

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE
WASHINGTON, DC

FSIS DIRECTIVE

9030.1

9/10/08

TARGETING FOR HIGH-RISK IMPORTED PRODUCT SHIPMENTS

I. PURPOSE

This directive provides instructions to designated FSIS field personnel in the Office of International Affairs (OIA) and the Office of Program Evaluation, Enforcement and Review (OPEER), and to designated personnel in the Office of Food Defense and Emergency Response (OFDER), for monitoring risk assigned to imported meat, poultry, or egg product shipments by the US Department of Homeland Security, US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Automated Targeting System (ATS). This directive also provides to import inspectors instructions regarding the process that FSIS will use to re-inspect imported products that may pose elevated food defense concerns.

Key points covered

- general activities for FSIS personnel using the ATS
- FSIS import inspection activities from targeting
- documentation and feedback

II. [RESERVED]

III. [RESERVED]

IV. REFERENCES

FSIS Directive 5500.2, Non-Routine Incident Response
FSIS Directive 5500.3, Incident Investigation Team Reviews
FSIS Directive 9600.1, Illegally Imported or Smuggled Products

V. BACKGROUND

The ATS is a CBP data system that obtains, provides, and analyzes sources of information in order to track import shipments that may pose a risk to the United States. The ATS assigns a risk based point score to shipments as they enter or prepare to enter the United States. The basis for the risk-based point score is a yearly assessment of FSIS import data. FSIS personnel working at the CBP National Targeting Center (NTC) for cargo will access the data and review the point score, providing target-specific

Information to contacts within FSIS and CBP to ensure that shipments identified as targeted have been analyzed and controlled.

VI. TARGETING ACTIVITIES AND PROCEDURES

A. General Activities for FSIS personnel using the ATS

1. The OFDER Assistant Administrator or designee is to coordinate the assignment of eligible FSIS personnel to conduct targeting activities at the NTC. An FSIS employee assigned to conduct targeting activities at the NTC will be the FSIS NTC Liaison.

2. Training on targeting will be provided to ATS users by CBP.

3. The FSIS NTC Liaison is to:

- a. serve as a liaison between the NTC management team and FSIS;
- b. alert FSIS managers to targeting issues;
- c. update data rule set information as needed (e.g., updated import data);
- d. deliver official FSIS responses to CBP inquiries made at the NTC and consult with representatives of appropriate FSIS Offices, when necessary, to respond to inquiries;
- e. enter an Import Alert into the FSIS Import Alert Tracking System (IATS) when high targeting scores are validated;

NOTE: The FSIS NTC Liaison may contact the OIA Import Inspection Division, Deputy Director for Operations (IID-DDO) or designee, or an OPEER Regional Manager, when necessary, to enter an Import Alert.

f. request sampling through appropriate FSIS channels based on risk evaluation.

B. FSIS Import Inspection Activities from Targeting

1. **Handling shipments identified as low risk** (scores below (<) 190)

a. The FSIS NTC Liaison may review low risk shipment information to confirm that a low risk score is valid. In some instances, import inspection personnel may be asked to provide feedback on these shipments.

b. FSIS import inspection personnel are to reinspect these shipments according to assignments generated by Automated Import Information System (AIIIS) and report findings back, through channels, to the FSIS NTC Liaison.

2. Handling high-risk (validated) shipments at the Port of Entry (scores equal to or greater than (\geq) 190 are considered high risk.)

a. When targeting criteria result in the classification of a shipment as high-risk (validated), CBP may hold the product before entry and determine appropriate action (e.g., X-raying the containers, radiation inspection). The product remains under the jurisdiction of CBP at the port of entry. If the shipment is confirmed hazardous, it will not be allowed entry by CBP.

b. The FSIS NTC Liaison is to initiate an Import Alert, based on available information, through the IATS, for all high-risk (validated) shipments.

c. If the product, the packaging, or the transport container in a high-risk shipment is determined by CBP not to be hazardous, the shipment of product is to move to an official import establishment for further examination in order to eliminate any product issues not identified in the CBP inspection (e.g. eligibility of product; tampering).

d. In order to track movement of a high-risk shipment cleared by CBP to the Import House, the FSIS NTC Liaison is to coordinate the movement of the product with the appropriate IID Regional Import Field Office (RIFO) or the appropriate OPEER Regional Manager via Import Alert updates or phone.

e. Import inspection personnel are to inform the IID RIFO when the high-risk shipment arrives at the designated import establishment, at which time the RIFO Supervisor will update the IATS. The RIFO will notify the OPEER Regional Manager where the product entered the United States in the event that it does not arrive at the Import House.

f. Import inspection personnel are to handle any shipments identified as high-risk in a manner to ensure personnel safety if the product or containers indicate possible tampering or contamination.

g. Before product staging and import reinspection of the shipment, import inspection personnel are to immediately contact the IID RIFO for guidance. The shipment is to be retained pending reinspection instructions.

h. The RIFO Supervisor is to dispatch an Import Surveillance Liaison Officer (ISLO) for reinspection of all high-risk (validated), non-hazardous shipments at import establishments identified by the FSIS NTC Liaison.

NOTE: The RIFO may request assistance from OPEER when an ISLO is not available.

i. The ISLO is to review shipment information (records, packaging, product, and possible evidence of tampering), and where evidence suggests tampering or concern, the ISLO is to:

i. inform the RIFO Supervisor or the IID DDO of the findings.

- ii. verify that the product is controlled.
- iii. initiate or update an Import Alert through the IATS.

NOTE: The IID-DDO will elevate the Import Alert to a Non-Routine Incident Report (NRIR) as set out in FSIS Directive 9600.1 and FSIS Directive 5500.2 and inform the appropriate OPEER Regional Manager.

- iv. conduct sampling, if requested, as directed by the Office of Public Health Science (OPHS) or the FSIS Emergency Management Committee (EMC) (see FSIS Directive 5500.3).

- v. inform the RIFO and FSIS NTC Liaison of all shipment findings.

- j. The FSIS NTC Liaison will consult with Agency subject matter experts on all RIFO findings and coordinate the release or refusal of the shipment, based on Homeland Security risk, with the RIFO.

- i. If the shipment is determined to be of no risk, import inspection personnel will reinspect the shipment based on the AIIS assignment.

NOTE: The RIFO will notify import inspection personnel to enter results (Passed) into the AIIS for the unscheduled homeland security physical exam.

- ii. The FSIS NTC Liaison is to notify CBP at the NTC of all high-risk shipments identified as refused entry and the reason for refusal.

NOTE: The RIFO will notify import inspection personnel to enter results (Refused) into the AIIS for the unscheduled homeland security physical exam.

VII. DOCUMENTATION/FEEDBACK

A. Results of examinations or laboratory testing that do not result in refusal may be provided to CBP by FSIS.

B. Results of all examinations, whether positive or negative, will be recorded by the import inspector in the AIIS.

C. The RIFO will update the Import Alert in IATS and close the alert for OIA. The OPEER Regional Manager will update the alert as needed and close the alert for OPEER.

D. Inspection results may be used to update the FSIS rule data set.

Direct all questions on this directive through supervisory channels.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Amy S. Duff". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial 'A' and 'D'.

Assistant Administrator
Office of Policy and Program Development