Commodity
Policies
A variety of domestic policies in Japan affect and support
producers of certain commodities. In addition, Japan imposes
tariffs on imports of many agricultural products, and other
trade policies protect domestic production. ERS publications
describe Japan's
domestic and trade policies for the following commodities:
In general, Japan's commodity policies fall into several categories,
including producer quotas, income stabilization policies, deficiency
payments, the rice diversion program, hazard insurance subsidies,
and stockholding policies. Brief descriptions of these policies
follow,
with more detail available in the commodity policy publications above.
Producer quotas exist for drinking and manufacturing milk.
The Japan Dairy Council administers the drinking milk quota, in
which producer participation is voluntary. The quota's purpose is
to limit milk production to keep market prices stable. The Agriculture
and Livestock Industries Corporation (ALIC), a state-trading enterprise
owned by the government, administers the manufacturing milk quota,
which applies to milk that is to be made into butter and milk powder.
Participating farmers get a direct payment per liter for milk within
their quota. Separate quotas are maintained for milk used in cheese
and cream production.
Japan introduced income stabilization policies in the late
1990s, based on an older program for vegetables and fruits. These
policies compensate farmers for part of the losses they incur if
current-year market prices are lower than a historical average price.
Besides covering vegetables and fruits, income stabilization policies
exist for rice, soybeans, milk, and other products. In general,
agricultural prices have been falling in Japan for some time, so
the historical average of prices also tends to fall (unlike the
target prices under the deficiency payment programs, discussed below).
Deficiency payments pay farmers all or part of the difference
between a fixed target price and the actual market price in the
current year. These programs exist for beef calves, soybeans, and
pork.
The rice diversion program paid farmers to use rice
paddy fields for purposes other than growing rice to harvest
for food. Declining rice consumption and high returns to rice
farming have meant that production has threatened to exceed
consumption in most years since the 1960s. In recent years,
about 40 percent of Japan's rice paddy area has been diverted.
Diversion payments varied according to the crop or land use
that the farmer chose. The payments were substantial, with
$920 per hectare the base payment for converting to wheat,
barley, or soybean production and a $6,933-per-hectare maximum
payment if the farm operation was above a minimum size. These
annual payments were in addition to other subsidies received
for crops other than rice. Many paddies planted in rice
also received diversion payments because the farmers did not
harvest rice grains for the food market, but instead cut the
fields when they were green (for green manure or feed), grew
special rices for industrial use, or farmed rice for other
special purposes.
In fiscal year 2008 (beginning April 1, 2008), Japan's
government implemented a new set of policies that put
the responsibility for controlling rice production into the
hands of local groups. While the diversion payments had been
made to all participating farmers, these new subsidies are designed to go only to larger farm operations.
In general, these policies offer incentives to plant wheat,
barley, soybeans, potatoes for starch production, and sugar
beets. Large farm operations are defined as 4 hectares
or more in the case of individual farm operations or 20 hectares
or more for farmer organizations that operate collectively.
(In Hokkaido, the minimum size for an individual operation
is 10 hectares.) There are a number of exceptions that allow
some smaller farms to participate, but the government seeks
to direct the subsidies that it offers just to farmers that
have a more competitive, business-like orientation. The motivations
for this switch are to encourage consolidation of farm operations
and to avoid ever-larger diversion payments as the gap between
falling rice consumption and rice production increases.
Payments in the new program are of three
types. One subsidy is a direct payment based on area farmed
in 2004-06 (i.e., a historical period) of wheat, barley, soybeans,
sugar beets, and potatoes for starch. A second subsidy is related
to the current year's volume and quality of these same crops. The third payment is an income stabilization
program related to current prices. In case a crop's price
falls, the program gives the farmer 90 percent of the reduction
in income suffered. Current prices are compared to the average
price of the previous 5 years, with the lowest and highest
prices removed. The income stabilization price applies to rice,
as well as to wheat, soybeans, sugar beets, and potatoes for
starch. All three programs are restricted to larger sized operations,
as defined above. For more information, consult Japan's New
Farm Subsidy Scheme (appendix of GAIN Report JA8012) and Japan's
Proposed Rice Reforms (GAIN Report JA3012), reports
from USDA's Foreign Agricultural Service from which
this information was taken.
Many crops and livestock activities benefit from government-subsidized
insurance programs, which pay an indemnity when crops fail
or livestock are hit by disease. The programs are voluntary, and
details of coverage vary by crop/livestock activity. The government
typically pays part of the farmer's premium and also provides reinsurance
in case indemnity requests overwhelm local insurance funds.
In 1987, the government began to gradually lower government-set
prices in a number of commodity markets and, in the
late 1990s, eliminated most set prices. A major exception
to this policy shift
was the sweeteners market where farm prices of sugarcane, sugar
beets, and potatoes and sweet potatoes for starch manufacture.
These policies were abolished in October 2007 and replaced
with direct subsidy payments.
The government's state-trading
enterprises maintain stocks of certain foods and feeds,
notably rice. Other stocks include butter, skim milk powder,
wheat, soybeans, and corn for feeding. The stocks
are supposed to be sold and replenished in an orderly way for
food security purposes. In addition, interventions in
dairy markets
are sometimes made in order to bolster prices.
Food safety and quality have become increasingly important
issues for Japan, in the wake of disease and labeling scandals in
the last decade. In 2003, the cabinet-level Food Safety Commission
was formed to assess and address safety risks related to food, animal
feed, and agricultural chemicals.
Japan's Trade Barriers
Japan's agriculture is heavily protected. Producer
subsidy estimates (PSEs), calculated by the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD), show that over 50 percent of the value
of Japan's farm production comes from trade barriers
or domestic subsidies. This is very high by world standards.
![Share of agricultural output value from government support, 2005](Gallery/valuegovernmentsupport.gif)
The degree of protection varies widely across commodities. Some
parts of Japan's agriculture are not heavily protected; some segments
have developed interesting technical solutions to deal with the
high price of labor, and some produce is of higher quality than
in any other country. These industries can compete with imports
without heavy protection. However, much of Japan's agriculture
is inefficient compared to production in exporting countries
and shelters behind very high barriers and subsidies.
The following table shows the main barriers to trade for some major
commodities. Japan uses tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) to protect its
most sensitive commodities, such as rice and dairy products. The
quota is a fixed volume of product. Imports brought in within the
quota pay a lower tariff, while imports outside the quota face much
higher tariffs, almost all so high that they prohibit trade. Japan's
government gains even more control by reserving the right to trade
within most major quotas to one of two state-trading enterprises.
The Food Department of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and
Fisheries has the exclusive right to import rice, wheat, and barley
within those TRQs, and the ALIC has exclusive importing rights to
two of the biggest dairy TRQs. The government, through the state-trading enterprises, decides how much to import, when to import,
and at what price to resell the imports into Japan's market.
Japan's tariffs and tariff-rate quotas |
Commodity |
Instrument |
Where the tariff goes |
Where the markup goes |
Rice |
TRQ |
No tariff collected |
Food Dept. (MAFF) |
Wheat |
TRQ |
No tariff collected |
Food Dept. (MAFF) |
Barley |
TRQ |
No tariff collected |
Food Dept. (MAFF) |
Beef |
Tariff |
To support beef farming |
No markups |
Pork |
Gate price system 1/ |
General revenues |
No markups |
Dairy products |
TRQ |
General revenues |
ALIC |
Vegetable oil |
Tariff |
General revenues |
No markups |
Oranges |
Tariff |
General revenues |
No markups |
Sugar 2/ |
|
No tariff collected |
ALIC |
Starch |
TRQ |
General revenues |
No markups |
Notes: MAFF=Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry,
and Fisheries. ALIC=Agriculture and Livestock Industries Corporation,
a quasi-governmental organization that is overseen by MAFF.
1/ The gate price system for pork involves a minimum import
price. If the value/kilogram (kg) of a shipment of pork is below
the standard price set in Japan's tariff schedule, an importer
must pay the difference between the standard price and the value/kg
of the shipment. A tariff of 4.3 percent is also applied. See
Pork Policies in
Japan for more detail.
2/ Sugar does not have a formal quota on imports. Instead,
private importers are required to sell all raw sugar that
they import
to ALIC, and then buy it back at a higher price. ALIC keeps
the markup for use in compensating processors for the high
price
of buying domestic sugar beets and sugarcane. See Sweetener
Policies in Japan for more detail. |
In recent years, Japan has converted part of the TRQs to operate
under Simultaneous-Buy-Sell (SBS) programs. Under SBS rules, companies
that are interested in selling to Japan and companies interested
in importing can jointly make a bid to import a specified quantity.
The joint bid proposes a purchase price (from the exporter) and
a sales price (to internal Japanese markets). The state trading
agency chooses the bids that have the biggest difference between
the purchase and sales price and awards them the requested import
volume, provided other criteria are met. The state-trading enterprise
then retains the difference between the prices as a markup. While
SBS systems do not avoid markups, they do allow for more direct
communication between sellers and buyers than a simple state-trading
system. Currently, SBS systems are in place for rice, wheat,
and barley.
In addition to tariffs and TRQs, Japan has phytosanitary and sanitary
rules that preclude imports of some important fresh vegetables
(e.g.,
cucumbers) and make imports of other vegetables and fruits difficult
and expensive. While some phytosanitary regulations protect Japan
against diseases that are not present or under control in Japan,
others have been challenged as unnecessary for plant health. For
example, lettuce is fumigated whenever inspectors see an insect—whether
or not the insect is a pest already endemic in Japan. Fumigation
lowers the quality of the produce. Some phytosanitary
and sanitary rules about
horticultural-product imports (notably, apples) have been successfully
challenged in the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement
system (see Issues
and Analysis).
ERS publications address Japan's policies for certain agricultural
commodities. For more information on policy, see the References
section.
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