  Ԯtising by requiring the dissemination of purely factual  J and uncontroversial information, Zauderer v. Office of  J Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471  J U.S. 626, 651 (1985); see Pittsburgh Press Co. v.  J` Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 386!387 (1973), outside that context it may not compel affirmance of a belief with which the speaker disagrees,  J see Barnette, 319 U.S., at 642. Indeed this general rule, that the speaker has the right to tailor the speech, applies not only to expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement, but equally to statements of fact the  JH speaker would rather avoid, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections  J Comm'n, 514 U.S. ___, ___ (1995) (slip op., at 6!7);  J Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 797!798 (1988), subject, perhaps, to the  J permissive law of defamation, New York Times, 376  J U.S. 254; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,  JX 347!349 (1974); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). Nor is the rule's benefit restricted to the press, being enjoyed by business corporations generally and by ordinary people engaged in unsophisticated expression as well as by professional publishers. Its point is simply the point of all speech protection, which is to shield just those choices of content that in someone's eyes are misguided, or even hurtful. See  J Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Terminiello  J v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).  Petitioners' claim to the benefit of this principle of autonomy to control one's own speech is as sound as the South Boston parade is expressive. Rather like a composer, the Council selects the expressive units of the parade from potential participants, and though the score may not produce a particularized message, each contingent's expression in the Council's eyes comports with what merits celebration on that day. Even if this view gives the Council credit for a more considered judgment than it actively made, the Council clearly decided to`"   exclude a message it did not like from the communication it chose to make, and that is enough to invoke its right as a private speaker to shape its expression by speaking on one subject while remaining silent on another. The message it disfavored is not difficult to identify. Although GLIB's point (like the Council's) is not wholly articulate, a contingent marching behind the organization's banner would at least bear witness to the fact that some Irish are gay, lesbian, or bisexual, and the presence of the organized marchers would suggest their view that people of their sexual orientations have as much claim to unqualified social acceptance as heterosexuals and indeed as members of parade units organized around other identifying characteristics. The parade's organizers may not believe these facts about Irish sexuality to be so, or they may object to unqualified social acceptance of gays and lesbians or have some other reason for wishing to keep GLIB's message out of the parade. But whatever the reason, it boils down to the choice of a speaker not to propound a particular point of view, and that choice is presumed to lie beyond the government's power to control.  Respondents argue that any tension between this rule and the Massachusetts law falls short of unconstitutionality, citing the most recent of our cases on the general subject of compelled access for expressive purposes,  J Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. ___. There we reviewed regulations requiring cable operators to set aside channels for designated broadcast signals, and applied  Jx only intermediate scrutiny. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 38). Respondents contend on this authority that admission of GLIB to the parade would not threaten the core principle of speaker's autonomy because the Council, like a cable operator, is merely a conduit for the speech of participants in the parade rather than itself a speaker. Brief for Respondent 21. But this metaphor is not apt here, because GLIB's participation would likely be`"   perceived as having resulted from the Council's customary determination about a unit admitted to the parade, that its message was worthy of presentation and quite possibly of support as well. A newspaper, similarly, is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and advertising, and we have held that [t]he choice of material ... and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and content ... and treatment of public issues ..."whether fair or unfair"constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment upon  Jp which the State can not intrude. Tornillo, 418 U.S., at  JH 258. Indeed, in Pacific Gas & Electric, we invalidated coerced access to the envelope of a private utility's bill and newsletter because the utility may be forced either to appear to agree with [the intruding leaflet] or to respond. 475 U.S., at 15 (plurality) (citation omitted). The plurality made the further point that if the government [were] freely able to compel ... speakers to propound political messages with which they disagree, ... protection [of a speaker's freedom] would be empty, for the government could require speakers to affirm in  J one breath that which they deny in the next. Id., at 16. Thus, when dissemination of a view contrary to one's own is forced upon a speaker intimately connected with the communication advanced, the speaker's right to autonomy over the message is compromised.  J  In Turner Broadcasting, we found this problem absent in the cable context, because [g]iven cable's long history of serving as a conduit for broadcast signals, there appears little risk that cable viewers would assume that the broadcast stations carried on a cable system convey ideas or messages endorsed by the cable operator. 512 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 31). We stressed that the viewer is frequently apprised of the identity of the broadcaster whose signal is being received via cable and that it is common practice for broadcasters to disclaim any identity of viewpoint between the management and`"    J the speakers who use the broadcast facility. Ibid. (slip  J op., at 31) (citation omitted); see id., at ___ (slip op., at  J 11) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that Congress might ... conceivably obligate cable operators to act as common carriers for some of their channels).  Parades and demonstrations, in contrast, are not understood to be so neutrally presented or selectively viewed. Unlike the programming offered on various channels by a cable network, the parade does not consist of individual, unrelated segments that happen to be transmitted together for individual selection by members of the audience. Although each parade unit generally identifies itself, each is understood to contribute something to a common theme, and accordingly there is no customary practice whereby private sponsors disavow any identity of viewpoint between themselves and the selected participants. Practice follows practicability here, for such disclaimers would be quite curious in a  J moving parade. Cf. PruneYard Shopping Center v.  J Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980) (owner of shopping mall can expressly disavow any connection with the message by simply posting signs in the area where the speakers or handbillers stand). Without deciding on the precise significance of the likelihood of misattribution, it nonetheless becomes clear that in the context of an expressive parade, as with a protest march, the parade's overall message is distilled from the individual presentations along the way, and each unit's expression is perceived by spectators as part of the whole.  JP  An additional distinction between Turner Broadcasting and this case points to the fundamental weakness of any attempt to justify the state court order's limitation on the Council's autonomy as a speaker. A cable is not only a conduit for speech produced by others and selected by cable operators for transmission, but a franchised channel giving monopolistic opportunity to`"   shut out some speakers. This power gives rise to the government's interest in limiting monopolistic autonomy in order to allow for the survival of broadcasters who might otherwise be silenced and consequently destroyed.  J` The government's interest in Turner Broadcasting was not the alteration of speech, but the survival of speakers. In thus identifying an interest going beyond abridgment of speech itself, the defenders of the law at  J issue in Turner Broadcasting addressed the threshold requirement of any review under the Speech Clause, whatever the ultimate level of scrutiny, that a challenged restriction on speech serve a compelling, or at  J least important, governmental object, see, e.g., Pacific  J Gas & Electric, supra, at 19; Turner Broadcasting,  J supra, at ___ (slip op., at 38); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).  In this case, of course, there is no assertion compara JX ble to the Turner Broadcasting claim that some speakers will be destroyed in the absence of the challenged law. True, the size and success of petitioners' parade makes it an enviable vehicle for the dissemination of GLIB's views, but that fact, without more, would fall far short of supporting a claim that petitioners enjoy an abiding monopoly of access to spectators. See App. to Pet. for Cert. B9; Brief for Respondents 10 (citing trial court's finding that no other applicant has applied for the per mit). Considering that GLIB presumably would have had a fair shot (under neutral criteria developed by the city) at obtaining a parade permit of its own, respondents have not shown that petitioners enjoy the capacity to silence the voice of competing speakers, as cable operators do with respect to program providers who wish to reach  J subscribers, Turner Broadcasting, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 32). Nor has any other legitimate interest been identified in support of applying the Massachusetts statute in this way to expressive activity like the parade.   The statute, Mass. Gen. Laws 272:98, is a piece of`"   protective legislation that announces no purpose beyond the object both expressed and apparent in its provisions, which is to prevent any denial of access to (or discriminatory treatment in) public accommodations on proscribed grounds, including sexual orientation. On its face, the object of the law is to ensure by statute for gays and lesbians desiring to make use of public accommodations what the old common law promised to any member of the public wanting a meal at the inn, that accepting the usual terms of service, they will not be turned away merely on the proprietor's exercise of personal preference. When the law is applied to expressive activity in the way it was done here, its apparent object is simply to require speakers to modify the content of their expression to whatever extent beneficiaries of the law choose to alter it with messages of their own. But in the absence of some further, legitimate end, this object is merely to allow exactly what the general rule of speaker's autonomy forbids.  It might, of course, have been argued that a broader objective is apparent: that the ultimate point of forbidding acts of discrimination toward certain classes is to produce a society free of the corresponding biases. Requiring access to a speaker's message would thus be not an end in itself, but a means to produce speakers free of the biases, whose expressive conduct would be at least neutral toward the particular classes, obviating any future need for correction. But if this indeed is the point of applying the state law to expressive conduct, it is a decidedly fatal objective. Having availed itself of the public thoroughfares for purposes of assembly [and] communicating thoughts between citizens, the Council is engaged in a use of the streets that has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights,  J and liberties of citizens. Hague v. Committee for  J Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.). Our tradition of free speech`"   commands that a speaker who takes to the street corner to express his views in this way should be free from interference by the State based on the content of what  J he says. See, e.g., Police Department of Chicago v.  J` Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); cf. H. Kalven, Jr., A Worthy Tradition 6!19 (1988); O. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1405, 1408!1409 (1986). The very idea that a noncommercial speech restriction be used to produce thoughts and statements acceptable to some groups or, indeed, all people, grates on the First Amendment, for it amounts to nothing less than a proposal to limit speech in the service of orthodox expression. The Speech Clause has no more certain  J antithesis. See, e.g., Barnette, 319 U.S., at 642; Pacific  J Gas & Electric, 475 U.S., at 20. While the law is free to promote all sorts of conduct in place of harmful behavior, it is not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose may strike the government.  J  Far from supporting GLIB, then, Turner Broadcasting points to the reasons why the present application of the Massachusetts law can not be sustained. So do the two other principal authorities GLIB has cited. In  J@ ԚPruneYard, 447 U.S. 74, to be sure, we sustained a state law requiring the proprietors of shopping malls to allow visitors to solicit signatures on political petitions without a showing that the shopping mall owners would otherwise prevent the beneficiaries of the law from reaching an audience. But we found in that case that the proprietors were running a business establishment that is open to the public to come and go as they please, that the solicitations would not likely be identified with those of the owner, and that the proprietors could expressly disavow any connection with the message by simply posting signs in the area where  J` the speakers or handbillers stand. Id., at 87. Also, in`"    J Pacific Gas & Electric, supra, at 12, we noted that  J PruneYard did not involve any concern that access to this area might affect the shopping center owner's exercise of his own right to speak: the owner did not even allege that he objected to the content of the pamphlets .... The principle of speaker's autonomy was simply not threatened in that case.  J  New York State Club Association is also instructive by the contrast it provides. There, we turned back a facial challenge to a state antidiscrimination statute on the assumption that the expressive associational character of a dining club with over 400 members could be sufficiently attenuated to permit application of the law even to such a private organization, but we also recognized that the State did not prohibit exclusion of those whose views were at odds with positions espoused by the general club memberships. 487 U.S., at 13; see also  JX Roberts, 468 U.S., at 627. In other words, although the association provided public benefits to which a State could ensure equal access, it was also engaged in expressive activity; compelled access to the benefit, which was upheld, did not trespass on the organization's message itself. If we were to analyze this case strictly along those lines, GLIB would lose. Assuming the parade to be large enough and a source of benefits (apart from its expression) that would generally justify a mandated access provision, GLIB could nonetheless be refused admission as an expressive contingent with its own message just as readily as a private club could exclude an applicant whose manifest views were at odds with a position taken by the club's existing members.  9H1 d d7IV؃  d2  Our holding today rests not on any particular view about the Council's message but on the Nation's commitment to protect freedom of speech. Disapproval of a private speaker's statement does not legitimize use of"   the Commonwealth's power to compel the speaker to alter the message by including one more acceptable to others. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court is reversed and the case remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.  J ` BIt is so ordered.ă