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A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)@@EFinal Op  ##  ( ( ( (  X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8: BQ d   ( , , This language, however, is not particularly clear, and some of it"especially the Advisory Committee's endorsement of the position taken by Dean McCormick's treatise"points the other way:  BQ C  , , (  A certain latitude as to contextual statements, neutral as to interest, giving meaning to the declaration against interest seems defensible, but bringing in selfserving statements contextually seems questionr"  Ԯable.... [A]dmit[ting] the disserving parts of the declaration, and exclud[ing] the selfserving parts ... seems the most realistic method of adjusting admissibility to trustworthiness, where the serving and disserving parts can be severed. See C. McCormick, Law of Evidence 256, pp. 551!553 (1954) (footnotes omitted).E BQ d   ( , , Without deciding exactly how much weight to give the  J$ Notes in this particular situation, compare Schiavone v.  J Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 31 (1986) (Notes are to be given  J some weight), with Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.,  J 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (Notes ought to be given no weight), we conclude that the policy expressed in the statutory text points clearly enough in one direction that it outweighs  J whatever force the Notes may have. And though Jus J tice Kennedy believes that the text can fairly be read as expressing a policy of admitting collateral statements,  J post, at 5, for the reasons given above we disagree.  ;H2 d d-B؃  J  2  We also do not share Justice Kennedy's fears that our reading of the Rule eviscerate[s] the against penal  J interest exception, post, at 7 (internal quotation marks  Jb omitted), or makes it lack meaningful effect, post, at 6. There are many circumstances in which Rule 804(b)(3) does allow the admission of statements that inculpate a criminal defendant. Even the confessions of arrested accomplices may be admissible if they are truly selfinculpatory,rather than merely attempts to shift blame or curry favor.  For instance, a declarant's squarely selfinculpatory confession" yes, I killed X"will likely be admissible under Rule 804(b)(3) against accomplices of his who are being tried under a coconspirator liability theory. See  J Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946). Likewise, by showing that the declarant knew some"  Ԯthing, a selfinculpatory statement can in some situations help the jury infer that his confederates knew it as well. And when seen with other evidence, an accomplice's selfinculpatory statement can inculpate the defendant directly: I was robbing the bank on Friday morning, coupled with someone's testimony that the declarant and the defendant drove off together Friday morning, is evidence that the defendant also participated in the robbery.  Moreover, whether a statement is selfinculpatory or not can only be determined by viewing it in context. Even statements that are on their face neutral may actually be against the declarant's interest. I hid the gun in Joe's apartment may not be a confession of a crime; but if it is likely to help the police find the murder weapon, then it is certainly selfinculpatory. Sam and I went to Joe's house might be against the declarant's interest if a reasonable person in the declarant's shoes would realize that being linked to Joe and Sam would implicate the declarant in Joe and Sam's conspiracy. And other statements that give the police significant details about the crime may also, dependingon the situation, be against the declarant's interest. The question under Rule 804(b)(3) is always whether the statement was sufficiently against the declarant's penal interest that a reasonable person in thedeclarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true, and this question can only be answered in light of all the surrounding circumstances.*Jx}P uB ԍ FTN    XFrXFr ddf < Of course, an accomplice's statements may also be admissible under other provisions of Rules 801!804. For instance, statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy may be admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), and other statements that bear circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness may be admissible under Rule 804(b)(5), the catchall hearsay exception.x "  Ԍ ;H2 dЙd-C؃  2  In this case, however, we cannot conclude that all that Harris said was properly admitted. Some of Harris' confession would clearly have been admissible under Rule 804(b)(3); for instance, when he said he knew there was cocaine in the suitcase, he essentially forfeited his only possible defense to a charge of cocaine possession, lack of knowledge. But other parts of his confession, especially the parts that implicated Williamson, did little to subject Harris himself to criminal liability. A reasonable person in Harris' position might even think that implicating someone else would decrease his practical exposure to criminal liability, at least so far as sentencing goes. Small fish in a big conspiracy often get shorter sentences than people who are running  J the whole show, see, e.g., United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual 3B1.2 (Nov. 1993), especially if the small fish are willing to help the au Jb thorities catch the big ones, see, e.g., id., at 5K1.1.  Nothing in the record shows that the District Court or the Court of Appeals inquired whether each of the statements in Harris' confession was truly selfinculpatory. As we explained above, this can be a factintensive inquiry, which would require careful examination of all the circumstances surrounding the criminal activity involved; we therefore remand to the Court of Appeals to conduct this inquiry in the first instance.  In light of this disposition, we need not address Williamson's claim that that the statements were also made inadmissible by the Confrontation Clause, see generally  J White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. ___ (1992), and in particular we need not decide whether the hearsay exception for declarations against interest is firmly rooted for Con J  frontation Clause purposes. Compare, e.g., United  J ԚStates v. Seeley, 892 F. 2d 1, 2 (CA1 1989) (holding that  J the exception is firmly rooted), with United States v.  J Flores, 985 F. 2d 770 (CA5 1993) (holding the contrary).  "   We note, however, that the very fact that a statement is genuinely selfinculpatory"which our reading of Rule 804(b)(3) requires"is itself one of the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness that makes a statement  J` admissible under the Confrontation Clause. See Lee v.  J8 Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543!545 (1986). We also need not decide whether, as some Courts of Appeals have held, the second sentence of Rule 804(b)(3)" A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liabil J ity and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissibleunless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement (emphasis added)"also requires that statements inculpating the accused be supported by corroborating circumstances. See,  J e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 584 F. 2d 694, 701 (CA5  J 1978); United States v. Taggart, 944 F. 2d 837, 840 (CA11 1991). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  J `9So ordered.ă