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A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)@@Final Other  ##  ( ( ` `  #\  PCsP# dd_P  <  i   SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES  uB< * ` ` ( ( *(  _Pdd #[ P['CdP# I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)-#[ P['CdP# ( ( , , ) (c C No. 92!854 ) !   J Z #o P['Cn&P# ddh  %j uB  ddh < #[ P['CdP#/&92!854"DISSENT  uBn  CENTRAL BANK v. FIRST INTERSTATE BANK%k uB  ddh < #[ P['CdP#/&92!854"DISSENT  uBn  CENTRAL BANK v. FIRST INTERSTATE BANK`B؃ C CENTRAL BANK OF DENVER, N. A., PETITIONER  J  v. FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF DENVER, N. A.  J %and JACK K. NABER o  hhx  on writ of certiorari to the united states court  of appeals for the tenth circuit % hxf #[ P['CdP# d [April 19, 1994] -,   #o P['Cn&P#  Jv  $Footnotes#[ P['CdP# ff X01Í Í01Í Í , , #o P['Cn&P#X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8: of a provision explicitly covering them. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce,  uB Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S., at 394 ( Having concluded that exchanges can be held accountable for breaching their statutory duties to enforce their own rules prohibiting price manipulation, it necessarily follows that those persons who are participants in a conspiracy to manipulate the market in violation of those rules are also subject to suit by futures traders who can prove injury from these violations).  Allowing aider and abettor claims in private   ! 10(b) actions can hardly be said to impose unfair legal duties on those whom Congress has opted to leave unregulated: Aiders and abettors of  Y! 10(b) and Rule "    J 10b!5 violations have always been subject to criminal liability under 18 U.S.C.  !! 2. See 15 U.S.C.  ! 78ff (criminal liability for willful violations of securities statutes and rules promulgated under them). Although the Court canvasses policy arguments against aider and  J8 abettor liability, ante, at 24!25, it does not suggest that the aiding and abetting theory has had such deleterious consequences that we should dispense with it on those  J grounds. oi uB( ԍ FTN  &  XFrXFr ddf < Indeed, the Court anticipates, ante at 27, that many aiders and abettors will be subject to liability as primary violators. For example, an accountant, lawyer, or other person making oral or written misrepresentations (or omissions, if the person owes a duty to the  uB injured purchaser or seller, cf. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654!655 (1983)) in connection with the purchase or sale of securities may be  uBr liable for a primary violation of 10(b) and Rule 10b!5. See, e.g.,  uB) W. O. Akin v. QL Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 525!526 (CA5 1992). The agency charged with primary responsibility for enforcing the securities laws does not perceive such drawbacks, and urges retention of the private right to sue aiders and abettors. See Brief for the Securities  J and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents 5!17.  As framed by the Court's order redrafting the questions presented, this case concerns only the existence and scope of aiding and abetting liability in suits brought by private parties under  g! 10(b) and Rule 10b!5. The majority's rationale, however, sweeps far beyond even those important issues. The majority leaves little doubt that the Exchange Act does not even permit the  J Commission to pursue aiders and abettors in civil enforcement actions under  F! 10b and Rule 10b!5. See  Jh ante, at 12 (finding it dispositive that the text of the 1934 Act does not itself reach those who aid and abet a   ! 10(b) violation). Aiding and abetting liability has a long pedigree in civil proceedings brought by the SEC under   ! 10(b) and Rule 10b!5, and has become an im  "  Ԯportant part of the Commission's enforcement  J Ԛarsenal. i uB@ ԍ FTN  &  XFrXFr ddf < See, e.g., SEC v. Coffey, 493 F. 2d 1304, 1316 (CA6 1974); Ruder, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev., at 625!626, nn.124 and 125. The Commission reports that it asserted aiding and abetting claims in fifteen percent of its civil enforcement proceedings in fiscal year 1992, and that elimination of aiding and abetting liability would sharply diminish the effectiveness of Commission actions. Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae 18, n.15. Moreover, the majority's approach to aiding and abetting at the very least casts serious doubt, both  J for private and SEC actions, on other forms of secondary liability that, like the aiding and abetting theory, have long been recognized by the SEC and the courts but are  J not expressly spelled out in the securities statutes. qi uBy ԍ & ! The Court's rationale would sweep away the decisions recognizing  uB0 that a defendant may be found liable in a private action for conspiring  uB to violate  2 ! 10(b) and Rule 10b!5. See, e.g., U.S. Industries, Inc. v.  uB Touche Ross & Co., 854 F. 2d 1223, 1231 (CA10 1988); SEC v. Coffey,  uBU 493 F. 2d 1304, 1316 (CA6 1974); Ferguson v. Omnimedia, Inc., 469 F.  uB  2d 194, 197!198 (CA1 1972); Shell v. Hensley, 430 F. 2d 819, 827 n.13  uB (CA5 1970); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F. 2d 262, 267, n.2  uBz (CA7), cert denied sub nom. Bard v. Dasho, 389 U.S. 977 (1967). See generally Kuehnle, 14 J. Corp. L., at 343!348. Secondary liability is as old as the implied right of action under  q! 10(b) itself; the very first decision to recognize a private cause of action under the section and  uBV rule, Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (ED Pa. 1946),  uB  involved an alleged conspiracy. See also Fry v. Schumaker, 83 F. Supp. 476, 478 (ED Pa. 1947) (Kirkpatrick, C. J.). In addition, many courts, concluding that  ! 20(a)'s controlling person provisions, 15 U.S.C.  w ! 78t, are not the exclusive source of secondary liability under the Exchange Act, have imposed liability in 10(b) actions based upon  uB respondeat superior and other commonlaw agency principles. See, e.g.,  uBW Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F. 2d 1564, 1576!1577 and n.27 (CA9 1990) (en banc) (citing and following decisions to this effect from six other circuits). See generally Kuehnle, 14 J. Corp. L., at 350!376. These decisions likewise appear unlikely to survive the Court's decision.  uB3 See ante, at 20. The principle the Court espouses today"that liability may not be imposed on parties who are not within the  "   scope of   ! 10(b)'s plain language"is inconsistent with longestablished Commission and judicial precedent.  As a general principle, I agree, the creation of new rights ought to be left to legislatures, not courts.  J` Musick, Peeler, 508 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 5). But judicial restraint does not always favor the narrowest possible interpretation of rights derived from federal statutes. While we are now properly reluctant to recognize private rights of action without an instruction from Congress, we should also be reluctant to lop off rights of action that have been recognized for decades, even if the judicial methodology that gave them birth is now out of favor. Caution is particularly appropriate here, because the judicially recognized right in question accords with the longstanding construction of the agency Congress has assigned to enforce the securities laws. Once again the Court has refused to build upon a  <! `secure founda JX tion ... laid by others,' !  Patterson v. McLean Credit  J0 Union, 491 U.S. 164, 222 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 149 (1921)).  I respectfully dissent.