[DNFSB LETTERHEAD]
June 1, 1993
The Honorable Hazel R. O'Leary
Secretary of Energy
Washington, DC 20585
Dear Secretary O'Leary:
On June 1, 1993, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, in accordance with 42 U.S.C. S 2286a(5), unanimously approved Recommendation 93-3 which is enclosed for your consideration. Recommendation 93-3 deals with Improving DOE Technical Capability in Defense Nuclear Facilities Programs.
42 U.S.C. S 2286d(a) requires the Board, after receipt by you, to promptly make this recommendation available to the public in the Department of Energy's regional public reading rooms. The Board believes the recommendation contains no information which is classified or otherwise restricted. To the extent this recommendation does not include information restricted by DOE under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. SS 2161-68, as amended, please arrange to have this recommendation promptly placed on file in your regional public reading rooms.
The Board will publish this recommendation in the Federal Register.
Sincerely,
John T. Conway
Chairman
Enclosure
RECOMMENDATION 93-3 TO THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 2286a(5)
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
Dated: June 1, 1993
Effective functioning of any organization, whether in the private sector or government, is highly dependent upon the capabilities of people and the way they are guided and deployed. Nowhere is this dependency more crucial than in the Department of Energy's defense nuclear complex, where the potential hazards inherent in nuclear materials production, processing, and manufacturing, require high quality technical expertise to assure public and worker safety.
Nuclear weapons development and production have progressed over the years from early efforts of a small group of highly talented, ingenious individuals in scientific laboratories to employment of thousands of workers in industrial-type production environments. While the national response to today's changing international scene is resulting in downsizing of the nuclear stockpile and a change in mission of many of the defense nuclear facilities, the need remains for continuing vigilance to protect public and worker health and safety. In fact, a case can be made for the need for greater vigilance now throughout the weapons complex because of: increased risk of equipment mishaps in aged facilities, loss of existing technical expertise through attrition and down-sizing, and a reduced inclination. for young engineers and scientists to get involved in the nuclear weapons field.
Nevertheless, the level of scientific and technical expertise in the DOE of defense nuclear facilities and operations has been declining. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board in its last three annual reports has observed that:
"... the most important and far reaching problem affecting the safety of DOE defense nuclear facilities is the difficulty in attracting and retaining personnel who are adequately qualified by technical education and experience to provide the kind of management, direction and guidance essential to safe operation of DOE's defense nuclear facilities."
The Board has not been alone in calling attention to the problem. Congressional perception of the need to upgrade DOE technical expertise is evident in the Board's enabling legislation. The need for such up-grading is further underscored by assessments made by a number of other groups over the past decade, as the attached excerpts from their reports indicate.
A reputation for technical excellence is a strong attraction for talented individuals. Organizations with strong technical missions commonly cite technical excellence as a goal towards which management should strive. However, sustained leadership emphasis and deliberate actions are required if the reality of technical excellence is to be achieved.
Actions by the Board, such as recommendations and public hearings, have resulted in some efforts on the part of certain DOE organizations and M & 0 contractors to upgrade existing staff and recruit better qualified personnel. However, such efforts have not been coordinated DOE-wide and have been well short of the need. The Board believes that a more aggressive, broad-based and well-coordinated program directed at the enhancement of the technical capabilities of the DOE staff should be defined and implemented.
The Board recognizes the difficulty any on-going organization faces in developing
programs targeted at upgrading competence of staff. Such efforts rarely succeed without
strong endorsement, involvement, and guidance by the organization's top management and
without the impetus provided by objective appraisals made by outside, independent experts.
Further, the sheer size, differing requirements, and dispersion of DOE staff complicates
both the problem and the solution. Nonetheless, the strong correlation between technical
excellence and assurance of public health and safety compels this Board to urge that DOE
give high priority to the problem of attracting and retaining technical personnel with
exceptional qualifications. More specifically the Board recommends that DOE:
John T. Conway, Chairman
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS IDENTIFYING
DOE TECHNICAL PERSONNEL PROBLEMS
An important contributing factor [to the lack of adequate attention by DOE Headquarters' organizations to the nuclear safety aspects of its reactors] is the lack of sufficient numbers of highly competent technical people in Headquarters' organizations with nuclear safety responsibilities. Field Office organizations also suffer from this lack.
... the technical knowledge and skills of many DOE managers and employees are not sufficient to do their jobs.
The Board is expected to raise the technical expertise of the Department substantially, to assist and monitor the continued development of DOE's internal ES&H organization, and to provide independent advice to the Secretary.
We recommend that you streamline management to make responsibilities clear, that you put knowledgeable people in line positions of responsibility, and that you give them authority. This is important for assurance of nuclear safety. Solving the DOE's problems will require upper management and operating personnel to work together closely and effectively. This will not be possible if the staff must work through buffers of people who are not technically competent.
EM ... lacks adequate numbers of qualified staff to develop occupational health and safety programs suited to EM line operations and has little capacity to assess contractors' performance in health and safety matters.
The DOE Office of Environment, Safety and Health (EH) does not have enough qualified field staff to monitor contractor operations.
John T. Conway