Rice Self-Sufficiency
Uruguay Round Commitments
Market Access and Domestic Policies for Rice
Market Access for Products Other Than Rice
Aggregate Measure of Support
South Korea, a major food-importing country, has tried for more
than three decades to strengthen its own agricultural production
and avoid imports. The Government's trade policies imposed strong
barriers to imports, and government policies strongly supported
farm prices and production of certain commodities within closed
borders. Korea's import barriers to agricultural products began
to be reduced, first through negotiations required under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in the late 1980s, and then
under the terms of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA),
signed in 1995.
The two major goals of South Korean agricultural policy are self-sufficiency
and parity between farm and urban household incomes. The Government
uses strong producer price incentives and import barriers to achieve
these dual goals. Domestic production of rice, barley, corn, soybeans,
and tobacco is subsidized to varying degrees. High import barriers
protect rice, barley, vegetable, fruit, and livestock farming. Imported
inputs such as wheat, feed grains, oilseeds, hides, and cotton,
however, are allowed easy access.
As in Japan and Taiwan, rice is central to South Korea's agricultural
policy. The Government affected prices and producer income by
purchasing a substantial amount—an average of 26 percent
between 1990-97—of
total rice production, at a high cost to the budget and taxpayers.
Since 1995, however, Korea's Aggregate Measure of Support commitment
to the World Trade Organization (WTO) has limited these subsidies,
and government purchases dropped to 14 percent of year 2004 production.
Since 2005, the Government has purchased rice for stocks under
the Public Storage System for Emergencies. Purchases under this
system ranged between 9 and 15 percent of production in 2005-07.
The Government controls imports and segregates them from the domestic
rice market. The combined policies of production support and import
restrictions lead to retail prices for rice well above international
levels.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
calculates producer support estimates (PSEs) that measure the proportion
of farm output value attributable to government support. For South
Korea, the aggregate PSE for major farm commodities is always over
50 percent. The consumer support estimate (CSE) is always negative,
representing an implicit tax on consumers caused by government programs
that support producers. As a percentage, it represents the size
of this implicit tax relative to consumer expenditures on foods.
The aggregate CSE for South Korea is highly negative, suggesting
that the implicit tax is equivalent to more than 50 percent of consumers'
expenditures on major foods.
Bilateral and multilateral negotiations have gradually reduced
South Korea's trade barriers. In particular, in negotiations under
the auspices of the GATT ending in 1989, South Korea agreed not
to invoke Article XVIII:B of GATT for all tariff-line restrictions
after July 1, 1997. Until 1989, a long list of commodities required
approval from various government or quasi-government agencies before
issuance of an import license. South Korea justified this under
the Article that allowed developing countries with balance of payments
(BOP) deficits to control imports. After the BOP agreement in 1989,
South Korea announced a series of liberalization moves for many
tariff lines. The end of import licensing for all remaining tariff
lines that were restricted was spelled out in the 1995 agreement
of the multilateral trade negotiations in the URAA.
South Korea's high protection levels left its agricultural sector
ill-prepared for the market access required under the URAA. As a
result, concurrent with the URAA, the Government implemented a comprehensive
5-year agricultural restructuring program in excess of $50 billion
in 1994. In contrast to the former policy of concentrating heavily
on rice production, the new policy was more forward-looking, with
resources gradually shifted from rice to other areas including production
of cash crops, marketing facilities, and rural infrastructure. In
1996, as the country's rice stocks fell to low levels, these forward-looking
policies were modified in favor of renewed emphasis on rice production
to minimize rice imports.
In addition to the 5-year development plan, South Korea's National
Assembly passed a special tax to raise $2 billion annually over
10 years, beginning July 1994, to help the rural sector cope with
the impact of the URAA. The combination of the two programs—the
5-year development plan and the 10-year special tax—meant
the Government budgeted $60 billion for the rural sector over
5 years. Despite the 1997-98 financial crisis and a change of
political administrations, South Korea continued to spend large
amounts on the rural sector.
A comprehensive 10-year plan for agriculture and rural areas was
begun in 2004, which committed spending of about $104 billion on
various programs in the period 2004-13. Funding is from a special
tax, primarily on nonfood consumer items. An additional $1 billion
was committed for the period 2004-10, primarily to assist horticultural
producers after the implementation of the Korea-Chile Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) in 2004. After the negotiations for the proposed
U.S.-Korea FTA concluded in 2007, the Korean government added spending
of another $21.8 billion to help farmers adjust over the period
2008-17.
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Rice Self-Sufficiency
Except for some lean years, since the late 1970s, South Korea
has achieved its stated policy of self-sufficiency in rice through
heavy government intervention. Rice production rose throughout the
1960s and 1970s and then gradually declined after the late 1980s.
Rice consumption per person grew until the 1980s, when it began
to fall, and it has declined almost every year since 1987.
In the 1970s, the South Korean Government embarked on a concerted
drive to attain rice self-sufficiency. It used two main methods:
increasing production and limiting consumption. Production of rice
in South Korea rose sharply in the 1970s, after the introduction
of tongil rice, crossbred from indica and japonica rices. Tongil
yields were higher than japonica yields, and farmers shifted most
of their paddies into the new variety. Domestic prices were allowed
to rise to give farmers a higher income. A cold snap in June 1980,
however, devastated the tongil rice, badly shaking farmers' confidence
in the new variety and creating a large deficit in rice supplies.
The Government was forced to make emergency rice imports of more
than 1 million tons. Thereafter, farmers increasingly switched from
tongil to japonica varieties, which, although lower yielding, were
less susceptible to cold weather damage.
The Government interfered with rice consumption in several ways.
Retail rice prices rose because the Government refused to import
any rice (the authority to import and export rice is reserved exclusively
to the Government), except after the 1980 harvest. The Government
mandated that barley and wheat be mixed with rice, to conserve
rice use. Most processing uses of rice were forbidden. Consumers
did not like the taste and cooking characteristics of tongil rice,
and the Government was forced to pay high prices to farmers to
induce them to plant tongil, especially after 1980, while offering
it to consumers at lower prices to get them to buy it. The Government's
budgetary deficit from its rice transactions ballooned, requiring
tax-paid subsidies.
During the 1980s, restrictions on the use of rice were gradually
lifted. By 1991, the Government had ended its purchases of tongil
rice. With no other market for the unwanted rice, planting of tongil
ceased. Although rice consumption per person has steadily declined,
the yield drop that occurred after tongil was abandoned meant that
production dropped below consumption in several years, and South
Korea's rice stocks fell to perilously low levels in 1994-96. Rising
labor costs in rural Korea made rice farming less and less attractive
on the small farms that are still common. As a result, area planted
to rice decreased each year during 1987-96. While yields of the japonica
rice varieties have risen, production generally decreased because
area planted to rice dropped. Government interventions raised the
rice planted area in 1996-2001, but area again fell each year after
2001.
In the Uruguay Round of the WTO, South Korea agreed to a minimum
access import regime beginning in 1995 (see Market
Access and Domestic Policies for Rice). With the aid of
imports, South Korea has been able to rebuild stocks in the years
since
1997.
The Government's present policy of using imported rice for processing
uses keeps the main table rice market in South Korea isolated
from the high-quality japonica market outside Korea. South Korea
has one of the most quality-conscious rice markets in the world,
and consumers now pay more for domestic rice than they would for
high-quality foreign rice. Thus, this market is very tempting
to
exporting areas like California, Australia, and northern China.
Uruguay Round Commitments
Like other signatories of the WTO, South Korea committed to policy
reforms under the 1995 URAA. In general, the agreement has resulted
in improved market access (in the form of tariff reductions, quota
growth, and elimination of import bans), restrictions on export
subsidies and trade-distorting domestic support, and provision of
some recourse against the use of safety and health standards as
disguised barriers. South Korea notified the WTO that it does not
provide export subsidies for agriculture. As for sanitary and phytosanitary
(SPS) measures, South Korea has agreed that all health-related measures
restricting imports be based on science. South Korea has also made
concrete commitments in the areas of market access and the Aggregate
Measure of Support.
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Market Access and Domestic Policies for Rice
Rice imports, a highly controversial issue in South Korea, were
essentially banned for more than a decade before the URAA. In the
URAA, South Korea agreed to a progressively increased minimum market
access (MMA) import regime. The URAA required that in 1995 South
Korea import the equivalent of 1 percent of average consumption
for the years 1988-90, increasing that amount to 4 percent by 2004.
In addition, there was a 5-percent tariff on permitted imports,
and rice trade remained strictly under government control during
the 10-year grace period. The MMA import requirement in metric tons,
milled basis for 1995-2004 was:
Korea: Minimum access import commitment on
milled rice, 1995-2004 |
Year |
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Year |
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1995 |
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2000 |
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1996 |
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2001 |
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1997 |
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1998 |
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2003 |
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1999 |
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2004 |
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According to the URAA, the replacement of the MMA was to be negotiated
with Korea's trading partners before December 31, 2004. Negotiations
continued through much of 2004 and culminated in an agreement just
before the deadline that set the rules for Korean rice imports for
2005-14. Under the agreement, the minimum-access import quota will
almost double in size by 2014, but there is no provision for imports
above the quota. The tariff within the quota will remain at 5 percent.
The South Korean Government is committed to resell a portion of
the imported rice into the Korean market with an allowed markup
on the price. The minimum import quota for 2005-14 is divided into
two sections. One section, consisting of the 205,228-ton quota size
reached in 2004, is to be divided each year among four exporting
countries:
- China, 116,159 tons
- United States, 50,076 tons
- Thailand, 29,963 tons
- Australia, 9,030 tons
All the quantities are metric tons and on a milled basis.
A second section, consisting of the increments added to the quota
each year, 2005-14, is open to exporters on a most-favored-nation
(MFN) basis, so that exporters in any country that has MFN standing
with South Korea can try to sell rice within the quota. The initial
MFN section of the quota in 2005 was 20,347 tons, and the quota increases
by 20,347 tons each year thereafter, until the total quota size
is 408,700 tons, with the MFN section equal to 203,472 tons in 2014.
Korea: Minimum access import
commitment on milled rice, 2005-14 |
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In side agreements, South Korea agreed to purchase an average of
9,121 tons of rice annually from India and to make a one-time purchase
of 20,000 tons of Egyptian rice in 2006 or after. More detail is
available in the USDA Foreign Agricultural Service GAIN report,
Quarterly Grain and Feed Trade Report (KS5022, May 2, 2005).
South Korea reserves the right to terminate the minimum access
quota and move to a tariff-rate quota (TRQ) system at the beginning
of any year, 2005-14. If a TRQ system is adopted, the size of the
quota remains at the level of the minimum access quota when the
switch to a TRQ system is made, with no further increases in later
years. A TRQ allows for imports outside the quota, and the over-quota
tariff would be calculated according to URAA guidelines. If agreement
is reached in the global Doha Development Round (DDR) of negotiations,
the over-quota tariff and the size of the TRQ would be changed to
reflect rules of the DDR agreement. In the event of a switch to
a TRQ system, country-specific quotas would end and the entire quota
amount would be open to imports on an MFN basis.
The agreement made at the end of 2004 to allow more rice imports
exacerbated a problem that South Korea has faced in recent years:
consumption has been declining faster than production in most years.
If imports are to be used in South Korea, they will replace domestic
production. In response to this problem, South Korea has been revising
its domestic rice policies to provide aid to farm income in ways
that it believes are in accordance with WTO rules, and to encourage
some farmers to reduce the area planted to rice.
The Government revised its Grain Management Act in March 2005
to end annual procurement of rice by the Government at a favorable
price. Instead, the Government will buy rice for food security stocks
at the prevailing market farm price, at harvest time, and sell older
stocks after harvest at market prices.
The Rice Income Compensation Act was also revised in March 2005.
It establishes two kinds of payment to rice farmers. The first pays
600,000 won per hectare (about $600 per hectare) each year for farmers
growing rice, as compensation for benefits to the public that come
from maintaining rice paddies. The second payment is related to
the price of rice that farmers receive. If the price falls below
a target that is fixed in advance, the Government pays farmers 85
percent of the difference between the target and market price for
the quantity of rice that farmers sell.
Another measure to deal with surplus rice production is the direct
payment for adjustment of rice production. Currently, the payment
is 3 million won per hectare ($3,000 per hectare) for fields that
are not used for any commercial production for 3 years.
For more information on South Korea's domestic policy changes in
2005, see the USDA Foreign Agricultural Service GAIN report, 2005
Annual Grain and Feed Report (KS5015, April 1, 2005), on which
this explanation is based.
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Market Access for Products Other Than Rice
Under its market access commitments, South Korea began to phase
out nontariff import restrictions on agricultural products in
January
1995. TRQs were established for a number of former import-restricted
agricultural products, including many horticultural products.
The
remaining phase of the BOP liberalization, somewhat modified
by the URAA, was completed on schedule by January 1, 2001. Since
then,
South Korea technically has liberalized imports of all agricultural
products except rice. In addition, the maximum levels for tariffs
on all agricultural products except rice were fixed (bound).
The
simple average of the 1,239 bound tariff lines is 64.8 percent—high
tariffs more representative of a developing country, even though
South Korea is a member of OECD.
South Korea agreed to remove all nontariff barriers to beef imports,
including state trading and price markups, by January 2001. Before
then, South Korea's beef import regime followed rules negotiated
under the auspices of GATT in agreements reached with the United
States and other trade partners in 1989 and 1993, before the URAA.
Imported beef was under a quota, which increased until 2000, the
final year. Steep price markups have been eliminated. Before 2001,
an increasing share of the quota was allocated to private "supergroups,"
representing private buyers such as supermarkets, restaurants, and
hotels. Through the Simultaneous-Buy-Sell (SBS) system, supergroups
were free to negotiate specific cuts and qualities with foreign
exporters. The rest of the quota was administered by the Livestock
Products Marketing Organization (LPMO), a state trading enterprise.
The LPMO allocated some imported beef to special shops licensed
to sell it. As of January 1, 2001, beef became freely importable,
at a 41.2-percent tariff. Special treatment of imported beef, such
as the requirement that it be retailed in shops that did not also
sell domestic beef, was supposed to end. The scheduled reduction
of tariffs under the URAA reached its end in 2004.
Korea: Beef import commitments |
Year |
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Markup |
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1997 |
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SBS = Simultaneous-Buy-Sell.
NA = Not applicable. 1/ The quota is in metric tons, retail
weight equivalent. The quota's final year was 2000. |
Horticultural and Processed
Product markets also benefited from trade liberalization.
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Aggregate Measure of Support
South Korea provides support to its farm sector through several
domestic policies, and some of these policies have significant
consequences beyond its borders. The URAA instituted the Aggregate
Measure of Support (AMS) to limit such support. According to South
Korea's Uruguay Round schedule, its AMS in the base period was
1,718.6 billion won ($2.14 billion). Unlike every other country
involved in the URAA, South Korea used 1989-91 as a base period
to calculate its AMS commitment (see below).
The base period AMS measured the monetary amount of selected domestic
(or internal) policies that transfer funds to the agricultural
sector by multiplying production by the difference between internal
and world prices in
the base period. The base period AMS is the starting point for
upper limits on domestic support spending for each year.
The
limits were reduced each year, 1995-2004. Annual spending on
certain kinds of domestic support policies in Korea must fall beneath
that year's
AMS limit. South Korea notified the WTO about internal support
measures for eight commodities, but the amounts for three of
them (grapes,
silkworm, and milk) were "under the minimum," and exempted
from reduction commitments in the URAA. The five remaining commodities
were (with their 1989-91 base period amounts):
- rice, 1,268 billion won
- soybeans, 73 billion won
- barley, 52 billion won
- corn, 23 billion won
- rapeseed, 2 billion won
Rice support is overwhelming—accounting for over 90 percent
of total AMS through 2004, the latest year for which South Korea
has reported an AMS estimate. Thus, the basic policy measured
by South Korea's AMS was the annual Government purchase of rice
production. Each year, Korea's National Assembly determined a
quantity and price of rice to be purchased by the Government.
Since the prices were favorable, this was a subsidy to the farmers that they would not receive in private-sector markets for rice and tended to encourage greater production. The rice portion of the AMS was defined as the extra value for
farmers represented by the direct government purchases of rice,
with the quantity and price determined annually by the National
Assembly. These purchases were made at prices above prevailing
private-sector prices in South Korea. The extra value, or subsidy,
was calculated as the difference between the government purchase
price to farmers in the current year and the sum of the free-on-board
price of Chinese rice plus 10 percent for transportation in the
1989-91 base period.
South Korea calculated its AMS based on the
higher 1989-91 average instead of the lower 1986-88 base period
used by other countries. South Korea pledged to reduce the AMS
over 10 years (1995-2004) by 13.3 percent, to 86.7 percent of
its base level. In addition, because South Korea raised its AMS
considerably after its base period, the AMS for rice has been
calculated based on the higher 1993 market price support instead
of the 1989-91 average. The final bound commitment level in 2004,
however, is the level reduced by 13.3 percent from the 1989-91
average base total AMS. South Korea's AMS commitments in billion
won were as follows:
South Korea's AMS commitments |
Year |
Billion won |
Year |
Billion won |
1995 |
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2000 |
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1996 |
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2001 |
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1997 |
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2002 |
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1998 |
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2003 |
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1999 |
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2004 |
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South Korea's purchase of cattle during a period of slumping prices
in 1997 and 1998 pushed spending under the AMS category above
the
agreed limits, and this additional spending has been challenged
in a WTO complaint against Korea by the United States. See Issues
and Analysis.
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References
USDA's Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) office in Seoul prepares
commodity reports with policy information. The latest Attaché Reports and archives of earlier reports are available through
FAS. The annual FAS report on Food
and Agriculture Import Regulations
and Standards explains current
Korean rules affecting agricultural imports in general. Additional
information and links to other sites about trade policy and regulations
is available from the FAS
Agricultural Trade Office in Seoul, South Korea.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s
annual report, Agricultural
Policies in OECD Countries: Monitoring
and Evaluation, provides information on the extent and trend
over time of South Korea’s support to agriculture. In
2008, the OECD published a special report on Korea, Evaluation
of Agricultural Policy Reforms in Korea.
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