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A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)Final Other  ##  ( ( ( (  # P['A>P#')  dd^_  R SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATESА uB  8(  ^_dd #T P[:+AdP# <<  I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)-#[ P['CdP# ( ( , , 4 C  39 C No. 91!1030 4 !   J &| #o P['Cn&P# ddd < Ӌ%gb uB  ddd < #[ P['CdP#-91!1030"CONCUR/DISSENT  uBn C/WITHROW v. WILLIAMS%hb uB  ddd < #[ P['CdP#-91!1030"CONCUR/DISSENT  uBn C/WITHROW v. WILLIAMS`Q؃ C PAMELA WITHROW, PETITIONER v. ROBERT  J /ALLEN WILLIAMS, Jr.    on writ of certiorari to the united states court ( of appeals for the sixth circuit 0#[ P['CdP# d [April 21, 1993] -,   #o P['Cn&P#  J gFootnotes#[ P['CdP# dd X01Í Í01Í Í , , #o P['Cn&P#X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8: cause for arrest; not in custody), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 929 (1988); Cobb  uB v. Perini, 832 F.2d 342, 345!347 (CA6 1987) (investigatory Terry!stop;  uB not in custody), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1024 (1988); Leviston v. Black, 843 F.2d 302, 304 (CA8) (injail interview initiated by incarcerated defendant;  uB no custody), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 865 (1988); Cordoba v. Hanrahan, 910 F.2d 691, 693!694 (CA10) (drunk driver questioned at accident scene before arrest; not in custody), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1014 (1990).  whe J ther or not there was interrogation,Y h uB ԍSee, e.   g.,    XgEpXFrEndress v. Dugger, 880 F.2d 1244, 1246!1250 (CA11 1989) (defendant volunteered information without questioning), cert. denied,  uB 495 U.S. 904 (1990); United States ex rel. Church v. De Robertis, 771 F.2d 1015, 1018!1020 (CA7 1985) (placing defendant's brother in cell  uB with him not interrogation); Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870, 873!875 (CA5) (en banc) (officer's surprised exclamation, What is this? upon finding condom filled with white powder, constituted interrogation), cert.  uB denied, 449 U.S. 880 (1980); Phillips v. Attorney General of California, 594 F.2d 1288, 1290!1291 (CA9 1979) (defendant volunteered information after officer stated that he wished to see interior of defendant's plane).Y whether warnings  J` were given or were adequate,n`h uB ԍ   See, e.   g., XgEpXFrChambers v. Lockhart, 872 F.2d 274, 275!276 (CA8) (omission of right to free appointed counsel), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 938  uB: (1989); Gates v. Zant, 863 F.2d 1492, 1500!1501 (CA11) (no warning that videotape of confession could be used), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 945 (1989);  uB Crespo v. Armontrout, 818 F.2d 684, 685!686 (CA8) (when and whether  uB_ warnings were given), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 978 (1987); De La Rosa v.  uB Texas, 743 F.2d 299, 301!302 (CA5 1984) (officer's explanation of the warnings alleged to be misleading), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1065 (1985);"##  uB Stanley v. Zant, 697 F.2d 955, 972 (CA11 1983) (allegedly misleading waiver form), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1219 (1984). whether the defendant's`"    J equivocal statement constituted an invocation of rights,Jh uB ԍ   See, e.   g., Bobo v. Kolb, 969 F.2d 391, 395!398 (CA7 1992) (standing  uB mute); Christopher v. Florida, 824 F.2d 836, 841!843 (CA11 1987) (equivocal invocation of right to silence), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1077!1078  uB (1988); Lightbourne v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012, 1017!1019 (CA11 1987) (spontaneous resumption of discussion after cutting off questioning), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 934 (1988).  J whether waiver was knowing and intelligentHh uB ԍ   See, e.   g., XgEpXFrTerrovona v. Kincheloe, 912 F. 2d 1176, 1179!1180 (CA9 1990) (validity of implied waiver in light of defendant's background,  uBf experience, and conduct), cert. denied, 499 U.S. ___ (1991); Fike v.  uB James, 833 F.2d 1503, 1506!1507 (CA11 1987) (defendant's initiation of contact waived previous invocation of rights)."this is the  J stuff that Miranda claims are made of. While these  J questions create litigable issues under Miranda, they generally do not indicate the existence of coercion "pressure tactics, deprivations, or exploitations of the defendant's weaknesses"sufficient to establish involuntariness.  J  Even assuming that many Miranda claims could simply be recast as voluntariness claims, it does not follow that  Jp barring Miranda's prophylactic rule from habeas would unduly complicate their resolution. The Court labels  J Miranda a brightline (or, at least, brighterline) rul[e]and involuntariness an exhaustive totalityof J circumstances approach, ante, at 12, but surely those  J labels overstate the differences. Miranda, for all its alleged brightness, is not without its difficulties; and  JX voluntariness is not without its strengths. Justice White  J0 so observed in his Miranda dissent, noting that the Court could not claim that  *BQ d  , , (  judicial time and effort ... will be conserved because  J of the ease of application of the [Miranda] rule.  J [Miranda] leaves open such questions as whether the accused was in custody, whether his statements were "   spontaneous or the product of interrogation, whether the accused has effectively waived his rights, ... all of which are certain to prove productive of uncertainty during investigation and litigation during prosecution.  J` Miranda, 384 U.S., at 544!545.  J8 . ~BQ 8d  ( , , Experience has proved Justice White's prediction correct.  Jt Miranda creates as many close questions as it resolves. The task of determining whether a defendant is in cus J$ tody has proved to be a slippery one. Elstad, 470  J U.S., at 309; see, e. > g., supra, at 14, n. 1 (custody cases). And the supposedly bright lines that separate interrogation from spontaneous declaration, the exercise of a right from waiver, and the adequate warning from the inadequate, likewise have turned out to be rather dim and  J4 illdefined. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291  J (1980) (interrogation); n. 2, supra (interrogation); nn. 4  J and 5, supra (waiver and invocation); n. 3, supra  J (adequacy of warnings). Yet Miranda requires those lines to be drawn with precision in each case.  The totalityofthecircumstances approach, on the other hand, permits each fact to be taken into account without resort to formal and dispositive labels. By dispensing with the difficulty of producing a yesorno answer to questions that are often better answered in shades and degrees, the voluntariness inquiry often can make judicial decisionmaking easier rather than more onerous. Thus, it is true that the existence of warnings is still a consideration under the totalityofthecircumstances  J approach, ante, at 12, but it is unnecessary to determine conclusively whether custody existed and triggered the warning requirement, or whether the warnings given were sufficient. It is enough that the habeas court look to the warnings or their absence, along with all other factors, and consider them in deciding what is, after all, the ultimate question: whether the confession was compelled and involuntary or the product of a free and unimpaired  J will. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S., at"   225!226.  J  Nor does continued application of Miranda's prophylactic rule on habeas dispense with the necessity of testing  J confessions for voluntariness. While Miranda's conclusive presumption of coercion may sound like an impenetrable barrier to the introduction of compelled testimony, in  J practice it leaks like a sieve. Miranda, for example, does not preclude the use of an unwarned confession outside  J the prosecution's case in chief, Harris v. New York, 401  J U.S. 222 (1971); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); involuntary statements, by contrast, must be excluded  JH from trial for all purposes, Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.  J 385, 398 (1978). Miranda does not preclude admission of  J the fruits of an unwarned statement, see Oregon v.  J Elstad, supra; but under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, we require the suppression of not only compelled confessions but tainted subsequent confessions  JX as well, Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 710 (1967).  J0 Finally, Miranda can fail to exclude some truly involuntary statements: It is entirely possible to extract a compelled statement despite the most precise and  J accurate of warnings. See Johnson, 384 U.S., at 730 (warnings are only one factor in determining voluntariness).  The Court's final rationale is that, because the federal  J courts rarely issue writs for Miranda violations, elimi J nating Miranda claims from habeas will not decrease  J statefederal tensions to an appreciable degree. Ante, at 13!14. The relative infrequency of relief, however, does not diminish the intrusion on state sovereignty; it diminishes only our justification for intruding in the first place. After all, even if relief is denied at the end of the day, the State still must divert its scarce prosecutorial resources to defend an otherwise final conviction. If relief is truly rare, efficiency counsels in favor of dispensing with the search for the prophylactic rule violation in a haystack; instead, the federal courts should concentrate`"   on the search for true Fifth Amendment violations by adjudicating the questions of voluntariness and compulsion directly. I therefore find it of little moment that the  J Police Foundation, et al., support respondent. Ante, at 14, n. 6. Those who bear the primary burden of defending state convictions in federal courts"including 36 States and the National District Attorneys Association" resoundingly support the opposite side. See Brief for  J California et al. as Amici Curiae; Brief for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., and the National District  Jp Attorneys Association, Inc., as Amici Curiae; see also Brief  JH for United States as Amicus Curiae (United States must  J defend against claims raised by federal prisoners under 28 U.S.C.2255).  The Court's response, that perhaps the police respect  J the Miranda rule as a result of the existence of [habeas]  J review, ante, at 14, is contrary to both case law and common sense. As explained above, there is simply no reason to think that habeas relief, which often  ! `strike[s] like lightning' !  years after conviction, contributes much additional deterrence beyond the threat of exclusion  J during state proceedings. See supra, at 8 (quoting  J Duckworth, 492 U.S., at 211 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). Accord, Friendly, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev., at 163. And our  J@ decision in Stone expressly so held: The view that the deterrence ... would be furthered rests on the dubious assumption that law enforcement authorities would fear that federal habeas review might reveal flaws . .. that  J went undetected at trial and on appeal. Stone, 428  Jx U.S., at 493 (footnote omitted). The majority offers no  JP justification for disregarding our decision in Stone; nor  J( does it provide any reason to question the truth of Stone's observation.   : H1 7IV؃  J  C  As the Court emphasizes today, Miranda's prophylactic rule is now 26 years old; the police and the state courts"    J have indeed grown accustomed to it. Ante, at 13!14. But it is precisely because the rule is well accepted that there is little further benefit to enforcing it on habeas. We can depend on law enforcement officials to administer warnings in the first instance and the state courts to provide a remedy when law enforcement officers err. None of the  J Court's asserted justifications for enforcing Miranda's prophylactic rule through habeas"neither reverence for the Fifth Amendment nor the concerns of reliability, efficiency, and federalism"counsel in favor of the Court's chosen course. Indeed, in my view they cut in precisely the opposite direction. The Court may reconsider its  J decision when presented with empirical data. See ante,  J at 12 (noting absence of empirical data); ante, at 7  J (holding only that today's argument in favor of extending  J Stone falls short). But I see little reason for such a costly delay. Logic and experience are at our disposal now. And they amply demonstrate that applying  J0 Miranda's prophylactic rule on habeas does not increase the amount of justice dispensed; it only increases the frequency with which the admittedly guilty go free. In  J my view, Miranda imposes such grave costs and produces so little benefit on habeas that its continued application is neither tolerable nor justified. Accordingly, I join Part III of the Court's opinion but respectfully dissent from the remainder.