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A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)@@EFinal Op  ##  ( ( ( (  X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:%i uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < An affiliated group of domestic corporations may, however, elect to file a consolidated federal tax return in lieu of separate returns.  uB  FTN  ,  XFrXFr ff 26 U.S.C.  ! 1501.>  Separate accounting poses the risk that a conglomerate will manipulate transfers of value among its components to minimize its total tax liability. To guard against such manipulation, transactions between affiliated corporations must be scrutinized to ensure that  J* they are reported on an arm's length basis, i.e., at a price reflecting their true market value. See 26 U.S.C.   ! 482; Treas. Reg.   ! 1.482!1T(b), 26 CFR 1.482!1T(b)  J (1993). J i uB? ԍEffective enforcement of arm's length standards  FTN  L XgEpXFr  ddf < requires exacting scrutiny by the taxing jurisdiction, and some commentators maintain that the results are arbitrary in any event. See 1 Hellerstein &  uBd Hellerstein, supra,   ! 8.03 (describing three inherent defects of separate accounting: compliance expense, impracticability, and the difficulty of arriving at arm's length prices).  Assuming that all transactions are assigned their arm's length values in the corporate accounts, a jurisdiction using separate accounting taxes corporations that operate within its borders only on the income those  J corporations recognize on their own books. See Con J tainer Corp., supra, at 185.Jni uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < Under the Internal Revenue Code, a foreign corporation reports only income derived from a United States source or otherwise effectively connected with the corporation's conduct of a United States trade or business. 26 U.S.C.  ! 881, 882, 884, 864(c). Domestic corporations must report all income, whether the source is domestic or foreign, 26 U.S.C.  ! 11, though they receive a taxT"## credit for qualifying taxes paid to foreign sovereigns. 26 U.S.C.   ! 901!908 (1988 ed. and Supp. IV). "  Ԍ At one time, a number of States used worldwide combined reporting, as California did during the years at issue. In recent years, such States, including California, have modified their systems at least to allow corporate election of some variant of an approach that confines combined reporting to the United States'  J  water's edge. See 1 Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra n. 1,   ! 8.16, pp. 8!185 to 8!187. California's 1986 modification of its corporate franchise tax, effective in 1988, 1986 Cal. Stats., ch. 660,  ! 6, made it nearly the last State to give way. 1 Hellerstein & Hellerstein,  JH supra n. 1,  ! 8.16, p. 8!187.  California corporate taxpayers, under the State's water's edge alternative, may elect to limit their combined reporting group to corporations in the unitary business whose individual presence in the United States surpasses a certain threshold. Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann.  { ! 25110 (West 1992); see Leegstra, Eager, & Stolte, The California Water'sEdge Election, 6 J. of St. Tax. 195 (1987) (explaining operation of California's water's edge system). The 1986 amendment conditioned a corporate group's water's edge election on payment of a substantial fee, and allowed the California Franchise Tax Board (Tax Board) to disregard a water's edge election under certain circumstances. In 1993, California again modified its corporate franchise tax statute, this time to allow domestic and foreign enterprises to elect water's edge treatment without payment of a fee and without the threat of disregard. 1993 Cal. Stats., ch. 31,  - ! 53; 1993 Cal. Stats., ch. 881,  4! 22. See Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann.  ! 25110 (West Supp. 1994). The new amendments became effective in January 1994.  ;H2 d"  Ԍd-C؃  2  The first of these consolidated cases, No. 92!1384, is a tax refund suit brought by two members of the Barclays Group, a multinational banking enterprise. Based in the United Kingdom, the Barclays Group includes more than 220 corporations doing business in some 60 nations. The two refundseeking members of the Barclays corporate family did business in California and were therefore subject to California's franchise tax. Barclays Bank of California (Barcal), one of the two taxpayers, was a California banking corporation wholly owned by Barclays Bank International Limited (BBI), the second taxpayer. BBI, a United Kingdom corporation, did business in the United Kingdom and in more than 33 other nations and territories.  In computing its California franchise tax based on 1977 income, Barcal reported only the income from its own operations. BBI reported income on the assumption that it participated in a unitary business composed of itself and its subsidiaries, but not its parent corporation and the parent's other subsidiaries. After auditing BBI's and Barcal's 1977 income year franchise tax returns, the Tax Board, respondent here, determined that both were part of a worldwide unitary business, the Barclays Group. Ultimately, the Board assessed additional tax  JJ liability of $1,678 for BBI and $152,420 for Barcal.YJi uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < The figures used by the Tax Board were:  i! XFrD, xLEz,  xWorldwide{(California ]x Taxableʱ*FormulaL4BusinessE=Franchise Taxpayerwx IncomeV(PercentageKL5IncomeʾE@Tax  L! D, xLEzD, xmz", , Barcalʣ x$401,566,973B*.0139032%J1$5,583,066Jm;$693,696 BBIʬ x 401,566,973B*.0003232%Ju4129,786Jm=16,126  uB  ! App. in No. 92!1384, p. A!13 ( FTN  6 D, xmz"XFr,  ff Joint Stipulation of Facts,  x! 22).Y  Barcal and BBI paid the assessments and sued for refunds. They prevailed in California's lower courts, but were unsuccessful in California's Supreme Court. The"   California Supreme Court held that the tax did not impair the Federal Government's ability to speak with  J one voice in regulating foreign commerce, see Japan  J Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S., at 449, and therefore did not violate the Commerce Clause. Having so concluded, the California Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeal for further development of Barclays' claim that the compliance burden on foreignbased multinationals imposed by California's tax violated both the Due Process Clause and the nondiscrimination requirement of the Commerce  JH Clause. Barclay's Bank Int'l, Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 2 Cal. 4th 708, 829 P. 2d 279, cert. denied, 506 U.S. ___ (1992). On remand, the Court of Appeal decided the compliance burden issues against Barclays, 10 Cal. App. 4th 1742, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537 (3d Dist. 1992), and the California Supreme Court denied further review. The case is therefore before us on writ of certiorari to the California Court of Appeal. 510 U.S. ___ (1993). Barclays has conceded, for purposes of this litigation, that the entire Barclays Group formed a worldwide  J unitary business in 1977._i uB   č FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < The petitioner in No. 92!1384, Barclays Bank PLC, is the successor in interest to the tax refund claims of both Barcal and BBI. For convenience, this opinion uses Barclays to refer collectively to the taxpayers and the petitioner in No. 92!1384._  The petitioner in No. 93!1839, ColgatePalmolive Co., is a Delaware corporation headquartered in New York. Colgate and its subsidiaries doing business in the United States engaged principally in the manufacture and distribution of household and personal hygiene products. In addition, Colgate owned some 75 corporations that operated entirely outside the UnitedStates; these foreign subsidiaries also engaged primarily in the manufacture and distribution of household and personal hygiene products. When Colgate filed California fran(l"  Ԯchise tax returns based on 1970!1973 income, it reported the income earned from its foreign operations on a separate accounting basis. Essentially, Colgate maintained that the Constitution compelled California to limit the reach of its unitary principle to the United States'  J8 water's edge. See supra, at 6. The Tax Board determined that Colgate's taxes should be computed on the basis of worldwide combined reporting, and assessed a  J 4year deficiency of $604,765.: i uB( ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < Colgate offered the following figures, using a water's edge approach: XFr|qE, 3 Water's edge q+ t2California Income Taxable@q)Formulaʝ3BusinessE=Franchise YearIncomeq'Percentage4IncomeʾE@Tax  X ! |qE|qu^!", , |qu^!"|q^!", , 1970J= $25,652,055q(9.31920%J/$2,390,566J^;$167,340 1971J 27,520,141q(9.01730%Jo02,481,574J4^<173,710 1972J 32,440,358q(9.21640%Jo02,989,833J4^<227,227 1973J 36,554,060q(8.88730%Jo03,248,669J4^<269,640  U\ No. 319715 (Super. Ct. Sacramento County, Apr. 19, 1989) (reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 92!1839, p. 85a). Under California's worldwide combined reporting method, the computations were:  ! |q^!"|qE, , ʉ Worldwide q+ t2California Income Taxable@q)Formulaʝ3BusinessE=Franchise YearIncomeq'Percentage4IncomeʾE@Tax |qE|qu^!", ,  p! |qu^!"|q^!", , 1970J $ 91,566,729q(4.42075%J/$4,047,936J^;$283,356 1971J= 108,177,612q(4.12017%Jo04,457,101J4^<311,997 1972J= 123,779,352q(4.03444%Jo04,993,803J4^<379,529 1973J= 151,585,860q(3.71812%Jo05,636,144J4^<467,800  uBm  m! Id FTN    |q^!"XFr,  ff ., at 84a.: Colgate paid the tax and sued for a refund.  Colgate prevailed in the California Superior Court, which found that the Federal Government had condemned worldwide combined reporting as impermissibly intrusive upon the Nation's ability uniformly to regulate foreign commercial relations. No. 319715 (Super. Ct. Sacramento County, Apr. 19, 1989) (reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 92!1839, pp. 88a102a). The Court "   of Appeal reversed, concluding that evidence of the federal Executive's opposition to the tax was insufficient. 4 Cal. App. 4th 1681, 1700!1712, 284 Cal. Rptr. 780, 792!800 (3d Dist. 1991). The California Supreme Court returned the case to the Court of Appeal with instructions to vacate its decision and to refile the opinion after modification in light of that Court's decision in  J Barclays. ___ Cal. 4th ___, 831 P. 2d 798 (1992). In its second decision, the Court of Appeal again ruled against Colgate. 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 761 (3d Dist. 1992). The California Supreme Court denied further review, and the case is before us on writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeal. 510 U.S. ___ (1993). Like Barclays, Colgate concedes, for purposes of this litigation, that during the years in question, its business, worldwide, was unitary.  9H1 d d,II؃  2  The Commerce Clause expressly gives Congress power [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States. U.S. Const., Art. I, 8, cl.3. It has long been understood, as well, to provide protection from state legislation inimical to the national commerce [even] where Congress has not acted ....  J& Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325  J U.S. 761, 769 (1945); see also South Carolina State  J Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 185 (1938) (Commerce Clause by its own force prohibits  J discrimination against interstate commerce). ni uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < Our jurisprudence refers to the selfexecuting aspect of the Commerce Clause as the dormant or negative Commerce Clause. The Clause does not shield interstate (or foreign) commerce  J6 from its fair share of the state tax burden. Depart J ment of Revenue of Washington v. Association of Wash J ington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 750 (1978). Absent congressional approval, however, a state tax on such commerce will not survive Commerce Clause  "   scrutiny if the taxpayer demonstrates that the tax either (1) applies to an activity lacking a substantial nexus to the taxing State; (2) is not fairly apportioned; (3)  J discriminates against interstate commerce; or (4) is not fairly related to the services provided by the State.  J8 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).  In the unique context of foreign commerce, a State's power is further constrained because of the special  J needfor federal uniformity. Wardair Canada, Inc. v.  Jp Florida Dept. of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).  ! `In international relations and with respect to foreign intercourse and trade the people of the United States act through a single government with unified and adequate  J national power.' !  Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los  J Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979), quoting Board of  J Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 59 (1933). A  JX tax affecting foreign commerce therefore raises two  J0 concerns in addition to the four delineated in Complete  J Auto. The first is prompted by the enhanced risk of  J multiple taxation. Container Corp., 463 U.S., at 185. The second relates to the Federal Government's capacity to  n ! `speak with one voice when regulating commercial  Jh relations with foreign governments.' !  Japan Line, 441  J@ U.S., at 449, quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976).  California's worldwide combined reporting system  J easily meets three of the four Complete Auto criteria.  J The nexus requirement is met by the business all three taxpayers"Barcal, BBI, and Colgate"did in California  JP during the years in question. See Mobil Oil Corp. v.  J( Commissioner of Taxes of Vt., 445 U.S. 425, 436!437  J (1980). %i uBh ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < Amicus curiae the Government of the United Kingdom points to  uB Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. ___ (1992), which held that the Commerce Clause demands more of a connection than the "## minimum contacts that suffice to satisfy the due process nexus requirement for assertion of judicial jurisdiction. Brief for Govern uB ment of United Kingdom as Amicus Curiae in No. 92!1384, pp. 24!25. Noting the absence of any meaningful contact between California and the activities of Barclays Group members operating  uB# exclusively outside the United States, id., at 25, the United Kingdom asserts that the trial court erred if it concluded that California  uB had the requisite nexus with every member of the Barclays group.  uBH Id., at 27 (emphasis added).  The trial court, however, did not reach the conclusion the United Kingdom suggests it did, nor was there cause for it so to do. As the United Kingdom recognizes, the theory underlying unitary taxation is that certain intangible `flows of value' within the unitary group serve to link the various members together as if they  uB were essentially a single entity. Id., at 26. Formulary apportionment of the income of a multijurisdictional (but unitary) business enterprise, if fairly done, taxes only the income generated within a  uB State. AlliedSignal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S., at ___ (1992) (slip op., at 12) (upholding unitary business principle as an appropriate means for distinguishing between income gener uB ated within a State and income generated without). Quill held  uB that the Commerce Clause requires a taxpayer's physical presence in the taxing jurisdiction before that jurisdiction can constitutionally impose a use tax. The California presence of the taxpayers before  uB us is undisputed, and we find nothing in Quill to suggest that California may not reference the income of corporations worldwide with whom those taxpayers are closely intertwined in order to approximate the taxpayers' California income. The fair apportionment standard is also  "   satisfied. Neither Barclays nor Colgate has demonstrated the lack of a rational relationship between the income attributed to the State and the intrastate values  J of the enterprise, Container Corp., 463 U.S., at 180!181 (internal quotation marks omitted); nor have the petitioners shown that the income attributed to California is out of all appropriate proportion to the business transacted by the [taxpayers] in that State. !   J Id., at 181 (internal quotation marks omitted). We note in this regard that, if applied by every jurisdiction, California's method would result in no more than all ofp  "    J the unitary business' income being taxed.  Id., at 169. And surely California has afforded Colgate and the Barclays taxpayers protection, opportunities and benefits for which the State can exact a return.  J` Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444  J8 (1940)); see ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S., at 315.  Barclays (but not Colgate) vigorously contends, however, that California's worldwide combined reporting scheme violates the antidiscrimination component of the  Jp Complete Auto test. Barclays maintains that a foreignowner of a taxpayer filing a California tax return is forced to convert its diverse financial and accounting records from around the world into the language, currency, and accounting principles of the United States at prohibitive expense. Brief for Petitioner in No.  J 92!1384, p. 44.R  i uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < Barclays estimates, and the trial court found, that an accounting system capable of conveying the information Barclays thought California's worldwide reporting scheme required for all of the enterprise's foreign affiliates would cost more than $5 million to set up, and more than $2 million annually to maintain. Brief for Petitioner in No. 92!1384, p. 44, n. 13; Nos. 325059 and 325061 (Super. Ct. Sacramento County, Aug. 20, 1987) (reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 92!1384, pp. A27 to A28).R Domesticowned taxpayers, by contrast, need not incur such expense because they already keep most of their records in English, in United States currency, and in accord with United States accounting  J principles.  Id., at 45. Barclays urges that imposing  J this prohibitive administrative burden, id., at 43, on foreignowned enterprises gives a competitive advantage to their U.S.owned counterparts and constitutes economic protectionism of the kind this Court has often  J condemned. Id., at 43!46.  Compliance burdens, if disproportionately imposed on outofjurisdiction enterprises, may indeed be inconso H "  Ԯ J nant with the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Hunt v.  J Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350!351 (1977) (increased costs imposed by North Carolina statute on outofstate apple producers would tend to shield the local apple industry from the competition of Washington apple growers, thereby discriminating against those growers). The factual predicate of Barclays' discrimination claim, however, is infirm.  Barclays points to provisions of California's implementing regulations setting out three discrete means for a taxpayer to fulfill its franchise tax reporting requirements. Each of these modes of compliance would require Barclays to gather and present much information not maintained by the unitary group in the ordinary  J course of business.A  i uB8 ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < Under the regulations to which Barclays refers, a unitary business with operations in foreign countries may determine its worldwide income based upon either (1) [a] profit and loss statement ... for each foreign branch or corporation, Cal. Code of Regs., Title 18, 25137!6(b)(1) (1985); (2) the consolidated profit and loss statement prepared for the related corporations of which the unitary business is a member which is prepared for filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Cal. Code of Regs., Title 18, 25137!6(b)(2); or (3) the consolidated profit and loss statement prepared for reporting to shareholders and subject to review by an  uB^ independent auditor. Ibid. A California's regulations, however, also provide that the Tax Board shall consider the effort and expense required to obtain the necessary information and, in appropriate cases, such as when the necessary data cannot be developed from financial records maintained in the regular course of business, may accept reasonable approximations. Cal. Code of Regs., Title 18, 25137!6(e)(1) (1985). As the Court of Appeal comprehended, in determining Barclays' 1977 worldwide income, Barclays and the Tax Board used these [latter] provisions and[made] computations based on reasonable approximations, 10 Cal. App. 4th 1742,m "   1756, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537, 545 (3d Dist. 1992), thus allowing Barclays to avoid the large compliance costs of  J which it complains.t i uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < The California Court of Appeal additionally found that Barclays' actual compliance costs were relatively modest during the years just prior to those here at issue, ranging from $900 to $1,250 per annum, for BBI. See 10 Cal. App. 4th, at 1760, n. 9, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at 548, n. 9.t Barclays has not shown that California's provision for reasonable approximations systematically overtaxes foreign corporations generally or BBI or Barcal in particular.  In sum, Barclays has not demonstrated that California's tax system in fact operates to impose inordinate compliance burdens on foreign enterprises. Barclays' claim of unconstitutional discrimination against foreign commerce therefore fails.  9H1 d dy,III؃  2  Barclays additionally argues that California's reasonable approximations method of reducing the compliance burden is incompatible with due process. Foreign multinationals, Barclays maintains, remain at peril in filing their tax returns because there is no standard to determine what `approximations' will be accepted. Brief for Petitioner in No. 92!1384, p. 49. Barclays presents no substantive grievance concerning the treatment it has  Jv received, i.e., no example of an approximation rejected by the Tax Board as unreasonable. Barclays instead complains that [t]he grant of standardless discretion itself violates due process, so that the taxpayer need  J not show actual harm from arbitrary application. Ibid.  We note, initially, that reasonableness is a guide admitting effective judicial review in myriad settings, from encounters between the police and the citizenry,  J6 see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (Fourth Amendment permits police officer's limited search for# "   weapons in circumstances where reasonably prudent man ... would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger based upon reasonable inferences ...draw[n] from the facts in light of [officer's] experience), to the more closely  J8 analogous federal income tax context. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. 162 (allowing deductions for ordinary business expenses, including a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation); 26 U.S.C. 167 (permitting a reasonable allowance for wear and tear as a deprecia Jp tion deduction); see also United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 522 (1942) (noting that determinations by reference to a standard of `reasonableness' [are] not unusual under federal income tax laws).  We next observe that California's judiciary has construed the California law to curtail the discretion of California tax officials. See 10 Cal. App. 4th, at 1762, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at 549 (the Tax Board must consider regularlymaintained or other readilyaccessibly corporate documents in deciding whether the cost and effort of producing [worldwide combined reporting] information justifies submission of reasonable approximations). We note, furthermore, that California has afforded Barclays the opportunity to clarify the meaning of the regulation[s] by its own inquiry, or by resort to an admin J istrative process. See Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,  J Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982). Taxpayers, under the State's scheme, may seek an advance determination from the Tax Board regarding the tax consequences of a proposed course of action. Cal. Code of Regs., Title 18, 25137!6(e)(2) (1985).  Rules governing international multijurisdictional income allocation have an inescapable imprecision given  J the complexity of the subject matter. See Container  J Corp., 463 U.S., at 192 (allocation bears some resem "  Ԯ J blance ... to slicing a shadow).J i uBh ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < As noted by the California Court of Appeal, even the federal separate accounting scheme preferred by Barclays entails recourse to a standard akin to reasonable approximation. 10 Cal. App. 4th 1742, 1763, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537, 550 (1993). The Internal Revenue Code allows the Secretary of Treasury to distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances among a controlled group of businesses if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of such businesses. 26 U.S.C. 482; see App. in No. 92!1384, p. A829 (testimony of Barclays' expert witness that 482 requires reasonable approxima uBE tion[s] of arm'slength prices); Peck v. Commissioner, 752 F. 2d 469, 472 (CA9 1985) (under 482, IRS determination of arm'slength prices will be sustained unless unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious).J Mindful that rules against vagueness are not mechanically applied but depend, in their application, on the nature of the  J enactment, Hoffman Estates, supra, at 498, we hold that California's scheme does not transgress constitutional limitations in this regard, and that Barclays' due process argument is no more weighty than its claim of discrimination first placed under a Commerce Clause heading.  9H1 d d,IV؃  2  ;H2 d d-A؃  B 2  Satisfied that California's corporate franchise tax is  JL  proper and fair as tested under Complete Auto's guides,  J$ see Container Corp., 463 U.S., at 184, we proceed to the additional scrutiny required when a State seeks to  J tax foreign commerce. Id., at 185. First of the two additional considerations is the enhanced risk of  J multiple taxation. Container Corp., 463 U.S., at 185.  J\  In Container Corp., we upheld application of California's combined reporting obligation to foreign  J  subsidiaries of domestic corporations, id., at 193 I "   (emphasis added), against a charge that such application unconstitutionally exposed those subsidiaries to a risk of  J multiple international taxation.4%i uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < We reserved judgment on whether an altered analysis would be required where the taxpayer was part of a foreignbased enterprise.  uB See Container Corp., 463 U.S., at 189, n. 26; id., at 195, n. 32.4 Barclays contends that its situation compels a different outcome, because application of the combined reporting obligation to foreign multinationals creates a  ! `more aggravated' risk ... of double taxation. Brief for Petitioner in No. 92!1384, p. 32, quoting Nos. 325059 and 325061 (Super. Ct. Sacramento County, Aug. 20, 1987) (reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 92!1384, p. A26). Barclays rests its argument on the observation that foreign multinationals typically have more of their operations and entities outside of the United States [compared to] domestic multinationals, which typically have a smaller share of their operations and entities outside of the  J United States. Id., at 33.  i uB5 ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < To illustrate, Barclays points to its own operations: only three of the more than 220 entities in the Barclays Group did any business in the United States. Brief for Petitioner in No. 92!1384, p. 33.  As a result, a higher proportion of the income of a foreign multinational is subject to taxation by foreign sovereigns. This reality, Barclays concludes, means that for the foreign multinational, which must include all its foreign operations in the California combined reporting group, the breadth of double taxation and the degree of burden on foreign commerce are greater than in the case of domestic  Jh multinationals. Ibid.  We do not question Barclays' assertion that multinational enterprises with a high proportion of income taxed by jurisdictions with wage rates, property values, and sales prices lower than California's face a correspondingly high risk of multiple international taxation. See"    J Container Corp., 463 U.S., at 187; cf. id., at 199!200 (Powell, J., dissenting) (describing how formulary apportionment leads to multiple taxation). Nor do we question that foreignbased multinationals have a higher proportion of such income, on average, than do their  J8 United States counterparts. But Container Corp.'s approval of this very tax, in the face of a multiple taxation challenge, did not rest on any insufficiency in the evidence that multiple taxation might occur; indeed, we accepted in that case the taxpayer's assertion that  Jp multiple taxation in fact had occurred. Id., at 187  JH ( [T]he tax imposed here, like the tax in Japan Line, has resulted in actual double taxation, in the sense that some of the income taxed without apportionment by foreign nations as attributable to appellant's foreign subsidiaries was also taxed by California as attributable to the State's share of the total income of the unitary business of which those subsidiaries are a part.); see  J0 also id., at 187, n. 22.  J  Container Corp.'s holding on multiple taxation relied on two considerations: first, that multiple taxation was  J not the inevitable result of the California tax;*i uB  ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < The Court stated: [T]he double taxation in this case, although real, is not the `inevitabl[e]' result of the California taxing scheme.... [W]e are faced with two distinct methods of allocating the income of a multinational enterprise. The `arm'slength' approach divides the pie on the basis of formal accounting principles. The formula apportionment method divides the same pie on the basis of a mathematical generalization. Whether the combination of the two methods results in the same income being taxed twice or in some portion of income not being taxed at all is dependent solely on  uB the facts of the individual case. Container Corp., 463 U.S., at 188 (internal citation omitted).* and, second, that the alternativ[e] reasonably available to  Jh the taxing State (i.e., some version of the separate  J@ accounting/ arm's length approach), id., at 188!189, could not eliminate the risk of double taxation andm "    J might in some cases enhance that risk. Id., at 191.&i uBh ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < The Court's decision in Container Corp. effectively modified, for  uB purposes of income taxation, the Commerce Clause multiple taxation  uB inquiry described in  FTN  3 XFrXFr ff Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979) (holding unconstitutional application of California's  uBD ad valorem property tax to cargo containers based in Japan and  uB used exclusively in foreign commerce). In Japan Line, confronting a property tax on containers used as "instrumentalities of [foreign] commerce," not an income tax on companies, we said that a state tax is incompatible with the Commerce Clause if it creates a  uB substantial risk of international multiple taxation. Id., at 451.  J  FTN  ,  XgEpXFr  ff We underscored that even though most nations have adopted the arm'slength approach in its general outlines, the precise rules under which they reallocate income among affiliated corporations often differ sub J8 stantially, and whenever that difference exists, the possi J bility of double taxation also exists.  Ibid. (emphasis  J added); see also id., at 192 ( California would have trouble avoiding multiple taxation even if it adopted the `arm'slength' approach ....).  These considerations are not dispositively diminished when California's tax is applied to the components of foreign, as opposed to domestic, multinationals. Multiple taxation of such entities because of California's  J scheme is not inevitable; the existence vel non of  J actual multiple taxation of income remains, as in Con J tainer Corp., dependent on the facts of the individual  JX case. Id., at 188. And if, as we have held, adoption of a separate accounting system does not dispositively lessen the risk of multiple taxation of the income  J Ԛearned by foreign affiliates of domesticĩowned corporations, we see no reason why it would do so in respect of  J the income earned by foreign affiliates of foreign!owned  Jh corporations. We refused in Container Corp. to require California to give up one allocation method that sometimes results in double taxation in favor of another allocation method that also sometimes results in double"    J taxation. Id., at 193. The foreign domicile of the taxpayer (or the taxpayer's parent) is a factor inadequate to warrant retraction of that position.  Recognizing that multiple taxation of international enterprise may occur whatever taxing scheme the State adopts, the dissent finds impermissible under the [dormant] Foreign Commerce Clause only double taxation that (1) burdens a foreign corporation, in need of protection for lack of access to the political process, and (2) occurs because [the State] does not conform to interna Jp tional practice. Post, at 5. But the image of a politically impotent foreign transactor is surely belied by the battalion of foreign governments that has marched to Barclays' aid, deploring worldwide combined reporting in diplomatic notes, amicus briefs, and even retaliatory  J legislation. See infra, at 26, n. 22; post, at 6. Indeed, California responded to this impressive political activity when it eliminated mandatory worldwide combined  J0 reporting. See supra, at 6. In view of this activity, and  J the control rein Congress holds, see infra, at 31!33, we cannot agree that international practice has such force as to dictate this Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence. We therefore adhere to the precedent set in  Jh Container Corp.   ;H2 d d-B؃  |2   We turn, finally, to the question ultimately and most energetically presented: Did California's worldwide combined reporting requirement, as applied to Barcal, BBI, and Colgate, impair federal uniformity in an area  J where federal uniformity is essential, Japan Line, 441 U.S., at 448; in particular, did the State's taxing scheme preven[t] the Federal Government from `speak Jn ing with one voice' in international trade? Id., at 453,  JF quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S., at 285.  =H3 d"  Ԍd-1؃  2  Two decisions principally inform our judgment: first,  J this Court's 1983 determination in Container Corp.; and  J second, our decision three years later in Wardair Can J ada, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1  Jj Ԛ(1986). Container Corp. held that California's worldwide combined reporting requirement, as applied to domestic corporations with foreign subsidiaries, did not violate  J the one voice standard. Container Corp. bears on Colgate's case, but not Barcal's or BBI's, to this extent:  J  [T]he tax [in Container Corp.] was imposed, not on a foreign entity ..., but on a domestic corporation. 463  JR U. S., at 195.JR  uB ԍ FTN  &  XFrXFr ddf < Container Corp. noted:   We recognize that the fact that legal incidence of a tax falls on a corporation whose formal corporate domicile is domestic might be less significant in the case of a domestic corporation that was owned by foreign interests. We need not decide here whether such a case would require us to alter our analysis. 463 U.S., at 195, n. 32. Other factors emphasized in Container  J* Corp., however, are relevant to the complaints of all three taxpayers in the consolidated cases now before  J us.  uB ԍ FTN  &  XFrXFr ddf < Container Corp. observed that the tax here does not create an  uBC automatic `asymmetry,' ... in international taxation, id., at  uB Ԛ194!195, quoting Japan Line, supra, at 453"i.e., it does not inevita uB bly lead to double taxation. See supra, at 19!20, and n. 17. Furthermore, Colgate, Barcal, and BBI are without a doubt amenable to be taxed in California in one way or another, and the amount of tax [they] pa[y] is much more the function of California's tax rate than of its allocation method. 463 U.S., at 195. Most significantly, the Court found no specific indications of congressional intent to preempt California's tax:  BQ bC  , , (  First, there is no claim here that the federal tax statutes themselves provide the necessary preemptive force. Second, although the United States is a party to a great number of tax treaties that require the Federal Government to adopt some form "   of `arm'slength' analysis in taxing the domestic income of multinational enterprises, that requirement is generally waived with respect to the taxes imposed by each of the contracting nations on its own domestic corporations.... Third, the tax treaties into which the United States has entered do not generally cover the taxing activities of subnational governmental units such as States, and in none of the treaties does the restriction on `nonarm'slength' methods of taxation apply to the States. Moreover, the Senate has on at least one occasion, in considering a proposed treaty, attached a reservation declining to give its consent to a provision in the treaty that would have extended that restriction to the States. Finally, ... Congress has long debated, but has not enacted, legislation de J signed to regulate state taxation of income. Id., at 196!197 (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted).  BQ 0d   ( , ,  The Court again confronted a one voice argument in  JD Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1 (1986), and there rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to Florida's tax on the sale of fuel to common carriers, including airlines. Air carriers were taxed on all aviation fuel purchased in Florida, without regard to the amount the carrier consumed within the State or the amount of its instate business. The carrier in  J, Wardair, a Canadian airline that operated charter flights to and from the United States, conceded that the  J challenged tax satisfied the Complete Auto criteria and entailed no threat of multiple international taxation.  J Joined by the United States as amicus curiae, however, the carrier urged that Florida's tax threaten[ed] the ability of the Federal Government to `speak with one voice.' 7 !  477 U.S., at 9. There is a federal policy, the carrier asserted, of reciprocal tax exemptions for aircraft, equipment, and supplies, including aviation fuel,"   that constitute the instrumentalities of international air traffic; this policy, the carrier argued, represents the statement that the `one voice' of the Federal Government wishes to make, a statement threatened by  J` [Florida's tax]. Ibid.  This Court disagreed, observing that the proffered evidence disclosed no federal policy of the kind described and indeed demonstrated that the Federal Government  J intended to permit the States to impose sales taxes on aviation fuel. The international convention and resolution and more than 70 bilateral treaties on which the carrier relied to show a United States policy of tax exemption for the instrumentalities of international air traffic, the Court explained, in fact indicated far less:  J  [W]hile there appears to be an international aspiration on the one hand to eliminate all impediments to foreign  J air travel"including taxation of fuel"the law as it presently stands acquiesces in taxation of the sale of  J0 that fuel by political subdivisions of countries. Id., at 10 (emphasis in original). Most of the bilateral agreements prohibited the Federal Government from imposing national taxes on aviation fuel used by foreign carriers, but none prohibited the States or their subdivisions from taxing the sale of fuel to foreign airlines. The Court concluded that [b]y negative implication arising out of [these international accords,] the United States has at least acquiesced in state taxation of fuel used by foreign carriers in international travel, and therefore  J upheld Florida's tax. Id., at 12.  Jx  In both Wardair and Container Corp., the Court considered the one voice argument only after determining that the challenged state action was otherwise constitu J tional. An important premise underlying both  J Ԛdecisions?J uB@ ԍ FTN  &  XFrXFr ddf < See also Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. ___@"## (1993) (slip op., at 14) (upholding Tennessee's tax on lease of cargo containers used exclusively in international shipping; because tax in question was not among those proscribed by various conventions, statutes and regulations[,] ... the most rational inference to be drawn is that th[e] tax, one quite distinct from the general class of import duties, is permitted).? is this: Congress may more passively indi"  Ԯ J cate that certain state practices do not  impair federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essen J tial, Japan Line, 441 U.S., at 448; it need not convey its intent with the unmistakable clarity required to permit state regulation that discriminates against inter J8 state commerce or otherwise falls short under Complete  J Auto inspection. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 139 (1986) (requiring an unambiguous indication of congressional intent to insulate otherwise invalid state legislation from judicial dormant Commerce  Jp ԚClause scrutiny); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of  JH Kent, 510 U.S. ___, ___, and n. 19 (1994) (slip op. at 17, and n. 19) (same).  =H3 d d-2؃  J4  4 2  As in Container Corp. and Wardair, we discern no specific indications of congressional intent to bar the state action here challenged. Our decision upholding  J California's franchise tax in Container Corp. left the ball in Congress' court; had Congress, the branch responsible for the regulation of foreign commerce, see U.S. Const., Art. I, 8, cl. 3, considered nationally uniform use of  JN separate accounting essential, Japan Line, supra, at 448, it could have enacted legislation prohibiting the States from taxing corporate income based on the worldwide combined reporting method. In the 11 years that  J have elapsed since our decision in Container Corp., Congress has failed to enact such legislation.  J^  In the past three decades"both before and after Con J6 tainer Corp."Congress, aware that foreign governments6"   were displeased with States' worldwide combined report J ing requirements,M uB@ ԍ FTN  &  XFrXFr ddf < The governments of many of our trading partners have expressed their strong disapproval of California's method of taxation,  uB as demonstrated by the amici briefs in support of Barclays from the Government of the United Kingdom, and from the Member States of the European Communities (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and the Governments of Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. Barclays has also directed our attention to a series of diplomatic notes similarly protest uB ing the tax. See, e.g., App. in No. 92!1384, pp. A!92 to A!123, A!127 to A!128, A!131 to A!138; see also p. A!603 (Letter from Secretary of State George Schultz to California Governor Deukmejian (Jan. 30, 1986)) ( The Department of State has received diplomatic notes complaining about state use of the worldwide unitary method of taxation from virtually every developed country in the world.). The British Parliament has gone further, enacting retaliatory legislation that would, if implemented, tax United States corporations on dividends they receive from their United Kingdom subsidiaries. See Finance Act, 1985, Pt. 2., ch. 1,  B! 54, and Sch. 13,   !  5 (Eng.), reenacted in Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988,  uB Pt. 18, ch. 3,  }! 812 and Sch. 30,  x! 20, 21 (Eng.). M has on many occasions studied  J Ԛstate taxation of multinational enterprises.c '  uB ԍ FTN  &  XFrXFr ddf < Pursuant to  7! 201 of Pub. L. 86!272, 73 Stat. 556, in which Congress undertook to make full and complete studies of all matters pertaining to the taxation ... of interstate commerce ... by the States, the House Committee on the Judiciary held extensive hearings on the (primarily domestic) implications of alternative tax apportionment schemes. See State Income Taxation of Mercantile and Manufacturing Corporations: Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). The Sub uB committee's comprehensive final Report recommended, inter alia, that formula apportionment be used as the sole method of dividing income among the States for tax purposes, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Report of the Special Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, House Committee on the Judiciary, H. R. Rep. No.952, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1144 (1965), and that States be required to refrain from taxing any foreign income exempt  uB from federal taxation. Id., at 1135. Congress, however, enacted no"## legislation embodying these recommendations.  Congress continued to study and debate this matter over the next two decades. See Interstate Taxation Act, H.R. 11798 and Companion Bills: Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Hearings before the Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce of the Senate Committee on Finance, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Interstate Taxation, S. 1273: Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. (1977!1978); Recommendations of the Task Force on Foreign Source Income, House Committee on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1977); State Taxation of Foreign Source Income, 1980: Hearings on H.R. 5076 before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); State Taxation of Interstate Commerce and Worldwide Corporate Income, Hearings on S. 983 and S. 1688 before the Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management Generally of the Senate Committee on Finance, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); Unitary Taxation: Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).c The nu"  Ԯmerous bills introduced have varied, but all would have prohibited the California reporting requirement here challenged. One group of bills would have prohibited States using combined reporting from compelling inclusion, in the combined reporting group, of corporate affiliates whose income was derived substantially from  J sources outside the United States.J uB{ ԍ FTN  &  XFrXFr ddf < See, e.  ! g., S. 1245, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 2173, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978); H. R. 6146, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); H.R. 4940, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); S. 3061, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); S. 1974, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 3980, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1986); S. 1139, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. 1775, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). Another set would have barred the States from requiring taxpayers to  J report any income that was not subject to federal in J come tax;%n uBM ԍ FTN  &  XFrXFr ddf < See, e.  ! g., H. R. 11798, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H. R. 5076, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 1688, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H. R. 8277, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H. R. 1983, 97th Cong., 1st"## Sess. (1981); H. R. 2918, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 1225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 1113, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). thus, foreign source income of foreign"   corporations ordinarily would not be reported. See  J supra, at 5, n. 5. None of these bills, however, was enacted.  The history of Senate action on a United States/United  J` Kingdom tax treaty, to which we referred in Container  J8 Corp., see 463 U.S., at 196, reinforces our conclusion  J that Congress implicitly has permitted the States to use the worldwide combined reporting method. As originally negotiated by the President, this treaty"known as the Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains"would have precluded States from requiring that United Kingdomcontrolled corporate taxpayers use combined reporting to compute their state income. See Art. 9(4), 31 U.S. T. 5670, 5677,  J ԚT.I.A.S. No. 9682.o  uB~ ԍ FTN  &  XFrXFr ddf < Article 9(4) would have provided:   Except as specifically provided in this Article, in determining the tax liability of an enterprise doing business in a Contracting State,  uB or in a political subdivision or local authority of a Contracting  uBZ State, such Contracting State, political subdivision, or local author uB ity shall not take into account the income, deductions, receipts, or outgoings of a related enterprise of the other Contracting State or of an enterprise of any third State related to any enterprise of the other Contracting State. (Emphasis added.) The Senate rejected this version of the treaty, 124 Cong. Rec. 18670 (1978), and  JX ultimately ratified the agreement, id., at 19076, subject to the reservation that the provisions of [Article 9(4)] ... shall not apply to any political subdivision or local  J authority of the United States. Id., at 18416. The final version of the treaty prohibited state tax discrimination against British nationals, Art. 2(4), 31 U.S.T.  Jh 5671; Art. 24, id., at 5687!5688,lnnhm  uB ԍ FTN  &  XFrXFr ddf < Article 2(4) provides: For the purpose of Article 24 (Nondiscrimination), this Convention shall also apply to taxes of every kindd"## and description imposed by each Contracting State, or by its political subdivisions or local authorities.l but did not requireh"   States to use separate accounting or water's edge appor J tionment of income. Id., at 5709.  Given these indicia of Congress' willingness to tolerate States' worldwide combined reporting mandates, even when those mandates are applied to foreign corporations and domestic corporations with foreign parents, we cannot conclude that the foreign policy of the United States"whose nuances ... are much more the province of the Executive Branch and Congress than of this  J Court"is [so] seriously threatened, Container Corp.,  Jp supra, at 196, by California's practice as to warrant our  JH intervention.uH  uB ԍ FTN  &  XFrXFr ddf < That federal law has long embodied a preference for the arm's length method, in the sense that this method is used in computing the federal income tax liability of multinational corporations, does not render a State's use of a different method unconstitutional, as  uB the Solicitor General points out. Brief for United States as Amicus  uB Curiae, pp. 17!18 (emphasis in original), citing Mobil Oil Corp. v.  uBh Commissioner of Taxes of Vt., 445 U.S. 425, 448 (1980) ( Concurrent federal and state taxation of income, of course, is a wellestablished norm. Absent some explicit directive from Congress, we cannot infer that treatment of foreign income at the federal level mandates identical treatment by the States.).u This Court has no constitutional authority to make the policy judgments essential to regulating foreign commerce and conducting foreign affairs. Matters relating to the conduct of foreign relations ... are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial in JX quiry or interference. !  Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952). For this reason, Barclays' and  J its amici's argument that California's worldwide combined reporting requirement is unconstitutional because it is likely to provoke retaliatory action by foreign gov J ernmentsz%  uBC ԍSee, e.g., Brief for Petitioner in No. 92!1384, pp. 25!28; Brief forC"##  uB Government of United Kingdom as Amicus Curiae in No. 92!1384, pp. 19!24; Brief for Member States of European Communities et al., as  uB Amici Curiae in No. 92!1384, pp. 16!17.z is directed to the wrong forum. The judi"  Ԯciary is not vested with power to decide how to balance a particular risk of retaliation against the sovereign right of the United States as a whole to let the States  J tax as they please. Container Corp., 463 U.S., at 194.  =H3 d d-3؃  2  To support its argument that California's worldwide combined reporting method impermissibly interferes with the Federal Government's ability to speak with  JV one voice, and to distinguish Container Corp., Colgate points to a series of Executive Branch actions, state J ments, and amicus filings, made both before and after  J our decision in Container Corp.p  uBk ԍ FTN  &  XFrXFr ddf < Colgate cites, for example, President Reagan's decision to introduce legislation confining States to a water's edge method, State Taxation of Multinational Corporations, 21 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 1368 (Nov. 8, 1985) (Statement of President Reagan); letters sent by members of the Reagan and Bush administrations to the Governor of California and the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, expressing the Federal Government's opposition to worldwide combined reporting, App. in No.92!1839, pp. 9!27; and  uB# Department of Justice amicus briefs filed in this Court, arguing that the worldwide combined reporting method violates the dormant  uB Commerce Clause, e.g., Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in  uBH Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., O.T. 1982, No. 81!349, cert. dismissed, 463 U.S. 1220 (1983); Brief for United  uB States as Amicus Curiae in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax  uBm Bd. of Cal., O.T. 1992, No.92!212, cert. denied, 506 U.S. ___ (1992). Colgate contends that, taken together, these Executive pronouncements constitute a clear federal directive proscribing States' use of worldwide combined reporting. Brief for Peti J> tioner in No. 92!1839, p. 36, quoting Container Corp.,  J supra, at 194.%"  Ԍ J  The Executive statements to which Colgate refers, however, cannot perform the service for which Colgate would enlist them. The Constitution expressly grants Congress, not the President, the power to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations. U.S. Const., Art. I.,  J8   ! 8, cl. 3. As we have detailed, supra, at 25!29, and nn. 23!27, Congress has focused its attention on this issue, but has refrained from exercising its authority to prohibit statemandated worldwide combined reporting. That the Executive Branch proposed legislation to outlaw a state taxation practice, but encountered an unreceptive Congress, is not evidence that the practice interfered with the Nation's ability to speak with one voice, but is rather evidence that the preeminent speaker  J decided to yield the floor to others. Cf. Itel Containers  J Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. ___, ___ (1993) (slip  J op., at 4) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ( [The President] is better able to decide than we are which state regulatory interests should currently be subordinated to our national interest in foreign commerce. Under the Constitution, however, neither he nor we were to make that decision, but only the Congress.).  Congress may delegate very large grants of its power over foreign commerce to the President, who also possesses in his own right certain powers conferred by the Constitution on him as CommanderinChief and as  J the Nation's organ in foreign affairs. Chicago & South J ern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109 (1948). We need not here consider the scope of the President's power to preempt state law pursuant to authority delegated by a statute or a ratified treaty; nor do we address whether the President may displace state law pursuant to legally binding executive agree"  Ԯ J ments with foreign nations uBh ԍ FTN  &  XFrXFr ddf < See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331!332 (1937). made in the absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, [where] he can only rely upon his own independent  J powers. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). The Executive Branch actions"press releases, letters, and  J amicus briefs"on which Colgate here relies are merely precatory. Executive Branch communications that express federal policy but lack the force of law cannot render unconstitutional California's otherwise valid, congressionally condoned, use of worldwide combined  JH reporting.  (H G uBg ԍ FTN  &  XFrXFr ddf < The Solicitor General suggests that when a court analyzes whether a state tax impairs the federal government's ability to speak with one voice ... the statements of executive branch officials are entitled to substantial evidentiary weight, Brief for United  uBC States as Amicus Curiae, p.19, but he argues that the constitutionality of a State's taxing practice must be assessed according to the federal policy, if any, in effect at the time the challenged taxes were assessed. He asserts that federal officials had not articulated a policy opposing use by the States of worldwide combined reporting prior to the mid1980's, and urges the Court to affirm the judgments below on the ground that California's use of worldwide combined reporting was not unconstitutional during the years here at issue, even if it became unconstitutional in later years (a question on which he takes no position, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 38!41). Colgate, on the other hand, suggests that the relevant time frame is when the tax is definitively enforced by the state taxing authority, through judicial proceedings if necessary, not when the tax technically accrues under state law, Reply Brief for Petitioner in No. 92!1839, p. 7, and argues in the alternative that a federal policy opposing combined worldwide reporting had been established as of 1970!1973,  uB id., at 9. We need not resolve this dispute, because we have concluded that the Executive statements criticizing States' use of worldwide combined reporting do not, in light of Congress' acquiescence in the States' actions, authorize judicial intervention here. i)* * * o "  Ԍ The Constitution does   ! `not make the judiciary the  J overseer of our government.' !  Dames & Moore v.  J ԚRegan, 453 U.S. 654, 660 (1981), quoting Youngstown  J Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra, at 594 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Having determined that the taxpayers before us had an adequate nexus with the State, that worldwide combined reporting led to taxation which was fairly apportioned, nondiscriminatory, fairly related to the services provided by the State, and that its imposition did not result inevitably in multiple taxation, we leave it to Congress"whose voice, in this area, is the Nation's"to evaluate whether the national interest is best served by tax uniformity, or state autonomy. Accordingly, the judgments of the California Court of Appeal are  J `z;Affirmed.ă