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A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)@@EFinal Op  ##  ( ( ( (  X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8: (1975).%J> %; uB; ԍIn Rogers, the jury had been deliberating for almost two hours without reaching a verdict. After the trial court informed the jury that it would accept a verdict of Guilty as charged with extreme mercy of the"## Court, the jury returned such a verdict within minutes. 422 U.S., at 36!37 (internal quotation marks omitted). We concluded that, instead of giving the jurors information about sentencing (that is, that they could recommend extreme mercy), the trial court should have admoni[shed] [them] that [they] had no sentencing function and should reach [their]  uB# verdict without regard to what sentence might be imposed. Id., at 40.  FTN  a  XgEpXFr  ff The principle that juries are not to consider> "   the consequences of their verdicts is a reflection of the basic division of labor in our legal system between judge and jury. The jury's function is to find the facts and to decide whether, on those facts, the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. The judge, by contrast, imposes sentence on the defendant after the jury has arrived at a guilty verdict. Information regarding the consequences of a verdict is therefore irrelevant to the jury's task. Moreover, providing jurors sentencing information invites them to ponder matters that are not within their province, distracts them from their factfinding responsibilities, and creates a strong possibility of confusion.  J See Pope v. United States, 298 F.2d 507, 508 (CA5  J 1962); cf. Rogers, supra, at 40.  Despite these familiar precepts, Shannon contends that an instruction informing the jury of the consequences of an NGI verdict is required under the IDRA whenever requested by the defendant. He also argues that such an instruction is required as a matter of general federal criminal practice. We address each argument in turn.  ;H2 d d8A؃  2  To determine whether Congress intended courts to depart from the principle that jurors are not to be  J informed of the consequences of their verdicts, we turn first, as always, to the text of the statute. The IDRA refers to the subject of jury instructions only once, and that reference occurs in its description of the possible verdicts a jury may return. Under the Act, the jury shall be instructed to find ... the defendant"(1) guilty;6"   (2) not guilty; or (3) not guilty only by reason of insanity. 18 U.S.C. 4242(b). The text of the Act gives no indication that jurors are to be instructed regarding the consequences of an NGI verdict. As the court below observed, the Act leaves the jury solely with its customary determination of guilt or innocence. 981 F. 2d, at 763. The Act's text thus gives no support to Shannon's contention that an instruction informing the jury of the consequences of an NGI verdict is required.  Shannon asserts, however, that an express statutory directive is not necessary because, by modeling the  JH IDRA on D.C. Code Ann. 24!301 (1981),JH  uB ԍDistrict of Columbia Code Ann. 24!301 continued to govern the operation of the insanity defense in federal criminal prosecutions in the  uB District of Columbia until the passage of the IDRA. Cf. United States v.  uB ԚCrutchfield, 893 F.2d 376, 377!379 (CADC 1990) (holding that the IDRA applies prospectively to insanity acquittees committed after its enactment). Congress  J impliedly adopted the D. C. Circuit's decision in Lyles  J and the practice endorsed by that decision of instructing the jury as to the consequences of an NGI verdict. For  J this argument he relies on Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 36 (1899), in which we stated:  BQ XC  , , ( - - " By a familiar canon of interpretation, heretofore applied by this court whenever Congress ... has borrowed from the statutes of a State provisions which had received in that State a known and settled construction before their enactment by Congress, that construction must be deemed to have been adopted by Congress together with the text which it expounded, and the provisions must be construed as they were understood at the time in the State.  J   K vBQ d  ( , , See also Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 26 (1944) ( [T]he general rule [is] that adopG"  Ԯtion of the wording of a statute from another legislative jurisdiction carries with it the previous judicial interpre J tations of the wording); Cathcart v. Robinson, 5 Pet.  J 264, 280 (1831). The canon of interpretation upon which Shannon relies, however, is merely a presumption of legislative intention to be invoked only under  J suitable conditions. Carolene Products, supra, at 26. We believe that the conditions are not suitable in this case. Indeed, although Congress may have had theD. C. Code in mind when it passed the IDRA, see  Jp ԚÚUnited States v. Crutchfield, 893 F.2d 376, 378 (CADC  JH 1990), it did not, in the language of Hof, borrow the terms of the IDRA from the D.C. Code. Rather, Congress departed from the scheme embodied in D. C. Code Ann. 24!301 in several significant ways.  The IDRA, for example, requires a defendant at trial to prove insanity by clear and convincing evidence, 18 U.S.C. 17(b); the D. C. statute, by contrast, employs a preponderance standard. D. C. Code Ann. 24!301(j). A commitment hearing must be held under the IDRA within 40 days of an NGI verdict, 18 U.S.C. 4243(c); the period is 50 days under the D. C. scheme. D. C. Code Ann. 24!301(d)(2)(A). Under the IDRA, a defendant whose offense involved bodily injury to another or serious damage to another's property, or the substantial risk thereof, must demonstrate at the hearing by clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to release, 18 U.S.C. 4243(d); under the D.C. scheme, an acquittee, regardless of the character of his offense, need only meet the preponderance standard. D. C. Code Ann. 24!301(k)(3). The IDRA provides that an acquittee, once committed, may be released when he no longer presents a substantial risk of harm to others or  J to their property, 18 U.S.C. 4243(f); an acquittee under the D.C. system may be released from commitment when he will not in the reasonable future be dangerous to himself or others. D. C. Code Ann.`"   24!301(e). Finally, in the IDRA, Congress rejected the broad test for insanity that had been utilized under  J the D. C. provision, uB ԍ FTN    XFrXFr ddf < Under the D. C. system, the courts had defined insanity as either the lack of substantial capacity to conform one's conduct to the  uB requirements of the law or the lack of substantial capacity to  uB= appreciate the wrongfulness of one's acts. See Brawner, 471 F. 2d, at 973!995. and instead adopted a more restrictive formulation under which a person is deemed insane if he is unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts. 18 U.S.C. 17(a). We believe that these significant differences between the IDRA and D. C. Code Ann. 24!301 render the canon  J upon which Shannon relies inapplicable in this case. # uB ԍIn addition, we note that the canon upon which Shannon relies is a  uBr canon of statutory construction. It stems from the notion that a court, in interpreting borrowed statutory language, should apply the same construction to that language that was placed upon it by the courts in the jurisdiction from which it was borrowed. In this case, however, the court in the jurisdiction from which the statutory text was supposedly  uB borrowed"that is, the Lyles court"did not purport to construe the  uB language of the D. C. Code provision; rather, in holding that jurors should be informed of the consequences of an NGI verdict, the court appears to have relied on its supervisory power over the Federal District  uB Courts in the District of Columbia. Cf. infra, at 11. Thus, we conclude that the canon is also inapplicable in this case because there was no  uBO  known and settled construction, Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S.  uB 1, 36 (1899), of the statute that Congress could have adopted by virtue of borrowing language from the D. C. statutory scheme.  Alternatively, Shannon contends that a provision explicitly requiring the instruction is unnecessary for a  JH different reason: namely, that Congress made its inten J tion to adopt the Lyles practice crystal clear in the IDRA's legislative history. In particular, Shannon points to the following statement in the Senate Report:  BQ C  , , ( - - " The Committee endorses the procedure used in the District of Columbia whereby the jury, in a case in which the insanity defense has been raised, may "   be instructed on the effect of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. If the defendant requests that the instruction not be given, it is within the discretion of the court whether to give it or not. S.Rep. No. 98!225, p. 240 (1983) (footnotesomitted).gb BQ 8d   ( , , Members of this Court have expressed differing views regarding the role that legislative history should play in  J$ statutory interpretation. Compare County of Washing J ton v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 182 (1981) (Rehnquist,  J J., dissenting) ( FTN   XFrXFr ff  [I]t [is] well settled that the legislative history of a statute is a useful guide to the intent of  J Congress), with Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier,  J\ 501 U.S. 597, 617 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (legislative history is unreliable ... as a genuine indicator of congressional intent). We are not aware of any case, however (and Shannon does not bring one to our attention), in which we have given authoritative weight to a single passage of legislative history that is in no way anchored in the text of the statute. On its face, the passage Shannon identifies does not purport to explain or interpret any provision of the IDRA. Rather, it merely conveys the Committee's  J  endorsement of the Lyles procedure"a procedure that Congress did not include in the text of the Act. To give effect to this snippet of legislative history, we would have to abandon altogether the text of the statute as a guide in the interpretative process. We agree with the D. C. Circuit that courts have no authority to enforce [a] principl[e] gleaned solely from legislative  J history that has no statutory reference point. Interna J tional Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, Local Union No.  Jd 474, AFLCIO v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 712 (1987)d "   (emphasis omitted). We thus conclude that there is no  J support in the Act for the instruction Shannon seeks. K  uB@ ԍ FTN    XFrXFr ddf < In the court below, Shannon made the additional argument that because Congress filled the gap that had been identified by the Federal Courts of Appeals prior to the IDRA with a general federal  uBe civil commitment procedure, the practice announced in Lyles must now be applied nationwide. 981 F. 2d 759, 763 (1993). We find this argument (which Shannon makes only implicitly before this Court) unpersuasive. As noted above, although the lack of a federal commitment procedure before the passage of the IDRA was one  uB reason for rejecting a Lyles!type instruction, courts generally, and properly, relied additionally on the principle that juries are not to be concerned with the consequences of their verdicts. This principle is not altered by fact that Congress established a civil commitment  uB procedure. See Thigpen, 4 F. 3d, at 1577.   ;H2 d d8B؃  2  Setting the Act aside, Shannon argues that the instruction he proposes is required as a matter of general federal criminal practice. Presumably, Shannon asks us to invoke our supervisory power over the federal courts. According to Shannon, the instruction is necessary because jurors are generally unfamiliar with the consequences of an NGI verdict, and may erroneously believe that a defendant who is found NGI will be immediately released into society. Jurors who are under this mistaken impression, Shannon continues, may also fear that the defendant, if released, would pose a danger to the community. Shannon concludes that such jurors, in order to ensure that the defendant will not be released, may be tempted to return a guilty verdict in a case in which an NGI verdict would be appropriate.  Even assuming Shannon is correct that some jurors will harbor the mistaken belief that defendants found NGI will be released into society immediately"an as JN sumption that is open to debate noN  uB ԍWe are not convinced that jurors are as unfamiliar with the consequences of an NGI verdict as Shannon suggests. It may have been the "## case in 1957 that, in contrast to verdicts of guilty and not guilty, a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity ha[d] no ... commonly under uB stood meaning. Lyles v. United States, 254 F. 2d 725, 728 (CADC 1957) (en banc), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961 (1958). Today, however, there is no reason to assume that jurors believe that defendants found NGI are  uB# immediately set free. See Fisher, 10 F. 3d, at 122 ( [H]ighly publicized cases, such as that involving John Hinckley, have dramatized the possibility of civil commitment following an NGI verdict). See also  uBH Blume, 967 F. 2d, at 54 (Winter, J., concurring in result). FTN   XFrXFr ddf < "the jury in his caseN  "   was instructed to apply the law as [instructed] regardless of the consequence, and that punishment ... should not enter your consideration or discussion. That an NGI verdict was an option here gives us no reason to depart from the almost invariable assumption of the  J8 law that jurors follow their instructions. Richardson v.  J Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987). Indeed, although it may take effort on a juror's part to ignore the potential consequences of the verdict, the effort required in a case in which an NGI defense is raised is no different from that required in many other situations. For example, if the Government fails to meet its burden of proof at trial, our judicial system necessarily assumes that a juror will vote to acquit, rather than to convict, even if he is convinced the defendant is highly dangerous and should be incarcerated. We do not believe that the situation involving an NGI verdict should be treated any differently.  We also are not persuaded that the instruction Shannon proposes would allay the fears of the misinformed juror about whom Shannon is concerned. [I]f the members of a jury are so fearful of a particular defendant's release that they would violate their oaths by convicting [the defendant] solely in order to ensure that he is not set free, it is questionable whether they would be reassured by anything short of an instruction strongly suggesting that the defendant, if found NGI, would very likely be civilly committed for a lengthy  "    J period. United States v. Fisher, 10 F. 3d 115, 122  J (CA3 1993), cert. pending, No. 93!7000. An accurate instruction about the consequences of an NGI verdict, however, would give no such assurance. Under the IDRA, a postverdict hearing must be held within 40 days to determine whether the defendant should be released immediately into society or hospitalized. See 18 U.S.C. 4243(c), (d). Thus, the only mandatory period of confinement for an insanity acquittee is the period between the verdict and the hearing. Instead of encouraging a juror to return an NGI verdict, as Shannon predicts, such information might have the opposite effect"that is, a juror might vote to convict in order to eliminate the possibility that a dangerous  J defendant could be released after 40 days or less.*   uB8 ԍ FTN  &  XFrXFr ddf < As the court below observed, a jury could assume that due to overcrowded mental hospitals, strapped social services budgets, sympathetic judges, etc., a defendant will be released after only a short period of commitment. To combat the prospect of early release, the jury could simply opt to find him guilty. 981 F.2d, at 763, n. 6. Indeed, depending upon the content of the instruction, information regarding the consequences of an NGI verdict could influence a juror's decision in countless"and unpredictable"ways.  uB See, e. g., Fisher, supra, at 121!122, and n. 7 (describing various scenarios in which sentencing information could induce compromise verdicts in the NGI context).* Whether the instruction works to the advantage or disadvantage of a defendant is, of course, somewhat beside the point. Our central concern here is that the inevitable result of such an instruction would be to draw the jury's attention toward the very thing"the possible consequences of its verdict"it should ignore.  Moreover, Shannon offers us no principled way to limit the availability of instructions detailing the consequences of a verdict to cases in which an NGI defense is raised. Jurors may be as unfamiliar with other aspects of the criminal sentencing process as they are m "   with NGI verdicts. But, as a general matter, jurors are not informed of mandatory minimum or maximum sentences, nor are they instructed regarding probation, parole, or the sentencing range accompanying a lesser  J` included offense. See United States v. Thigpen, 4 F.3d 1573, 1578 (CA11 1993) (en banc), cert. pending, No.  J 93!6747; United States v. Frank, 956 F. 2d 872, 879 (CA9 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. ___ (1992). Because it is conceivable that some jurors might harbor misunderstandings with regard to these sentencing options, a district court, under Shannon's reasoning, might be obligated to give juries information regarding these possibilities as well. In short, if we pursue the logic of Shannon's position, the rule against informing jurors of the consequences of their verdicts would soon be swallowed by the exceptions.  Finally, Congress' recent action in this area counsels hesitation in invoking our supervisory powers. As noted above, the IDRA was the product of a thorough and exhaustive review of the insanity defense as used in the federal courts. Given the comprehensive nature of the task before it, Congress certainly could have included a provision requiring the instruction Shannon seeks. For whatever reason, Congress chose not to do so. Under these circumstances, we are reluctant to depart from wellestablished principles of criminal practice without more explicit guidance from Congress.  9H1 d dy7III؃  2  Although we conclude that the IDRA does not require an instruction concerning the consequences of an NGI verdict, and that such an instruction is not to be given as a matter of general practice, we recognize that an instruction of some form may be necessary under certain limited circumstances. If, for example, a witness or prosecutor states in the presence of the jury that a particular defendant would go free if found NGI, it "   may be necessary for the district court to intervene with an instruction to counter such a misstatement. The appropriate response, of course, will vary as is necessary to remedy the specific misstatement or error. We note this possibility merely so that our decision will not be misunderstood as an absolute prohibition on instructing the jury with regard to the consequences of an NGI verdict. Our observations in this regard are not applicable to Shannon's situation, however, for there is no indication that any improper statement was made in the presence of the jury during his trial. 5* * *  Because the District Court properly refused to give the instruction Shannon requested, we affirm. S  J GkSo ordered. S