WPCH 2DB5Rc Z3|oNew Century SchoolbookNew Century Schoolbook Italic"m^36Gff%==\o3=33ffffffffff33oooQzKfzztzp=o=o\%ffQi\=bp:6m:p\ifQUGpbbbX=o=o=3============i:fffffQ\\\\K:K:K:K:p\\\\ppppbfi\\b\zifffQQQQi\\\\bbbbbbppK:K:K:K:fmz:z:z:z:z:pppp\\QQQtUtUtUtUzGzGzGppppppbpXpXpXiz:pQtUzGbbi\pNo3o\6QNNfff=7f=f=%GGf//\\pp%G=ooee3o<P#)  dd^_  R SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATESА*(  ^_dd #T P[:+AdP# <<  I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)Final OpFinal Opinion Formatr   #  ( (   X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:P#x X )  dd^_ SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATESА*(  ^_dd #T P[:+AdP# <<  I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)5 EllipsisParagraph EllipsisD;X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:P# Justice Stevens#e P['C|P# 14Circulated: _______________________________ 14Recirculated: _____________________________ "m^AE[¾0NNuANAAAAh_ܾ夤NNu0huN}JEJϏuhl[}}}pNNNANN'NNNNNNNNNNJ麨huuuu_J_J_J_Juuuu}uu}uhhhhuuuu}}}}}}_J_J_J_JJJJJJuu¨hhhllll[[[嶤}pppJhl[}}uNAuEhccNFÂNN0[[<<uu0[NэA'MM捍]@s:`捍fsѨ`sfszNMϏzsffzfMMfffffffMMMMMMMMMMMMNN"m^*,:SS}z22K[*2**SSSSSSSSSS**[[[Collluldu}=Sudzudul_dzljj\2[2[KSSCVK2Q\/,Y/\KVSCE:\QuQQH2[2[2*222222222222V/lSlSlSlSlSwlClKlKlKlK=/=/=/=/z\uKuKuKuKz\z\z\z\jQlSuVuKuKjQuKdVlSlSlSlClClClCuVlKlKlKlKuQuQuQuQuQuQ}\}\=/=/=/=/SuYd/d/d/d/d/z\z\z\z\uKuK}lClClC_E_E_E_Ed:d:d:z\z\z\z\z\z\ujQ\H\H\HuVd/z\lC_Ed:jQjQuVuKz\N[*[K,C@@SSS2-}}S2ooS}2::S''KK\\:2[[RRk*[11RRRkskk[ZZ<[){kJ%>gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR2:cB-c0c4ck7"m^*2gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR"m^)+9RRzx11IY)1))RRRRRRRRRR))YYYAljjjrjbrz>RRR1,zzR1llRz199R&&IIZZ91YYQQi)Y00QQQiqiiYXX;Y(yiH$<euXXqiiii@yqqqXXaHQQQiiij]bQXcA c"E"m^?DY/LLr?L????e]غࡡLLr/erL{HDHˌrejY{{{nLLL?LL&LLLLLLLLLLH䶥errrr]H]H]H]Hrrrr{rr{reeeerrrr{{{{{{]H]H]H]HHHHHHrr侥eeejjjjYYYಡ{nnnHejY{{rN?rDeaaLELL/YY;;rr/YLъ}}?&KK}}}ኊ[?q8^ኊdq}}}ѥ}^qdqwLK}}ˌwq}}}ddw}dKK}dddddddKKKKKKKKKKKK}}}}}}}LL}&)o=3no P['C&P&4NA> P['CP&u![2*d[ P['CP u![2*[e xzCX&r!Y1)LY P['CP)o=3no P['C&P)o=3Roe xzC&X&3L? P['CP&UC%D4C P['CJP&F66 P['CP"m^!+==\Z%%7C%==========CCC1QOOOVOIV\-=VIhZVIVOEIZOlMMC%C%C7==1?7%;C#!A#bC7?=13+C;V;;5%C%C%%%n%%%%%%%%%%?#O=O=O=O=O=nXO1O7O7O7O7-#-#-#-#ZCV7V7V7V7ZCZCZCZCM;O=V?V7V7M;V7I?O=O=O=O1O1O1O1V?O7O7O7O7V;V;V;V;V;V;\C\C-#-#-#-#=VAI#I#I#I#I#ZCZCZCZCV7V7n\O1O1O1E3E3E3E3I+I+I+ZCZCZCZCZCZClVM;C5C5C5V?I#ZCO1E3I+M;M;V?V7ZCNCC7!1//===%!\\=%QQ=\%++=n77nCCn+n%CC<HYYY66^E@@@@(JEEE66;,1N11@@@A9<16%7,7(7,A6C/A1>1P7A/:,A1E12156(7(>4E/A1H>E>9(6144>986@9999999999999999999(((((((666666666666666666661111111444444444444>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>A7AA>E>12H Opin InitЊ #  (( (     П I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a) Final Other  ##  ( ( ( (  # P['A>P#)  dd^_  R SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATESА uB  -(  ^_dd #T P[:+AdP# <<  I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)-#[ P['CdP# ( ( , , ) C  (9 C No. 91!1826 ) !   J  #o P['Cn&P# ddd < %i<| uB  ddd < #[ P['CdP#"&91!1826"DISSENT  uBn  RENO v. CATHOLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, INC.%j<| uB  ddd < #[ P['CdP#"&91!1826"DISSENT  uBn  RENO v. CATHOLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, INC.`B؃ C JANET RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al.,  J 3 PETITIONERS v. CATHOLIC SOCIAL  J " SERVICES, INC., et al.   on writ of certiorari to the united states court  of appeals for the ninth circuit &#[ P['CdP# d [June 18, 1993] -,   #o P['Cn&P#  J gFootnotes#[ P['CdP# dd X01Í Í(01Í Í , , #o P['Cn&P#X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:< BQ d "  Ԍ J  ( , , Our decision in the Jacksonville case is well supported by precedent; the Court's ripeness holding today is notable for its originality.  Though my approach to the ripeness issue differs from  J` that of Justice O'Connor, we are in agreement in concluding that respondents' claims are ripe for adjudication. We also agree that the validity of the relief provided by the District Courts, in the form of extended application periods, turns on whether that remedy is consistent with  J congressional intent. See ante, at 10 (opinion concurring  Jp in judgment); American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 557!558 (1974) (equitable relief must be  J  consonant with the legislative scheme); Weinberger v.  J RomeroBarcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982) (courts retain broad equity powers to enter remedial orders absent clear  J statutory restriction); INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 883 (1988) (courts of equity bound by statutory require JX ments). Where I differ from Justice O'Connor is in my determination that extensions of the application period in this case were entirely consistent with legislative intent, and hence well within the authority of the District Courts.  It is no doubt true that [w]hen Congress passes a benefits statute that includes a time period, it has two  Jh goals. See ante, at 9 (opinion concurring in judgment). Here, Congress' two goals were finality in its onetime amnesty program, and the integration of productive aliens  J into the American mainstream. See Perales v. Thorn J burgh, 967 F.2d 798, 813 (CA2 1992). To balance both ends, and to achieve each, Congress settled on a 12month application period. Twelve months, Congress determined, would be long enough for frightened aliens to come to understand the program and to step forward with applications, especially when the full period was combined with"   the special outreach efforts mandated by the Reform Act.  J Ibid.; see 8 U.S.C.  ! 1255a(i) (requiring broad dissemination of information about amnesty program); 8 U.S.C.   ! 1255a(c)(2) (establishing QDEs). The generous 12month period would also serve the goal of finality, by   `ensur[ing] true resolution of the problem and ... that the program will be a onetimeonly program.'   967 F.2d, at 813 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 99!682, pt 1, p. 72 (1986).  The problem, of course, is that the full 12month period was never made available to respondents. For the CSS class, the 12month period shrank to precisely 12 days during which they were eligible for legalization; for the  J LULAC class, to roughly 5 months. See supra, at 1. Accordingly, congressional intent required an extension of the filing deadline, in order to make effective the 12month application period critical to the balance struck by  J Congress. See 956 F.2d, at 922; Perales, 967 F.2d, at 813.  That congressional intent is furthered, not frustrated, by the equitable relief granted here distinguishes this case  J from Pangilinan, supra, in which we held that a court lacked the authority to order naturalization for certain persons after expiration of a statutory deadline. 486  Jh U.S., at 882!885. In Pangilinan, we were faced with a congressional command [that] could not be more mani J fest specifically precluding the relief granted. Id., at 884. The Reform Act, on the other hand, contains no such  J explicit limitation.J l uB0 ԍ   XgEpXFrThere is no language in the Reform Act prohibiting an extension of the application period. Section 1255a(f)(2), relied on by the Government, see  uB Brief for Petitioners 28!29, precludes review of individual latefiled applications; like  O! 1255a(f)(1), it has no bearing on the kind of broad uB  based challenge and remedy at issue here. See ante, at 11!12; ante, at 7!8 (opinion concurring in judgment). Indeed, the Reform Act does not itself contain a statutory deadline at all, leaving it largely to the Attorney General to delineate a 12month period. x"   8 U.S.C.  \! 1255a(a)(1)(A). This delegation highlights the relative insignificance to Congress of the application cutoff date, as opposed to the length of the application period  J itself. See Perales, 967 F.2d, at 813, n. 4.  Finally, I can see no reason to limit otherwise available relief to those class members who experienced frontdesking, on the theory that they have applied for  J legalization. Cf. ante, at 23, n. 29; ante, at 10 (opinion concurring in judgment). It makes no sense to condition relief on the filing of a futile application. Indeed, we have already rejected the proposition that such an application is necessary for receipt of an equitable remedy. In  J Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), a case involving discriminatory employment practices under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, we held that those who had been deterred from applying for jobs by an employer's practice of rejecting applicants like themselves were eligible for relief along with those who had unsuccessfully applied. We reasoned:  *BQ d  , , (  A consistently enforced discriminatory policy can surely deter job applications from those who are aware of it and are unwilling to subject themselves to the humiliation of explicit and certain rejection. N N  ... When a person's desire for a job is not translated into a formal application solely because of his unwillingness to engage in a futile gesture he is as much a victim of discrimination as is he who goes through the motions of submitting an application. 431 U.S., at 365!366.YY BQ d   ( , , The same intelligent principle should control this case. A respondent who can show that she would have applied for legalization but for the invalid regulations is in a position analogous to that of an applicant, and entitled to the same relief. See 431 U.S., at 368.  In my view, then, the Court of Appeals was correct on both counts when it affirmed the District Court orders inP "   this case: Respondents' claims were justiciable when filed, and the relief ordered did not exceed the authority of the District Courts. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.