Testimony
Before the Committee
on Science
United
States House of Representatives
The
Science of Bioterrorism: HHS Preparedness
Statement of
D.A.
Henderson, M.D.
Director,
Office
of Public Health Preparedness
Department
of Health and Human Services
For Release on
Delivery
Expected
at 10:00 am
on
Wednesday, December 5, 2001
Mr. Chairman and Members
of the Committee, thank you for inviting me here today.
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) welcomes
your interest in our efforts to respond to terrorist events,
including uses of biological weapons against the civilian
population. I am Dr. D. A. Henderson, Director of the
newly created HHS Office of Public Health Preparedness,
which will coordinate the Department-wide response to
public health emergencies. To that end, I look forward
to working with the Office of Homeland Security and our
other partners at the Federal, state and local level to
protect the American people from acts of terrorism.
HHS READINESS
TO RESPOND TO MASS CASUALTY EVENTS
Although the Department
of Defense (DOD) has developed defenses for biological
warfare, there are additional concerns that need to be
addressed to provide an adequate civilian defense from
a bioterrorist attack. The potential list of microbial
pathogens that threaten civilian populations is larger
than that of classical biological warfare threats. HHS's
identification of the major bioterrorism threat agents
- a list developed in collaboration with experts in medicine
and public health, law enforcement, and national security
- is included as an Appendix to this testimony. Moreover,
the populations to be protected are different from those
generally involved in combat situations because the civilian
community includes people of all ages and health status.
As you know, local and state
governments bear much of the initial burden and responsibility
for providing an effective response by medical and public
health professionals to a terrorist attack on the civilian
population. If the disease outbreak reaches any significant
magnitude, however, local resources will be overwhelmed,
and the federal government will be required to provide
protective and responsive measures for the affected populations.
HHS is working on a number of fronts to assist our partners
at the state and local level, including local hospitals
and medical practitioners, to deal with the effects of
biological, chemical, and other terrorist acts.
Metropolitan
Medical Response System
Since Fiscal Year 1995,
for example, HHS through its Office of Emergency Preparedness
(OEP) has been developing local Metropolitan Medical Response
Systems (MMRS). Through contractual relationships, the
MMRS uses existing emergency response systems - emergency
management, medical and mental health providers, public
health departments, law enforcement, fire departments,
EMS and the National Guard - to provide an integrated,
unified response to a mass casualty event. As of September
30, 2001, OEP has contracted with 97 municipalities to
develop MMRSs. During FY 2002, we intend to invest $20
million in 25 additional cities (for a total of 122) for
bioterrorism-related planning through the MMRS and to
help them improve their medical response capabilities.
National Disaster
Medical System (NDMS)
As HHS's action agent for
responding to requests for assistance and resources, OEP
also manages the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS),
which was established in partnership with DOD, the Department
of Veterans Affairs (VA), the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), and the Public Health Service Commissioned
Corps Readiness Force. The NDMS can be called into action,
depending upon the severity of the event, to assist in
providing needed services to ensure the continued health
and well being of disaster victims..
The National Disaster Medical
System is a group of more than 7,000 volunteer health
and support professionals who can be deployed anywhere
in the country to assist communities in which local response
systems are overwhelmed or incapacitated. Organized into
44 Disaster Medical Assistance Teams, these volunteers
would provide on-site medical triage, patient care and
transportation to medical facilities. Four National Medical
Response Teams (NMRTs), which travel with their own caches
of pharmaceuticals, have capabilities to detect illness-causing
agents, decontaminate victims, provide medical care and
remove victims from the scene. Three of the four NMRTs
can be mobilized and deployed anywhere in the nation;
the fourth is permanently stationed in the Washington,
D.C. area. The NDMS also includes Disaster Mortuary Operations
Response Teams that handle the disposition of the remains
of victims of major disasters, as well as provide for
victim identification and assistance to their families.
The Department of Veterans
Affairs is one of the largest purchasers of pharmaceuticals
and medical supplies in the world. Capitalizing on this
buying power, HHS and VA have entered into an agreement
under which the VA manages and stores specialized pharmaceutical
caches for OEP's National Medical Response Teams. The
VA has purchased many of the items in the pharmaceutical
stockpile. The VA is also responsible for maintaining
the inventory, ensuring its security, and rotating the
stock to ensure that the caches are ready for deployment
with the specialized National Medical Response Teams.
National Pharmaceutical
Stockpile
HHS has also developed
the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Program (NPS) into
a major national security asset. The purpose of the NPS
is to be able to rapidly respond to a domestic biological
or chemical terrorist event with antibiotics, antidotes,
vaccines and medical materiel to help save lives and prevent
further spread of disease resulting from the terrorist
threat agent. Operated by HHS's Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC), the NPS Program would provide an
initial, broad-based response within 12 hours of the federal
authorization to deploy, followed by a prompt and more
targeted response as dictated by the specific nature of
the biological or chemical agent that is used.
One of the NPS "12-hour
Push Packages" was brought to operational status on September
11th. CDC delivered a 12-hour Push Package of pharmaceuticals
and medical supplies by ground, vendor managed inventory
by air, and a technical advisory team in New York City,
all within 7 hours of the order to deploy. Three out of
the four non-military aircraft in United States airspace
on the night of September 11th were carrying
National Pharmaceutical Stockpile assets and personnel
to New York City.
The Stockpile Program was
developed as a supplementary response asset mainly to
address biological and chemical terrorism. But following
the events of September 11th, the program is
now being expanded for response to an all-hazards event.
The Stockpile presently is able to provide a full course
of anthrax post-exposure prophylaxis to more than 2 million
persons. Secretary Thompson has directed that the Stockpile
development be accelerated to provide increased anthrax
prophylaxis capacity for 12 million persons, and CDC will
reach that level of response within the next 12 months.
We will also add four more push packs to the eight already
located across the country, making more emergency supplies
available and augmenting our existing supplies of 400
tons by another 200 tons.
But we must accelerate
the production of vaccines and antibiotics and invest
in essential programs to ensure the speedy and orderly
distribution of antibiotics and other supplies in the
event of a biological event. That is why the President
has called for an additional $1.5 billion in federal funding
for those areas most critical to our ability to respond
to bioterrorist threats. His proposal includes include
$643 million to expand the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile
and $509 million to speed the development and purchase
of smallpox vaccine.
Just last week, Secretary
Thompson announced that Acambis Inc., with support from
its subcontractor, Baxter International Inc., has been
awarded a $428 million contract to produce 155 million
doses of smallpox vaccine by the end of 2002. Production
of the vaccine under the new contract could begin as soon
as this month and, once completed, will bring the total
number of vaccine doses in the nation's stockpile to 286
million by the end of next year, enough to protect every
United States citizen, if needed. In light of increasing
concerns regarding the possible use of biological agents
such as smallpox in acts of terrorism or war, HHS is undertaking
efforts to stockpile as much vaccine as needed to protect
the nation in the event of an outbreak of smallpox.
CDC Surveillance
and Prevention Efforts
As our nation's premier
prevention agency, CDC's top priority is to protect the
Nation's health. To do this, CDC focuses on building a
solid public health infrastructure - at CDC, as well as
at the state and local level to protect the health of
all citizens. CDC has used funds provided by Congress
to begin the process of improving the expertise, facilities
and procedures of state and local health departments and
within CDC itself related to bioterrorism. CDC has a dedicated
anti-bioterrorism staff of more than 100 full-time professionals
comprising expertise in epidemiology, surveillance, secure
communications, and laboratory diagnostics.
Over the last three years,
CDC has awarded more than $130 million in cooperative
agreements to 50 states, one territory and four major
metropolitan health departments to support,
(1) Preparedness planning
and readiness assessment;
(2) Epidemiology and surveillance
(3) Laboratory capacity
for biological or chemical agents; and
(4) The Health Alert Network
(a nationwide electronic communications system).
Since September 11, almost
500 CDC staff have been sent to the field. For example,
at the height of the anthrax response in the Nation's
Capital, there were 85 staff in Washington, DC alone.
These experts included epidemiologists, industrial hygienists
involved in environmental sampling and clean up, laboratorians,
communications specialists to assist with media relations,
and logistics and management staff. CDC not only investigated
cases that proved to be anthrax in four states and the
District of Columbia, but also investigated suspicious
cases in six other states. These cases proved not to be
anthrax, but required CDC assistance to go through the
process of ruling them out. CDC experts were needed to
augment the staff of state and local health departments,
who would have been severely overtaxed without our help.
The Administration has requested $20 million to support
additional expert epidemiology teams that can be sent
to states and cities to help them respond quickly to infectious
disease outbreaks and other public health risks. And let
me reiterate Secretary Thompson's conviction that every
state should have at least one federally funded epidemiologist
who has been trained in the CDC's Epidemic Intelligence
Service (EIS) training program. The President's budget
will accomplish this goal.
CDC and ATSDR
Remediation Support Activities
Since the intentional release
of anthrax spores, one of the areas on which CDC and HHS's
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR)
have focused is the identification and cleanup of contaminated
facilities. We have refined methods for environmental
sampling to assess whether anthrax contamination had occurred.
In buildings, that has meant sampling of air and surfaces.
CDC and ATSDR have issued recommendations on how to conduct
environmental sampling and how laboratories should analyze
those samples. We also recommended environmental sampling
strategies to characterize the extent of exposure and
to guide cleanup. We issued recommendations to protect
first responders, investigators, and cleanup personnel.
As buildings were identified as contaminated, we provided
technical input to EPA and others tasked with cleanup
to determine where remediation was necessary. These recommendations
have been widely disseminated to federal, state and local
health and environmental agencies, and are available at
CDC's bioterrorism website (www.bt.cdc.gov).
EPA has devised strategies
for remediation and has gained much experience through
its activities to date. Disease experts at CDC are developing
strategies to prevent the spread of disease during and
after bioterrorist attacks. Although there are some data
on chemical disinfectants in the scientific literature,
there are no historical data that indicate the best way
to eliminate spores from an office building, or to disinfect
a sorting machine. The ability of a disinfectant to kill
an anthrax spore is dependent upon time of contact and
concentration and is mitigated by the amount and composition
of material through which it must penetrate to get to
the spore. For many of the clean-up methods being used
to kill anthrax spores, we will not know their effectiveness
until we go through the process. EPA understands this
and has sought help from a variety of sources, including
CDC and ATSDR, to ensure that the appropriate indicators
are used and that post-sampling strategies are adequate.
With regard to the effectiveness
of cleaning, even our most exhaustive sampling strategies
will not identify every spore. It is unlikely that any
cleaning strategy will kill every spore. However, the
EPA should be able to clean and re-test to the point where
we all are comfortable that spores have been killed or
removed from surfaces where human contact is likely to
occur. A range of sampling methods and strategies should
be used to ensure the safety of building occupants.
In heavily contaminated
areas, such as Senator Daschle's suite and the Brentwood
postal facility, fumigation is being proposed as the method
of clean-up. The use of fumigants is a potential hazard
for clean-up workers, those in areas adjacent to the buildings,
and those that must re-occupy the building. A fumigant
that is effective at killing spores is, of necessity,
a highly toxic agent. The protection of workers during
the fumigation process is a matter of good industrial
hygiene. EPA, CDC and ATSDR are working together to ensure
remediation workers are protected during the fumigation
processes. EPA works with local public health agencies
to ensure that people in the area but outside of the building
being fumigated are notified and kept at a safe distance.
With regard to the safety
of those who will re-occupy the building, it is important
to determine both that the area is clear of the fumigant
and that there is no health risk. Again, CDC, ATSDR, and
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
have developed exposure limits for fumigants, and detection
methods are available to determine when any residual fumigant
is well below established limits. After buildings are
cleaned and post-cleaning environmental sampling has been
conducted, CDC and ATSDR are committed to providing technical
input to the incident command and other experts to determine
whether the building is ready for re-occupancy.
HHS ROLE IN VACCINE
AND DRUG RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
With the support of Congress,
the President has implemented a government-wide emergency
response package to help deal with the tragic events of
September 11th and subsequent anthrax attacks.
This complements efforts already underway to prepare our
nation against such heinous attacks, including threats
of bioterrorism. For example, CDC, the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), and the National Institutes of Health (NIH), all
within HHS, are collaborating with the DOD and other agencies
to support and encourage research to address scientific
issues related to bioterrorism. The capability to detect
and counter bioterrorism depends to a substantial degree
on the state of relevant medical science. In some cases,
new vaccines, antitoxins, or innovative drug treatments
need to be developed, manufactured (or produced), and/or
stocked. Moreover, we need to learn more about the pathogenesis
and epidemiology of the infectious diseases that do not
affect the U.S. population currently. We have only limited
knowledge about how artificial methods of dispersion may
affect the infection rate, virulence, or impact of these
biological agents. HHS's continuing, collaborative, research
agenda at CDC, FDA, NIH, and with DOD, is critical to
overall preparedness.
Let me briefly outline
the vital role that HHS agencies, particularly the FDA
and NIH, play in our Nation's research and development
agenda for vaccines and other drugs.
Food and Drug
Administration
Even before the events
of September 11, HHS's Food and Drug Administration actively
cooperated with DOD in the operation of DOD's vaccine
development program and the maintenance of their stockpile
program. Any vaccine or drug development, whether by a
government agency or private industry, must be in accordance
with FDA requirements that ensure the safety, effectiveness
and manufacturing quality of the finished product. FDA
provides regulatory guidance to DOD, CDC, and others regarding
the studies required to develop new vaccines and drugs,
as well as assistance during all phases of development.
FDA also works with DOD's office that screens new and
unusual ideas for development of products to treat diseases
and develop diagnostic tools.
The scope of FDA's regulatory
responsibility extends to both approved (licensed) products
and investigational products (unlicensed products). FDA's
Center for Biologics Evaluation Research (CBER) is responsible
for evaluating the safety, purity, and potency of biological
products such as vaccines, antitoxins and blood products.
FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) is
responsible for a similar regulatory process for drugs.
Bio-warfare defense vaccines and drugs undergo the same
FDA review process as any other vaccines or drugs.
FDA will work with potential
sponsors of experimental therapies, at all stages of the
product development process in order to stimulate scientific
interchange and clarify FDA regulatory requirements. A
sponsor of a vaccine or drug under review must also provide
adequate product labeling to allow health care providers
to understand the product's proper use, including its
potential benefits and risks, to communicate with patients,
and to safely deliver the product to the public.
When all of the clinical,
chemistry, pre-approval inspection, manufacturing, labeling
and other issues have been adequately resolved, FDA will
approve the application. Licensing or approving a new
vaccine or drug is only one stage of FDA's oversight of
medical product safety. Following issuance of the license,
there is continued post-marketing surveillance of the
product by monitoring adverse events through the Adverse
Event Reporting System. Subsequent to the issuance to
the license, FDA also monitors the manufacturer's production
activities through FDA inspections to determine the manufacturer's
compliance with good manufacturing practices (GMP) regulations.
Because of the complex manufacturing processes for most
biological products, manufacturers may be required to
submit samples of each licensed vaccine lot, along with
manufacturing testing results, to FDA for review and permission
to release the lot for distribution.
National Institutes
of Health
The NIH bioterrorism research
program, spearheaded by the National Institute of Allergy
and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), includes both short-
and long-term research targeted at the design, development,
evaluation and approval of diagnostics, therapies and
vaccines needed to control infections caused by microbes
with potential for use as biological weapons. NIAID efforts
have primarily focused on the bioterrorist threats posed
by anthrax and smallpox, and many of these efforts are
carried out in collaboration with other Federal agencies.
NIAID formed a Working
Group on Anthrax Vaccines (WGAV) in 1998 to develop and
test a new vaccine that could be used in response to a
bioterrorist event. Such a vaccine must be capable of
generating protective immunity against inhalation spores
within a relatively short period of time after 1-2 immunizing
doses. Through an Inter-Agency Agreement, NIAID is collaborating
with the Department of Defense's U.S. Army Medical Research
Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) on a research
plan to develop a new vaccine based on the use of recombinant
protective antigen vaccine (rPA) to protect all ages of
the American public, including military personnel. In
preparation for Phase 1 clinical trials of rPA vaccines,
NIH is working with CDC, FDA and DoD to refine standard
serological tests to assess the effectiveness of anthrax
vaccines. These tests would enable comparison of new rPA
vaccines to the currently licensed anthrax (or AVA) vaccine.
If the new vaccine is capable of generating a rapid immune
response, it may provide a quick transition to protective
immunity to those individuals undergoing treatment with
antibiotics due to an anthrax exposure.
NIAID also has expanded
the national research capacity substantially over the
past few years on those bioterrorist threat agents of
greatest concern. First, NIAID has solicited from the
scientific community research proposals on anthrax and
other bacterial pathogens, in an effort to further encourage
research that may lead to better means of diagnosis, prevention,
and treatment.
Second, NIAID recently
awarded administrative supplements to several active research
grants to further studies on how anthrax causes disease,
which could expedite the development and implementation
of novel, more effective therapeutic intervention strategies.
NIAID also anticipates funding several new research proposals
on the molecular mechanisms involved in the germination
of anthrax spores in vivo; such work may provide
the basis for a novel and very promising post-attack strategy,
one that would be more acceptable than the widespread
use of antimicrobial drugs which are not specific for
anthrax and, when given to large groups of exposed
individuals, may promote the development of antibiotic
resistant strains of other bacteria.
Through an Inter-Agency
Agreement with the Office of Naval Research, NIAID has
provided funding to help complete work on sequencing the
DNA of the chromosome of anthrax; additional funds were
also provided by the Department of Energy for this purpose.
The information derived from this genome-sequencing project
should be of great value in developing rapid diagnostic
tests, as well as new vaccines and antibiotics therapies
against mutant strains of anthrax.
NIAID research on smallpox
focuses on extending existing vaccine stocks to increase
the number of available doses, developing new vaccines
and treatments, as well as diagnostic tools to detect
the disease quickly. Although a worldwide immunization
program eradicated smallpox disease decades ago, small
quantities of smallpox virus still exists under guarded
conditions at CDC and in Russia, but several rogue nations
may have samples. NIAID, in collaboration with DOD, CDC,
and the Department of Energy, funds increased research
to:
- Develop and evaluate
at least three antiviral drugs with preclinical activity
against smallpox and vaccinia viruses and acceptable
clinical safety;
- Extend the usefulness
of the currently available, older vaccine by doing human
studies to see if we can "stretch" available stocks
by diluting it;
- Help develop a safe,
sterile smallpox vaccine grown in cell cultures using
modern technology;
- Explore development
of a vaccine that can be used in all segments of the
civilian population (i.e., the immune-suppressed, pregnant
mothers, etc.); and
- Increase our knowledge
of the genome of smallpox and related viruses.
NIAID recently launched
a Phase 2 clinical trial to further evaluate the effectiveness
of different strengths of vaccine in order to possibly
expand the use of the limited smallpox vaccine supply;
CDC and FDA have cooperated to ensure that the NIH study
is carried out as expeditiously as possible.
In addition, NIAID and
DOD's Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
have funded a collaborative effort involving those two
agencies along with four academic centers, the CDC, USAMRIID,
and the American Type Culture Collection that will focus
on designing and implementing an "Orthopoxvirus Genomics
and Bioinformatics Resource Center." This Center will
conduct sequence and functional comparisons of genes to
provide insights for the selection of targets for the
design of antivirals and vaccines. The Center will design
and maintain relational databases to store, display, annotate
and query genome sequences, structural information, phenotypic
data and bibliographic information. Part of the effort
will include development and maintenance of a "Poxvirus
Bioinformatics Resource Center" website to facilitate
the availability of this data for other researchers.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, let me again
emphasize that the Administration is taking aggressive
steps to make sure that our country is well protected
from bioterrorism. Moreover, the government - at all levels
- is responding to bioterrorist threats, and responding
well.
Contemplating bioterrorism
is unpleasant, but it is imperative. Under the leadership
of President Bush, Secretary Thompson, and Homeland Security
Director Ridge, we are taking all the steps necessary
to keep America safe in an era when biological and chemical
attacks are as possible as they are unthinkable.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
for letting me speak about this matter of critical importance.
I will be happy to answer any questions which you or members
of the Committee may have.
APPENDIX
CRITICAL
BIOLOGICAL AGENTS
The U.S. Public Health system
and primary healthcare providers must be prepared to address
varied biological agents, including pathogens that are
rarely seen in the United States. The critical agents
are listed below in priority order:
Category
A
High priority
agents include organisms that pose a risk to national
security because they can be easily disseminated or transmitted
person-to-person; cause high mortality, with potential
for major public health impact; might cause public panic
and social disruption; and require special action for
public health preparedness.Category A Agents:
- variola
major (smallpox)
- Bacillus
anthracis (anthrax)
- Yersinia
pestis (plague);
- Clostridium
botulinum toxin (botulism)
- Francisella
tularensis (tulararemia);
- filoviruses,
- Ebola
hemorrhagic fever; and
- Marburg
hemorrhagic fever; and
- Lassa
(Lassa fever)
- Junin
(Argentine hemorrhagic fever) and related viruses
Category
B
Second highest
priority agents include those that are moderate easy to
disseminate; cause moderate morbidity and low mortality;
and require specific enhancements of CDC's diagnostic
capacity and enhanced disease surveillance.
Category
B Agents
- Coxiella
burnetti (Q fever)
- Brucella
species (brucellosis);
- Burkholderia
mallei (glanders)
- alphaviruses,
- Venezuelan
encephalomyelitis,
- eastern
and western equine encephalomyelitis;
- ricin
toxin from Ricinus communis (castor beans);
- epsilon
toxin of Clostridium perfringens; and
- Staphylococcus
enterotoxin B
A subset
of List B agents includes pathogens that are food or waterborne.
These pathogens include but are not limited to:
- Salmonella
species,
- Shigella
dysenteriae,
- Escherichia
coli O157:H7
- Vibrio
cholerae, and
- Cryptosporidium
parvum.
Category
C
Third highest
priority agents include emerging pathogens that could
be engineered for mass dissemination in the future because
of availability; ease of production and dissemination;
and potential for high morbidity and mortality and major
health impact.
Category
C Agents
- Nipah
virus,
- hantaviruses,
- tickborne
hemorrhagic fever viruses
- tickborne
encephalitis viruses,
- yellow
fever, and
- multidrug-resistant
tuberculosis.
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